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ABSTRACT 
The main focus of this thesis is the three copyright 
collecting societies operating in the music field - PRS, which 
looks after the public performance and broadcasting rights in 
music, MCPS which is responsible for the mechanical 
(recording) right in music and PPL which looks after the 
public performance and broadcasting rights in sound 
recordi ngs. Beb/een them, these three soc; eti es had gross 
revenue (before costs) of over £83 million in 1983, of which 
PRS was responsible for 72%, MCPS for 17% and PPL for 11%. 
The thesis attempts to investigate their operations and 
performance. In many ways they are similar but there are also 
important di fferences especi ally between PRS and PPL on the 
one hand and MCPS on the other. They a 11 depend for the; r 
operations on the concept of collective licensing - that 
copyright owners can more effectively exploit their copyrights 
by bandi ng together in soci eti es such as PRS, MCPS and PPL. 
In many cases, collective licensing represents the only 
possibility for the copyright owner to receive income from his 
copyright. All three societies also use blanket licences in 
their operations to various extents this means that 
1 i censees can use the entire reperto; re of the soc; ety on 
payment of royalties and provided they supply the society with 
returns of their music use (on which the society bases 
distributions to members). Since PRS and PPL are effective 
monopolies, representing virtually all copyright owners in 
their respective fields, such licensing can be effective. 
MCPS is an effective monopoly only in the broadcasting field 
and it is only in this field that it employs blanket 
licensing. The other fundamental differences between MCPS and 
the other two societies are its agency relationship with its 
members and its charging of a commission to cover costs. All 
of this is looked at in detail. 

GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is an attempt to investigate a subject which I 
feel has not really received sufficient attention in view of 
its importance to individuals and the country as a whole, 
that of copyright. The main focus of attention, in Part III, 
will be the three copyright collecting societies operating in 
the music field in the UK, which have not really been subject 
to detailed analysis, especially the two smaller ones, PPL 
and MCPS. There is more information available on the largest 
one, PRS, but even it has not been covered adequately in my 
view. The first two parts of this thesis will provide a 
background to Part Ill, containing as they do a theory 
chapter and two chapters on the problems caused by technology 
for copyright, one on reprography, the other on problems in 
the audio-visual field. These two subjects represent the 
most publicised causes of concern in the field of copyright 
today and both are likely to be the subject of collective 
licensing in the future, although there seems more doubt of 
this in the audio-visual field. There has been a large 
amount of literature on the subject matter of Parts I and II 
and the chapters represent an attempt to summarise this. 
The main question I wanted to answer was why are collecting 
societies set up and how do they operate? Do they succeed 
in their aims? To an extent the problems of technology are 
related to collective licensing since the latter is often the 
solution to the former. The main method used to gather 
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i nformati on was i ntervi ew - wi th El i zabeth Thomas at ALCS, 
Clare Cheney at PLS, Patrick Isherwood at the BPI, Michael 
Freegard and Marshall Lees at PRS, Keith Lowde and Caroline 
Robertson at MCPS and Peter Rogers at PPL and I would like to 
express my appreciation and thanks for their help and 
co-operation. I would also like to thank Lesley Bray at PRS 
and Mike Hill at MCPS. 
For the technology chapters, it might have been possible to 
carry out an empirical study but it was felt that the 
problems of obtaining data were too. acute to make this 
practicable. In studying the collecting societies, the 
questions I was attempting to answer and the fact that there 
were only three societies involved anyway dictated against 
such an approach. The result of my study hopefully casts a 
lot more light on an important subject. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF COPYRIGHT 
What is Copyright? 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines copyright as the 
uexclusive right given by law for tenn of years to author, 
designer etc. or his assignee to make copies or give 
performances of hi s ori gi na 1 work ll and Chambers Twentieth 
Century Dictionary as lithe sole right to reproduce a 
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work - also to 
perform, translate, film or record such a workll. The current 
U.K. statute, the 1956 Copyright Act, supplies a legal 
definition in Section 1(1) - IIIn this Act Ucopyrightll in 
relation to a work (except where the context otherwise 
requires) means the exclusive right, by virtue and subject to 
the provisions of this Act, to do, and to authorise other 
persons to do, certain acts in relation to that work in the 
United Kingdom or in any other country to which the relevant 
provision of this Act extends". The subsection goes on to 
say that the "certain acts ll are those IIdesignated as the acts 
restricted by the copyright in a work of that description Jl • 
The restricted acts for literary, dramatic and musical works 
are defined in Section 2(5) - reproducing the work in any 
materi a 1 form, pub 1 ish i ng the work, performi ng the work ; n 
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public, broadcasting the work, causing the work to be 
transmitted to subscribers to a diffusion service (this 
refers to the likes of cable television systems, where 
signals are carried by cable or wire as opposed to signals 
transmitted through the air), making an adaptation of the 
work and doing any of the above five acts (reproducing, 
publishing, performing, broadcasting, transmitting to 
subscribers to a diffusion service) to an adaptation of the 
work. For an artistic work, the restricted acts are 
different and are laid down in Section 3(5) - reproducing 
the work in any material form, publishing the work, including 
the work ina tel evi s i on broadcast, caus i ng a tel evi s ion 
programme which includes the work to be transmitted to 
subscribers to a diffusion service. It should be pOinted out 
here that the 1956 Act di vi des copyri ght matter into two 
parts - the "original works ll of Part I, those referred to 
above (literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works) which 
are regarded as giving a true "author's rightll and as being 
the most important, by virtue of their creativity, and the 
II subject-matter" of Part II (sound recordings, cinematograph 
films, television and sound broadcasts and published 
editions), which produces "neighbouringll or "ancillary" 
rights (lidroits voisinsll in France) which are regarded, it 
seems, almost as second-class rights (for example, 
Phonographic Performance Ltd (PPL), the U.K. collecting 
society for broadcasting and public performance royalties in 
sound recordings and the British Phonographic Industry (BPI), 
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the trade association for the record industry, are not 
members of the British Copyright Council (BCC), made up of a 
group of organisations representing the interests of creators 
and disseminators of 'original works' in many fields, even 
though, I would have thought, they have more in common than 
in conflict, and any change in one set of rights will affect 
the other set!, although these bodies represent record 
companies which are music users as well. The general 
argument against such subject matter being regarded as "true" 
copyright material is that the manufacturer of a record, for 
examp.l e, is not an II author" in the copyri ght sense since the 
works involved are not original creative intellectual works 
but mere mechani ca 1 objects. Such works are merely 
derivative of literary, dramatic, musical and artistic 
creations and, as Whale2 says, serve as a medium of 
communication of authors' works. So, Part I works are 
primary materials whereas Part II subject matter is secondary 
because it derives from Part I works 3 (in some countries, 
especially on the Continent, and in the main international 
copyri ght conventi ons ci nematographi c works are cl assed as 
primary works because they contain a creative element). 
Similarly to Part I works, there is a list of restricted acts 
for each of the subject matter of Part II. The distinction 
between original works and subject matter is followed more on 
the Continent than in the U.K. and U.S., however, because of 
the different approaches followed in the countries. The 1956 
Act declares that the rights in Part II are additional to and 
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independent of, the rights in Part I but nothing in Part II 
affects the operation of Part I. The practical relevance of 
this is that in any Part II subject matter there is more than 
one copyright - in a record, there is a copyright in the 
actual record (Part II) and also in the musical composition 
on which the record is based (Part I); in a broadcast, there 
• 
is a copyright in the actual broadcast (Part II) and in the 
material included in the broadcast. Although performers do 
not have copyrights in their performances, they are protected 
under the Performers Protection Acts 1958 - 1972. This dual 
nature is often difficult for users to come to grips with but 
it is vital if copyright is not to be infringed. It is also 
important to remember that copyright is not just the right to 
copy. At one stage this was the case but those days are long 
gone and its scope is now greatly extended to cover the 
restricted acts mentioned. Two other points should be made 
in any definition of copyright. First, copyright is intended 
to protect the product of a person I s 1 abour and/ or sk ill 
provided it is fixed in a material form. Any work (Part I or 
Part I I materi a 1) whi ch shows a suffi ci ent degree of skill 
and/or labour, from a football coupon to a great work of art, 
may be protected. However, it is only the way in whi ch the 
work is fixed (in writing, on record, on film etc.) in a 
material form which is protected not the idea contained 
wi thi n the form. There is no copyri ght in ideas (otherwi se 
progress would be impossible because most new works are based 
on previous works). A Part I work also has to be 
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sufficiently lI original li but this does not mean it has t,o 
necessarily be creative. The intrinsic value of the work is 
not important and nor does the work have to be novel. Even 
minimally creative works are protected provided they are 
original, fixed in a material form and show sufficient 
expenditure of labour and skill. In addition, to breach 
copyright, a substantial part has to be taken and this is a 
qualitative as well as a quantitative matter. Second, the 
lack of formalities is an important part of the philosophy of 
copyright in the UK and on the Continent. Copyright comes 
into existence from the moment the work is fixed in a 
material form in the U.K. and from the date of creation on 
the Continent and in countries which are signatories of the 
Berne Convention, one of the two major international 
copyright conventions (there are now 71 members)4. This 
latter Berne Convention (or the International Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works)' 1886, as 
revised at Paris (1896), Berlin (1908), Rome (1928), Brussels 
(1948), Stockholm (1967) and Paris (1971) is the basis for an 
international system of copyright protection, in which 
signatories agree to grant reciprocal protection to the works 
of each others· nationals. The system means that no 
formalities have to be complied with as a pre-requisite for 
the operation of copyright. As Oietz5 points out, this is 
achieved in most member countries by just not laying down any 
such conditions in the country·s copyright statute, although 
the Berne Convention does explicitly state this principle in 
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the revised Brussels version, Article 4, Paragraph 2 - "The 
enjoyment and the exerci se of these ri ghts shall not be 
subject to any formality •..... 11. This is only half the 
story, however, because many countries including the U.S., do 
require formalities and these tend to be signatories of the 
other great copyright convention, Unesco's Universal 
Copyright Convention (UCC), 1952, (last revised in Paris, 
1971). As well as a copyright notice, consisting of the 
symbo 1 ~ ~ the name of the copyr; ght owner and the year of 
first publication, the U.S. also requires deposit of copies 
of the work within three months of the date of publication 
and registration of a claim to copyright with the Copyright 
Office. These formalities under the relatively new U.S. 
Copyright Act, 1976, are less arduous than they were -
copyright protection now arises on fixation as in the U.K. 
which theoretically means there are no formalities as a 
condition of copyright,6 but non-deposit makes the copyright 
owner liable to a fine and registration is a condition of 
taking out an infringement suit and may affect remedies. The 
di fference is accounted for by the di fference in approaches 
to copyri ght by each country - the E. E. C adopts an II authors II 
right approach whereas the U.S. attempts to balance the 
7 
copyri ght owner' s interests wi th those of the user. The 
U.K. approach is something of a hybrid. 
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The Purpose of Copyright 
Copyright is part of the general group of legal rights called 
lIintellectual property rightsll which also takes in the 
sub-group lIindustrial property rights" which includes 
patents, trademarks and industrial designs but copyright 
differs in a number of significant ways from its partners in 
the group. First, copyright is not subject to formalities 
and requires no special effort on the part of the creator of 
the work to bring it into operation (at least not in the 
U.K., Europe and Berne Convention countries). Patents, 
trademarks and industrial designs, on the other hand, have to 
be registered (although industrial designs can gain ·copyright 
protection in some cases). As Dietz says,8 no legal or 
commercial action nor any commercial motive is required to 
gain copyright protection whereas industrial property right 
protection is dependent on specific, positive action. The 
other main difference is in the scope of protection. 
Industrial property law gives the owner of the rights a true 
monopoly so that no-one else can market, use or make the same 
or a substantially similar product even if it is not copied 
from the ori gi na 1 and was made independently of it whereas 
copyright just gives a right to prevent copying of the work 
(and various other acts in relation to the work) and to stop 
others exploiting the product of someone else's skill and 
labour without his consent. If a person can prove that he 
produced an identical result independently, he will not 
breach copyright and can enjoy a copyright in his own work 
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provided it shows a sufficient degree of skill, labour and 
expert i se. Copyri ght gives only a 1 imi ted monopoly in the 
form of expression (not in the ideas embodied in that 
expression) while a patent, for example, protects ideas as 
well provided they are novel and inventive. Independent 
creation of the same invention would not be allowed. It is 
much harder to patent a work, first because of the need for 
novelty and inventiveness which is often a difficult 
cri teri on to fu 1 fil and second because before a patent is 
filed, it is necessary to carry out a patent search to ensure 
that it has not been filed before which is expensive of time, 
effort and resources. In addition, of course, there are 
differences of detail for example, protection under 
industrial property law is much shorter than under copyright 
law. (16 years for a patent, up to 15 years for a registered 
design, as against the creator's life plus 50 years for a 
copyright). 
The Whitford COrTUnittee Report of 1977 9 states that 
"Copyright protection finds its justification in fair play" -
if a person produces a work using his own skill, expertise 
and labour, it should be his to do as he likes with and he 
should be able to benefit from it: others should not be able 
to IIsteal" it from him (through use or exploitation without 
payment) by reproducing it and profiting from his hard work. 
This is summed up in the maxim used in the Whitford Report, 
that 'What is worth copying is prima facie worth protecting'. 
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Another way of looking at it is as a "legal mechanism for the 
ordering of social and cultural life". It is "one method for 
linking the" world of ideas to the world of corrunerce u10 • The 
recent Green Paper on copyright 11 reinforces both of these 
ideas by say; ng that copyr; ght is des i gned to protect the 
products of intellectual endeavour and ensures that the 
author is rewarded for the fruits of his labour, while 
establishing the legal framework within which copyright 
material is exploited corrunercially, on which the 1 ivel ihood 
of the many organi sati ons whi ch di ssemi nate copyri ght 
rna teri alto the general pub 1 i c wi th the copyri ght owners I 
consent depends. So, copyright is important to both authors 
and those who exploit copyright material commercially such 
as music and book publishers, the record industry, the 
broadcasting organisations, and film companies. But there is 
another interest at stake - that of the general pub 1 i c and 
users of copyright material in the non-commercial field 
(researchers, students, libraries, for example), who want 
access to these works as freely and as cheaply as possible. 
Thus, copyright can be looked at as a way of reconciling the 
interests of the three main secti ons of soci ety concerned -
the author in the wi dest sense of that term (creators of 
works), the commercial organisations who are reliant on those 
creators (the di ssemi na tors) and the general pub 1 i c, users 
and society at large which use copyright material. Still 
another way of looking at the subject is as "a means of 
organising and controlling the flow of information in 
society" 12 which, if abused, could have sinister 
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repercussions. The importance of this is shown by the fact 
that Third-world and developing countries are constantly 
ca 11 i ng for a "new i nformati on order II in Unesco. Ploman and 
Hamilton cite four main reasons for the development and 
popularity of copyright13 -: (a) a tradition of creation, 
culture and art in which artists have, as one of their goals, 
recognition and fame, (b) a market-oriented attitude related 
to the industrial revolution and the advent of mass 
production, (c) the fact that copyright is a very flexible 
concept which can be moulded into many different types of 
economic, social, political and cultural environments and 
systems reflecting different priorities and philosophies, (d) 
the fact that copyri ght provi des the most practi ca 1 method 
for dealing with the problems inherent in remunerating 
creators of works and reconciling the conflicting interests 
in both the national and international spheres. 
Copyright may be analysed in three main ways - (a) as a form 
of encouragement to the creation and dissemination of works 
of all kinds and a means of protecting the investments of the 
various people involved in the process of creation and 
dissemination of those works. Thus, it is necessary for the 
development of culture and national prestige, (b) as an 
author IS ri ght, emphas is i ng the concept of a natural ri ght 
and the inalienable link between author and work and locating 
the right in the author, (c) as a system of property rights 
located in the work. A mixture of approaches is contained in 
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the view that it is morally right that the person who creates 
a work should be able to decide what happens to the work, 
when and how, and that he should be able to benefit 
financially from it. As Ploman and Hamilton state l4 , 
royalties represent the creator1s salary. 
(a) Encouragement to creation and dissemination 
Thi s approach to copyri ght can be seen ina number of 
different statutes. For example, in the U.K. the 1709 
Statute of Anne had the ti tl e "An Act for the 
Encouragement of Learning by vesting the 'Copies' of 
printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such 
Copies during the Times herein mentioned" 15. The 1814 
Act was lito afford encouragement to 1 iterature" 16 and 
the 1842 Act says "Whereas it is expedient to amend the 
law relating to Copyright and to afford greater 
Encouragement to the Producti on of Literary Works of 
lasting Benefit to the World .••• 11 17. Similarly, the 
U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, says that 
copyright is intended lito promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to 
Authors •.•. the exclusive Right to their ..•. Writings 
18 In U. S. v Paramount Pi ctures Inc., the Supreme 
Court took thi s to mean that the author' s benefi twas 
secondary and lithe economic philosophy behind the clause 
empoweri ng Congress to grant patents and copyri ghts is 
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the conviction that encouragement of individual effort 
by personal ga in is the best way to advance the pub 1 i c 
welfare ll 19. In this respect, copyright law is similar 
to patent law - both are intended to encourage, patents 
to encourage invention, copyright to encourage creation 
and dissemination of works of literature, drama, music, 
art and so forth. The author is encouraged to produce 
works by being able to obtain remuneration for creation 
and use of his works and to control what happens to them 
while those who exploit the works - publishers, record 
producers and so on - are encouraged to disseminate the 
works through protection of thei r i nves tment by vi rtue 
of the suspension of competition for a particular work 
and the grant by the au thor of ali cence, exc 1 us i ve or 
non-exclusive. As Thomas 20 says, it is questionable 
whether the grant of copyright encourages the author but 
entrepreneurs who disseminate works and bear most of the 
risk would, no doubt, be sorely affected if there was no 
copyright system. They depend on some sort of monopoly 
peri od, it is argued, to cover thei r costs and 
eventually make a profit (of course, the length of that 
monopoly period is open to debate). Macaulay described 
copyright as lIa tax on readers for the purpose of giving 
a bounty to writersll and in general this is accepted as 
necessary. The author is paid by those who enjoy his 
work (through their use and exploitation of it), so that 
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he receives equitable remuneration for what he 
contributes to society. This means that society has 
access to what authors produce and they are pa i d for 
this through royalties. Like patents, the creation 
would not take place if it was not for the encouragement 
provided in the first place, although, of course, some 
authors would still produce without copyright in the 
same way as some inventors would still invent without 
patent protection. The author can provide the publisher 
or whoever with an exclusive licence, meaning the latter 
does not have to worry about competition for the 
particular work so he is more willing to invest his 
ski1l and expertise in exploiting the work and 
disseminating its contents to the rest of society. 
Without the exclusive nature of copyright, works might 
not be disseminated to society because profit would be 
whittled away by competition. By its very nature, 
copyright material has to be made available publicly and 
this makes it very susceptible to piracy and plagiarism. 
The pirate or plagiarist does not have the same costs of 
production as the original exploiter, so he can copy the 
work, sell it more cheaply and make a profi t at the 
original exploiter's expense. As a result, the original 
,exploiter cannot recoup enough of his initial costs or 
make a sufficient profit to turn exploitation of the 
work into a financially viable proposition. Thus, the 
exploiter does not invest in the work and society is 
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deprived of it. It is therefore in the interests of the 
exploiter, society and, to a lesser extent, the author, 
(since his main aim is to communicate his work to the 
public while presumably making some money) that the 
exploiter has an exclusive licence and that competition 
for that particular book is suspended. 
(b) The author's right and the idea of a "natural" right. 
The concept of the author's right or the natural right 
gives an added d imens i on to the idea of copyri ght by 
acknowledging a special relationship between the author 
and his work, a relationship which does not cease when 
the work is ass i gned or transferred to someone else. 
Wha 1 e 21 bemoans the fact that the author IS ri ght has 
become submerged in the term I copyri ght I so that the 
true nature of the right and the proper beneficiary of 
it have become hidden and downgraded. This is because 
the term 'copyright' is impersonal unlike the terms used 
on the Continent, for example, where the concept of the 
author's right is the prevailing one - droit d'auteur in 
France, derecho de autor in Spain, dirito d'autore in 
Italy and Urheberrecht in Germany. If the author 
assigns his copyright to someone else, the latter· 
becomes the copyri ght owner, but he is not the author 
and cannot take his place in the author-work 
relationship. There may be a natural affinity towards a 
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creator but not towards his assignees but the 
distinction does not arise with the term 'copyright' and 
the ri ghts have become IIdi ssoci ated from the authorll. 
The second aspect of the impersonal nature of copyright, 
Whale says, is the fact that it also applies to 
neighbouring rights which reinforces the blurred 
distinction and dissociation from the author, so that 
II some controvers; a 1 aspects of the ri ghts attachi ng to 
this other subject matter have unjustly been fastened on 
to those of the author". In any case, he says, the term 
"copyright" is no longer appropriate since it is not the 
r; ght to copy any more. The concept of the author I s 
right puts the author centre-stage. The term 
"copyrightll is generally accepted as the right to do 
certain restricted acts to the work but the concept of 
the author's right gives him extra rights, springing 
from natural justice, purely by virtue of the fact that 
he is an author. These ri ghts cannot be ass i gned away 
and are i nd i sso 1 ub 1 e. Copyri ght places the r; ghts in 
the work whereas the author's right places them in the 
author. The recogni ti on of the author IS ri ght spri ngs 
morally from the act of creation. 
Under this approach, the author's rights consist of two 
parts - his economic rights, by which he is able to earn 
a living and is. remunerated for use of his work, 
consisting of the right to do, and authorise others to 
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do, the restricted acts for which he receives royalties 
and hi s personal or moral ri ghts (droi t moral on the 
Continent) which protects the author-work relationship. 
Copyri ght 1 aw in the U. K. protects the economi c ri ghts 
but not the moral rights, whereas on the Continent both 
sets of rights are protected. The Whitford Committee 
did, however, recommend that the droit moral be 
protected under future U.K. copyright legislation. At 
present in the U. K., moral ri ghts are protected not 
under copyright law but under the laws of passing off, 
defamation and common and contract law. Not everyone 
agrees that this provides adequate protection, ~ ~
however.22. Under the Berne Convention, Article 6 bis, 
paragraph 1, revised Brussels edition, the author has 
the rights, independently of his copyright and even 
after the transfer of the copyright, and during his 
lifetime, to claim authorship of the work (the paternity 
right) and to object to any distortion, mutilation or 
alteration of it or any other action in relation to 
the work which would be prejudicial to his honour or 
reputati on (the ri ght of i ntegri ty). Under the 
copyright system a work has an existence independent of 
its physical embodiment so physical possession does not 
confer copyright. The concept of the author's right is 
based on the premise that when copyright passes by 
assignment a relationship still. exists between the work 
and the author by vi rtue of the fact that the author 
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created the work in the first place. This special 
relationship does not and cannot pass with physical 
possession or with assignment. If the special 
relationship is accepted, the author has an interest in 
how the work is communicated to the public, when and by 
whom it is communi cated and how it is changed in the 
process. He also has an interest in claiming 
authorship. Droit moral II;S to ensure that the author's 
status and integrity as an author is protected" 23. 
Most of the EEC countri es recogni se the dual nature of 
the copyri ght/ author I s ri ght system, but when it comes 
to moral rights, there are also two distinct theoretical 
approaches, noted for example by Whale 24 and Dietz 25 
the MONISTIC or UNITARY THEORY and the DUALISTIC THEORY. 
The former concept emphasises the interdependence of 
economi c and moral ri ghts, fi nanc i a 1 and i nte 11 ectua 1 
interests. Economic rights protect moral rights and 
vice versa. Thus, for pract i ca 1 rea sons, one cannot 
rigidly set out the boundaries of the two sets of 
rights. The dualistic approach, however, takes economic 
ri ghts and moral ri ghts as independent of and separate 
from each other. The dualists reject the monistic view 
because economic rights can be transferred from one 
person to another and are subject to 1 ;m; tati on as to 
duration while moral rights are inalienable and not 
limited in time. How can one square these conflicting 
views, they say? The main difference between the 
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monistic and dualistic approaches, however, is that for 
the former, the moral rights end when the economic 
rights do, whereas in the latter case, the moral rights 
are eternal and do not end at the same time as the 
economic rights. Dietz 26 mentions that protection of 
mora 1 ri ghts after the author IS death is generally not 
covered by copyright law in monist countries but is left 
to the area of protection of ancient memorials through 
assignment to cultural and official institutions. The 
practical effect of this is that while under both 
concepts the moral rights are not assignable and cannot 
be severed from the author, a moni st i c approach means 
that because both the economic and moral rights are part 
of a single right and the moral right element cannot be 
assigned, then nor can the economic rights be assigned, 
although they can be licensed exclusively or 
non-exclusively and the whole right (moral and economic) 
can be passed by wi 11 • Under the dua 1 is tic approach, 
however, the moral and economic rights are independent, 
so it is possible to assign the economic rights. German 
law follows a monistic approach, French law a dualistic 
approach 27. Dietz, in his study of copyright law in the 
EEC28 , recogni ses two other moral r; ghts whi ch are 
recogni sed in only a few EEC countri es - the r; ght of 
publication, which is the right of the author to decide 
whether publication will take place and if so under what 
conditions and the right of recall because of a change 
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of opi ni on, whi ch is the ri ght of the author to ca 11 
back a work already exploited if he considers such 
exploitation no longer suitable - and this suitability 
ranges from German law which allows recall if the 
author's opinions no longer correspond to those of the 
work so that exploitation of the work can no longer be 
reasonably expected of him, to Italian law which only 
allows recall for serious moral reasons, to French law 
which allows recall and does not ask for a motive. This 
right clashes with the idea that a contract, once 
entered into, must be fulfilled, so all countries 
allowing the right provide for compensation by the 
author. Di etz notes that the importance of these two 
rights is likely to grow with the advance of technology 
and centralised computer and documentation centres. The 
two most important moral rights, recognised in virtually 
all EEC countries, are the right to claim authorship and 
the right to integrity of the work. The paternity right 
has two aspects 29, - a positive aspect, on the part of 
the author, to claim authorship either in his own name 
or anonymously or pseudonymously and a negative aspect 
to dispute that the work is someone else's. The basis 
of th is ri ght is the acceptance of the notion of an 
author's right, which protects the relationship between 
the author and his work rather than the work itself. 
The right to integrity of the work is similarly based 
and refers to the ri ght of an author to object to any 
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modification, mutilation or distortion of his work if 
this would adversely affect his honour or reputation. 
,.. 30 0, etz notes two approaches: those that protect the 
author against such acti ons only if it can be proved 
objectively that the author1s honour or reputation has 
been adversely affected and those that provide absolute 
protection. However, if he has consented to changes and 
if the changes a re bona fi de and if they are necessary 
for the practical exploitation of the work, the author 
is unlikely to be able to withhold his consent. But if 
the nature of the work is changed, he will have a right 
of prohibition 31. The U.K. and Eire do not directly 
protect moral rights but the same effect may be produced 
indirectly through the economic right to publish, fair 
dealing and the need to state sources, false attribution 
of authorship, the ability to produce a work anonymously 
or pseudonymous ly and other methods already menti oned. 
Most commentators seem agreed that the U.K. should 
recognise the droit moral. Whale 32, for example, 
suggests that if a legal system does not recognise the 
moral rights of an author, it will only inadequately 
defend authors' interests, interests already somewhat 
diminished by the many limitations on copyright. 
Similarly, in the U.S., moral rights are not protected 
explicitly but under other legal doctrines33 . 
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(c) The Property Rights Approach 
Another way of look i ng at copyri ght is as a ri gh t of 
property. even though the property is II i nte 11 ectua 111 or 
uincorporeaV' and differs somewhat from what is 
traditionally thought of as property. Whale34 mentions 
some of the problems created by treating copyright as a 
property ri ght: un 1 ike a person who sells goods and 
services, a composer or an author cannot ensure that he 
, 
obtains remuneration by withholding his work until he is 
paid. Thus, he is very susceptible to mis-appropriation 
through plagiarism and piracy by virtue of the fact that 
it is in the very nature of his works that they be put 
before the public in large quantities. Technological 
advance in copying devices makes copying relatively 
cheap, reliable and of high quality and has made piracy, 
plagiarism and counterfeiting lucrative b u s i n ~ s s e s s and 
easier to do and the increasingly large amounts of 
copyright material available have made the problem 
worse. Property is generally meant for private and 
personal use whereas authors' works are by their nature 
for public consumption. In addition, copyright material 
is subject to many limitations as to time, use and so 
forth whereas property usua l1y is not. One s imil ari ty 
with property is that the copyright can be bought, sold, 
hired (by 1 icence) as can normal property (one must 
remember here the distinction between the work itself 
and the rights in the work - the copyright does not pass 
wi th the ·work). Another comp li cati on Whale notes is 
Page 27 
that the work (and the copyright) can be owned by 
someone other than the author, such as an employer. 
These do not, to me, seem particularly difficult 
prob1 ems to overcome, however. Becker 35 defines 
property r; ghts as lithe r; ghts of ownershi p" and then 
goes on to descr; be the concept of II full II or "1 i bera 1" 
ownership. The attainment of all of the rights he 
mentions represents full ownership but people may still 
own something even if only in a restricted sense if they 
do not have all the rights. A copyright owner does not 
have all the rights of full ownership but he has many of 
them. His ownership may be restricted, but he still has 
property rights. The fact that it is more difficult to 
contro 1 the use to whi ch the materi ali s put does not 
take away from the fact that he has rights in it. In 
many cases ri ghts can be enforced anyway. Property is 
something you own and copyright holders own their 
copyri ghts. The fact that copyri ght. materi ali s for 
public use just differentiates it from other forms of 
property - it does not mean that it is not property per 
see And the difficulty of enforcement just complicates 
the analysis, it does not mean that copyright material 
cannot be property. Simil arly, who owns the copyri ght 
first surely does not rule out copyright as being a form 
of property and the fact that the copyright is owned by 
other than the creator is not a general rule anyway but 
only applies in certain cases. In addition, material 
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property does have limits imposed on it in many cases _ 
full liberal ownership is the exception rather than the 
rule. For example, use rights may be curtailed by 
zoning, building permits and planning organisations. 
Becker also differentiates between a general 
justification of property rights - why there should be 
any property rights at all, - specific justification _ 
why there should be a certain sort of property right _ 
and particular justification - why a certain person 
should have a particular property right in a particular 
thing. In conclusion, he says that there are only four 
arguments for a general justification of property rights 
per se - two from 1 abou r theory, one from ut il ; ty, one 
from 1 i berty. The problem is, however, that they may 
conflict with one another in applications to specific 
justifications of property rights. Each of the four are 
equally valid so that if they do conflict at the 
specific level, they impose limitations on one another 
which have to be reflected in specific ownership rights. 
Some of the limitations imposed at the specific level on 
copyright may be accounted for by such conflicts between 
general justifications. One hears a lot in copyright 
circles about a person who expends time and effort in 
the creation of a work being entitled to receive 
something for it and to do what he likes with it. The 
two arguments for labour recognised by Becker provide a 
general justification for this and for limitations 
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imposed on copyright. The first concerns entitlement to 
the products of a 1 abourer' s work whil e the second is 
based on desert and the value labour produces. The 
rationale behind the labour theory of property 
acquisition is that if a person produces something 
through his own efforts, labour and expertise, he should 
be able to keep it as property. The problem is in 
deciding why, just because a person works on something, 
he should be entitled to own the thing produced rather 
than just be entitled to the value added or to thanks or 
hero-worship. In fact, it is not so much that the 
worker deserves the products of his labour but that 
no-one e1se does. The arguments on thi s theory 
basically come down to the form "I didn't ask you to 
work so why shou 1 d I pay you in the form of property 
rights?" and "As long as you do not lose anything, why 
shoul d you worry about me bei n9 pa i d through property 
rights?". Becker also pOints out that the claim to 
property rights in the products of labour falls down on 
a number of points, such as in cases where people work 
on things owned by others and also where the claim is at 
someone else's expense. Becker suggests that people do 
deserve something for their work but not always property 
rights - in different cases, different rewards are 
appropriate: property ri ghts , monetary reward or 
recognition. The basis of the desert is that a person 
has added value through inventing, discovering or 
improving something which helps others. The argument 
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can be further strengthened by adding that the act 
should be allowable morally and be beyond what is 
mora l1y expected. Further aspects of the argument are 
that if a person is to derive benefit for adding value, 
he must be penalised for subtracting value, that a 
person whose acti ons are morally impermi ss i b lei s not 
covered, that the benefit or penalty should be 
proportional to the value added or subtracted (if there 
is no labour the argument does not apply and if value is 
unaltered, there'is no desert) and that desert must fit 
the penalty/reward to the labour/labourer. The 
fittingness of the reward will also be related to the 
goal of the activity. So, if the aim of the labour is 
to keep the work produced (have property rights in it) 
and the labour deserves the benefit and as long as 
giving property rights does not breach the need for 
proportionality, then property rights will be fitting. 
In other cases, money recognition or whatever may be a 
more fitting reward. This is much more open than the 
first argument from labour and provides a general 
justification for the granting .of property rights in the 
works .of authors and composers (copyrights) in many 
cases. However, it may be difficult to square this with 
the fact that many works enjoyi ng copyri ght protecti on 
are of minimal use and creativity, such as football 
poals coupons, examination papers, written tables and so 
forth. Is; t fi tti ng that such works recei ve property 
rights? And what of those who write just to 
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disseminate their works or become known in a set circle 
- surely they want recognition rather than property 
rights? In many cases, copyright has been reduced to a 
mere claim to compensation for practical reasons; would 
thi s be more "fi tti ng" than granting property ri ghts? 
Becker shows that the argument can be used to justify 
many of the limitations on copyright on the basis of the 
"no-loss" or penalty/reward desert aspect. For 
inventions in small, closed-environment markets, 
property rights would significantly reduce the 
opportunities availai?le to others, so one could argue 
for limitation of such rights since it is a loss to 
someone else. However, in general, if a person invents 
something or writes a book or a symphony, this by itself 
does not limit the opportunities available and in fact 
may enhance them since new works are usually based on 
old ones. So, this does not justify limitation. It 
depends on the c i rcums tances • Also t the argument does 
not work if there is no benefit or loss to anyone else -
it just affects the creator. Thus, this argument from 
labour would seem to justify copyright in many cases but 
might also reduce considerably the number of works 
covered and justify the payment of compensation/fees and 
the use of honours and rewards of status and prestige 
more than at present. Limitations on time and use can 
also be justified - on the basis that it is in the 
interests of society that works be in the public domain 
as soon as possible, and the arguments will get stronger 
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the longer the copyright period lasts. 
Spec i fi c countri es I approaches to copyri ght cou 1 d 
similarly be split into three or four groups - (a) the 
author-orientated approach adopted on the Continent; 
(b) the market-orientated approach of the US AND UK; 
(c) the society-orientated approach of social ist 
countries like the U.S.S.R. To this might be added the 
approach of the developing countries 36. The first 
approach generally corresponds wi th the author I s ri ght 
mentioned earlier while the second is a 
commercial-economic approach and is analogous to the 
property rights concept. The market-orientated approach 
is very much a result of the historical development of 
copyright in the U.K., for example, copyright 
initially was a pub1ishers ' /printers ' right (and in many 
respects still is). As one would expect, socialist 
countries put the public interest and socialist society 
first so that author's rights are only allowed insofar 
as they enhance socialism. Rights are not private 
property, nor for economi c gain, but are intended to 
encourage education and dissemination of works. Hence, 
limitations in favour of the public interest are more 
numerous than under other systems. Nor are the authorls 
property rights exclusive [although both property rights 
and personal rights (corresponding to moral rights) are 
recognised] since there is effectively no explOitation 
of works outside state ownership. Dissemination of 
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works is the job of the state, so all means of 
dissemination (publishing companies, theatres and the 
1 ike) are state owned and controlled. The author can 
only exploit his works on the conditions laid down by 
the State and what he earns is regulated by the State37 . 
The main factors influencing copyright legislation in 
the developing countries are that they import many more 
creative copyright works than they export and that they 
have certain special social and economic needs. It must 
be remembered that many of the developing countries are 
f o r ~ e r r colonies of the European countries, so their 
copyright philosophies will be influenced by this. One 
of the most important aspects of the international scene 
has been the attempt by the developing countries to have 
greater access to the works of the developed countri es 
at costs they can afford. This, and the lack of 
protecti on of the works of the developed countri es in 
the developing countries has led to many acrimonious 
disputes at international conferences in the past. 
However, the developing countries do have to provide 
protection to encourage the production of indigenous 
creative works and to attract foreign works, 
particularly those of the developed countries, in order 
to promote their own cultural progress. New 
communications technology should help them and the 
formulation of the Model Law on Copyright for Developing 
Countries at Tunis in 1976 considerably eased the 
38 problem . 
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Traditionally, copyright has been an exclusive right of 
the author to control the various exploitations of his 
work. It is also a means for the author to earn a 
living from his creative works. The fact that the 
majori ty of authors and composers do not earn a great 
dea 1 from thi s source causes some concern and tends to 
undermine this view - copyright does not seem to fulfil 
its stated objective. As we have seen, one of the 
functions of copyright is to encourage the production of 
creative works and we must never lose sight of the fact 
that without the author (in the widest sense) the work 
would not exist in the first place. The publisher is 
also important in the process. He is the intermediary 
between the author and the pub 1 i c at 1 arge. Copyri ght 
helps him since it enables him to take the risk of 
investment in publishing the work. There are many 
failures, so the profit-makers subsidise the loss-makers. 
Without the publisher, the general public would not have 
access to the large numbers of works available or at least 
not in ,very large numbers and the author would have great 
trouble exploiting the work and communicating his ideas. 
The more commerci a 1, market-ori entated property ri ghts 
approach of the U.K. and U.S. tends to tilt the e ~ p h a s i s s
more towards the publisher and away from the author. It 
is often said that the publisher and the author have a 
common interest in selling the work.and this is at least 
partly true. However, in general, the author will tend 
to be in the weaker bargaining position by virtue of the 
mere size of the parties relative to one another, 
. 
especially if he is a little-known author, despite the 
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fact that he owns the copyright, and this finds vent in 
complaints from authors that they have been "ripped off" 
by publishers. This complaint, however, is heard a lot 
less now than previously and the balance has been tipped 
back towards authors somewhat by their organisation into 
trades unions, the growth of collecting societies and 
1 aws on copyri ght contracts in vari ous countri es. In 
any case, the Performing Right Society, the largest 
collecting society in the U.K., which administers 
performing and broadcasting rights in mus i ca 1 
compositions, is "An Association of Composers, Authors 
and Pub 1 i shers of Mus i c"39 wi th composers/ authors and 
publishers having equal numbers of seats on the General 
Council, the policy-making body. This also shows the 
difference in approach between market ori entated and 
author orientated countries like those on the Continent, 
where collecting societies are like trades unions of 
authors40 • What the publisher achieves also benefits 
the author, but the relationship can sometimes come 
under strain. The pub 1 i sher IS role has changed 
enormous ly over the years because of the decl i ne in 
sheet mus i c sa 1 es, and Ploman and Hamil ton 41 poi nt to 
the increasing concentration in the communi cations/ 
entertainments field, which may further weaken the 
author's position. In addition, some see the publishers 
as holding back dissemination of creative works,. which 
causes them to be vi ewed wi th hosti 1 i ty in many camps, 
as evidenced by Roth42 . Roth sums up the problem very 
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we11 when talking about classical music publication -
II Composer and pub 1 i sher are tin fact, bound by common 
interests with only one subtle difference: the composer 
wants hi s work performed; so too does the pub 1 i sher -
but not at any price ll • As he says earlier 43, the 
publisher II stands at the crossroads of art and commerce ll 
- and this is where the conflict may arise. The author 
may be more interested in seeing his work communicated 
to the public whereas the publisher has to make sure it 
is a commercial proposition, that the work is exploited 
on a business-like basis so as to bring in the greatest 
amount of revenue for all concerned (obviously this 
confl i ct does not ari se ina 11, maybe not even in the 
majority of cases). New authors especially depend on 
publishers for their promotional skills. In fact, there 
does seem to be some element'of ambivalence towards the 
commercial side of things in the music industry by 
composers. 
The thi rd element of the process is the user of the 
works, the consumer, and soci ety in general, who want 
easy and cheap access to copyright works. Obviously, it 
is in the interests of culture, education and progress 
that people are able to use such works, although the 
genera 1 pub 1 i c does a 1 ready have access to a great many 
out-of-copyright-works, works which are said to be in 
the PUBLIC DOMAIN. 
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The massive increase in the amount of information 
produced and requi red and the rapid fa 11 in the costs 
and time involved in communication of such information 
(all of which is likely to improve even more in the 
future) has caused cons i derab 1 e problems for copyri ght 
po 1 icy, whi ch has to try to ba 1 ance these confl i cti ng 
interests - the creati ve interests of the author, the 
commercial interests of the publisher, the exploitive 
needs of the users (which may be divided into those that 
use copyright material in a commercial business such as 
broadcasters, film companies and video and record 
companies and other users, such as those in the 
education sector, libraries and schools) and the general 
needs of society; the need for encouragement of 
production of creative works and the need for the widest 
possible dissemination of such works given the need for 
encouragement. The delicate nature of this balance is 
well illustrated by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights t drawn up by the United Nations, Article 27 of 
which is quoted in both Whale44 and Ploman and Hamilton 
45 
(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the 
cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts 
and to share in scientific advancement and its 
benefits. 
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(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of 
the moral and material interests resulting 
from any sCientific, 1 i terary or artistic 
production of which he is the author". 
Technology has always been the bugbear of the copyright 
system and the rapi d increase in the rate of 
technological advance over the years has severely upset 
the balancing of these interests. A new balance is 
required. The problem of technology is not a new one 
for the copyright system but more and more technological 
advances have occurred with nothing being done to 
redefine the borders. The traditional method for 
ensuring sufficient dissemination of works has been to 
prune back the author's exclusive rights by limiting the 
duration of copyright protection and making some uses of 
copyright works subject only to compensation and others 
free of any royalty subject to certain conditions. In 
mos t cases, the author I s consent to use is requ; red. 
New techno 1 09Y has increased the need for such 
limitations, especially those i n v o l ~ i n g g compensation but 
not permission from the author, if only for the 
practical reason that the exclusive right is 
S h D· t 46 unenforceab 1 e in many cases. orne, suc as 1 e z , 
express concern that copyright should not just become a 
right to compensation but remain an exclusive right of 
control and consider that the growth of the compensation 
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principle makes the recognition of moral rights even 
more important and are particularly concerned about the 
growth of th is phenomenon on young, unknown authors. 
This increase in the use of compensation claims, Dietz 
notes, has also partly resulted from the growth of 
collecting societies, which are there to collect 
royalties rather than to exclude use and they are 
generally not allowed under the law to refuse a licence 
provided the requisite royalties are paid. For example, 
in the U.K. the tariffs and licensing of the Performing 
Right Society (PRS) and Phonographic Performance Ltd. 
(PPL) (which controls public performance and 
broadcasting of records) are under the jurisdiction of 
the Performing Right Tribunal (PRT), which was set up to 
guard against abuse of monopoly power, such as refusal 
of licences. Another example of a compensation claim is 
that of the statutory recording licence under Section 8 
of the 1956 U.K. Copyright Act. The U.S. Copyright Act, 
1976, introduced the simi 1 ar concept of a compul sory 
licence (use subject only to a compensation claim) into 
a number of new areas, such as juke boxes, cable 
television and publ ic broadcasting. There are notable 
names on both sides of the argument as to the balance to 
k b th .. Kapl an
47 argues be struc etween e varlOUS groups. 
for more freedom of access to copyright works especially 
since the means of dissemination are more and more 
concentrated in fewer hands and freedom of expression is 
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often under attack. Whale and Freegard48 (Chief 
Executive of PRS) want to tip the balance back towards 
the author, since most authors earn very little from 
royalties and the public already has the large number of 
public domain works to choose from. The balance is a 
matter for each country to decide, although the move 
towards EEC harmonization of copyright law represents an 
important projective force towards the idea of the 
author IS ri ght as does the recoJTJJlended i ntroduct i on of 
the droit moral into the U.K. 
General Principles of Copyright Law 
A number of similarities and principles are discernible in 
the copyri ght 1 aws of vari ous countri es. I have already 
noted the di fference between EEC/Berne countri es and US/UCC 
countries as regards formalities. The nearest any EEC 
country comes to formalities is the necessity in U.K. law for 
works to be reduced to a material form but, as Dietz 
t · 49 th . . t' f f f . t men 10ns , , s , s more a ques , on 0 proo 0 ex, s ence 
than anything. The fact that copyright comes automatically 
into existence in some countries, however, may cause 
problems, in the case of unpublished works when it comes to 
proof. Whale50 suggests, however, that the way round this is 
to depos ita signed, dated copy wi th a profess i ona 1 person 
like a bank manager or solicitor, and ask for a receipt. 
Alternatively, a copy may be deposited with the Stationers 
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Company in London for a small fee or a registered parcel 
conta i ni ng the work may be se 1 f addressed and posted to 
oneself. Despite such problems however, formalities are not 
a condition of copyright coming into existence for a lot of 
countries. Also, remember that ideas are not protected, only 
how they are expressed. The U.S. explicitly states this in 
its legislation in S102 (b) of the 1976 Act. The first 
problem you have when drawing up a copyright law is to find a 
term whi ch can be used to map out the boundari es of those 
works whi ch can be protected by copyri ght from those that 
cannot
51
. There is something to be said for having as broad 
an expression as pOSSible, especially at a time of rapid 
technological advance when it may be difficult to fit new 
forms of expression into a few categories. Some of the 
• 
problems in the copyright field at the moment are caused by 
this latter problem. In any case, it is impossible to be 
exhaustive. The US, in its latest revision, tries to come to 
terms with the problem in Section 102(a) when it says. 
IICopyright protection subsists •.... in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now 
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or 
with the aid of a machine or device ll • This is then followed 
by seven broad categories. Copyright protection also extends 
to minimally creative, IIsmall change ll works as Dietz calls 
them 52, (a 1 though the U. S. excl udes some of these), whi ch 
sometimes attracts criticism. Dietz fears that for such 
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works commercial interests predominate, distracting attention 
• 
away from the author's right. In any case, such limitless 
expansion of copyright is not necessarily a good thing. 
A 1 so, assumi ng reducti on of protecti on for such works, one 
must then ask is there to be no protection, or a shorter term 
of protection as a neighbouring right, or protection under 
laws other than copyright? 
The Author as Creator Concept 
Copyright is intended to provide creators of works, authors, 
with protection for their works. The concept of the author's 
right means that an author can only be a person, not a 
company, and the first owner of a copyright can only ever be 
the creator53 . A person is the only one who can create a 
work, a company cannot, so' a company cannot be a first owner 
of the copyright in a work, it can only ever be a successor 
to the ri ghts gi ven to the author as the creator and fi rst 
owner. Most EEC countri es adopt thi s approach except the 
Netherlands, Eire, Luxembourg and the U.K. Nor does the U.S. 
follow the principle. The U.K. breaches the principle in the 
case of works created by the employee and commissioned works, 
where the original creator is not the copyright owner and in 
the case of Part II neighbouring rights, where companies can 
be the first owner (although these do not traditionally come 
within the ambit of the author's right anyway). Changes in 
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techno logy and in how and where the author works comp 1 i ca te 
the issue of who is the author. For example, what happens in 
the case of joint-authorship or works produced by many 
authors? Compilations and collective works? What about 
adaptations? Another problem is in deciding who is the 
author in the case of cinematographic films because there are 
a large number of people involved in making films. Dietz 
divides the approaches adopted into two groups - those that 
give the copyright to the film producer, the film maker, such 
as the U.K., Eire and Luxembourg, which will breach the 
natural persons criterion if the producer is a film company, 
and those that only give the copyright to human beings 
involved in making the f.ilm, those who have participated 
creatively, although the situation is made beneficial to the 
film producer through presumptions of assignments of certain 
rights to him and similar arrangements. Examples are West 
Germany, France and Italy. Who can claim ~ u t h o r s h i p p and the 
number of those who can do so di ffers between countri es in 
this group, however. Details vary widely. There is also the 
prob 1 em of anonymous and pseudonymous works. The pri nci p 1 e 
is similarly broken in some countries, such as the 
Netherlands, Eire and the U.K. in the case of employed 
authors (and commissioned works in the U.K.) where there is 
the problem, as wi th fi lms, of all owi ng the employer to 
exp 1 oi t works created under his orders if you fo 11 ow the 
creator as author principle. Those countries that follow the 
principle get round the problem by assuming that the employee 
assigns his rights to the employer by contract. Countries 
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breaking the principle allow the employer to be the first 
owner of the copyright but generally allow it to be 
overridden by contractual arrangement to the contrary. The 
question is not just an academic one since the majority of 
lIauthors" (creators of copyright material) nowadays are 
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employed in some way. The varying forms of employment 
situation in which authors find themselves today and the fact 
that many are employed in IIteams" is likely to produce more 
problems in the future. For socialist countries, the 
copyright, apart from moral rights, would rest with the 
employer in such cases. 
Individual Rights 
Copyright gives the author the right to carry out certain 
restricted acts with regard to his works and to authorise 
others,to do the same so that the author can exploit the work 
commercially himself or get others to do so (even though in 
some cases the right to an economic return is not laid down 
explicitly in legislation). Another method of organising the 
system is to make uses of the work after publication only 
subject to the payment of compensation, as Dietz says either 
directly to the author or to a collecting society (which acts 
on authors' behalves), such compensation to be laid down by 
1 aw or under blanket agreements through the tari ff rates of 
11 · . t· 55 co ectlng SOCle les . Some uses are free while others 
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require compensation but the author's ability to control uses 
of his work directly through giving or withholding his 
consent is largely lost. Such a system is becoming 
increasingly necessary and being almost forced on authors 
because of technological developments making possible mass 
use of copyri ght works. The futu re is 1 ike 1 y to see an 
increase in the number of collecting societies, again caused-
by the difficulties posed by technology. Another development 
highlighted by Dietz, especially evident in the European 
countries rather than in the U.K., is the use of compensation 
from exploitation in social security schemes for authors 
where part of such compensation is used for the benefit of 
authors in general rather than authors i nd i vi dua lly. 
Compensation claims are increasingly looked at in association 
with traditional exclusive rights rather than with 
limitations on copyright. It is generally accepted, then, 
that the author should be able to share in the economic 
exploitation of his works and in every use of his work, 
subject to certain exceptions. Individual rights granted 
vary between countries. For example, Dietz 56 analyses the 
legislation of the EEC countries in terms of two broad 
rights, based on West German law:-
1. The exclusive right to exploit the work in a material 
form, made up of: 
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- (a) The right of reproduction. 
(b) The right of distribution 
(c) The right of exhibition. 
2. The exclusive right of public communication in 
non-material form, made up of: 
(a) The right of recitation, performance, 
representation and presentation. 
(b) The right of broadcasting. 
(c) The right to communicate the work through sound or 
visual records. 
(d) The right to communicate broadcasts. 
l(a) The Reproduction Right 
All EEC countries have a reproduction right although its 
scope differs between countries and it is not always 
clear that adaptations of the work also have a 
reproduction right57 . The right is to reproduce the 
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work in various forms, to make cop,'es of 't 1 • All 
countries also limit the right (for example, the U.K. 
has 'fair dealing' provisions for research and private 
study and criticism and review). The revised Berne 
Convention, while laying down the right [Article 9(1)] 
also allows for limitations provided "such reproduction 
does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work 
and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the author" [Article 9(2)]. One important 
limitation in the U.K. is the statutory music licence. 
In the U.K., the concept was first introduced in the 
1911 Act as a way of preventing the record industry 
becoming monopolised by individual record companies, 
especially in the popular and light music markets. The 
U.K. and Eire are the only countries in the EEC really 
to use the concept - the others ei ther have no such 
measure at all or only use it in·very minor ways. Other 
countries in the World which use it, however, include 
the U.S., New Zealand, Australia and other British 
1 . 58 ex-co onles • There is a di fference between a 
statutory licence and a compulsory licence. West 
Germany has a compulsory licence which may only be used 
in 1 imi ted ci rcumstances and means that the copyri ght 
owner only has to give record manufacturers a use right 
under suitable conditions while the U.K./Eire measure 
means that a record manufacturer can use it provided he 
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complies with certain conditions. The West German 
measure thus means that the record manufacturer may not 
use the compulsory licence if suitable conditions are 
not negotiated, while the U.K./Eire record manufacturer 
already knows what the conditions are59 • The system of 
collecting societies effectively means that there is a 
compulsory licence in all areas where they operate since 
they have to grant licences under suitable conditions60 
and there are bodies such as the Performing Right 
Tribunal in the U.K. to ensure that licences are not 
unreasonably withheld. 
l(b) The Distribution Right 
Some countries give the author a special distribution 
right in addition to and independent of the reproduction 
right, allowing the author to control distribution of 
his work and copies of it - whether to offer it to the 
public and circulate it or not and under what 
d 't' 61 can 1 10ns • In Europe, only Denmark, West Germany, 
Italy and the Netherlands have such a right. There may 
be a confl i ct here wi th the Treaty of Rome as regards 
free movement of goods. The right allows the copyright 
owner or hi s successors to contra 1 di stri buti on even 
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where manufacture of copies 1S not illegal or unlawful _ 
Di etz notes that a copyri ght owner may want to control 
distribution where a work not protected at all by 
copyri ght in one country is then imported into another, 
where the copyright protection period has run out in one 
country but not in another or where the publishing right 
is divided so that there is one publisher in a country 
and different ones elsewhere and the work is imported 
from one country to another so that one publ isher may 
spoil the market for another. Wherever the copyright is 
limited in some way as to time, purpose, market or 
whatever ina s i ngl e market, the copyri ght owner wi 11 
want to have the right to control the distribution. In 
all these cases, the copies are produced legitimately, 
so the reproduction ri ght cannot be used aga ins t them, 
but it is obviously in the copyright owner's interest to 
be able to control such situations to prevent his 
copyright being undermined. The distribution right 
cannot be used permanently, however - there is a theory 
of the "EXHAUSTION OF THE DISTRIBUTION RIGHT", achieved 
differently in each country: in Denmark, when 
publication of a literary, musical or artistic work 
occurs, further distribution of published copies is 
possible; in West Germany, further distribution is 
possible if the work or copies of it have been sold (but 
not hi red) wi th the consent of the person who has the 
right to distribute in Germany; while in Italy and the 
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Netherlands, there is a distribution right only if the 
work has not yet been printed. Belgium and France have 
no official right of distribution but effectively 
provide one (without an exhaustion principle, so it is 
more powerful) by allowing the reproduction right to be 
subject to restrictions and conditions which may be used 
against others if they are visible on the copies. Dietz 
quotes Gotzen as calling this "the right of 
determination (droit de destination) since it applies to 
any use of the work, not just further distribution. The 
distribution right in general ceases when copies of the 
work are put on public sale so that the copyright owner 
loses control of what happens to the work, this 
generally being called the FIRST SALE DOCTRINE62 • This 
only applies to authorised copies, however, and the 
right to prevent distribution of unauthorised copies is 
quite widely recognised. Many countries do not have a 
distribution right but the U.K./Eire approach, Dietz 
notes, may amount to the ri ght s i nee it grants both a 
reproduction right and a publication right. Also 
related to the question of the distribution right is 
that of PUBLIC LENDING RIGHT - shou1d legitimately 
produced copies of works which are hired out and loaned 
resul tin compensati on for copyri ght owners or not? 
I 
This particularly applies to the loan of books but 
presumably may also be extended to record 1ibraries, for 
example. The growth of public libraries has made this 
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an important issue since by making books available to 
peop 1 e free of charge, the market for sale of those 
books bought by the 1 i brari es is reduced, and a source 
of income for publishers and authors is lost. This is a 
mass use of copyright material for which copyright 
owners ought at least to be compensated, the argument 
goes. Against this is the need for widespread 
dissemination of works and the needs of cultural policy. 
Also one must decide whether to include the lending 
right within or outside copyright law. Of the few 
countri es that have a pub 1 i c 1 endi ng ri ght - Denmark, 
West Germany, the Scandinavian countries and the U.K. -
only West Germany has a solution within copyright law 
and pays foreign authors. The Authors Lending and 
Copyright Society (ALCS), a collecting society for 
authors in the U.K., collects royalties from West 
Germany for the lending of books written by British 
nationals in Germany and reports that this has amounted 
to over £150,000 since 1980 (the money comes from WORT, 
the West German collecting society, and can only be paid 
through an authorised collecting society. This latter 
stipulation is so that part of the proceeds can be paid 
into a soci a 1 fund for wri ters). In the U. K. , the 
Pub 1 i c Lendi ng Ri ght Act was passed in 1979, and £2 
mill i on has been made a va il ab 1 e by the government for 
payment to authors accordi ng to 1 endi ng of thei r works 
in a sample of British libraries. 
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l(c) The Exhibition Right 
This is only of minor importance. 
2. The Right of Public Communication 
Whereas the above rights involve exploitation of the 
work in physical form, the second part of Dietz1s schema 
involves exploitation of the work in non-physical form, 
the right of public communication. The French, he 
notes, distinguish between communication to the public 
(droit de representation) and exploitation in a physical 
form, (droi t de reproduction), too. The bas i c concept 
behind payments for uses of copyright works is that if a 
person uses a copyright work to achieve his financial or 
non-financial objectives the author should receive 
remuneration for helping the user in this way since the 
user has profited from the author1s work. The author is 
basically a supplier and the user has to pay him in the 
same way he has to pay other parties whose services and 
d h h . h . b . t . 63 0 k' goo s e uses to ac leve 1S 0 Jec 1ves • enmar 1S 
the on ly other country in the EEC to have a 
comprehensive generic term - public performance which is 
part of the ri ght to gi ve the general pub 1 i c access to 
the work, which in turn is part of the right of disposal 
over the work64 • Dietz says this includes all 
non-physical communications of the work to the publ ic 
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through performers or mechani ca 1 means and covers the 
broadcasting right. In the French and German laws, the 
generic terms are followed by lists of what they cover. 
All the EEC countries grant the right of public 
corrununication in its widest sense but the three above 
ment i oned countri es are the only ones to use a generi c 
term. The right of broadcast is included in the term 
'right of public communication'. As regards cable 
television, Dietz suggests65 that "the adoption or 
feed-in of protected programmes in shared aerial systems 
and cable television systems is copyright protected" but 
"the further distribution (with or without cable) must 
be directed to the public and the organisation 
responsible for further distribution must be different 
from the original broadcasting organisation". Simple 
domestic aerials and low range community aerials are not 
covered, he thi nks, but he a 1 so notes that the 1 ega 1 
position is subject to some uncertainty. 
Exceptions to the Exclusive Copyright 
One must establish a balance between the legitimate 
rights of the author to control uses of his work and the 
. 
equa 11y legitimate needs of society for access to 
information. One must also be careful not to interfere 
in the private life of the individual when enforcing 
copyright. The balance is achieved by limiting the 
scope and extent of copyright in various ways. The most 
Page 54 
important limitation is that on the length of time 
during which the copyright will last, but there are also 
other 1 imi tati ons where the use is free and does not 
requ ire the copyri ght owner I s consent or requ i res the 
copyright owner's consent and has to be paid for. 
Oietz66 describes the middle ground, which is growing, 
of use requiring compensation but not permission. Such 
an intermediate course is adopted, he suggests, when the 
legislator is trying to save the user time and effort in 
getting in touch with the copyright owner but still 
wants to give the latter an income for use of his work, 
especially where such use may have an adverse effect on 
exploitation of the work. Thus, the economic aspect of 
copyright takes precedence over the control aspect. If 
an exclusive right seems inoperative for technical 
reasons or because it would be very difficult to control 
and check uses, the compensation claim will often come 
into play. The compensation and no compensation 
provisions are closely related and even a small change 
in the circumstances of the situation may change one to 
the other. The fair dealing provisions are an important 
part of the limitations on copyright, particularly when 
it comes to problems such as photocopying. Limitations 
are found, for example, for copyi ng for personal use, 
quotation, press and radio reporting, printing of public 
speeches and reprinting of newspaper articles, ephemeral 
recordings by broadcasters (copying of works onto audio 
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and vi deo tape for 1 ater broadcast wi th the recordi ngs 
being destroyed in a short time period after broadcast), 
judicial administration, religious services and popular 
festivals, educational and school uses. Detail s 
obviously differ between countries. The scope of 
limitations differs between countries - some set narrow 
limits, others are very generous - as does the extent of 
the granting of compensation claims for the author. 
Whether a limitation should be allowed or not depends on 
whether the use would encroach on the normal 
exploitation of the work. If it does not, a limitation 
is usua lly permi ss i b 1 e, whi 1 e if encroachment is 
happening, either there is no limitation or very narrow 
limits are set or a compensation claim is established. 
Allied to the question is the need to maintain freedom 
of reporting and information and to encourage public 
debate and cultural development. If this latter aim 
cenfl i cts wi th the encroachment cri teri on, a 
compensation claim may be allowed. For example, Dietz67 
does not favour an exception for educational and school 
uses because they are a substantial encroachment and the 
s i tuati on does not i nvo 1 ve uncontro 11 ab 1 e mass use of 
the work. He uses an argument wh i ch ari ses a lot in 
copyright circles, following on from his view of the 
copyright owner as a supplier - that schools and 
educational institutions do not expect supp}iers of 
books, pens, paper and so forth to supply thei r goods 
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and services free, so why should the copyright owner 
supply his work (the content of his books) free? He 
favours at least a compensation claim. There is also the 
argument mentioned earlier about why a person should 
have to pay more once he has bought a good - that the 
copyright owner should be able to derive an income from 
use of his works if it has helped the user achieve his 
objectives. Practical necessities also have to play. a 
part in such 1 imitations as in the case of ephemeral 
record i ngs whe re the broadcas t i ng i ndu s try wou 1 d ha ve 
great problems otherwise since programmes usually have 
to be recorded since they cannot be broadcast 1 ive and 
live broadcasts are rare. Private copying is allowed 
under certa inc; rcums tances as long as the copi es are 
not then commercially exploited so as to interfere with 
the original work. The author is never given an 
absolute right - the public always has some right to use 
the author's work. But if the public is allowed to use 
the work so much that it substantially eats into the 
work's market, it may become difficult to get it 
published in the first place and the basis of the access 
- the works themselves - may disappear or become greatly 
reduced in number. In this case, the public would not 
have access to the works because they would not exist. 
The more vulnerable the work is to free use - the easier 
it is to appropri ate it - the 1 ess wi 11 be the reward 
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the author/publ isher can earn and the less works we 
would expect to be published. 
Duration 
The main limitation on copyright is as to time. In the 
EEC countries, in general, the protection period is the 
life of the author plus 50 years (50 years post mortem 
auctoris). The 50 year period runs from the 1st January 
of the year following the author's death for practical 
reasons so that the copyri ght peri od never runs out in 
the middle of the year but only on 31st December of any 
given year. The exceptions to this general rule are 
Wes t Germany, where the protecti on peri od is 70 years 
from the author's death and Belgium, Italy and France 
where the protection period was extended because of the 
World Wars to about 60, 56 and 65 years respectively68. 
In the U.S., the protection period for works created on 
or after January 1, 1978 is 1 i fe plus 50 years too 
(previously, there were 2 terms - an initial term of 28 
years, renewable for a further 28 years) whil e works 
copyrighted before January 1, 1978 have a 75 year term 
made up of an initial term of 28 years and renewal term 
of 47 years. (It is worth noting that the U.K. used to 
have such a two-stage protection period with any initial 
assignment of copyright in a work lapsing and returning 
the copyright to the author's heirs for the last 25 
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years of the term of life plus 50 years. This was to 
break the monopoly of the initial publisher and to allow 
the author's heirs to make a new deal if, subsequent to 
the initial assignment, the work proved to be worth more 
than the author thought in wh i ch case he mi ght have 
received too little in return for the rights - this is 
related to the concept of the "droit de suitel/. The 
I/doma i ne pub 1 i c payante ll is another way of i ncreas i ng 
the protection period by imposing a levy on uses of 
publ ic domain works to help authors generally). The 
very long protection period is so that the author's 
heirs or successors can still protect his work and 
derive an income from exploiting its commercial 
potenti a 1 • The quest; on of the balance between author 
and the general public partly explains the limitation on 
du ra t i on of copyri ght. Di etz mentions a fu rther 
practical 
(quoti ng 
reason for such a limitation on duration 
Erich Schoulze) that works covered by 
copyright are by their very nature in common use by many 
people, they are for public consumption whereas physical 
goods are used by only a few people, so there is a 
greater problem in ascertaining ownership with copyright 
works. The problems involved are evidenced by the fact 
that the collecting societies spend a lot of time 
investigating ownership claims and in court cases it is 
invariably the case that title of ownership is disputed. 
The further away from the author I s death you go and the 
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more times the copyri ght changes hands by ass i gnment, 
will, or whatever, the more difficult the problem 
becomes of proving ownership and backing it up with 
documentation. For physical objects, the problem is not 
as great because fewer people are involved and the fact 
that the object is phys i ca 1 makes ita lot eas i er to 
prove ownership. The main aim of the longer protection 
period is, it seems, to help the author1s heirs but this 
does seem the least acceptable aspect of copyright and 
there seems no rea 1 reason for such along peri od. 
Breyer69 thinks the same (and in fact views the whole 
copyright system as somewhat shaky) and considers that 
there is always an incentive for the protection period 
to increase but never for it to diminish because present 
copyright holders have a vested interest in increasing 
the period and have formed effective lobbying groups to 
get their own way whereas there is no such group to put 
the counter argument for greater dissemination of works 
(because of their large numbers and lack of 
concentration and coherence, presumably). In fact, the 
copyright period has never actually been reduced, always 
increased. In Europe, the fact that Germany has a life 
plus 70 years protection period, whereas nearly everyone 
else has life plus 50 years is inevitably going to be 
seized on in any future harmonisation of European 
copyright law as a reason for increasing the period to 
life plus 70 years. As Dietz70 says, lithe simplest 
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solution would be an lIupward ll approximation, by taking 
as the basis the largest protection period of 70 years 
post mortem.... This would have the advantage of also 
covering the extensions of the periods in Belgium, 
France and Italy and of enabling them to be formally 
revoked without any resistance from the parties affected 
t hereby A lid dll • t· . . ownwa r approx 1ma 1 on. • • . .. ra 1 ses many 
difficulties of a constitutional nature and relating to 
the 1 aw of property and must be expected to encounter 
insuperable opposition from the countries concernedu • 
If we use the encouragement theory of copyright, Breyer 
again disputes the advantages of a long protection 
period - the length of the period is unlikely to affect 
the decision of the author of whether to write or not. 
As Thomas71 says, "Does the ever-lengthening term of 
copyright protection enter his calculations very much or 
indeed at all?lI. Breyer72 asks IIWould prospective 
authors give up creating if they knew of an author1s 
heir who was poor because of the absence of a copyright 
system?u. Breyer notes that the further in the future 
the earni ngs come the more heavi ly they are di scounted 
so the less they are worth - and most authors are highly 
unlikely to be selling a lot of copies of their works 50 
years after their deaths anyway (although well-known 
classical composers and authors probably will be). 
Increasing the copyright term would barely affect the 
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present value of future earnings and could hardly be 
expected to affect the decision of whether to create or 
not. As to pub 1; sh ; n9, a longer or shorter protecti on 
period is not going to affect the decision to publish, 
Breyer says, since publ ishers have a short-term 
viewpoint, requiring payback within a relatively short 
period of time, certainly nowhere near the length of the 
copyright period. Breyer also argues that the copyright 
system produces certain benefits such as encouraging 
production of works but also certain problems in terms 
of increased prices and the conferment of a monopoly and 
that the longer the protection period lasts, the greater 
the risks and harm become and the less the benefits are 
- for example, the longer the protection period, the 
more difficult it is to get hold of the copyright owner 
to ask for his consent to use the work and this will be 
particularly important when the book is out of print; 
also, increasing the protection period may limit 
competi ti on between works in copyri ght and works that 
would normally become public domain works. Breyer uses 
the ex amp 1 e of co 11 ect i ng soc i et i es whi ch 1 i cense the 
use of music. By increasing the protection period, it 
makes it more difficult for people to substitute public 
domain works for copyright works, so the societies can 
increase revenue at 1 i censees I expense and the 1 atter 
may pass this onto the public, (although tribunals 
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nonnally regulate the tariffs of the collecting 
soci eti es). Another argument di scussed by Breyer is 
that increasing the protection period will prevent 
adverse alteration of the work by others, but this is 
countered by the argument that increased protect i on may 
allow the "author-hating" heir to stop publication of 
his parents I works. Another argument is why give such a 
long protection period to copyright but not patents even 
though both patent and copyright are intended to 
encourage something? (although the nature of the 
monopoly in each case probably dictates this). The 
present needs of society for more and more information 
is surely also another argument for shortening the 
protection period - and publishers do not need anywhere 
near such a long time period to cover costs and make a 
profit (one of the arguments put forward in favour of 
copyright). Towards the end of the protection period, 
most works are unlikely to be making much money anyway, 
so it is highly unlikely to provide much income for 
heirs and when one considers that most authors receive 
very 1 i ttl e income from copyri ght anyway, meani ng that 
many have to take secondary jobs other than writing, the 
argument is put into context. As Breyer mentions there 
are various ways of getting round the harmful effects of 
the extended protection period such as that in the U.K. 
1911 Act, which provided for any assignment of copyright 
to return to the author's heirs for the last 25 years of 
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· the copyri ght and duri ng those 1 as t 25 years for a 
statutory licence to come into operation so that anyone 
could reproduce the work on payment of a royalty of 10% 
(of the book price). Such devices are ad hoc and there 
would be little need for them if the period were shorter 
in the first place. Dietz73 notes that the collecting 
societies rely on a long protection period for their 
strength and this strength is of help to copyright 
holders and living authors to the extent that revenue is 
used to help them collectively through the likes of 
soci a 1 securi ty schemes. Such a social view of 
copyri ght , however, does not apply to the U. K. to any 
great extent and still does not provide a particularly 
good reason for such a long protection period, although 
strong collecting societies mean that revenues for 
authors are larger because the societies have a better 
bargaining position and are able to negotiate larger 
payments. 
There are shorter protection periods for some individual 
works such as posthumous works and anonymous and 
74 pseudonymous works. 
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CHAPTER I - THE THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF COPYRIGHT REFERENCES 
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Page 65 
5. Dietz, Dr. Adolf. Copyright Law in the European 
Community. Alphen aan den Rijn - The Netherlands. 
Sijthoff & Noordhoff. 1978. 
6. Ploman & Hamilton, op cit, p104. 
7. ibid. p58. There is a requirement under the 1956 
Act for a copy of all books published in the UK to 
be deposited with the British Library and other 
stated libraries on request. 
8. op cit, pp 25-26. 
9. op cit, p3, paragraph 13. 
10. Both quotes are from Ploman & Hamilton, op cit, pl. 
11. Department of Trade, Reform of the Law relating to 
Copyri 9ht 2 Des i 9ns and Performers I Protect; on - A 
Consu 1 ta t i ve Document. Cmnd 8302. London. HMSO. 
July 1981. 
12. Ploman & Hamilton, op cit, p5. 
13. ibid, pp22-3. 
14. ibid, p24. 
Page 66 
15. Quoted in Whale & Phillips, op cit, pp 7-8. 
16. ibid, p11. 
17. ibid, p24. 
18. Quoted in IIComputer Programs and Proposed Revisions 
of the Patent and Copyri ght Laws ". Ha rvard Law 
Review 81. 1967-8. pp 1541-57. 
19. ibid. 
20. Thomas Denis. Copyright and the Creative Artist. 
London. Institute of Economic Affairs. 1967.p21. 
21. op cit, p18. 
22. For example, see McFarlane, Gavin. The Droit Moral 
in the UK. Performing Right. May 1971. p26. 
23. De Freitas, Denis. The Importance of Copyright 
Performing Right. May 1972. 
24. Whale & Phillips, op cit, pp 22-4. 
25. Dietz, op cit, pp 66-8. 
26. ibid, p68. 
Page 67 
.. 
27. Whale & Phillips, op cit, p23. 
28. Dietz, op cit, pp 69-72. 
29. ibid, p73. 
30. ibid, p75. 
31. ibid, p76. 
32. . Whale & Phillips, op cit, p27. 
33. Ploman & Hamilton, op cit, p102. 
34. Whale & Phillips, op cit, pp18 - 21. 
35. Becker, Lawrence. C. Property Rights. Philosophic 
Foundations. Boston, London and Henley. Routledge & 
Kegan Paul 1977.pp 18-19. 
36. The classification is found in Ploman & Hamilton, 
op cit, p26. 
37. Ploman & Hamilton, op cit, p28 and pp121-29. 
38. ibid, pp61 - 65. 
39. Foreword Performing Right Year Book 1983-4. p3. 
Page 68 
40. For example, see Dietz, op cit. 
41. op cit, p192. 
42. Roth, Ernst. The Business of Music. London. 
Cassell. 1969, p126. 
43. i bi d, p49. 
44. op cit, pIS. 
45. op cit, p39. 
46. op cit, p81. 
47. Kaplan, Benjamin. An Unhurried View of Copyright. 
New York. Columbia University Press. 1967. 
48. Whale & Phillips, op cit. Freegard, Michael. The 
Future of the Author's Copyright. Performing Right 
Year Book 1977. pp42 -9. 
49. op cit, p28. 
50. Whale & Phillips, op cit, p41. 
51. Dietz, op cit, p29. 
52. ibid, p31. 
Page 69 
53. ibid, p41 -66. 
54. Ploman & Hamilton, op cit, p34. 
55. Dietz, op cit, p79. 
56. ibid, p83. 
57. ibid, P84-89. 
58. Whitford Report, op cit. 
59. Dietz, op cit, p87. 
60. ibid, pl15. 
61. ibid, p89 - 101. 
62. International Federation of the Phonographic 
Industry leaflet. The Control of Rental of 
- - ~ - - ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~
Phonograms. IFPI. 
63. Dietz, op cit, p103. 
64. ibid, p103, quoting Torben Lund. 
65. ibid, p109, quoting Michel M. Walter. 
Page 70 
66. ibid, ppI15-118. 
67. ibid, p143. 
68. ibid, pp165-68. 
69. Breyer, Stephen, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A 
Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies and 
Computer Programs. Harvard Law Review. December 
1970. Volume 84 (II). pp 281-351. 
70. op cit, p171. 
71. op cit, p21. 
72. op cit, p324. 
73. op cit, p162. 
74. ibid, pp174-181. 
Page 71 
THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE 
& COPYRIGHT 
PART II 
COPYRIGHT & TECHNOLOGY 
Page 72 
INTRODUCTION TO PART II COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 
AND THE PROBLEMS OF TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE 
If there is anyone factor which accounts for the great state 
of flux in which the copyright system finds itself today, it 
is techno 1 ogi ca 1 advance and the growth of new methods and 
new medi urns for communi cati on of copyri ght material. New 
technology has always posed problems for the system of 
copyright protection but what has caused the greatest 
problems in the last thirty years or so is the speed of 
techno 1 ogi ca 1 change and the sheer range of new uses of 
copyright material. The invention of printing, the growth of 
broadcasting, the cinema and the record industry, the 
development of photocopiers and tape recorders laid the 
foundati ons for the probl ems we have today. The advent of 
video cassette recorders and enhanced computer technology 
added a further twist and now cable and satellite television 
are about to enter the fray. New forms of technology, 
equally challenging, are no doubt just around the corner. All 
this has caused considerable dislocation of traditional 
copyri ght concepts and forced a wi despread rethi nk on the 
whole subject. New solutions have to be and are being found. 
Hand in hand wi th the growth in the I copyri ght I indus tri es 
has been the massive increase in piracy and counterfeiting of 
copyright material which, in all fields, has become a major 
worry and the source of enormous losses in income. 
copyright system suffers from the fact that a 
proportion of its subject matter is located in 
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"col11T1unications" industry in the widest sense of that term, 
in the mass media, requiring the diffusion of large amounts 
of information and material to the general public and it is 
in this area that the greatest strides in technology have 
occurred. Copyright material, by its very nature, has to be 
placed in a large number of hands in the public sphere which 
inevitably opens it up to illegal and unlawful uses. In 
addition, the whole field is fast moving but the law on which 
it is based is qu i te the oppos i te and changes very s 1 owl y. 
Rigidity is probably the main characteristic of the law and 
the flexibility required to deal with fast moving 
environments is usually missing. A prime example is the 
attempt to change UK copyright law - a Committee was set up 
under Mr. Justice Whitford to look into the whole question of 
Copyri ght and Des igns Laws. I t reported in 1977. There was 
then a long gap to July 1981 when a much criticised Green 
Paper was produced. To date, nothing has been done, apart 
from a few adjustments to deal with video piracy. Just how 
long it will take before any action is taken is unknown but 
something has to be done soon to re-establish the exact 
obligations of the various parties and to deal with the many 
and varied problems. There is a place here for the courts to 
interpret the law so as to allow for the requisite 
fl ex i b i1 i ty and to an extent they have done th is. 
Ultimately, though, it ;s a question of legislation. 
Obviously, given the present economic climate, the government 
has more to thi nk about than just copyri ght 1 aw reform and 
one would not like it to rush into things but given that the 
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law in this area was last revised in 1956, that the copyright 
industries are of great importance to Britain1s economic 
health and that the problems are getting worse and the 
copyright system becoming destabilised in many areas, the 
time would seem ripe for something to be done. 
There is little doubt that new technology offers great new 
opportunities for the creator of copyright material in the 
form of vastly greater audiences and new outlets as well as 
the chance to earn more money than was previously possible 
(even though income is highly skewed towards a small minority 
who earn a great deal while the majority earn only modest 
sums and often have to have a second job). Every major 
technological advance has potentially benefited the creator 
in this way. Assuming that the creator1s main objective is 
to communicate his works to the widest possible audience, the 
creator of copyright works has never been in a better 
position - the mass media now enables him to tap a vast 
audi ence. However, much of the di scuss i on of copyri ght at 
present centres on the threats rather than the benef; ts of 
technology, even at a time when copyright is more valuable 
commercially than at any time previously, and the music 
collecting societies are distributing more money than ever 
before. There is some concern about the future of copyright 
and to an extent the pess imi sm is warranted because the 
system is under attack from a growing number of sources. One 
may wonder, though, whether the gloom is not a little 
overdone at times since creators have had to deal with 
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similar problems in the past (although the nature of 
techno 1 ogi ca 1 change has altered somewhat in recent years) 
and they are better able to deal with them than previously 
being more organised through unions and collecting societies 
and thus being in a better bargaining position. The 
copyright system itself may have to change somewhat - and to 
an extent is already doing so - but it is unlikely ever to 
fall apart completely. It is rather a question of 
re-evaluating the situation and accommodating new concepts, 
finding new solutions. As we have seen, the copyright system 
is very accommodating to different philosophies and flexible, 
too. There is a need for care, however, and complacency is 
not what is required since there will always be 
abolitionists, sceptics and the non-committed. 
In a number of ways, however, present technology differs in 
nature from past experience and it is these differences which 
must be borne in mind when analysing problems and framing 
solutions. For example, traditional methods of mechanical 
reproduction allowed the user to be identified and rights to 
be asserted against him. 'Modern copying devices are 
available to most people at little cost and are easy to use. 
Why, Koumantos 1 asks, buy books, periodicals, records and so 
forth when you can borrow and copy them so that a single 
copy, purchased and reproduced privately, can satisfy the 
needs of an unlimited number of readers (viewers and 
1 i steners) free of any copyri ght 1 i abil i ty. Part of the 
author's market disappears. IIEnlargement of the audience is 
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accompanied by a retraction of the base on which the 
remuneration of authors is calculatedu2 • Ploman and 
Hamilton3 note that new technology is characterised by lIa 
vast increase in the capacity to generate, transmit and 
receive information ll and for its "flexibility and opportunity 
of choice, convergence and complimentarity and the inequality 
of access ll . Flexibility results from the fact that for 
example, "a terrestrial system .... always has to follow a 
given path on earth" whereas the sate 11 i te does not, and 
te 1 ev is i on is usually a one-way sys tern whereas cable 
television may be interactive, allowing consumers to "talk 
backll. Within each technology, there is also now a wider 
choice of distribution - for example, music recordings can be 
distributed by record or tape or broadcast while for 
television there is broadcasting through the ether, by 
satellite and by cable. The television is no longer just a 
receiving set - it may also be used to show video recordings, 
for teletext sys terns, for vi deo games and the 1 ike. Th is 
flexibility also allows for combinations of technologies -
for example, computers and television produce teletext 
systems. The main change in the nature of technology seems 
to be "decentralisation and individualisation in concept of 
use ll4 • Cable tel evi s i on allows a more regi ona 1 form of 
broadcasting, video allows choice of time and content, tape 
recording is done in the privacy of one's own home. 
Copyright owners have generally in the past been able to deal 
with groups or organisations of one size or another. 
However, the individual is the source of the problem in many 
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cases today and it is to the individual that the copyright 
owner must go for recompense. This is virtually impossible 
without invading privacy. Because the individual does not 
usually have commercial objectives in his copying, it is much 
more difficult to get copyright ideas across and accepted. 
In-equa 1 i ty of access ari ses from the fact that only certa in 
groups within a country and certain countries in the World 
have access to the most up-to-date technology, leading to a 
distinction between 'information rich' and 'information poor' 
countries5 . This is where the politics in the copyright 
system come into play. Within developing countries, only a 
small minority of households possess the newer forms of 
technology. Ploman & Hamilton6 show that traditionally it 
has been possible to differentiate the various stages in the 
creation and production of a work and attach rights to 
objects and stages. It is more difficult to identify each 
stage now. Production may take place at the same time as 
performance or distribution and lithe function of authorship 
"7 is combined with other functions • It is often difficult to 
determi ne when pub 1 icati on or performance take place. 
Traditionally, the publisher was the intermediary between the 
author and the market but now there are 1 a rge number of 
intermediaries. The publishing function is often combined 
with other functions, such as distribution. Definitional 
problems abound. Legislation always seem to lag behind 
technology, dealing with today's or yesterday's problems 
rather than looking to the future. As De Freitas says8, the 
rights laid down by law tend to relate to the main ways works 
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are conunercially exploited today but changes in technology 
are so swift that it is impossible to know whether these 
ri ghts wi 11 be suff; ci ent for the future when new forms of 
exploitation arise. 
Koumantos
9 
notes the reaction of the authorities to new 
technology. First, the recipient of protection now tends to 
be the organisations which exploit the author's works rather 
than the author himself. This leads him to think that it is 
economic power which determines protection rather than 
respect for the author's creation. He cites the more recent 
international conventions as an example. One might also note 
. that the 1956 Act in the UK greatly benefited neighbouring 
works under Part II. There is probably something in this 
criticism but it may go too far. It seems to adopt an 
author's right approach whereas the UK has a property rights 
approach and economi c power has always tended to detenni ne 
copyright protection in the UK - copyright protection was 
initially produced on lobbying from publishers and printers. 
The author-publ isher relationship seems to have improved of 
late and the author is probably in a better bargaining 
pos i ti on than he has ever been. Koumantos a 1 so bemoans the 
"capitulation of law to illegal acts", that the law does not 
try whole-heartedly to solve the problems involved but makes 
only a token effort and adopts a tone of defeati sm. The 
recent Green Paper and the slowness of the government in 
doing anything about copyright law reform may add credence to 
this view and again there is some truth in it but this too 
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would seem rather overstated since the problems concerned are 
very complex, there is more than just author's interests at 
stake and given present economic circumstances, copyright is 
bound to take something of a backseat. The third paint made 
by Koumantos is that the structure of copyright is changing 
from an exclusive right of control with remuneration to just 
a claim to lIequitable ll remuneration and the argument put 
forward is that the result is usually exploitation and 
remuneration anyway so why not just cut corners and go 
straight to remuneration. Koumantos, though, points out that 
there is a big difference between being able to negotiate 
from a position of strength with an exclusive right to accept 
or refuse different uses voluntarily and having to just 
accept remuneration no matter what. Reaction to this depends 
on whether one thinks that copyright should be the right to 
control, as it has traditionally been, or the right to 
remunera ti on. One mi ght th ink that moral ri ghts represent 
the control aspect of copyright. Three reasons are put 
forward for these developments - first, a general tendency to 
attack exclusive rights and private property and towards 
collectivisation and increasing concentration in economic 
uni ts. Koumantos fears for the future of authorshi p under 
such collectivisation but one must remember that one aspect 
of this col1ectivisation is the growth of the collecting 
societies, without which authors would be in a much more 
inferior position. Secondly, the economic power wielded by 
the mass media and those organisations which exploit authors I 
works enables them to pressurise governments and influence 
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their decisions as well as influence public opinion. In 
comparison, authors have little persuasive power. One might 
doubt that the i nfl uence of these bodi es is as great as 
suggested - to take an example, the record industry has not 
had a lot of success in i nfl uenc i ng the UK government to 
introduce a levy on blank audio and video tapes and recorders 
and is unlikely to influence public opinion because of its 
rather unfl atteri ng image to the pub 1 i c. The thi rd reason 
noted by Koumantos is that there are many more users of 
copyright material than creators, so that lIevery limitation 
imposed on copyri ght . i n favour of the consumers ....... , is 
often regarded in the 1 i ght of a victory for democracy and 
humanitarianism ll • This particularly takes on a political 
character when applied to developing countries. 
In the two chapters that follow I will deal with the two main 
sectors in whi ch technology has caused copyri ght problems -
the audio-visual and reprographic fields. These are chosen 
because they demonstrate quite well the main areas of 
concern. This means that I have had to leave out problems 
related to the newer forms of technology - computers, 
satellites and cable television - but force of space requires 
this. In the computer field, the main topics of discussion 
are whether copyri ght is the best form of protecti on for 
computer programs anyway or whether patent, trade secrecy or 
contract law might have a part to play (although programs are 
genera lly thought not to be patent protectab 1 e because they 
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are not sufficiently inventive or novel), whether they may be 
protected under copyri ght at all, for example as 1 i terary 
works (what about programs in the form of punched holes or 
magnetic tape which are not readable by the human brain), 
whether they fit into an existing category of copyright 
material or not and what the restricted acts should be. 
There has also been a lot of discussion of data bases such as 
whether a licence would be required from the copyright owner 
at input or output of copyright material. There is also the 
question of copyright status for works created with the help 
of the computer. As regards cable television, the main 
concern is that authors should share in the large-scale 
expansion of the system. It is not so much simultaneous 
transmission systems that copyright owners are concerned 
about but systems that originate their own programmes 
containing copyright material for which copyright owners 
would expect to be paid. Payments for cable diffusion of 
broadcas t copyri ght works are res is ted in some quarters on 
the basis that it is an inequitable double payment - one for 
the initial broadcast and one for cable diffusion. This is 
not so, however, because it represents a public performance 
which is a restricted act under the 1956 Act. For example, 
an employer who plays music to his employees over 
loudspeakers has been held to be publ icly performing. For 
satellite broadcasting, there is a definitional problem of 
whether it is broadcasting at all. Copyright owners also 
want to control the up-leg of a satellite broadcast (whether 
poi nt-to-poi nt through a transmi tti ng s tati on or by DBS, 
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directly into people1s homes) since they think that only this 
wi 11 91 ve them suffi ci ent control - what if the copyri ght 1 aw 
is inadequate in the second country in the case of satellite 
broadcasts between countries10? There is an additional 
point that the up-leg may not be broadcasting since the 
signal is not meant to be directly received by the general 
public, a view held by the Green Paper. The down-leg would 
seem to be broadcasting. A further problem for satellite 
broadcasting is that it is difficult to exactly match the 
recei vi ng area to the geographi ca 1 pos i ti on of a country or 
group of countri es - there may be cons i derab 1 e overspi 11 • 
Furthermore, both cable and satellite greatly increase the 
number of broadcasters, which may prove difficult to control. 
It would be impossible to deal with the problems of 
techno logy for copyri ght wi thout menti oni ng. commerci a 1 
piracy, that is unauthorised copying of copyright works for a 
commercial motive. This also takes in counterfeiting. The 
copyright industries are particularly vulnerable and all of 
them are beset with the problem. For broadcasts, whether 
traditional, cable or satellite, there is the additional 
problem of IIpoachingll of programmes by unauthorised people. 
Piracy is, of course, not a new problem. It is lias old as 
copyright11 • Ploman & Hamilton12 note that lI[mJodern piracy 
is mainly technological in nature ll • New technology has been 
a double-edged sword, bringing great benefits but also making 
pi racy bi 9 bus i ness. The worst cases seem to occur in the 
developing countries, particularly Singapore, and there may 
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be a link with their calls for greater access to works of all 
kinds. The scale of the problem is very large. The j'"ecord 
industry is losing about £20 million a year in the UK13 (4% of 
retail value) and about £1,000 million 14 Worldwide (12!% of 
retail value); the publishing industry about £40 - 50 million 
in the UK and £500 million Worldwide in 198215 , and the infant 
video industry lost about £120 million16 in the UK and £570 
million Worldwide in 198317 . Video piracy is the most talked 
about problem, but the situation seems to be getting better 
now that there are severer penalties, the Federation Against 
Copyright Theft has been formed and piracy has b e e ~ ~ attacked 
from different points all at once. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REPROGRAPHY 
The Present Situation 
By reprography, we mean a whole family of techni ques for 
copy; ng graph i c rna teri a 1, inc 1 ud; ng photocopy; ng, whi ch is 
its most familiar form. The term also includes non-light 
techniques, laser, holographs and microfilm and microfiche l . 
In the narrative below, we will mainly talk about 
photocopying. 
Photocopying was not a major problem until the 1960's since 
when the problem has got worse as photocopying technology has 
deve loped and become an a ll-pervas; ve part of the modern 
worl d, found ina 11 manner of estab 1; shments. The problem 
has been with us for a long time now and still no solution 
has been found. It has exercised the minds of many experts 
both in the national and international arena and the various 
parti es concerned have attempted unsuccessfully for along 
time to reach a workable solution. The negotiation has been 
conducted seemingly in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion with 
claim and counter claim and a fair amount of political 
manoeuvri ng. Just as a compromi se seems ; n the off; ng, a 
shift in opinion seems to have occurred. In many cases, the 
extent of the problem even is disputed, a position made 
eas i er by the fact that there have been few surveys of how 
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widespread the problem is. In general, the user groups 
dispute that the problem is as great as the publishers say 
and argue that a large proportion of their copying is either 
of non-copyri ght materi a 1 or is covered by the fa i r deal i ng 
provisions of the 1956 Act covering the likes of research and 
private study and criticism and review. Only a small 
proportion, they say, is multiple copying (more than a single 
copy of anyone page) and one Vice Chancellor even staked his 
reputation on there being no multiple copying in his 
University and another saying that if a particular scheme 
went ahead, he would stop all photocopying going on in his 
University. A common sense point of view would seem to be 
that with the large number of photocopiers in existence 1n 
a 11 types of premi ses throughout the country, the extent of 
copying is very substantial, although a large part of it is 
likely to be of non-copyright material or of internally 
generated material or material covered by fair dealing. The 
pub 1 i shers say that they are mak i ng great losses from 1 arge 
scale photocopying, particularly multiple photocopying, but 
do not very often produce figures to back themselves, a 
factor which does not help their cause. 
The three studies with which I am familiar as to the extent 
of photocopying in the UK provide varying pictures. In the 
late 1960's. Barker carried out a study 2 covering 
peri od i ca 1 s and books but not mus i c, coveri ng a one year 
period, dividing the 409 usable replies into five categories 
_ academic libraries, public libraries, Government research 
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establishments, scientific, technical and learned societies, 
institutions and associations and industrial and commercial 
organisations. 
Barker summarises his findings by saying that "there is a 
cons i derab 1 e amount of photocopyi ng be i ng done in the UKI/3 
and that this is likely to increase in the future. Also, 
lI[t]here appears to be some evidence that multiple 
subscriptions to periodicals reduces the number of multiple 
photocopi es made, and photocopyi ng genera lly; but the 
duplication of book stock appears to have no discernible 
effect on the photocopying of extracts4 • A lot of copying 
is of non-copyri ght works and the copyri ght rna teri a 1 copi ed 
is mainly from periodicals rather than books, but a large 
part of it is allowed by the 1956 Act and its Regulations and 
by "Photocopying and the Law,1I which he suggests should be 
incorporated into the law. In addition, the distinction 
between privileged libraries and Ifor profit l libraries under 
the 1956 Act is misunderstood and resented. The main fear of 
publishers and authors - that there is a great deal of 
multiple copying taking place - seems to be borne out, and 
this is not allowed under the law. One must remember that 
this study took place quite a while ago now, and the problem 
has got a lot worse since. A number of criticisms can also 
be levelled at Barkerls work, the most important of which is 
that the study only covered the making of copies by the 
librarians of the various libraries and did not include 
photocopyi ng done by students, researchers, i ndi vi dua 1 s 
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themselves, which is surely the greatest part of photocopying 
today. Nor does the study give any real indication, 
quantitatively, of the amount of the copying which is of 
copyri ght materi a 1. The amount of copyi ng of copyri ght 
material covered by fair dealing, insubstantial use and the 
guidelines in "Photocopying and the Law" would also be useful 
to know, although problematic to calculate. In addition, the 
survey excl udes copyi ng done in schools, primary and 
secondary, which we know is very high. Another criticism, 
which Barker recognises himself, is that the amount of 
copying must relate in some way to the number of people each 
library serves, but a survey cannot really give an indication 
of the size of each library. Obviously, the problem is one 
of the cost, complexity and time which extension of the study 
in any of the directions mentioned would necessitate. 
In 1973, the Publishers Association and the Nationa1 Council 
for Educational Technology carried out a survey of schools, 
for which various schools were given an amnesty from 
prosecuti on, payment and so forth by the Pub 1 i shers 
Association, Music Publishers Association and the Society of 
Authors and asked to dec 1 are how much copyi n9 they di d and 
what type this was. The schools taking part were not a 
random sample but a IIrepresentative" sample. The schools 
were geograph i ca lly spread throughout Engl and and Wales but 
Northern Ireland and Scotland were excluded. They also 
included examples of authorities which spent more than 
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average, average, and less than average amounts of money on 
text and library books. The period studied was seven weeks 
(22nd October - 7th December 1973). 17 primary and 49 
secondary schools took part. Taken as a whole, the survey 
seems to show that whilst a lot of copying is undoubtedly 
taking place, a lot of it is of internally produced 
(non-copyright, non-publisher copyright owned) school 
material, especially at secondary schools. A lot more 
copying took place in secondary schools than in primary 
schools, however. The survey does not seem to differentiate 
between single and multiple copies however, although the 
notes on the survey suggest that very little of the copying 
is covered by fair dealing. The observations on the survey 
also admit that the sample is rather small so any conclusions 
must be tentative but, nevertheless, the authors regarded it 
as representing a IIgeneral situation ll • One might also argue 
that the results are not typical of the year as a whole, that 
the timing of the survey - just before Christmas - introduced 
distortions, for example as regards copying of musical works. 
By extrapolation, the authors calculated that during a 
similar 7 week period over 27 million copies would be made 
from publications (excluding periodicals and examination 
papers) in England and Wales. They then take this as 
one-quarter of the school year and so suggest that in one 
school year about 108 million copies might be made (although 
this would make a school year only 28 weeks, which seems a 
little on the low side). One criticism would be the 
smallness of the sample and the shortness of the period 
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covered as well as the fact that it only covers schools, not 
universities, industry, public libraries and so forth. 
However, it does comp 1 ement Barker I s study by deal i ng wi th 
schools, which were left out by Barker. 
The third survey was a result of negotiations between the 
various copyright owners and the local authorities which led 
to the setting up of a pilot scheme in Fife in Scotland to 
discover the extent of the photocopying problem. This survey 
did differentiate between single and multiple copying, 
although it is still a problem to define multiple copying -
is it one copy of each of 100 pages or 100 copies of a single 
page? Generally, it is regarded as the latter and the survey 
adopts this approach, too, but one could argue that the 
former is just as harmful as the latter, maybe more so 
because then the photocopy would seem to be substituting even 
more so for the purchase of the book. The same criticism of 
smallness of sample size and shortness of period covered 
apply here. 97 institutions - Central Institutions, primary 
schools, Junior High schools, Colleges of E ~ u c a t i o n n and 
~ ~
Secondary schools - took part in the survey. The survey only 
covered 6 weeks during a term and the figures were multiplied 
by six to give figures for the whole school year of 36 weeks. 
However, it is difficult to know whether the pattern in the 
six weeks would be continued for the whole school year. 
A 1 so, the survey on ly covers Scotl and, not the rest of the 
UK. The survey was carried out at the behest of the 
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Publishers Association, the Music Publishers Association and 
The Authors Lending & Copyright Society Ltd (ALCS), a UK 
collecting society for writers, and was particularly 
concerned with multiple copying, as defined above. Taking 
a 11 groups as a whole, there were, in the six weeks of the 
survey" 1,541 acts of multiple copying, producing a yearly 
fi gure (X6) of 9,246. These acts produced 66,428 copi es 
(398,568 copies on a yearly basis). There were 1,318 acts of 
single copying over the period (7,908 on a yearly basis). 
Acts of multiple copying were fairly evenly spread throughout 
the institutions apart from the Junior High Schools which 
represented a very small percentage of acts and multiple 
copi es. Secondary schools accounted for a 1 arge part of 
total multiple copies made. Presumably, most of the single 
copying done is legal under the fair dealing provisions. 
Mas t copyi ng was from books, although Juni or Hi gh Schools 
copied more from examination papers. 
The pi cture from a 11 three surveys does seems to show that 
photocopying is occurring on a very widespread scale and much 
of it is multiple copying of copyright material which is 
clearly illegal. In the schools, copying seems mainly of 
books while in academic, public, research and commercial 
libraries, it is mainly of journals. Recent court cases 
emphasise the problem of copying of music which was shown to 
be quite large in the last two surveys (about 9% for the last 
survey). Most of the music publishers disassociated 
themselves at. an early stage from the negotiations for a 
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licensing scheme for photocopying and came to their own 
agreement with music users - Fair copying Rules OK? Their 
aim was not to licence the photocopying of music but to 
control it and they were not slow to enforce their copyrights 
in the courts if copying exceeded their guidelines. In 1980, 
the Music Publishers Association (MPA) brought an action for 
infringement in the High Court against Wolverhampton 
Education Authority and received £1,300 damages and costs of 
over £2,0005. The Code of Practice points out that if 
i nfri ngi ng copi es are made, the copyri ght owner can sue for 
damages, which can be very great if it can be shown that the 
i nfri ngement was wil fu 1 or for gain, and the person payi ng 
damages wi 11 often have to pay the costs of the acti on as 
well as damages, costs which may run into thousands. The MPA 
and Novello & Co. also took Oakham public school in 
Leicestershire to the High Court, where the school admitted 
to illegal photocopying of 15,000 sheets of music made over 
several years6. The sum paid by the school came to £4,250 
7 ' 
for damages and costs. In both cases, the defendants had to 
pay their own costs as well. The MPA estimates that about 8 
million copies of copyright music and written material are 
made illegally in British schools every year8. Illegal 
copying of sheet music is costing about £6 million a year 
while the Educati ona 1 Pub 1 i shers Council says that about 200 
million pages are copied illegally by teachers every year 
\ 
costing educational publishers as much as £20 m i l l i ~ n n a 
year9. Overall, more than 1,000 million illegal copies are 
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made a year from all sources (according to a P.A. estimate 
given to me). 
The Market for Photocopiers 
Worldwide revenues in the plain paper copier market are 
expected to increase from $22,800 million in 1982 to $49,600 
million in 1987 according to Dataquest, a copying and 
duplicating industry service, based in California 10 . This is 
about a 300% increase over the past 5 yea rs 11. In 1970, 
there were 100,000 copiers worldwide, most of them 
manufactured by Xerox. By the early 1980 J s there were more 
than 1 million such copiers worldwide, either sold or leased, 
90% of whi ch were small mach i nes, a market developed by the 
Japanese and now dominated by them12 . It is this end of the 
market whi ch is expected to produce the greatest amount of 
growth in the years to come. The trend, as in most other 
things, seems to be towards smaller machines. For the 
copyright fraternity, introduction of very small machines 
into individual homes as opposed to libraries, shops and the 
1 ike, cou 1 d produce unto 1 d harm. Unt i1 the bas i c patent for 
xerography, expi red ; n the early 1970 J s, Xerox was making 
very 1 a rge profi ts. As compet it ion increased, pri ces fe 11 
and the market grew rapi dly. The sma 11 cop; er market has 
seen the greatest growth. There are now 38 fi rms se 11 i ng 
11 . . B' t . 13 . 1 J sma coplers 1n rl aln ,maln y apanese. 
The Advantages of Photocopying 
The main advantages are;-
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(a) Selectivity - only those parts of a book or journal of 
interest to you need be copied. 
(b) Mobil i ty and portabil i ty - photocopyi ng means that you 
are not ti ed down to ali brary, whi ch may be important 
where the book or journal is large. 
(c) Time and urgency of need - taking a photocopy is quicker 
than getting another copy of the work, especially if it 
has to be ordered from a publisher. If time is of the 
essence, hav i ng to order may defeat the object of the 
exercise. There ~ s s also a saving of time and effort in 
not having to make handwritten notes. 
(d) Non-availability of a work and difficulty of contacting 
the copyright owner. In such cases, being able to 
photocopy is a boon. 
(e) Cost - it will undoubtedl y be cheaper to photocopy the 
relevant parts of a work than buy the whole work, 
a 1 though if the whole work is requ ired, it wi 11 be 
cheaper to buy a copy. Copies of works from publishers 
wi 11 contain a royalty for the author, hence the cost 
advantage of photocopying. 
(f) The genera 1 ava il abil i ty of photocopi ers may encourage 
photocopying. 
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(9) The high quality of photocopies. 
The Problem 
General 
The wi de ava i1 abil i ty and advantages of photocopi ers all i ed 
to a law which is largely out of date and unable to deal with 
new forms of technology has created distortions in the 
balance between authors/publishers and the libraries/general 
public. Most people do not want to break the law but the law 
is unenforceable. 'Before copying, apart from questions of 
fair use, the copyright owner1s consent is required, but 
there is really no incentive to obtain it. The copyright 
owner cannot check up on photocopyi ng of hi s works and if he 
tried he would have to employ an army of people to police 
photocopiers (as Barker notes) which is clearly 
impract i ca 1 • Thus, the copyri ght owner cannot e-nforce hi s 
c o p y r i ~ h t t and large scale copying of copyright works by large 
numbers of people continues unabated. One cannot blame the 
machine it is neutral until someone chooses to breach 
copyright with it. One cannot smash up all photocopiers in 
the country nor declare their use illegal. One must live 
with the technology and find a satisfactory solution to a 
practical problem as best one can. Besides which, the 
photocopier provides immeasurable benefits to the population 
in general and the majori ty of users probably do not even 
breach copyright. The problem may be analysed in terms of the 
purpose of copyright - to encourage authors to create and 
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allow them to earn a living from their creations, to encourage 
the publication of works. Widespread copying of copyright 
materials threatens to shortcircuit the whole system and 
defeat it purpose. 
The Author 
It is unlikely that the copyright system alone encourages 
authors to create but its purpose of allowing authors to earn 
a living is very important. Authors have never been very 
well paid and any practice which threatens to undermine the 
system of royalty payments for use or purchase of copyri ght 
material will have severe consequences for them. The 
distribution of authors' incomes is highly skewed with a few 
earning very large amounts of money and a sizeable proportion 
being on or below the national minimum wage. Large scale 
photocopying of copyright works represents large scale 
non-payment of copyright fees. The author has more problems 
than most in receiving a living wage for his work because of 
their public nature. In most cases, he cannot afford not to 
be pa i d on such a 1 arge sca 1 e. A lot of photocopyi ng is 
illegal. Many commentators speak of such practices as being 
theft - the appropriation of someone elses' property without 
his consent and without paying for it. As Barker says14, lilt 
would be short-sighted to sacrifice the interests of authors 
and publishers to those of education (which depends on them) 
for the sake of such economic savings as might be achieved by 
copying; it would also be immoral. The fact that it is 
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cheaper to stea 1 someone e 1 s€ I s property rather than buy it 
does not make it right to steal ll • 
The Publisher 
The publisher relies, for his publication decisions, on the 
copyright owner providing him with an exclusive licence to 
print his work. This gives the initial publisher the time to 
recoup his production costs and hopefully make a profit. A 
large proportion of books do not make a profit, so the 
publisher uses profitable works to subsidise loss-making ones 
and overall he hopes to be profitable. Publishers may suffer 
in two main ways from the large scale availability and use of 
reprographic equipment. First, a rival publisher could buy a 
copy of a work published by the initial publisher' and produce 
an identical one much cheaper since he will not have to meet 
the same costs as the initial publ isher - for example, he 
will not have to pay the author's royalty and certain 
promotional costs and in general his fixed costs will be much 
lower. Competition will force prices down, the initial 
publisher may not be able to cover his costs and some books 
just would not be published - it would not be an economic 
p r o p o s i t i ~ n n since the initial publisher takes all the risks. 
Breyer15 denies that this will necessarily be the case. He 
maintains that the initial publisher will have certain 
advantages over the copier which may be sufficient to 
outweigh the cost advantage. These include the fact that the 
initial publisher's work will reach the market first (1l1ead 
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time" advantages) so that before a copier can produce his own 
copies, the initial publisher has provided retailers with 
large stocks and only a large price differential is likely to 
influence buying decisions significantly. If the copier 
tries to rush production he will have additional costs to 
cover. This lead time may be enough to produce a profit. In 
addition, a copier may fear retaliation from the initial 
publisher - in the past, publishers have produced "fighting 
editions" sold below copiers' costs. A publisher may 
temporarily run a loss leader, although this may produce 
problems with competition law. In addition, the initial 
publisher will have advantages such as better quality 
reproduction and better channels of distribution. Would a 
copier produce a work himself unless the initial publisher 
was making very large profits anyway? Breyer thinks it 
unlikely that a copier would enter a low volume market yet in 
high volume markets the copier's advantage is likely to be 
less because the initial publisher will be able to benefit 
from economies of scale, so fixed costs will be spread over a 
larger number of copies and price per copy will be lower. A 
duopoly or oligopoly may allow all the publishers concerned 
to make enough money anyway. The second ma in way pub 1 i shers 
may suffer from photocopyi n9 and the area in whi ch most 
attenti on is focussed, is 1 i brary photocopyi ng by students, 
research workers and so on, on a day to day basi s, not as a 
way of competing with the publ isher, but for the reasons 
mentioned earlier and as a means of disseminating information 
and promoting knowledge and progress. A lot of this 
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discussion centres on questions of fair use. Here, the main 
area of concern seems to be copyi ng from journa 1 s, 
particularly scientific journals, although similar problems 
arise for book publication as well. The central issue seems 
to be whether such users would buy copies of the journal or 
book if they could not photocopy it. It must be said that 
the publishers seem unable to prove a direct relationship 
between reduced sales/subscriptions and increased 
photocopyi ng. For books, if users do photocopy rather than 
buy, thi s may turn a margi na lly profi tab 1 e book into a loss 
rna ker. If th is happens on a 1 a rge enough sca 1 e, the number 
of books published will fall and the publisher will be 
wi 11 i ng to ri sk his money, ti me and effort on lyon those 
books wi th a II known" market (to the extent that he can know 
this). Lesser known authors may suffer as may more 
experimental, minority-audience books. The other effect will 
be on price - lower sales means lower volume markets which 
may mean higher prices per book. (As prices rise, more 
copying takes place, however, which may reduce markets 
further leading to further price rises. It is a vicious 
circle). For journals, the situation is similar but somewhat 
more complicated. The publisher is concerned about loss of 
sales and subscriptions, loss of sales of back issues and 
reprints and loss of advertising revenue16 as a result of 
copying of articles. Publishers maintain that libraries and 
individuals now copy articles rather than subscribe to 
journals. Nasri 17 points further to library resource sharing 
worsening the problem. The activities of the British Library 
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Lending Division have proved a great annoyance to publishers. 
The problem is particularly intense for journals with a small 
circulation since drops in their subscriptions may threaten 
their very existence, and for scientific journals published 
by non-profit societies as a way of disseminating research 
results and knowledge since they rely almost entirely on 
subscriptions (and often subsidies) and do not generally 
receive advertising revenue 18 . Similarly, it is argued that 
libraries and individuals copy back issues of journal 
articles rather than buy reprints and back issues, thus 
depriving publishers of another source of income 19 . However, 
this assumes that such reprints are available from the 
publisher - and Nasri says that often they are not because of 
the logistics and expense of storage, the cost and the 
unpredictable nature of the demand. Losses of advertising 
revenue ari se from the fact that the pri ce a pub 1 i sher can 
charge for advertising in his journal depends on his sales 
and subscri pti ons if circulations fall because of 
photocopyi ng, advert is i ng revenue wi 11 fa 11 too. The more 
readers a journal has, the more attractive it is to 
11 h d t ·· 20 adverti sers because more people wi see tea ver 1 s 1 ng . 
There is the additional problem that when a person 
photocopi es an art i c 1 e, he wi 11 not a 1 so copy the 
advertisements if he can avoid it. Also, libraries represent 
a very important source of income for publishers because of 
the numbers of journals and books they buy. Hence, any 
reduction in the libraries' subscriptions due to large scale 
Page 102 
photocopying will obviously affect publishers' revenues. The 
problem is proving a causal relationship between large scale 
photocopyi ng and reduct ions in 1 i brari es' subs cri pti ons to 
journals and sales of journals in general. Line and Wood21 
dispute the causal relationship basing this on practices at 
the British Library Lending Division (BLLD). They agree that 
the BLLD is being used more and more, that a greater 
proportion of this demand is being met by photocopies, and 
thst a great deal more photocopying is taking place in 
libraries than ever before. But they see little evidence of 
a fall in journal sales. They point to the exponential 
growth in the number of journals available: to keep up, a 
library would also have to increase its budget exponentially. 
In this respect, Nasri 22 points to the phenomenon of 
IItwiggingll, particularly in the scientific field - the 
increasing specialisation of science and the resulting 
increase in the number of speci ali sed journals deal i ng wi th 
these areas. The result of all this is that while the market 
for scientific works as a whole is increasing, the market has 
become more and more fragmented, the market for these 
speci ali sed journals bei ng very sma 11. They also note that 
the average pri ce of journa 1 s has ri sen sharply because of 
rises in publication costs and because they are getting 
thicker as the amount of information generated by research 
grows - journals have to either grow in size or reject more 
papers23. Either way the publisher cannot win, Nasri says: 
more pages increases costs, putting up prices which leads to 
loss of subscribers, while not increasing journal size may 
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1 ead to comp 1 a i nts of gaps in the 1 i terature and not enough 
publication outlets, which again may lose subscribers 24 . 
Line and Wood25 note that libraries could not spend more on 
journal subscriptions even if they wanted to and regardless 
of whether they were supp lyi ng photocopi es or not because 
they have a finite budget to keep to and could not keep up 
with the growth in journals. Libraries were cutting 
subscriptions but because of economic constraints, not 
because of the availability of photocopying. Less 
photocopyi ng wou 1 d not mean more subscri pti ons. Journa 1 s 
were cancelled as much for extent of use, content and quality 
as for pri ce. Those journa 1 s most 1 ike ly to be affected, 
they think are those that can easily be spared on the 
'fringe ' and those with large circulations where multiple 
copies are bought bJI a library. As to individuals, it is 
unlikely, they continue, that they would buy more journals if 
1 i bra ri es cou 1 d not supply them or· if photocopi es were not 
available since they would probably need access on very few 
occasions. Line and Wood also attribute the growth in demand 
for BLLD to a good fast servi ce, lithe supply has created the 
demand " - IIWe are not therefore talking about an alternative 
to 1 oca 1 purchase, but an extra demand". Of the requests 
filed, they say many are for articles more than 3 years old 
which are unlikely to be available from publishers and so 
would not affect sales of current journals, while others are 
met by loans not by copies. Only 30% are photocopies. A 
large number of titles are involved and each library is 
unlikely to have more than a few copies of each of the most 
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popular journals made a year, the authors conclude. For the 
res t of the j ourna 1 s, copyi ng was regarded as on a sma 11 
scale so that lIif copying on this scale ..... is threatening 
the continued existence of such journals, their value to the 
community must be called in question ll • Of those journals 
from which a large number of copies were made, many had such 
large circulations that even a lot of copying would have had 
little effect, virtually all were in pure science and they 
were all prestige journals which would be taken by any 
1 ibrary with an interest in the field. If a journal were 
expected to be used a lot, the library would probably buy it 
anyway, because it costs to borrow from BLLD whereas if 
little use was required a library would not buy. In 
addition, BLLD often lends journals to libraries which want 
to sample it to decide whether to subscribe or not - so in 
this respect it is helping journal publishing. Even if BLLD 
did not photocopy articles but just loaned them, the 
borrowing library might photocopy anyway. Also, articles 
would often not be available because they would be out on 
loan. It could not buy that many more copies of the journals 
since there would not be that much more money available - and 
the extra copies would most likely be of the prestige, high 
circulation journals, rather than journals used infrequently. 
So, the service would deteriorate, the user would have to 
wait longer for articles and some of the least used journals 
would not be available, which would greatly harm journal 
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pub 1; shers. L; ne and Wood further poi nt out that wi th c 
royalty of 5p a copy, even those journals which are copied a 
lot (mainly high circulation ones) would receive very little 
money (and most might be eaten up by administrative costs). 
They conclude that concentrating on the question of 
photocopyi ng defl ects a ttent i on from the real problems of 
journal publishing which have little to do with photocopying 
but are the results of the difficulties mentioned. There was 
a reply to Line & Wood in the Journal of Documentation by Van 
Tongeren26 . He contends that wide-scale photocopying of 
scientific journals is affecting journal sales adversely, the 
highly specialised journals with many pages and low 
circulations being most in danger, leaving no margin for 
safety. Scientific publishers believe that BLLD is 
i nfl uenc i ng cance 11 at ion deci s ions - for one because it is 
cheap. BLLD gi ves academi eli brari es access to the 
expensive, small circulation, specialised journals, so this 
inevitably affects library budgeting in that a cancellation 
does not mean being cut off from the requisite literature. 
If people use a work, they ~ h . o u l d d pay for that use, he 
argues. Back issues should be obtained from publishers, not 
photocopied. As to the claim that BLLD is helping journal 
publishers by allowing libraries to obtain journals they 
wou 1 d not norma lly see, he wonders how often th is happens, 
especially since each society or publisher bringing out a new 
journal provides a large number of free sample copies to 
potential subscribers. Van Tongeren also criticises the size 
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of the royalty proposed by Line & Wood - why Sp per article, 
he says, why not 2Sp or 7Sp? He regards thei r fi gure as 
deri sory and wonders why payment shou 1 d not be per page 
rather than per article. Line & Wood replied to these 
charges, also in the Journal of Documentation, reiterating 
many of thei r earl i er poi nts27 . Duri ng the 1960' s, they 
s ta te, j ourna 1 pub 1 ish i ng seemed to have a boom peri od and 
only in the 1970's were its problems suggested to be the 
result of widespread photocopying. I f there was a 
relationship, it should have been evident earlier. It is 
libraries· lack of money to buy journals which has caused all 
the problems and this is a worldwide phenomenon even 
stretching to countries with no equivalent of the BLLD. A 
radical review is needed of journal publication, they 
continue, since conventional publishing is a very expensive 
way of reaching a 1 imited number of people - new forms are 
requi red. Tryi ng to squeeze more money out of 1 i brari es is 
not the best way of dealing with the problems and just 
deflects attention away from them. Libraries help scientific 
literature through input into it by providing works, and 
through its dissemination. Reprints are not widely available 
from publishers. Free samples of new journals may be 
available but it may be easier to go to BLLD. Line & Wood 
say that a royalty of 2Sp would not work because libraries 
would then borrow instead - and might then copy it. The 
library first started photocopying because it noticed that 
many journals were sent back as soon as they were received, 
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so borrowers were obviously copying. Payment per page is not 
recorrunended because it woul d pena 1 i se journa 1 s wi th 1 arge 
pages and high dens i ti es of pri nt per page, d i scouragi ng 
production economies. 
The above discussion, if nothing else, should show how 
difficult it is to prove a causal relationship between 
increases in large scale photocopying and declining sales and 
subscri pt ions of j ourna 1 s and books although one must note 
that the Line & Wood and Van Tongeren works are fairly old. 
It is only the scale of the problem which is likely to have 
changed, however, not the nature. A person may photocopy 
part of a book or an article but would he buy it in the 
abs ence of the ab il i ty to photocopy, or wou 1 d he copy by 
hand, or would he just get by without the work? Therein lies 
one of the problems - you could ask people if they would buy 
the work if they could not photocopy it, but it would be a 
hypothetical question - who knows what people would do if 
they could not photocopy? Similarly, there are problems of 
cause and effect - do peop 1 e cancel subs cri pt ions because 
photocopying is available or because of other factors? As in 
most cases, the situation is rather more complex than it is 
sometimes depicted - photocopying is probably just one of a 
number of factors that come into play; its ready 
availability and accessibility may just clinch the argument 
rather than bei ng the determi ni ng factor - ; t may make the 
decision easier. In all these areas, there would seem room 
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for a good econometric study but any such study would face 
severe difficulties. The main problem would seem to be data. 
There might be a natural inclination not to supply the data 
in case the results do not back up your side of the argument 
or are inconclusive. Such a study would 
co-operati on of pub 1 i shers and subscri bers. 
require the 
Nasri 28 thinks 
that reprography is not the main reason for loss of 
subscriptions. Cost and time were prohibiting factors in 
subscribing and avail abil i ty of the journals to 
non-subscri bers was the rna in reason for non-subscri pti on -
the presence of 1 i brari es was a more important factor than 
photocopying. Other factors affecting subscription were the 
amount the person had to read and budget cuts. In some 
cases, librarians had introduced subscribers to the journals 
and in others photocopying had actually done so. The user is 
selective in his reading since the growing number of journals 
means that he cannot read everything ;n his field and their 
prices are rising. 
Library Photocopying, Fair Use and the Needs of Research and 
Scholarship 
It is generally accepted that the rights of copyright owners 
should not be absolute and that those working in the 
non-profit making education sector should be able to make use 
of copyright works to a certain extent since they are in the 
vanguard of the di ssemi nat; on of knowl edge and facil; tate 
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progress. What is in doubt, however, is the extent of this 
freedom of use and the conditions attached to it. Many 
countries, including the U.K., allow libraries to supply 
single copies of works in their collections realiSing that 
progress depends on the results of research being widely 
disseminated. Many authors are more interested in their 
works being widely read than in making money from them. The 
argument is that research would be adversely affected if 
researchers and students could not at least make single 
copies and similarly if there were too many regulations 
research would be unnecessarily hindered and delayed. In 
such cases, the pub 1 i c interest must overri de the interests 
of the copyright owner, but as in all cases it is a matter of 
balance. In any case, teachers and research workers may open 
up new fields of knowledge for authors and publishers, which 
will obviously benefit them29 . In the field of teaching, it 
is argued that it should even be allowable for multiple 
copies to be made because it makes for more efficient 
teaching - making sure that students have all the material 
needed for courses and allowing teachers to assume that 
students have done all the required reading30 • It is better 
than having to rely on the library, where books tend to go 
missing when needed, or they become vandalised; and 
1 i brari es cannot cope wi th 1 arge numbers of students after 
the same books anyway31. The ability to make multiple copies 
gives the teacher control of course work since its content is 
not then dictated by what is in the text books32 . 
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A particularly thorny issue in the area is that of 'fair 
dealing' since the 1956 Act does not define it and there seem 
to have been few legal cases on the subject. In 1958, the 
Society of Authors and the Publishers Association issued a 
joint statement saying that they would regard copying for 
criticism or review as fair dealing if a single extract up to 
400 words or a series of extracts (of which none exceeded 300 
words) to a total of 800 words were taken from a prose work 
in copyright. There were also guidelines for poems and 
collections for schools33 • The law also requires "sufficient 
acknowledgement" of source for such criticism and review. 
This joint statement was followed in 1965 by a pamphlet, 
"Photocopying and the Law" 34 published because librarians and 
pub 1 i shers found it i rri tati ng to have to seek and provi de 
permi ss i on to copy, even where on ly a sma 11 proporti on was 
taken, because librarians were regarding copying as not 
substantial or fair dealing even when it was not because it 
was such a nuisance to obtain consent and because there was a 
danger of the law being ignored or being regarded as unfair 
or unreasonable35 . Music was not covered by the scheme nor 
were articles from periodicals. The two organisations said 
they would regard it as fair dealing if a single copy were 
made for research or pri vate study from a copyri ght work 
(book) of a single extract of not more than 4,000 words, or a 
series of extracts, of which none was more than 3.000 words, 
to a total of 8,000 words prov i ded the total amount cop; ed 
never exceeded 10% of the whole work36 . The general licence 
was meant to a 11 ow 1 i brari ans to copy wi th in the 1 imi ts set 
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out wi thout havi ng to get in touch wi th the pub 1 i shers and 
authors concerned to obtain their permission to do so, as 
laid down under S7 and the Copyright (Libraries) Regulations, 
1957 but librarians still have to obtain a written 
declaration, under the Act, from the person requiring the 
copy, that he wants the single copy for research or private 
study and has not previously been supplied \t/ith a copy. This 
requirement is a source of annoyance amongst librarians, as 
noted by Barker. For multiple copying, the copyright ownerls 
consent is still required. Single copies of illustrations 
may also be made in the course of instruction in a school or 
educational establishment subject to acknowledgement. 
In recent years, with the photocopying problem seemingly 
getti ng worse, pub 1 i shers have been attempti ng to set up a 
blanket licensing scheme. The music publishers, however, 
were not interested in this and have set up their own code of 
fair practice, IIFair copying Rules OK!II with a number of 
music user organisations, starting in 1979. The code is not 
comprehensive - not all publishers and music copyright owners 
have signed it, but a great many have. Nor does it cover 
foreign imported publications. All music users may use it, 
not just those that participated in drawing it up and 
permi ss ion provi ded by the code app 1 i es equally to 
organisations, individuals and those acting on behalf of the 
user. The code sets out two general principles - that 
copyri ght owners (composers and pub 1 i shers) II recogn i se the 
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need of musicians and students for reasonable access to 
copyright material so that their music may be widely 
performed and studied ll and that composers and publ ishers 
require compensation to maintain the economic incentive and 
means for creating and publishing music. Copying to avoid 
hire or purchase will always be wrong. This is followed by 
ten cases where copyright owners will allow copies of music 
to be made without instituting proceedings, subject to a 
copyri ght notice on each copy. These inc 1 ude emergenc i es , 
performance difficulties and future reference. All cases are 
hedged with limitations such as that replacements be bought 
as soon as possible and copies destroyed or copies returned 
with other hire material and with 1 imitations as to the 
extent of copying such as that it be less than a performable 
unit. The procedure for copying. of seemingly out of print 
works and ordered music which has not been supplied is also 
laid down. Seven prohibitions are then laid down such as 
copying to make anthologies and selling or hiring copies made 
under the permissions section. The main problems, it notes, 
may be over serious music. Both codes (the Music Publishers 
and Society of Authors/Publishers Association Codes) are not 
1 ega lly enforceable but were welcome because they at 1 east 
provide some guidelines in a very uncertain environment. 
In the US, the concept of fair dealing was a judicially 
created one and was included in the latest 1976 US Copyright 
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revision Act. The US also saw c major case on this 
particular subject in the Williams & Wilkins Company v the 
United States. As a result, there is rather less uncertainty 
about the issue there than in the UK, although even now 
problems are still arising there. The previous US Copyright 
Act 1909, did not provide for exceptions to the copyright 
owner's exclusive right to copy37 nor did it define or 
provi de for fa i r dea 1 i ng, whi ch had to be developed by the 
courts. As Nasri notes38 , this was of deep concern to the 
education sector. A "Gentlemen's Agreement" between some of 
the groups involved, including publishers, laid down limited 
guidel ines on the subject in 1935 39. Various other groups 
also laid down guidelines. Meanwhile, the fair use doctrine 
developed which lIallowed the copying of small portions of 
copyrighted works, for a legitimate purpose, in circumstances 
where such copying would have no appreciable effect on the 
copyright owner's market for his work ll 40. The concept of 
fair use has always created problems, however. A widely 
quoted statement is that in the case of Dellar V Samuel 
Goldwyn, Inc. that lithe issue of fair use .... is the most 
1 1 f . h ,AI St· troub 1 esome in the who e aw 0 copyrl g t.... . ec lon 
107 of the new US Copyright Act gives statutory recognition 
to the fair use doctrine and restates it to include copying 
for criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship or research. 
I t then 1 i sts 4 factors to ta ke into account when dec i ding 
whether a use is fair - the purpose and character of the use, 
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including whether such use is of a commercial nature or for 
non-profit educational purposes, the nature of the 
copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole 
and the effect of the use upon the potenti a 1 market for or 
value of the copyrighted work. The examples given are not 
exhaustive, however, but just give guidelines. Presumably, 
other factors may also be taken into account since the 
statute just says that the factors to be considered include 
these four. The four factors are basically the same ones 
that the courts have used for many years in determining fair 
use 42. The nature of the use and its economi c effect are 
usually the decisive factors with the other two only being 
significant when the former factors are inapplicable or 
indecisive43 . Freid44 notes that under the US Constitution 
copyri ght is intended to promote the arts and sci ence by 
giving authors exclusive rights so as to provide an economic 
incentive. Thus, if copyright works are used to benefit arts 
and sc i ences, the purposes of copyri ght are bei ng advanced 
even though the copyright owner's exclusive rights are being 
infringed, so that the courts will often allow the use so as 
not to arrest progress in the arts and sciences. The factor 
concerned with the economic effect of the use is to protect 
the economic incentive system provided by copyright to 
encourage creation and dissemination of copyright works - if 
the economi c effect of the use is an adverse one, th is wi 11 
damage the incentive, in which case it may not be fair use. 
Thus, a delicate balancing act between a beneficial effect 
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(progress in the arts and sciences) and a detrimental effect 
(damaging the incentive) is required. The problems arise 
when the use ei ther affects nei ther factor or both factors 
since then the effect is ambiguous. In other cases, it 
should be fairly easy to tell whether fair use is involved or 
not. Freid45 notes that a problem may arise in proving 
adverse economic harm if this is taken as meaning that the 
copyright owner has to prove that some use of his work IItends 
to diminish or prejudice the potential sale of the 
plaintiff1s work ll (a comparison between the actual market and 
the market that would have existed if no use had taken 
place). Obviously, however, it is virtually impossible to 
calculate the latter hypothetical market. Therefore, some of 
the courts have used a probable effects test - the copyright 
owner has to show that the probable economi c effect of the 
use will be harmful. The 1976 Act also regulates library 
photocopying but the provisions are complex and I shall not 
deal with them here46 . In general, though, libraries are not 
allowed to systematically reproduce or distribute single or 
multiple copies, involving deliberate substitution of 
photocopying for the buying of the copyrighted work47. Nor is 
the related or concerted reproduction of multiple copies or 
phonorecords of the same material allowed48 . 
The case of Williams & Wilkins Co. V The United States was 
the first major court decision on whether large scale 
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photocopying of copyrighted works in libraries was an 
infringement of copyright actionable before the courts. It 
lasted 8 years, ending in February 1975 in the Supreme 
Court49 . Thus, it took place before the passing of the 
rev i sed Act. I t represented a test case and as a resu 1 t 
parties on all sides sought and were allowed to file briefs 
as amicae curiae50 . Williams & Wilkins is a major publisher 
of medi ca 1 journa 1 s and books, four journa 1 s of whi ch were 
the subject of the case. All four were copyrighted and 
revenue was mainly from subscriptions (which were small in 
number) with a small percentage from advertising51 . The 
company brought the suit on the grounds that the Deparment of 
Health, Education and Welfare, through the National Institute 
of Health (NIH) and the National Library of Medicine (NLM) 
infringed its copyright in the four journals by making 
unauthorised photocopies of articles from them52 . In 1970, 
the NIH filed 85,744 requests for photocopies of journal 
articles, totalling about 930,000 pages. With an average of 
10 pages per article, this is about 93,000 photocopies53 . In 
1968, about 120,000 requests were fill ed by NLM by 
photocopying single articles54 . Both NIH and NLM conceded 
that they made at least one photocopy of each of eight 
articles from the four journals between 29 September 1967 and 
12 January 1968, the request having been made by researchers 
in connection with and solely for the purposes of their 
professional work55 . In all eight cases the article was more 
than 21-22 months old56 . Williams and Wilkins sought 
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"reasonable and entire compensation ll for the infringement 
while stating that photocopying was essential and that it did 
not want to interfere with it - the company just wanted to be 
paid for any photocopying from their journals. The main 
argument concerned fair use. The government argued that the 
copying was fair use while Williams and Wilkins said that 
fa i r use only comes into play when a sma 11 amount ot" copyi ng 
occurs
57
• The case was first heard by the Commissioner of 
the Court of Claims who found that NLM and NIH had infringed 
William and Wilkins copyright and were liable for 
infringement - the libraries engaged in wholesale copying and 
met none of the cri teri a for fa i ruse, he sa i d, since the 
photocopies are exact duplicates of the original, substitute 
for the originals and diminish the plaintiff's market by 
substituting for a subscription58 . The government appealed 
to the whole of the Court of Claims and the decision was 
reversed by a m a j o r ~ ~ ty of 4 
-
3 - it was f . 59 a1r use . The 
decision rested on 3 main planks, as noted b N .60 y aSrl 
-
that 
Williams and Wilkins had not been able to show substantial 
concrete harm through the NIH and NLM I s photocopyi ng 
practices, (the court did not use a probable effects test as 
suggested by Freid); that medical science and research would 
be seriously damaged if library photocopying were not allowed 
because of an inadequate supply of reprints and back issues 
and unwi 11 i ngness or i nabil i ty of 1 i brari es to subscri be to 
journals which will only be used rarely; that the balance to 
be struck between the interests of science and those of 
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publishers/copyright owners was one for legislative not 
judicial action so the court would not risk harming medicine 
and science in the interim. The case finally went on appeal 
to the Supreme Court which upheld the previous Court's 
decision - that the use was fair - even though, as Treece61 
notes, it split 4-4, meaning that the 16 judicial officers 
involved in the series of cases were equally divided 8-8. 
This gives some idea of how evenly balanced the competing 
claims were. 
As regards fair use, one has to show extreme vigilence if the 
author's position is not to deteriorate and if the balance is 
not to shift too far away from him. In the UK, there does 
seem to be quite a lot of freedom to copy, especially if one 
considers that fair dealing only comes into effect if a 
substantial part of a work is taken, always remembering, of 
course, that substantiality refers to the quality of the work 
taken as we 11 as its quantity so that anyone can take other 
than a substantial part. There does seem to be a certain 
amount of uncertainty at the margin as to just how far fair 
dealing can go which is not helped by the fact that many of 
the terms in the 1956 Act are not defined. Undoubtedly, the 
development of copying technology has created more 
uncerta i nty and problems. The Whi tford Report62 menti ons a 
number of the criticisms librarians have of the law - for 
example, there was a general call for simplification. The 
declarations required under S7 were regarded as annoying and 
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of little use. The examples were given of a person asking 
for 25 copies of the same article supported by 25 
declarations with 25 different signatures and of a research 
worker in a commercial organisation asking a 1 ibrary 
privileged under S7 for a copy of an article after declaring 
that the article is for research (not necessarily private 
study) . The Whitford Report notes that there are no 
sanctions for false declarations and users are very impatient 
with formal procedures if only a few pages are needed. In 
many cases, 1 ibrari ans fi nd it very di ffi cul t to make sure 
the regulations are kept to - for example, in industrial and 
commercial libraries and where machines are worked by 
individual users. The Whitford Report further notes that 
libraries would like more freedom to copy for wear and tear, 
out of pri nt works, and where securi ty is important, for 
example. As to teaching, it states that all educationalists 
want more freedom, especially because of changes in methods 
of teaching with the growth of resource-based learning and 
the use of a wide range of teaching material and sources made 
possible by t e c h ~ o l o g i c a l l development. Teachers are likely 
.. 
to want to make multiple copies while individual researchers 
will only want single copies. It is difficult, even in a 
genera 1 sense, to pi n down what exactly fair use is - as 
P loman & Hamil ton note 63 . lsi t i nfri ngement of copyri ght 
which is allowed or does it not infringe copyright at all ab 
, 't' ? 1n1 10 •• Virtually all countries, however, make provision 
for fair use and it is included in both the major copyright 
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conventi ons, although, its scope vari es between countri es. 
What is clear is that it is very difficult to strike a 
balance between the varying interests through fair use. One 
can see that the concept of fair use could get in the way of 
a solution to the photocopying problem, especially as regards 
blanket licensing, where as comprehensive as possible a 
coverage is required. A solution is required and quickly 
(although one might conceivably think that the problem has 
been with us so long with nothing being done and the various 
parties stumbling from crisis to crisis that time is not of 
the essence - is the publishing industry in that much of a 
mess and if it is, is it a result of photocopying? Or bad 
management? Recession? A number of reasons?). 
The Solutions 
The Whi tford Report64 notes that efforts to prevent copyi ng 
through technical methods such as a coat of fluorescent dye 
on documents have met with no great success, so the solution, 
it seems, is unlikely to come in this way. Nor did the 
Whitford Report regard this as a desirable solution. This 
would seem to be a case of cutting off your nose to spite 
your face as photocopying does fulfil a vast number of very 
useful and beneficial functions by no means all of which are 
illegal. It is an aid to progress, education and research, 
and the way to deal with the problem would not seem to be to 
cripple the technology, but to find a practical solution to a 
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practical problem, given the technology. Weston65 suggests a 
technical solution but from the point of view of publishing 
technology - increasing the cost of photocopies by spreading 
articles over more pages, making the size of pages of 
journals or books greater than that that can be handled by a 
photocopier, using thick paper or different colour 
combinations to make the photocopy unreadable. The problem 
with all these ideas is that they would also increase the 
costs of publishers at a time when they are already 
experiencing steadily rising costs. The result would probably 
be that the price of journals would have to rise which would 
worsen the situation. Similarly, making journals bigger than 
the size a photocopier can handle would just lead to 
development of larger photocopiers, so publishers would be 
back to square one. Such a solution could only be a short 
term one. 
A further solution advocated, for example, by Michael King in 
the Times Higher Education Supplement (24 September 1982) is 
a fair use code similar to the one contained in the latest US 
revision. He seems to regard a blanket licensing scheme as 
lIa licence to print money" by publishers. This seems to be 
rather an exaggeration since there is no need for this to be 
so if the scheme is run properly. There are similar schemes 
in the mus i c fi e 1 d and these do not seem to be just money 
grabbing exercises, especially since there is a tribunal, the 
Performing Right Tribunal, to make sure this does not happen. 
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He also seems to think that such a scheme is likely to 
greatly restrict the dissemination of knowledge in the 
education field. Again, there is no reason why this should 
be so. He suggests that a set of guidelines be drawn up by 
representatives of authors, publishers and teachers. Surely, 
though, we have something akin to this already in 
IIPhotocopyi ng and the Law ll and wh i 1 e such gu i de 1 i nes are 
undoubtedly useful they do not seem to have solved any of the 
problems involved - the situation does not seem to be any 
better now than it was when they came out and it may even be 
worse. As long as you allow exceptions as with fair dealing, 
you have the problem of defining the lim1ts of those 
exceptions which ultimately have the effect of increasing the 
uncertainty of the situation. King also suggests that 
educationalists be their own police officers and enforce the 
guidelines themselves but in the present climate of mistrust 
on both sides, this is unlikely to be possible and how is 
this control going to be possible anyway? The American 
IIcode ll is very complex even for lawyers and may cause more 
problems than it solves. The problem with such a complex 
code written into a statute, as de Freitas66 notes, is that 
it is ufrozen" for a very long time and is very difficult to 
change. In the field of copyright, flexibility is of the 
essence because the situation changes so quickly. Surely 
this is the lesson of previous copyright statutes. IIToday l s 
code may be unsuitable for tomorrow I s situation ll67 • Even in 
the simplest cases of fair use you have to decide whether to 
adopt a narrow or a wide definition - in the case of private 
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use, for example, does the user have to make the copy 
himse1f?68. Are you going to take account of the qualitative 
difference between reprography and hand cOpying?69 One might 
add typewriting too. One might redefine fair dealing and 
make it more precise, but the problems remain. There wi 11 
always be pressure to extend the 1 imi ts outwards especially 
since there are more users than creators. The Green Paper 
says that preventing the making of copies for research or 
private study would probably be ignored when the student 
controlled the photocopier himself, but goes on to say that 
the government intends keeping the right of individual 
students to make copies but tightening up the provisions to 
prevent abuses. Surely, though, that is the crux of the 
prob 1 em - no matter how you try to defi ne or change the 
provisions, the student in most cases will have control of 
the machine so that he can just ignore the law. Would not a 
new approach be preferable? 
Another sol ut i on often proposed is a 1 evy on photocopyi ng 
equipment, so that the manufacturers not the users will have 
to pay since it is they who make possible the widespread 
copying of copyright material and they can pass on the amount 
necessary to users anyway in the prices they charge for 
machines and materials70 . Surprisingly, though, there does 
not seem to be much ca 11 for a 1 evy on photocopi er paper, 
on lyon the photocopi er. The argument genera lly advanced 
against such a levy on machines is that such once and for all 
licensing would allow unlimited amounts of copying, a free 
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for all, with no way of monitoring or checking the extent of 
use, in return for a small fee 71 . Obviously, one could not 
charge a very large fee on each photocopier without 
frightening people away from buying them (although this would 
be one way of reducing the level of copying) and no 
government would bump up the fee by a massive amount anyway 
(assuming that it would take a government measure to impose 
such a 1 evy) . Expressed from an economi c poi nt of vi ew, 
buying a photocopier is a once and for all activity, so it is 
a I sunk cost I and what is needed is a way of ensuri ng that 
people pay a fee in proportion to the amount of material they 
copy, a way of i ncreas i ng the margi na 1 cost of use. The 
obvious answer would be to have a fee (royalty) per page copy 
- and th is is ac tua lly what is proposed under a different 
scheme, a blanket licensing scheme with no levy on the 
machiner,Y. A variant of this is to have a levy on both the 
machine and the material. Another problem would be to keep 
administration costs down so that copyright owners do not 
ultimately only receive a pittance. Also, what about copiers 
presently in existence? Is the levy just going to be on new 
machines or old ones as well? If the latter course is 
adopted, how do you track them a 11 down? I f the former 
course is adopted, you have an area where large scale copying 
is occurring without recompense for copyright owners 
effectively the same situation as at present. The other 
criticism levelled at such a levy is that it would unfairly 
prejudice a person who only used such photocopiers rarely to 
photocopy copyright material or who did not photocopy 
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copyright material at all and photocopiers that were 
similarly used seldom. This was the main reason why the 
Whi tford Commi ttee di d not recommend a 1 evy on photocopi ers 
whereas it did for private tape recording of records 72 . One 
must remember that a much larger proportion of the works 
copied onto tape recorders from the radio or records is 
copyri ght than the materi a 1 copi ed on photocopyi ng mach i nes. 
Di etz notes 73 that the reason the West German authori ti es 
turned down a levy on reprographic equipment but not on tape 
and video recorders was because it was thought that private 
photocopying did not adversely affect sales of printed works 
like private recording affected sales of records. Dietz74 
menti ons that France has adopted such a scheme but outs ide 
copyright law in that a levy was introduced under the 1976 
Finance Law of 0.2% on sales by book publishers of most types 
and 3% on sales of reprograph i c equ i pment by manufacturers 
and importers, the money going to the Centre National des 
Lettres for the advancement of wri ters in general and the 
promotion of books. Dietz, notes another criticism - that it 
mi ght seem to 1 ega 1 i se all ill ega 1 photocopyi ng. Such a 
solution would be simple, however75 . 
Other solutions put forward are that when journals are sold 
to libraries, research organisations and other institutions, 
purchasers would have certain rights of reproduction in 
return for much higher prices 76 although print runs might be 
much lower; publishing abstracts or summaries first and then 
supplying separate prints of the full articles on demand; 
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publishing more offprints of articles; for books, publishing 
some textbooks in parts (say chapters) as well as in full 
work fOnT! (although this would increase risks and prices); 
publishers providing their own photocopying service or 
providing microfilm copies (which some do now) from which 
copies and full size photocopies could be made (the extra 
price covering copying up to a certain level)?? 
The most often talked about solution for the problem is a 
blanket licensing scheme, run by a collecting society 
representing authors' and publishers' interests under which, 
in return for royalty fees, those who wi sh to reproduce 
copyright material (journals and books) by reprographic means 
can do so prov i ded the work is; n the repertoi re of the 
society. Individual copyright owners give the society the 
authority to issue licences so that as long as the users pay 
the royalties due, they can copy as much as they like 
(a 1 though there may be 1 im; ts) . The soc; ety co 11 ects the 
roya 1 ti es owi ng and di stri butes the revenue to its members 
whose works have been copied in proportion, as far as 
possible, to the extent that each work has been copied after 
deduction of its administration costs. To enable the revenue 
to be properly distributed, information on the extent of 
copyi n9 of each work may be requ ired, so any such scheme 
mi ght requ ire a certa in amount of record-keepi ng by users, 
libraries, maybe even individuals, unless some other way is 
used to distribute revenue. Sampling might be a compromise. 
The essence of the scheme is that licensing is collective -
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individual copyright owners do not collect and neaotiate 
"" 
their own royalties, they leave it to the society. The 
advantage of such schemes will be examined in later chapters. 
The situation in the music field where PPL and PRS operate 
blanket schemes subject to certain differences, seems very 
much akin to the problems faced by copyright owners in books 
and journals in enforcing their rights. In many cases, the 
user is unwi 11 i ng or unable to contact the copyri ght owner 
and the copyri ght owner is unable to see when his work is 
being copied because of the thousands of reprographic devices 
in operation and the number of establishments in which they 
are housed. In many cases, the reproduction right is 
unenforceable. Such a scheme would certainly answer the 
criticism of many that there is unnecessary delay and 
difficulty in contacting copyright owners for permission -
once a user had a licence he would not have to get in touch 
with the copyright owner. All he would have to do would be 
to pay the royalties and probably keep records. The present 
system seems rather a slow, cumbersome, time consuming and 
complicated way of doing things. Administrative work is 
reduced and simplified. 
One difference between the reprographic field and the music 
field in which PRS and PPL operate is that the performances 
PRS and PPL deal with are publicised in newspapers, on 
posters and the like, whereas the copying of books, 
periodicals and so forth is obviously not - no-one knows it 
is happening or when except for the copier and those near to 
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him in the library. This is obviously going to cause more 
headaches for licensing. In addition, the reprography 
problem differs from the problem of the home taping of 
records, despite some similarities, in that home taping takes 
place in private and one cannot invade the privacy of the 
home, whereas photocopying is actually done in public and one 
can see it being done. The problem of reprographic 
reproduct i on has been around for qu i te some time and the 
difficulties faced by authors seem quite similar to those of 
composers who long ago set up collecting societies to solve 
the problems. So why has it taken authors so long to do the 
same thing? It would seem that the answer is that there are 
many more authors than composers so it is very difficult to 
develop a consensus or get them together. In addition, 
authors are very slow and reluctant to organise anyway, 
although this would also apply to composers and they 
eventually managed to form societies. A blanket licensing 
scheme for reprography was recommended by the Whitford 
Committee. 
A number of potential problems may present themselves in the 
operation of a blanket licensing scheme. The first problem 
is to ensure that the scheme does not eat up so much of the 
revenue received in the form of administration expenses that 
there is little left for copyright owners. The fixed costs 
of setting up any such scheme are likely to be quite high and 
revenues, in the initial stages, are likely to be low. But 
as the scheme catches on, the society becomes more adept at 
Page 129 
its job and at enforcement, the 1 eve 1 of coverage increases 
and economies of scale come into play, distributable revenue 
should increase so that copyright owners receive quite 
sizeable sums (although, of course, the distribution of sums 
between different copyright owners is likely to be very wide 
and highly skewed). The most likely cause of administration 
expenses taking up a large proportion of revenue is an 
attempt to be too accurate in distribution - going too far in 
attempting to match the extent of copying of each work with 
the amount of money distributed to each copyright owner 
according to the extent of copying of each of his works. The 
collecting societies have tended to find that their greatest 
expense is personnel, although there would seem to be a lot 
of scope for computerisation. Obviously, a society must have 
someway of deciding how much to distribute to each copyright 
owner and the extent of use is the logical one to employ but, 
at least at the beginning, the system should be simple to 
operate and understand and fairly cheap. The users will also 
want a system which is easy to understand and operate and one 
which does not involve them in too much record keeping, which 
is a burden on thei r time and resources otherwi se the 
scheme will be much less attractive to them, especially if it 
is a voluntary as opposed to a compulsory or statutory 
system. The problem of record keeping, in fact, is one which 
has caused a fa i r deal of fri ct i on between pub 1 i shers and 
libraries and other educational users in the UK and has been 
one of the sticking points in setting up a scheme. Limited 
samp 1 i ng requ i ri ng the keepi ng of records on ly for a few 
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weeks or only by large volume users for longer might get 
round the problem; or no record keepi ng at all mi ght be 
required by assuming that lithe proportionate volume of 
reproductions by all users from anyone journal is roughly 
equivalent to the proportionate volume of its subscriptions 
or sales ll78 • Or the user might only have to note the total 
number of pages or articles copied by him from all the 
journals in his collection. To be effective, a scheme would 
also mean the society employing personnel, similar to the 
licensing inspectors who work for PRS, to monitor buildings 
and premises and provide licences and take action where they 
discover infringements; the society would also have to take 
infringers to court to set precedents in a similar way to PRS 
in its early days. This will tend to add disproportionately 
to costs. It will also be necessary to ignore infringements 
in small libraries and premises since these may not be 
economically viable to licence. Breyer79 also suggests that 
there may be problems with the size of revenues especially if 
one cons i ders that a lot of 1 i censees wi 11 be schools and 
libraries. These are unlikely to be able to pay large sums 
for licences, particularly in view of the present education 
cuts (although they can always pass the cost onto users). 
Even if one argued that copyright fees had to be paid in the 
same way that books have to be pa i d for, or school desks, 
royalties would still have to take account of the economic 
circumstances of licensees and in the reprography field, 
there are just no organisations that could afford to pay the 
sort of sums of money PRS gets from the BBC and the 
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independent tel ev is i on and rad i 0 compan i es except for 
commercial organisations although these only account for a 
sma 11 part of copyi ng. Those users whi ch copy most are 
primarily public bodies like libraries and schools. Whereas 
new outlets and markets are being found all the time for the 
public performance and broadcasting of music, this is not 
really the case for the reprographic reproduction of books 
and journals. Thus, the area such a society would be engaged 
in would be very specialised and unlikely to produce revenues 
of the magnitude enjoyed in the music field. The only way 
round such a limitation would seem to be for the society to 
widen its interests into other areas. A lot depends on the 
philosophy behind setting up the society - is it to maximise 
revenues for its members like the collecting societies in the 
music field, is it to have a commercial motive and 
orientation or is it just to control the reprography problem 
and at 1 east obta in some remunerat i on for copyri ght owners, 
however small? It is the total amount receivable from all 
1 i brari es taken together that counts, not just the amount 
from individual libraries80 . Breyer81 notes that the royalty 
may not be high enough to significantly help authors, 
especially since most copying is of different articles, but 
it may be high enough to persuade some not to photocopy. One 
might regard both as unacceptable. 
A further problem is getti ng enough authors and pub 1 i shers 
interested in a blanket licensing scheme to make it worthy of 
its name, as Freegard82 notes, so that a person knows that 
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when he receives his licence he is not going to infringe the 
copyright of an owner who is not a part of the scheme. The 
lower the coverage the 1 ess attracti ve the scheme is 1 i kely 
to be to users and the more difficult it wi 11 be to get them 
to join. The problems are 1 ikely to be greater in the case 
of books and journals than of music because there are so many 
more authors. Freegard83 , for example, notes that in the 
music field, virtually all the works publicly performed are 
published, the composer generally assigns his whole copyright 
to the pub 1 i sher (who then ass i gns it to PRS), and at the 
time of formation of PRS there were relatively few publishers 
in business and they quickly recognised the benefits of 
blanket licensing. The situation is somewhat different in the 
literary world - authors do not usually assign their whole 
copyright to their publishers, they licence individual rights 
to them, many authors are reluctant joiners (although so are 
composers as the hi story of the performi ng ri ght shows) and 
some authors only want widespread dissemination of their 
works not financial reward (although this also goes for 
composers). There are also a large number of book p u b l ~ s ~ e r s s
in .a highly competitive industry. One solution is legislation 
along the lines that the author can only exercise his rights 
through a collecting society, a device used in West Germany 
in the case of audio and video recording. The Whitford 
Report suggested a solution in this vein84 - no copying which 
conflicted with lithe copyright owner's normal modes of 
exploitation", such as distribution of copies to the public, 
would be allowed. As few societies as possible would be 
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allowed so that users do not have to obtain a large number of 
1 i cences . Th is wou 1 d also keep cos ts down. Rates mi ght be 
reduced in return for statistics on copying of copyright 
material. 
A further criticism often put forward is that it is inherent 
in the need for a society·s repertoire to be as comprehensive 
as possible that the society would be a monopoly or at least 
an oligopolistic organisation in its field. This obviously 
opens up the possibility of criticism on the grounds that 
publishers will try to IImilkll the users by charging excessive 
rates or refusing licences arbitrarily. This is almost 
exactly the same sort of charge levelled at PRS and PPL when 
they were set up. The result was the es tab 1 i shment of the 
Performing Right Tribunal under the 1956 Act to settle 
disputes on licences and their terms and conditions. This 
has done a lot to alleviate the criticisms. In fact, the 
Whi tford report suggested such an arbi trati on tribunal. It 
recommended that the PRT carry out the task under a new name, 
the Copyright Tribunal, not only in the field of reprography 
~ b u t t in other areas for which the Committee recommended 
blanket licensing as well - with widened powers. 
The other problem to overcome is whether fair use will 
continue to apply. If so, there would be no incentive for 
1 i brari ans to obta i n 1 i cences under a scheme so the system 
would be undermined. Certainly, even if the fair dealing 
provisions were mainta.ined for private copying and research 
and private study, they would have to be considerably 
ti ghtened up and defi ned wi th a great deal of preci s i on to 
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prevent the uncertain situation which exists at present. 
This is probably not possible. One must always remember, as 
Whi tford notes t that 1 i brari es depend on authors and 
publishers (and to a greater extent than vice versa, I should 
th ink) • I f a person obta ins copi es by reprograph i c means 
rather than by hand with all the concomitant savings it seems 
only fair that the author and publisher should receive at 
least a reasonable royalty for it. To repeat the often 
quoted argument in copyright fields, no-one expects 
manufacturers of books, desks, pencils or whatever to provide 
their goods free, so why should authors simply because their 
rights are difficult to enforce? As Whitford says, just 
because education i tse 1 f is a good cause, there is no real 
reason why copyright owners should subsidise it. It has been 
generally accepted that when music is used for public 
performance, broadcasting and diffusion, regardless of 
whether this is by a profit making organisation or not and 
regardless of its size and purpose, then royalties have to be 
paid. What is so different about reprographic reproduction? 
To use Dietz's argument, those who copy copyright works are 
doing so to achieve their own targets, regardless of whether 
these are financial or non-financial, they are profiting 
(albeit in a non-financial way) from the copyright owner's 
work and the copyright owner is a supplier and as such, like 
a 11 other supp 1 i ers of goods and servi ces, has to be pa i d. 
There is also the problem that in many cases, the material 
copied will not. be ln copyright or will be internally 
generated. The Whitford Report suggests that it will be up 
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to the users to negotiate reductions in the licence fees to 
take account of th is - for example, one of the schemes in 
West Germany ha 1 ves the fee payable based on the assumpti on 
that half the material copied will be non-copyright. This is 
also a problem from the point of view of the EEC Commission 
which objects to collecting societies charging for 
non-copyright material. The Green Paper seems to be in 
favour of blanket licensing and a Copyright Tribunal to deal 
with disputes from such a scheme but says that it would be 
unfair to deprive students of the use of a photocopier which 
is just another too 1 of modern technology. But the 
government intends tightening up the fair dealing provisions 
to prevent the making of multiple copies and to make sure 
that the exceptions are not used "for research for the 
business ends of commercial organisations". In view of the 
preceding discussion this seems rather an unacceptable 
approach. Whitford also suggested upper limits to the 
1 i cences - one coul d not a 11 ow 1 i cences for uses whi ch 
involved exploitation of the work through publication nor 
could one allow a publisher to demand a licence to reproduce 
the works of another, for example. 
The scheme would have to be flexible and would not be needed 
in all areas. The music publishers, for instance, are quite 
happy with their code of fair practice. Then there are 
q u e ~ t i o n s s of a policy and constitutional nature - is it to be 
a voluntary or a statutory scheme? Is it to be compulsory 
licensing with a fee to be set by statute? As CIC Systems 
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says85, a voluntary system is more flexib1e and can be 
changed more easily by negotiation according to experience 
and changing circumstances and it is nearer to the philosophy 
of copyright that the copyright owner should be able to 
decide what happens to his work and have control over uses of 
it. A fee set in a statute may be very difficult to change _ 
note the difficulty of altering the figure for the compulsory 
1 i cence for record i ng mu sica 1 works in both the UK a nd US. 
And compulsory licences are not very popular amongst 
copyright owners who, after all, have to implement any 
scheme. How is the licensing body to be run? Is it to be a 
Government agency or a statutory corporati on wi th members 
appointed partly by Government, partly by copyright owners, 
part ly by users or who 11y by Government? Or it may be 1 eft 
entirely to copyright owners. Similarly, the activities of 
the society may be controlled by special legislation, 
anti-trust legislation, or by special tribuna1 86 . Then, 
there is the question of the distribution system by the 
society is distribution to be to individual authors 
according to use of their works, or is the money to be paid 
into a centra 1 fund for the help and welfare of authors in 
general. The distribution system for general welfare of 
authors is genera lly used wnere it is thought that problems 
of record-keeping would be too great to make individual 
distribution possible87 (and one must remember that vast 
amounts of information would be involved .- much more than 
that dealt with by PRS). The most popular authors subsidise 
the less popular. 
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A further alternative to a blanket licensing scheme in which 
users pay royalty fees would be one in which the Government 
paid a royalty for copying of works 1n libraries, 
universities and schools on the basis that photocopying in 
many cases produces spillover effects which are of great 
benefi t to soc; ety in general through enhanci ng and 
facilitating research and improving education, dissemination 
of information and research results88 • The great problem 
with Government involvement, however, might be the 
possibility of censorship. Also, this is unlikely to happen 
in the UK with its present Conservative administration aiming 
at Government spending cuts but the principle seems to have 
been accepted to an extent in the introduction of a publ ic 
lending right. A system on the above basis exists in Sweden. 
Discussions have been continuing for quite a while now on the 
pos s ; bi 1 ; ty of setting up a blanket 1 i cens i ng scheme for 
reprographic reproduction in the UK but questions of detail, 
political expediency and differing interpretation of fact 
have constantly been getting in the way delaying the process 
so that the negotiations have become rather bogged down. As 
a result, the discussion below may be subject to change89• 
For 10 years or so, publishers and authors have watched the 
problem of reprographic reproduction of copyright works on a 
1 a rge scale get progres s i ve ly worse. The Wh i tford Commi ttee 
had recommended a blanket 1 i cens i ng scheme in the fi e 1 din 
1977, but it was not until July 1981 that the Government 
published its reaction to the Whitford Report. In the 
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meantime, several committees, national and international, had 
mooted the idea of blanket licensing. The parties concerned 
had been thinking along these lines, although they hoped that 
the Government, through the Green Paper, would make it easier 
to set up a scheme by giving it legal and statutory backing. 
The Green Paper was almost universally greeted as a great 
disappointment, not only as regards reprography but most 
other areas as well - and a lot of hopes had been pinned on 
it. The Government seemed reluctant to do someth i ng that 
might be regarded as unpopular. The scheme has to be shown 
to have widespread support first. This was the general view 
held. The Government has also notified its reluctance to 
legislate on specific issues - it does not want a piecemeal 
approach to copyri ght reform but is more interested in an 
all-encompassing wide-ranging amendment under one statute to 
cover all problem areas. So, copyright owners were left with 
something of a problem - continue to let the problem mount or 
go about the setting up of a scheme as quickly as possible in 
the hope of obtaining Government support later on when it can 
be shown to have widespread support. They chose the latter 
course. The result was the setting up of the Publishers 
Licensing Society (PLS) entirely for the purpose of finding a 
solution to the reprography problem. It initially had just 
one employee. The Authors' Lending and Copyright Society 
Limited (ALCS) already existed on the authors' side, having 
been set up in 1977 by a group of writers who had just won 
the campaign for Public Lending Right and who noticed that 
there was no society enabling writers to administer their 
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rights collectively, (it does not deal with UK PLR, which is 
administered by a Government-appointed Registrar). These 
two soci eti es got together to form the Copyri ght Li cens i ng 
Agency Ltd (CLA) which will issue licences under a blanket 
licensing scheme for photocopying. The CLA has 11 directors 
- 6 from PLS and 5 from ALCS. PLS has 6 directors and is 
made up of 3 main bodies as its members - the Publ ishers 
Association (PA), the Periodical Publishers Association (PPA) 
and the Association of Learned and Professional Society 
Pub 1 i shers (ALPS), each of whi ch have two di rectors on the 
Board of PLS. This does not cover all publishers but most of 
them. The seemi ng 1 y comp 1 i ca ted way of runn i ng the scheme 
results, it seems, from differences of opinion between 
authors and publishers - although they are theoretically both 
working in the same direction, there have been clashes. of 
view. For example, as regards books, PLS will distribute the 
money collected to publishers while ALCS will distribute its 
share to writers and the CLA will issue licences and collect 
the money owing under them. So, we will have a situation of 
the form:-
PLS Distributes 
to Publishers 
CLA Issues Licences 
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Collects Royalties 
50% 
ALCS Distributes 
to Writers 
Both sides are agreed that this will mean administration 
costs being higher than they need be. However, they do not 
seem able to agree on a single distributive organisation _ 
ALCS believes it should be the sole distributive- organisation 
(and the fact that it already distributes some money from 
foreign societies may give it an edge here) but the 
publishers will not agree while publishers similarly would 
like just one body to distribute to publishers and authors 
and propose the CLA but the authors wi 11 not allow th is. 
Hence, there is this rather unacceptable position, which is 
not to the advantage of copyright owners. It must be 
remembered that the authors I side is only concerned on the 
book side of the scheme so this curious distribution system 
will only apply to the scheme for books, not to journals and 
~ e r i o d i c a l s . . Apparently, the authors wanted a 50% share of 
royalties from journals and periodicals as well, but the 
publ ishers vetoed this on the basis that contractual 
arrangements are very different in this field from what they 
are in the book field - in the journal and periodical field, 
authors are mainly employees, employed under contract or 
freelance, and receiving a salary, and the copyright is owned 
by the publisher. Thus, the distribution system overleaf is 
un 1 ike ly to affect members of the PPA and the ALPS, the 
royalties in this case all being distributed to the 
publisher, presumably through the PLS. The publisher will 
then pass on any money to the authors concerned if thei r 
contracts allow for it. ALCS and PLS collect mandates from 
authors and publ ishers respectively to allow their works to 
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be included in the scheme, and do whatever is necessary to 
implement the scheme. On the publishers side, the Publishers 
Association covers about 90% by turnover of book titles, the 
PPA about 75% of periodicals and the ALPS about 75% of non 
commercial learned journals, so PLS covers a large proportion 
of all material likely to be included in a licensing scheme. 
Authors, however, do not have to belong to ALCS to obtain 
royalties (ALCS has about 1,400 members). The CLA 
indemnifies licensees against litigation by copyright owners 
(if a copyright owner is not part of the scheme and his works 
are copied). This is the problem with not having the backing 
of the government in setting up a scheme. I f such back i ng 
did exist, legislation could look after this problem. 
The authors seem to regard the publishers as rather 
intransigent, particularly in inSisting on full record 
keeping, and themselves as being rather more flexible in 
their approach. The user groups with whom the publishers and 
authors have been negotiating the local authorities 
representing schools and libraries and the Committee of Vice 
Chancellors and Principals representing tertiary educational 
institutions, for example, maintain that it is inefficient 
and unreasonable to expect libraries and other users to make 
full records, although they seemi ngly do not object to a 
sampling scheme similar to that used for PLR (it was decided 
to start a 1 icensing scheme'in the educational field first 
because it was here that there was the greatest evidence of 
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widespread illegal photocopying). The users maintain that 
full record keep; ng woul d be too burdensome and costly in 
terms of staff and time. The idea of a rotating sample with 
concessions for those users making full records was floated 
in CLA meetings. Apparently, the rotating sample was 
acceptab 1 e to the user groups i nvo 1 ved but the pub 1 i shers 
insisted on full records, a situation which seems to have 
created something of a stalemate. The author1s view seems to 
be that full record keeping is not feasible and they want to 
keep administration costs down as much as possible so as to 
get as much money out to the writers as possible at least 
cos ts. They a 1 so bel i eve tha:t the pub 1 i she-rs want to 
eliminate photocopying altogether rather than obtain 
compensation for it. The publishers insist on full records 
because they want to know exactly what has been photocopi ed. 
They say that they do not want to eliminate photocopying 
a 1 together, only control it. Photocopy; ng ; s a usefu 1 and 
necessary part of the educational sector but wholesale 
copyi ng is ill ega 1 and they want to prevent it getting any 
worse because it is affecting their livelihood. They want a 
limit of how much can be copied. This, they maintain, is 
done in two ways - by the mere fact that people have to pay 
more for the copying they do so it makes them think twice 
about whether the copying is worth it. The keeping of full 
records woul d be another form of control. Not all records 
would be analysed, only some of them, so that an individual 
user would not know whether his particular records were going 
to be analysed or not. He would have to keep records just in 
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case. The aim, apparently, is not to maintain full record 
keeping in the long term. It would continue for an 
experimental period to see how it went and then a new scheme 
might be devised. You would be able to find out the extent 
of copyi ng and what types of work were most copi ed. Once 
this was known, it would be easier to devise a new scheme or 
improve the old one. Later on, an alternative might be just 
to have libraries keeping records for a short period of time. 
Widespread photocopying is doing untold harm, the publishers 
say, and the problems are growing. Sales of school textbooks, 
they say have plummeted. They do not maintain that this is 
just because of large-scale photocopying and acknowledge that 
education cuts, the books themselves not being interesting, 
attractive or good enough and piracy play their parts too, 
but emphasise that photocopying does playa large part. In 
fact, it is ironic, they say, that at a time when the need 
for information is increasing all the time, there has been a 
large drop in purchases of the material in which the 
information is contained. They are trying to solve the whole 
copyright problem in one effort, one campaign: problems of 
piracy, photocopying and similar trends. They further 
dispute that the taking of records would be greatly demanding 
of staff and time since it would only involve the taking down 
of a few details. Nor is the problem just confined to the 
educational sector, they argue, it is prevalent in industry 
as well and PLS wants to extend the scheme to industry later. 
In industry, there is a continual need to keep up to date and 
at a time of increasing technological change, this need is 
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even greater. Hence, managers and scientists working in 
industry photocopy the latest, newest articles to keep up to 
date rather than buy them - and this is being done on a large 
scale. This is equivalent to giving away the copyright 
owners' property. When one considers the benefits users 
derive from photocopying copyright material, copyright owners 
really are entitled to some thought and compensation. A 
copyright is as valuable to a publisher as a patent is to a 
manufacturer and when it is being undermined it is much less 
valuable. The aim of the publishers' campaign, they say, is 
to educate people in the use of copyright material, to make 
them think differently, if possible, about copying. 
L i brari ans would 1 ike to have control over the photocopyi ng 
done in the i r 1 i bra ri es but wi th mach i nes dotted about all 
over the place, this is not possible, so individuals must be 
educated on the problem. Even if the process was only 
part i a liy successful and records on ly, say ~ ~ 60% accurate, 
this would still represent a better situation than at 
present. In industry, companies are nervous about their 
reputati ons, they want to preserve a good image and do not 
want thei r names in the paper in an adverse reference to 
their photocopying practices. This could also be used to 
control the problem. Damage to reputation is as significant 
as damage to a bank balance in many instances. Schools would 
equally be worried by damage to their reputations. 
Page 145 
There were disagreements between authors and publishers about 
whether it should be a transactions (per sheet) or capitation 
(per head of student population) royalty. The users in the 
educational sector would accept the latter but not the 
former, although by the time they had agreed to a capitation 
fee, they 'said it was too late to include an allowance for 
such a scheme in that year's budget (1982-1983), so this was 
another delay. The publishers argue that a capitation fee 
would produce a free-for-all so that people would photocopy 
more and more, knowing that the fee paid bore no relationship 
to how much they copied. This would obviously be contrary to 
their policy of controlling photocopying. Under such a 
capitation scheme, there would be no incentive to keep the 
level of copying down. The argument put against the 
publ ishers view is that, even using a rotating sample as a 
basis for calculation, any great increase in the amount of 
photocopying done would show up in the figures and the 
capitation fee could be adjusted accordingly. Presumably, 
though, any adjustment woul d have to be subject to 
negotiation and could not take place for quite a while - so 
it woul d be a very slow and cumbersome process and not very 
flexible, particularly in view of the history of negotiations 
between the various parties. The publishers are against a 
capitation fee because it would not control photocopying, it 
would just bring in an income and this income would not be 
representat i ve of the value of the copy; ng. The pub 1 i shers 
want to control copying rather than derive an income from it, 
although presumably an income would be a welcome secondary 
effect. 
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The publishers maintain that in the book field at least the 
authors have the whip hand since they own the copyright so 
that nothing can go ahead without them agreeing to it first. 
The copyright is not assigned to publishers like it used to 
be because of the change in the market brought about by the 
fact that the material can be put to so many new uses 
nowadays. These days the author, rather than ass i gni ng the 
who 1 e copyri ght to the pub 1 i sher 1 i censes the pub 1 i sher for 
each individual use. 
The first priority is to get the 1 icensing scheme off the 
ground, in whatever form, wi th at 1 east some 1 i cences, not 
necessarily a lot. Once it has done this, the various 
copyri ght owners groups can go to the Government and show 
that at least some sort of scheme is operating, even though 
the amount distributed would not be very large. Then, it 
coul d ask the Governement to recogni se the scheme through 
legislation and it can grow from there. Many people would 
1 ike to be able to do more photocopyi ng than they can at 
present under fair dealing - a licensing scheme would allow 
them to do th is provi ded they are will i ng to pay for the 
privilege. Also, apparently, any licence would contract out 
of fair deal ing which would still exist. The scheme would 
only apply in the field of education, not the non-educational 
sector. The definition of fair dealing would be virtualiy 
the same as in" Photocopyi ng and the Law ll except that it 
woul d be 1 imi ted to 5% of a book as opposed to 10% at 
present. There would also be a change in the definition of 
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II substantial copyingll. The problem at the moment, it is 
felt, is that one can argue about the definition of fair 
dealing since there is no statutory definition of it. 
Presumably, then, it would be tightened up in the licensing 
scheme. The publishers say that they have deliberately not 
taken legal action recently when they could have because they 
were aware that the scheme was due to start soon and they 
wanted to give the culprits the chance to take licences up. 
However, if the s i tuati on gets much worse, they say, and 
nothing is done about it, legal action may be the only 
alternative. 
The scheme has been subject to considerable delay because of 
the difficulties encountered in negotiation with the starting 
date being put back several times. Before the idea of a 
capi tat; on fee was floated (an idea rejected by the 
publishers), negotiations over the price per page to be 
charged took place and the fee was gradually brought down 
from 10 pence to 8 pence (whi ch was call ed IIwil dly 
excess i veil and the fi gu re was then reduced to 4 pence per 
copy of a page from a book and 10 pence per copy of a page 
from a journal. The outline of the scheme would be as 
follows:-
Individual copyright owners can exclude their works from the 
scheme if they want to, although the pub 1 i shers note the 
importance of ke-epi ng such exemptions to a mi nimum to make 
the scheme as attractive as possible to as many people as 
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possible. The number of copies which may be made and the 
proportion of any work which may be photocopied will be 
1 imi ted under the terms and cond it ions of the 1 i cence. A 11 
licensees will have to keep simple records of the number of 
copi es made and full records of what has been copi ed wi 11 
have to be made by some licensees at first, although there 
will be a 2 year revi ew peri od duri ng whi ch an assessment 
will be made as to whether this is really necessary. Any 
institution where copying takes place will be able to obtain 
a licence. The royalties per copy mentioned will be reduced 
for educational institutions because of lower publishing 
costs of school textbooks. There will be an i ni ti a 1 
registration fee of £10 for each photocopier covered. 
Industrial and non-educational l i c e n s e e ~ ~ will not be able to 
use the fair dealing provisions and will have to pay for all 
photocopies made to avoid the problems of differentiating 
between Ilegal l and lillegal l copying. Fair dealing will, 
however, apply to educational institutions. Non copyright 
material will be included in the scheme because of the 
difficulties of excluding it. (presumably rates will be 
reduced to take account of it). Each pub 1 i sher grants a 
non-exclusive licence to PLS to authorise reprographic 
reproduction (but not input into a computer or facsimile 
transmitter, for example) by users in the UK. (ALeS 
administers various rights, including the reprographic right 
for its members). This is the scheme at the time of writing -
it is quite possible that it will change, especially because 
of the problem over full record keeping and capitation fees. 
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CHAPTER 3 
AUDIO & VIDEO RECORDING 
The main problem, apart from piracy, in the audio and video 
fi e 1 d also concerns the reproducti on ri ght and much of the 
same ana lys is as was used for the problem of reprographi c 
reproduction also applies here. The main problem is that of 
home recordi ng of records and another, whi ch has recently 
sprung up, is that of record rental shops and libraries. The 
campaign in this area against the practice of home taping has 
been going on for quite a considerable length of time and the 
subject is frequently in the newspapers. Several campaigns 
have been fought, a 11 unsuccessfully to date, and a great 
many resources have been expended. The peri ods before and 
after pub 1 i cati on of the Green Paper have seen the most 
concerted attempts to persuade the Government to adopt the 
record industry's favoured solution of a levy on blank tapes. 
In fact, the record industry had most to feel aggrieved at in 
the Green Paper, which virtually said that there was nothing 
the Government cou 1 d do at present. One can expect the 
campaign to continue until something is done. It is quite an 
example for those who say that Government is unduly 
influenced by powerful economic pressure groups - the record 
industry is one of the biggest, yet it has not been notably 
successful in its campaign. The rapidly expanding but 
relatively new video industry faces similar problems and 
proposes a similar solution and, by joining with the record 
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industry, represents a considerable power block. One wonders 
how much longer the Government can resist the campaign. 
The Present Situation 
Un 1 i ke in the Uni ted States, where it is generally thought 
that private recording does not breach copyright (although 
there is some doubt), in the UK it seems that home taping, 
whether audio or video, is an infringement of the copyright 
owner's reproduction ri ght, to make or authori se copi es of 
his work. One must remember that in a record there is a 
copyri ght in the actua 1 record i tse 1 f whi ch belongs to the 
record company and in the actua 1 musi ca 1 work (the song) 
embodied in the record which belongs to the composer (or the 
publisher if the work has been aSSigned to him). Both the 
composer of the mus i ca 1 work and the record company have a 
reproduction right in their works. The fair dealing 
excepti ons under Sect ion 6 and the educati ona 1 except; ons 
under Section 41 may cover some reproductions of the musical 
work but there are no similar exceptions to the reproduction 
right for sound recordings, so home taping will infringe the 
record company's copyright (records are defined as including 
tapes as well as discs). There is also a copyright in sound 
broadcasts and television broadcasts including the right to 
make a film of the visual part of a television broadcast or a 
copy of such a film and to make a record of a sound broadcast 
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or the sound part of a television broadcast or a record 
embodying such a recording. In these cases there is an 
except i on for copi es for pri vate purposes. The owner of the 
copyright in a film is protected against making a copy of the 
film and the fair dealing and educational exceptions do not 
apply to films, broadcasts, or any of the Part II subject 
matter. Since most television programmes are pre-recorded, 
they are apparently covered by the definition of a film (the 
Green Paper notes this, for example). Subject to certain 
exceptions, the public performance fight may also be 
infringed, (llpublic" being interpreted narrowly as only the 
domest i c ci rc 1 e) • Performers are protected summarily under 
the Performers' Protection Acts 1958-72, against the making 
of a record or fil m of the performances of ali tera ry , 
dramatic, musical or artistic work, except when the record or 
film is for private and domestic use. One might also ask 
whether video cassettes are records or films. It is 
generally assumed, though, that a video cassette is a film1. 
The problem of record rental shops is relatively new and 
seems to be a particular problem in Japan, where the number 
of such shops has proliferated. Here, the situation is not 
so straight forward from a legal point of view. We have to 
ask whether the record company (the copyri ght owner) can 
prevent rental of records or demand royalties for such rental 
once he has sold the records to the dealer or retailer, and 
whether a retailer can be regarded as liable for copyright 
infringement, indirect though it is, for authorising or 
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contributing to home taping (which we know to be illegal)2. 
So, we can see that this is another aspect of the home taping 
problem. One might say that the problem of record rental 
shops (and video rental shops) is analogous to that of books 
lent out from libraries for which authors (not publishers) 
have just gained PLR except for the fact that 1 i brari es do 
not make money out of such rental. Could one not argue that 
such rental shops are making profit out of the use of 
copyright material, reaching their objectives through use of 
copyright owners' works, and therefore tpat they ought to pay 
royalties? 
Although there are a number of similarities between the 
reprography and home taping problems, there are also 
differences. For example, the record companies, unlike book 
and journal publishers, have many estimates of how much they 
are losing, they have concrete figures, and the record 
companies seem to have a much higher profile for their 
campaign and one might say a better presented case. 
Furthermore, the solution advocated for the problem is 
different in each case. The different solutions proposed for 
the problems of reprography and home tapi ng spri ng from the 
fact that the nature of the problem is different in each case 
in both fields, the reproduction right is virtually 
unenforceable because it is impossible to tell when an 
infringement is taking place but a licensing scheme is still 
theoretically possible in the reprographic field because the 
copying takes place in public and largely in institutions 
Page 162 
whereas for home taping the infringement takes place in 
private and not in institutions and one cannot invade the 
private sphere. At least in licensing institutions in a 
reprographic reproduction scheme, the number of licensees 
cou 1 d be reduced to manageab 1 e proportions and enforcement 
problems would not be totally insoluble. One might make home 
taping licences compulsory but one would have to have 
equ i pment to show when copyi ng of copyri ght materi a 1 was 
taking place. Such equipment does not exist (equipment is 
used at the moment to show when televisions are being 
operated without a licence but the operation of a tape 
recorder could not be made illegal, one must still be able to 
play cassettes which are legal. One would have to have 
equ i pment to show when tape recorders were tapi ng i 11 ega 11y 
from records or the radio). Again, one cannot adopt a 
luddite approach and ban the technology. One must live with 
it and try to find a practical solution to a practical 
problem. The interests concerned naturally appreciate this. 
The Market for Tape Recorders and Blank Tapes 
Cassette sales are the bright lights on the horizon for the 
record industry - they are on the ri se whereas other sales 
are down. The number of cassette players in domestic 
ownership increased by about 51% between 1978 and 1981 alone, 
from 13.8 million units in 1978 to 2'0.8 million units in 
19813 and the percentage of the adult population over 15 with 
access to a tape recorder increased from 30% in 1973 to 56% 
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in 19794. (The latest BPI estimate is that 77% of households 
have a tape player and 64% have a tape player that can record. 
With multiple ownership and car players, the BPI estimate is 
25 million players in use or ownership.) Retail sales of blank 
tapes have similarly increased greatly from 50.1 million units 
in 1978 to 73.4 million in 1981 (46.5% up)5 (81.1 million in 
1983 according to a BPI estimate) although the Economist 
Intelligence Unit, quoted in the Green Paper, shows fewer 
sales of blank cassettes at 33 million in 1978. Virtually all 
blank tape is imported since EMI, which took 5-6% of the UK 
market for a while, stopped production in 19806• According to 
the BPI 7, the average price paid for a blank tape fell from £1 
in 1979 to 94 pence in 1981. This represents a price adjusted 
for inflation of 71 pence in 1981. The average landed cost 
for imported blank cassettes is 39.5 pence and profit margins 
are high because blank tape does not cost a lot to produce, 
the dealer price being about 68 pence and the contribution to 
overheads and profit 27 pence (40% of the dealer price). This 
is against a pre-recorded cassette retail price of £4.59 with 
a dealer price of £2.95 and a contribution to overheads and 
profi ts of 45 pence (15% of the dealer pri ce) 8• We can see 
that the market for cassette recorders and blank tapes is 
quite considerable. 
The Market for Video Recorders and Cassettes 
Great Britain is the fastest growing market for video 
recorders in the Worl d - about £400 mi 11 i on worth of vi deo 
recorders were rented or sold in the UK in 1982 as against 
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£227 million in 1981 (an increase of about 76%)9. At the end 
of 1982, there were 2.2 million video cassette recorders in 
use in UK households, 10.2% of all households 10 [The British 
Videogram Association (BVA) estimates that there are now 6 
million VCRs in use in the UK (30% of UK households)]. The 
most si gni fi cant feature of the market, as the BPI Yearbook 
1982 notes, is that rental of recorders and tapes is the main 
form of acquisition since rental charges are low (the BVA 
estimates that 41% of VCRs are rented). BBC Research suggests 
that 85% of the video cassettes used in the home are rented, 
which represents about 4.5 million transactions a week and a 
value for the rental cassette market of about £400 million 11 . 
Sales of blank cassettes are also large. There are more VCRs 
per head of population in the UK than in any other country in 
the World. The Japanese again dominate the market with VHS 
(Vi deo Home System) developed by the Japanese company JVC 
being market leader (75%) followed by Betamax (23%), developed 
by Sony, and then Video 2000 (2%), developed by Philips of the 
Netherlands and Grundig of West Germany12. The video cassette 
market, despite the recession, is going through a boom phase, 
which shows little sign of halting. Following or. from the 
video cassette, the video disc was highly publicised but it 
does not seem to have caught on and many think that its future 
is not in the consumer market at all but in the education and 
business markets. Fortunately for copyright owners, video 
disc players cannot record, so questions of home taping do not 
apply, although 'New Scientist' of 23rd June 1983 suggested 
that the Japanese company, Matsushita, may be ready to launch 
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a videodisc system which records and erases. The other 
product in the video area which has copyright implications is 
the video juke box which plays videos along with the normal 
playing of records by audio juke boxes. In view of the 
startling take-off of video, such juke boxes are likely to 
generate a large amount of new royalties and PRS and PPL have 
just started licensing them. 
The Advantages of Home Taping 
1. Cost Pre-recorded audio tapes and records cost about £5, 
whereas a good quality blank C-90 costs about £1.50. 
(Similarly, blank video tapes cost about £5 for 3 hours 
and pre-recorded tapes about £40, although here it is not 
a straight buy-or-home tape decision because of the 
different market structure with rental being the main 
form of exploitation - and the cheapest. It costs about 
£18 a month to rent a video cassette player and about 
£1.50 to rent a video cassette for 1-2 nights). Even 
taking account of record discount shops, the blank 
tape-home recording solution will generally be the 
cheapest in the record field. 
2. Two LPs will fit onto a C90 audio blank tape and it can 
be overtaped many times to take account of changing 
musical tastes. 
3. Recording facilities are widespread and have become more 
and more sophisticated so that high quality copies can be 
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4. 
made. Systems are now available with two cassette 
facilities, so that one can record from one to the other 
whereas before two cassette players plus an adaptor 1 ead 
were required. The advent of personal stereos may give 
an added twist to the problem by encouraging people to 
tape more (although one cannot record wi th a persona 1 
stereo) since they have added mobility, although it 
should also increase legitimate cassette sales. Hi-fi 
systems are cheap and available in a wide variety of 
reta i 1 outl ets. Vi deo cassette recorders, too, produce 
high quality copies. 
The point is often made that people tape records at 
home because the quality of records and tapes they 
buy seems to be bad and getting worse and their 
price is too high. When the cassette was first 
invented and marketed, the argument goes, the 
record industry neglected it somewhat a.nd high 
cost, poor sound quality, and unattractive 
packaging made people turn to home taping. Poor 
press i ngs , low sound quality and high price are 
similarly levelled as criticisms at records. One 
might say that the sound quality of records and 
tapes has not improved to the same extent as the 
playing and reproduction capabilities of hi-fi 
systems. The record industry naturally disputes 
these claims, pointing out that records are cheaper 
now in real terms than they have ever been and that 
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quality has been and continues to be improved. 
With the advent of digital recording and the 
compact disc, there seems little doubt that this is 
true. The record industry has also made many 
attempts to make pre-recorded cassettes more 
attractive in an attempt to lure people away from 
home taping. 
5. Copying is easy and convenient. 
6. Copying from records provides flexibility and 
portabil i ty at a low pri ce. Many people record 
compilation tapes of their favourite records which 
may not be ava il ab 1 e on a compil ati on record or 
they may buy an LP and not like all the tracks, so 
they may tape the songs they like and sell the LP. 
Some people might like to have several copies of an 
LP for use in various places (such as one for the 
house, one for the car) and only be prepared to buy 
one copy. Copies can be made in a manageable and 
portab 1 e form whereas photocopyi ng, for example, 
just produces a pile of papers. As the BPI Booklet 
notes, blank recording tape has little intrinsic 
value and is only worth what is recorded on it. 
7. A lot of video recording is for time-shift 
purposes, so that you can record programmes whi 1 e 
you are out or while you are watching something 
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else and watch them later. Thus, the viewer has 
more flexibility in planning his night1s viewing. 
8. There is a qualitative difference between recording 
records and recording programmes from the 
television - records can be heard often and they do 
not last as long as television programmes 
genera lly, so the abi 1 i ty to record them is not 
nearly as much an advantage13 . 
9. Un 1 i ke photocopyi ng, if a per-son cop; es the who 1 e 
of a record, it will not cost him as much as the 
original record. If a person copies the whole of a 
book, it is likely to cost him more than the actual 
book. 
The Problem 
Sales of LPs have been falling consistently in the UK and 
worldwide. This is the main plank of the record industryls 
case - that home taping is causing them to lose considerable 
amounts of money every year because people buy blank tapes 
and record LPs and s i ngl es onto them after borrowi ng them 
from fr; ends and record 1 i brari es, rather than buy; ng them. 
One must remember, though, that not all home taping is 
illegal, some of it is of non-copyright material, though less 
than for photocopying. Every two years the BPI commissions 
independent studies to try to estimate the size of the 
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problem. These show a trend of declining trade deliveries 
and retail sales of LPs and rising trade deliveries and 
retail sales of cassettes14 . Total trade deliveries and 
trade deli veri es of singles also seem on a downward trend 
while for total retail sales and retail sales of singles 
there seems no particular trend. Real prices of records have 
generally fallen over the period 1970-1981 with an LP costing 
£4.49 in 1981 costing the equivalent of £8.04 in 1970 (actual 
price £1.99), this being nearly half what it was in 1970, and 
single prices of £1.10 in 1981 were the equivalent of £1.70 
in 1970, 65% cheaper15 • The days of l a r ~ e e profits seem to be 
over and many companies have fallen into 10sses16 • The BPI 
es t imates that about 15 million people record copyri ght mus i c 
from radio or television or record regularly and that in 1981 
they lost £304.9 million due to home taping. This is 
apparently arrived at from an estimate of the amount of 
copying going on derived from surveys, working out a figure 
for LP equivalents, multiplying by the average price paid for 
LPs and then assuming that about 25% of this recording 
prevents the sale of an LP, tape or single. For example. the 
estimate for LP equivalents copied in 1979 was 280.9 
million • multiplied by the average price paid for LPs of 
£4.03, to give a total values for copies made .of £1132 
million. 25% of this is £283 millionl7. This is the 1979 
figure for the value of lost sales. Using the same method 
and assumi ng that an average pri ce for an LP is £4.49, a 
figure widely quoted in the BPI Yearbook 1982, it would seem 
that the LP equivalent for 1981 is only 271.6 million, a 
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slight fall from 1979, but still very high. This figure for 
the lost value of sales has been going up consistently over 
the years - £152.8 million in 1977, £283 million in 1979, 
£304.9 million in 1981. Why there should be such a massive 
increase in the 1977-1979 period is open to question and is 
in great contrast to a ri se of 7.7% in the 1979-81 peri od. 
Was the 1977 peri ad an understatement? In any case, the 
figure arrived at seems to be somewhat arbitrary as does the 
figure of 25% for lost sales of recorded materi"al. The 
record industry does not say that all material taped would be 
bought if home taping were not possible (a claim that would 
be easily attacked) and it also seems to recognise that the 
fa 11 in LP sales is not just due to home tapi ng but a 1 so 
takes in the problem of recession and high unemployment 
amongst the young (its main customer). The fact that young 
people have more things on which to spend their money than 
previously must also playa part. In fact, the view has been 
expressed by some that the LP is an outmoded means of 
exploitation of music and that people are losing interest in 
it. It would seem fair to say that not too much emphasis 
should be placed on the actual figure estimated for home 
taping losses because this is, after all, just an estimate. 
One should also note that the figure supplied by the BPI for 
losses from home taping in 1981 at £304.9 million is nearly 
72% of the total value of retail sales in the UK in 1981 (at 
£424 million), which would seem to suggest that the record 
industry should be three quarters of its size again, which 
seems a bit on the large side. The arbitrary nature of the 
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figure put forward by the BPI is further shown by the way the 
Green Paper works out the loss to the record industry. The 
figures supplied by the BPI assume that it loses the whole of 
the retail value of the LP when it is taped at home. The 
Green Paper notes, however, that the loss to ri ghts owners 
and artists is £1.92 per LP since there is a saving of about 
20 pence on distribution costs, manufacturing and sleeve 
costs of 38 and 18 pence respectively, the dealer margin of 
1.40 and V.A.T. of 61 pence, a total saving of £2.77 
(assumi ng a reta il pri ce of £4.69). The Green Paper then 
takes the loss to rights owners and artists as £2 and 
multiplies by a figure of 25 million which it says MCPS and 
the BPI put out as a reasonable conservative estimate of 
sales lost through home taping in 1977 to give losses of £50 
million a year. This figure of 25 million seems rather out 
of step with the figures supplied by the record industry. If 
one takes the LP equivalent figures they provide in the 1982 
Yearbook and work out the losses using the figure of £1.92 
(which may be lower or higher for other years) estimated by 
the Green Paper, we get fi gures of £99.8 mi 11 i on for 1977, 
£134.8 million for 1979 and £130.4 million for 1981, assuming 
that 25% of LP equivalent tapes are lost (the LP equivalent 
figure for 1981 is the one I worked out myself and mentioned 
earlier). Thus, one must be careful with the figures. 
There seems little doubt that the record industry is losing a 
lot of money because of home tapi ng and that most of thi s 
home taping is illegal. It is not only the record companies 
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that are los i ng money - the composers of the works are as 
well. Many composers earn very little from their composing 
from copyright royalties and have to take on other jobs. 
Money earned from coyright royalties is highly skewed towards 
the most popular composers. One would expect the extent of 
home copying to be similarly skewed towards the most popular 
artists and composers. This naturally opens up the view that 
the most popul ar arti sts and composers wi 11 not mi ss the 
losses, and that home taping does not affect the less popular 
composers and acts s i gni fi cantly or di rectly anyway. 
Nevertheless, home taping is breaking the law - it often 
being said that it is IItheft ll of another person1s property, 
music being property even though it is intangible. Rights 
are largely unenforceable in this sphere. The record 
industry is of vital importance to the UK, it is argued, and 
if the home taping problem continues unabated, then the base 
on which it depends for its continued existence - the records 
and the record companies which make them - will shrink and 
maybe disappear. The BPI 18 notes that artists and composers 
depend on records for a large part of their income with most 
pop artists achieving their initial breakthrough and 
ultimate fame through records. The ability of the record 
industry to take on new acts and record them depends on the 
popular artists subsidising these new artists. Very few 
records released are hits and the big hits subsidise the 
misses. Home taping is mainly of these popular artists 
leaving less money to subsidise the others. Classical 
recordings are particularly likely to be hit in this way -
Page 173 
and their availability is already quite low. Only about 10% 
of record releases makes a profit. If this figure is 
reduced, fewer little known artists will get a chance. Nor 
would the economy benefit from a contracting record industry 
- it employs about 40,000 people, generates sales of £1,500 
million annually worldwide and is a major export earner with 
British recordings and works by British composers making up 
over 25% of World sales 19 . The World economy will similarly 
suffer from contraction of the record industry. In 1980, the 
UK had the fourth highest total of retail sales of records 
(LPs, singles, cassettes) in the World after the USA, Japan 
and West Germany and the seventh highest per capita 
expenditure on records in the World20 . Contraction of the 
record industry would mean less investment, fewer records and 
1 ess jobs. There wou I d also be knock-on effects on other 
industries and the whole of the music industry, not just the 
record industry would be affected. The record industry also 
contributes ·to the musical and artistic culture of this 
country and to broadcasting and encourages high quality 
musicians to live and work here. The BPI says that the 
ability to copy records easily has moulded the attitudes of a 
whole generation and this attitude will continue into the 
future as the present generation gets older - they will keep 
the habit of copying. Almost 4 out of 5 young people aged 15 
to 24 who have a tape recorder will copy records. Young 
people represent only one-seventh of the whole population but 
one-third of those who buy blank tape. The record industry 
maintains that if the present trend continues, the next 
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generation will not have the choice between copying and 
buying. The BPI Yearbook 1982 reports a survey of 5,000 
answers by BMRB in 1979 in which 41% said that they were 
likely to have bought a record if they had not taped it, 
aga i nst 40% who wou 1 d not have done so. 9% of respondents 
sa i d they taped thei r own copi es of records. Nor is the 
problem confined to the UK - the record industries in most 
developed countries are finding home taping to be a problem. 
The record industry does not want individuals or even groups 
to get in touch wi th it to ask for permi ss i on to copy, it 
just wants compensation for such use. When use is made of a 
\ 
copyri ght work, a royalty is usually pa i d. When a person 
buys a record, included in the pri ce is a roya 1 ty for the 
artist, composer and record producer. The levy proposed by 
the record industry would compensate for the loss of the 
royalty which is not received when the individual tapes his 
fri end· s record and does not buy one. Since the 1 aw does 
provide copyright owners with a reproduction right and home 
tapi ng breaches th is ri ght, despi te the fact that the ri ght 
seems to be unenforceable in private circles, there seems to 
be justice in the record companies· claim for compensation -
either they should be allowed compensation, which is, after 
all, one of the functions of copyri ght, or it should be 
expressly stated in the law that in this private area, there 
is no right or that the right cannot be enforced. There is 
no point in having the right unless it is enforceable - and 
there are ways of making the right enforceable, although none 
of them are perfect. 
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In the education sector most institutions have audio or video 
recorders so they have the abi 1 i ty to record the materi a 1 
they want but they do not want to infringe copyright and face 
prosecution, but obtaining permission is slow and cumbersome. 
Either material is copied illegally or is not used at all 
which may be to the detriment of education21 . Since there is 
no single body to represent all sectors of education and no 
collecting and licensing agencies to negotiate for some 
categori es of ri ghts owners, it is very di ffi cu 1 t . to reach 
agreements. There are, however, a number of agreements with 
the BBC, IBA companies and Open University allowing 
educational users to record broadcasts on-and off-air subject 
to licences, and licences are also available from MCPS. 
A further problem allied to that of home taping is that of 
rental of records. This seems to have particularly caught on 
in Japan where the output of the record industry has been 
estimated to be almost half what it would have been without 
home taping22 Over 130 million blank tapes were sold in 
Japan in 198023 . The fi rst record rental shop opened in 
Tokyo in June 1980 and by September 1 9 8 ~ , , about 749 were in 
. t 24 eX1S ence . Record sales have fallen overall but especially 
badly at retailers near rental shops. Because of the 
cheapness of rental and blank tapes, it is much more 
financially attractive to rent or record and tape records at 
home than to buy them. A poll by the Japanese record 
industry indicated that over 97% of those who rented records 
did so to record them. When some producers tried to withhold 
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s upp 1 i es to di stri butors who supp 1 i ed record rental shops, 
they were investigated by the Japanese Fair Trade Commission 
as regards infringement of the anti-monopoly law on the basis 
that they were preventing rental shops from pursu i ng thei r 
business activities. Copyright actions do not seem to have 
worked either. The question of rental of records and whether 
the copyri ght owner can prevent or c 1 aim roya 1 ties for such 
rental is related to the distribution right. Only where 
national laws allow the distribution right to continue past 
the fi rst sa 1 e wi 11 the copyri ght owner be able to control 
rentals and claim royalties. In the UK, the general view is 
that renta 1 cannot be controlled because there is no such 
distribution right. Whether a retailer could be guilty of 
copyright infringement by authorising or inducing home taping 
depends on whether home tapi ng is an i nfri ngement under the 
law of the country lthis is often not the case under the fair 
use doctrine) and whether the producer can produce proof that 
the reta i 1 er knew about home tapi ng of rented records and 
took active steps to encourage it, which may be difficult 
(for example, does selling blank tapes and cassette recorders 
and renting records in the same shop constitute "active 
steps") and may, for example, require that he provides 
recording facilities for making such copies on the premises. 
Cases on the subject do not seem to provide a decisive 
answer. In the UK, record rental does not seem to be a major 
problem. The renting of video cassettes is the growing and 
dominant phenomena in the UK, and this has caused problems. 
The vi deo industry encourages renta 1 as part of the 
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exploitation of its product because of its nature. Video 
cassettes cost so much to buy that if peopl e di d not rent 
they would be unlikely to buy them. The industry is, 
however, concerned about uncontrolled renta 1 forci ng pri ces 
down to uneconomic levels. It wants to be able to authorise 
who rents it products and who does not, so that it can 
control the market. 
Home taping is similarly a problem in the video market 
worldwide but there are added dimensions there. For example, 
the television broadcasters, especially the commercial 
television companies, fear the effect video may have on their 
advert is i ng revenue since th is depends on the size of the 
television audience. There are already signs that television 
audiences on both BBC and lTV are falling25 • As Brill 
notes26 , video recorders have a fast-forward facility so that 
advertisers will not know if or when they are reaching their 
target - and what if the advertisement is for a one-day sale? 
Copyright owners in the video industry want payment if their 
works are taped at home. Brill notes that fa i ruse mi ght 
apply - but many people do not agree arguing that fair use 
should be narrowly defined and that it does not apply to 
copying done just for entertainment, only to educational or 
creative purposes. It is further argued that home recording, 
when done by millions of people, becomes a public commercial 
practice. Non-copyright arguments are of the form IIwhy 
should a literal interpretation of the law prevent the 
enjoyment and exploitation of new technology?lI. In fact, 
Page 178 
Sony, makers of the Betamax video cassette system, were sued 
in the US by MCA, which owns Universal Pictures and Walt 
Disney Productions, for infringing the copyrights of the two 
latter companies, in selling video cassette recorders to home 
users. The case was fi rst started in 1976 and the vi deo 
industry has grown enormously since then. Initially, the 
Federal District Court exempted home video taping from 
copyri ght protection since in 1971 Congress exempted home 
audio taping but the California Federal Appeals Court 
reversed this decision, noting that Congress was not dealing 
with home video recording in 1971 since it was only in its 
infancy then27. The Supreme Court has recently held that 
home video taping does not break the law by 5-4 decision. 
The Solutions 
Several solutions have been suggested to the problem of home 
taping, the most popular of which seems to be a levy on blank 
tapes (or a royalty as the BPI likes to call it, believing 
that the term 'levy' is misleading suggesting a tax), to 
compensate for the loss of the royalty when records are taped 
at home rather than bought, which recognises that the 
reproduction right is not enforceable in the private sphere. 
The BPI says that it would be possible to enforce the law 
aga ins t home tapers - and the 1 aw is on the side of the 
copyright owners - but it would be very difficult to obtain 
the necessary proof and it would not be possible on a large 
scale. It would also open up the claim of highly selective 
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enforcement. Nor would the scheme be difficult to administer 
nor even costly since one of the existing collecting 
societies could do the job. The money would be collected by 
the society and distributed by agreement between those 
suffering loss or by a decision of a special tribunal. The 
BPI also suggests placing a proportion of the money collected 
in a Music Development Trust Fund, which might, for example, 
provide funds for making recordings of music which might not 
otherwise take place because the commercial risk is too 
great. The rest of the money would be distributed to the 
composers, performers and producers who lost money because of 
home taping. The Government would fix the level of the 
royalty. The record companies were initially asking for a 
royalty of at least £1 per tape but they maintain that even 
£1.50 - £2 on a egO would have only a negligible impact on 
blank cassette sales. When one considers how low their cost 
is at the moment, they would still cost considerably less 
than pre-recorded records and tapes. I n any case, the BPI 
says, the blank tape manufacturers could absorb at least some 
? 
of the royalty and need not pass it all onto the user - and 
their product is not much use without music to record on it. 
It is also proposed that there should be exemptions from the 
royalty since the BPI recognises that not everyone uses blank 
tapes ill ega lly and one wou I d not want to penal i se such 
people - suggested exemptions are Talking Books for the 
Blind, dictaphone tapes and short tapes of less than 15 
minutes a side. The BPI notes that copyright reform is 
urgently needed and that home taping ought to be dealt with 
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as part of a wider legislative attempt to solve the problem 
but the problems are very pressing and could quite easily be 
dealt with separately (in the same way that video piracy has 
been dealt with separately, one might say). Other countries 
have taken steps to combat the problem and many look to the 
UK for gui dance on copyri ght matters, it says. The BPI 
suggests the same so 1 uti on for vi deo - a royalty on blank 
video tape. In addition to a royalty on blank tape, the 
video and audio industries also propose a royalty· on video 
recorders and tape recorders, the hardware as we 11 as the 
software. An arbitration tribunal - for example, an enlarged 
Performing Right Tribunal - could oversee the collection and 
distribution processes. There might also be a ceiling on the 
amount each artist or composer could earn in a year, in a 
similar way to PLR, although at a higher level because of the 
size of the record industry. The Whitford Report was in 
favour of a 1 evy on recordi ng equi pment but not on blank 
tapes28 . The equipment levy should only apply to 
non-commercial uses, Whitford thought, and the criticisms of 
it wou 1 d not be as great as for a 1 evy on reprographi c 
equipment since reprographic equipment is usually not bought 
by private individuals and a high proportion of copying is of 
internally generated or out-of-copyright material whereas 
audi 0 and vi deo recordi ng equi pment is genera lly bought by 
individuals and most recording is of copyright material. 
Thus, the argument that non-infringers would be unfairly 
penalised does not apply to the same extent. Whitford 
recommended a 1 evy on all equ i pment wh i ch is su i tab 1 e for 
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private recording, whether it is intended to be used for that 
purpose or not and whether manufactured at home or imported. 
The manufacturer or importer would be liable for the levy. A 
statutory tri buna 1 mi ght have juri sd i ct i on over rates, 
application of the levy and its distribution. For recording 
in educational institutions, Whitford went further in 
suggesting a levy on sale of equipment allied with payment of 
an annual licence fee paid under a blanket licence scheme 
because of greater use in this sector. Strictly commercial 
uses of copyright material would be subject to normal 
licensing procedures. A further problem for an equipment 
levy would be what happens to machines which are already in 
circulation. The levy would apply to new machines but what 
about the old ones? The Whi tford Commi ttee suggested that 
old machi nes be assumed to have been 1 icensed as well. In 
addition, as the BPI has previously noted, the price of 
hardware generally falls over time whereas the cost of making 
records increases so any levy based on a percentage of sales 
proceeds of equi pment mi ght not produce as much money as 
might be expected. 
There are already a number of schemes in Europe involving 
levies on blank tapes and recording equipment. West Germany 
has had a levy on most audio and video recording equipment 
since 1965 in return for which there is a blanket licence to 
make single copy recordings for personal use. The right may 
only be exercised through a collecting society, ZPU in this 
case 29 Each copyri ght owner is enti tl ed to an equi tab 1 e 
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share of the manufacturer's (or importer's) revenue from 
sales of such equipment although no specific percentage has 
been laid down, but the total claims of all copyright owners 
may not be more than 5% of revenue. Di etz30 says that 
another weakness of the scheme is that it; s not easy to 
obtain figures on sales of audio and video tape recorders but 
the advantage is that the levy will ultimately be passed onto 
the user anyway (although this is not necessarily so) so that 
each user pays a lump sum for his later acts of copying and 
competi ti on is not d; started s; nce the. 1 evy ; s part of the 
costs of all competi ng manufacturers and importers31 . 
Educational and commercial use is not covered 32 
Apparently, the levy ;s not collected on an individual 
machine basis but the industry makes a single lump sum 
payment each year33. For systems combi ni ng cassette 
recorders wi th other faci 1; ti es such as rad; 0 and record 
decks, the levy is only worked out on the cost of the 
recorder, so that costs are apportioned between the different 
facilities34 • Foreign copyright owners may also benefit 
(through the principle of national treatment)35. In 1980, 
the West German scheme brought in £6.9 million36 . 
Apparently, though, this revenue has proved not to be enough 
and there has been a campa i gn to have a 1 evy put on blank 
tape as well, whi ch I understand has now been successfully 
won (the original figures were: a 50-cent levy on blank 
cassettes, estimated to raise about $200 million a year)37. 
In Austria, a levy on blank tapes was introduced in 1981 - 7 
cents on each cassette, estimated to raise about $700,000 in 
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the first year to be split 60% to composers, 20% to 
performers and .20% to record compani es in 1 i ne wi th record 
sa1es38• 
The Government's Green Paper of July 1981 rejected the call 
for a royalty on blank tape. It said that it might be argued 
that private home taping should not be regarded as within the 
ambit of copyright protection and that copyright owners 
should concentrate instead on the commercial exercise of 
their rights. Unless a scheme can be thought up to give 
copyright owners compensation without putting "into1erable 
burdens on the individua1", it says, the record industry may 
have to content itself with obtaining most of its revenue 
from broadcasting and public performance of records, such as 
at discotheques. The record and video industries are 
naturally displeased with this suggestion. There has never 
been any suggestion tha t the 1956 Act intended the 
reproduction right to exclude copies made in private - the 
only reason the situation has become so severe is that new 
technology has overtaken the law and the drafters of the 1956 
Act did not foresee it. Why should people not pay for 
pri vate copyi ng - they have to pay for all other types of 
entertainment? The suggestion that the industries will have 
to rely on other forms of income would mean that broadcasters 
would be penalised for the activities of those who -use blank 
tape to copy music and would also mean an increase in the BBe 
licence fee, says the BPI. A charge levelled at the idea of 
a blank tape levy is that it would be inflationary. Surely, 
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increases in the royalties paid by the bf-oadcasters and in 
the SBC licence fee would also be inflationary and any 
attempt to add a new twist to the amount of royalties paid by 
the broadcasters is sure to be severely resisted and lead to 
wrangles before the Performing Right Tribunal - which will be 
very costly, if past experience is anything to go by. 
Using its estimate that the record industry loses £50 million 
a year due to home taping (a figure the BPI would probably 
di spute as too low anyway), the Green Paper goes on to say 
that if the burden for compensating the-record industry fell 
entirely on blank tapes and assuming sales of 35 million 
blank tapes a year and that the same size levy was put on all 
such cassettes regardless of running time, this would imply a 
levy of about £1.40 per tape and more than double the cost of 
a C90. Or, assuming sales of 3 million recorders a year the 
sum could be raised by a £10 levy on each machine plus 60 
pence on each blank tape, or a levy of £17 on each recorder 
only. It is not only home taping that is losing the record 
industry sales, it continues - varying rates of VAT and of 
disposable income as well as the changing popularity of 
recorded music in different years are also likely to have 
played a part. Sales lost directly as a result of home taping 
cannot be preci se ly cal cu 1 ated. Increases in pri ces as a 
result of a levy would fallon many consumers and be against 
government anti-inflation policies. The British Copyright 
Council (BCC)39 maintains that the case for a levy does not 
stand or fallon whether the revenue derived will compensate 
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rights owners completely for their losses. Even if a 
reasonable amount is collected, adoption of the levy ;s 
justified. Rights owners seem more interested in 
establishing a principle at the moment than in having all 
their losses reimbursed. The Bee continues that the Green 
Paper suggests that the amount collected under the West 
German scheme is hardly enough to make the scheme worthwhile 
yet the Government considers the £2 million it provides for 
PLR as sufficient. The fact that it may run counter to 
Government economic policies is also attacked. The overseeing 
tribunal recommended byWhi tford would take account of a 11 
relevant factors in setting rates including the economic 
situation of the country and current government policies. But 
it does not think that present economic conditions or 
policies and strategies necessarily have anything to do with 
copyright law. Economic conditions change widely, rapidly 
and often as can Government policies; copyright law changes 
2-3 times a century and is not an instrument for managing the 
economy. The general pu rpose of copyri ght is to encou rage 
creation and dissemination ot works of various kinds subJect 
to certain public interest limits - and transitory economic 
conditions and Government policies have no relevance to such 
general considerations. Legal reform is meant to make 
control of rights possible which is not possible at the 
moment because of changes in technology. In exercising these 
rights, authors will be subject to the same limits as 
everyone el se imposed by economic condi tions and Government 
policies but such considerations should be dealt with through 
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free collective bargaining and not be contained in 
legislative policy. The Performing Right Society40 says it 
finds it astonishing that a Government is prepared to accept 
copyright owners being seriously harmed economically through 
infringement of their rights just because lIit would cost the 
infringers something to be authorised to carry out the 
i nfri ngi ng acts Il • Manufacturers and importers of record i ng 
equipment and blank tapes are making large profits by 
granting customers free access to what is not theirs to give. 
Why should copyr; ght owners have to accept thi s just because 
it would help control inflation? On that bas; s any 
significant exercise of rights by copyright owners could be 
regarded as inflationary. 
Another argument put forward by the Green Paper is that a 
1 evy woul d mean part of the revenue ra i sed goi ng abroad 
because of the UK's international obligations under various 
copyright conventions - the Green 'Paper says the record 
industry believes 15-20% of any levy would go abroad with 
little compensating inflow. In addi ti on, many record 
companies in the UK are foreign owned, so these would also 
benefit because of their copyright in the recordings and more 
money wou 1 d be remi tted abroad by these compani es wi th few 
1 nfl ows . (I n 1979, the Green Paper says, 65% of LP sales 
were by fore; gn-owned compani es) • The Bee is horri fi ed at 
this tlshop-keeperll attitude. The UK is one of the greatest 
creators and exporters of copyright works in the World, which 
are consumed in large and growing volumes everywhere, 
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especially in developing countries .. There are very few 
countries where use of UK works is not much greater than use 
in the UK of works from those countries.. It is of great 
importance to the UK to persuade Thi rd World countries to 
introduce a workable copyright system (involving reciprocal 
obligations) even though, for these countries, it would 
result in a net outflow of money, a lot of which will go to 
the UK, and the BCC (and its members) is deeply involved in 
this. The Government1s attitude could be construed ~ s s one of 
double standards in these sectors and wreck the Bee's 
attempts at expandi ng the copyri ght system, expans i on from 
which the UK can only benefit. The BPI also disputes that a 
lot of the money would go abroad - estimating it as under 3% 
of any distributable revenue. Almost all records sold in the 
UK are owned or controlled (as an exclusive licensee) by UK 
record companies, except that certain companies may have to 
pay certain receipts under contract to non-UK licensees and 
certa in companies are owned by non-UK shareholders and thus 
remit dividends overseas. Dividends from non-British 
compani es are apparently rarely remi tted by forei gn owned 
companies to overseas parents. A similar situation applies 
to musical works most of which wil I be owned or controlled by 
UK music publishers or MCPS. 
The Green Paper also suggests that payment by manufacturers 
and importers is the only effective solution because they 
make mass use of records possible but then notes the 
practical problems of rough justice, and a rebate scheme, the 
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fact that any levy could only be an arbitrary percentage and 
the problem of old machines and new machine buyers 
subsidising everyone else. A blank tape levy would be a 
better measure of the extent of private recordings but the 
consumer might be able to get round it by buying tapes direct 
by mai 1, order from abroad; a dea 1 er mi ght get round it by 
selling tapes with trivia recorded on them, so that they 
were no longer IIblank tapes ll • (IINew Scientistu41 , in fact, 
reports that BASF, the West German blank tape manufacturer, 
has come up with exactly this answer by devising a system of 
recording non-copyright material on the bulk rolls of tape 
leaving the magnetic coating bath so that the finished tape 
is no longer blank - or taxable). In addition, says the 
Green Paper, a levy would have to be administered by a 
statutory body, which would be complex both for collection 
and distribution. One would have to decide how to share out 
revenue between di fferent ca tegori es of ri ghts owners and 
between individuals within these categories. Unless the levy 
were unacceptably high, net distributable revenue might be so 
low as not to be worth collecting. The Whitford Committee 
also suggested a similar criticism as regards a blank tape 
levy - that although it would reflect actual usage more 
accurately, it would be a much larger operation and because 
of the small er va 1 ue of tapes as opposed to equi pment and 
because tape can be re-used, it mi ght produce 1 ess revenue. 
The BCC fi nds none of these problems i nsurmountab 1 e, aga in 
pointing out that these are problem of practicality rather 
than principle and the justice of a levy cannot stand or fall 
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on decisions about them and an existing collecting society 
could perform the task fairly cheaply anyway. P'RS also notes 
that the levy need not be passed onto users by equipment or 
blank tape manufacturers since there is severe competition in 
the market, and the market is still growing, so the levy 
might be absorbed in profit margins. Exemptions can be 
worked out through negotiation. Existing societies have to 
take account of them. The BPI suggests that mach; nes not 
meant mainly for music copying could be sold with 2-3 
exempted tapes. Mr. Isherwood, at BPI, agreed that there are 
problems with the idea of a levy but that it is probably the 
least imperfect method of compensating the record industry 
for its losses, assumi ng that you accept that there is a 
problem. 
The Green Paper a 1 so says that video copyi ng may not be 
ana 1 ogous to aud i 0 copyi ng because it is not clear that it 
adversely affects commercial interests - recorders are mainly 
used for 'time shi ft I purposes, and rarely to make 
'libraries' since people may not want to use expensive video 
tape to record programmes they will hardly ever watch. 
Recording is determined by the machines on the market and 
those which are available at the moment can only record 
television broadcasts and films broadcast and play them back 
on the television screen - they do not threaten producers of 
pre-recorded video cassettes since these cannot be copi ed 
except when broadcast. In the future, cheaper tapes may be 
available and equipment may be less expensive and allow home 
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copying of commercial pre-recorded video cassettes and video 
discs (video centres like music centres) but for now the 
Government does not think there is a problem. The BCC thinks 
the Government is missing the point - except under fair 
dealing, recording copyright works is illegal. Nothing can 
take that away. There are now a very large number of video 
recorders privately owned or hired and the figure is growing 
all the time, and it would be very naive to think they were 
only being used for fair dealing purposes. Private 
video-recording has added a new dimension to using television 
sets and by no means all recording is 'time shift'. One 
might add that it is not that difficult to record from one 
video cassette to another - all you need is two recorders and 
a lead - but this may be sufficiently burdensome to prevent 
it happening on a very large scale. 
The Green Paper concludes that the Government is not 
convinced that a levy on audio and video equipment and tape 
would be an acceptable solution and suggests that it may have 
to .be accepted that there is no acceptable solution - an 
att i tude severely cri t i ci sed by the BCC. Fi na lly, the BPI 
says that the Green Paper does not mention the international 
copyright conventions protecting the copyright owner's right 
to authorise home taping. The Government has obligations 
under such conventions and the Green Paper does contain many 
references to our international obligations and how the 
Government intends keeping to them elsewhere. 
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One of the reasons the Government may be unwilling to 
introduce a levy is because it feels that it would be 
unpopular with the general public. There does seem to be a 
certain amount of antipathy towards the record industry 
amongst the general publ ic, as evidenced by letters to the 
music press on the subject of a levy, for example. It seems 
that the record industry is suffering to an extent from its 
past extravangance. There seems little doubt that the image 
of the record industry in the public's eye has quite a lot to 
do wi th the res i stance amongst people to payi ng a 1 evy. 
There seems to be a general feeling that the record industry 
is inefticient and wasteful. No doubt, there is also an 
element of the fact that the record industry is made up ot a 
number of multinationals and there is a natural feeling of 
unease about them. There is also the view commonly 
expressed, for example, by Maurice Healy of the National 
Consumer Council, (NCC) that since the consumer has already 
made payment to the copyright holder (which is obviously not 
the case if you tape a friend's records) by buying the 
record, he shoul d be free to re-record for hi s own purposes 
(which obviously goes against the whole concept of copyright 
that if you use someone else's work to achieve your own 
objectives, you have to pay for the privilege). The NCC42 , 
also argues that putting a tax on recording equipment and 
tape is subsidising the past rather than encouraging 
commercial opportunities of the future. It would hold back 
development of new, more competitive ways of delivering the 
product the consumer wants - the music. A similar argument 
Page 192 
is put by the Consumers in the European Community Group43, 
that a levy would increase tape prices to protect the record 
industry in the guise of obtaining justice for copyright 
owners. The record industry is trying to protect itself by 
attacking a more successful rival at the expense of the 
consumer rather than by improving its product or 
competitiveness. Other people attack the idea along the 
1 i nes of: liThe record industry invented cassette players and 
tapes so whQ is it to complain and why is the record industry 
only complaining now when its sales are dropping? It was a 
. 
problem before, so why did it not complain when it was dOlng 
well?". This, however, ignores the fact that home taping is 
illegal. Mr. Isherwood at the BPI noted that when records 
were fi rst introduced, they represented hi gh technology and 
unique qualities, the price reflecting their uniqueness and 
value. This, however, is no longer the case since it is very 
easy now to make your own copies of records. All the record 
industry is trying to do is restore this former value in 
h t 't 44 w a ever way 1 can • 
The Performing Right Society suggests another solution-
amending the law so that copyright owners can enforce their 
rights against manufacturers and importers of tape and 
equipment. There would be a presumption in the law that 
suppliers of such products for sale in the home market who do 
not have the authority of rights owners to do so are 
contributory infringers. Licensing would be through a 
collecting society, not individually, and there would be a 
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Tribunal to which disputes could be taken. 
Until the end of 1980, there was a voluntary licensing 
scheme, introduced in the 1960s, in which MCPS in conjunction 
with the BPI issued an amateur recording licence under which, 
for a fee of £1.50 (plus VAT) per year, a person could 
legally tape music and records under certain conditions. 
However, only about 12,000 people took out a licence (as 
against a BPI estimate that 15 million people regularly copy 
music from records) and the scheme, at that level of coverage, 
was expensive to administer, so it gradually became clear 
that the record industry could no longer continue with it 
and the licence was dropped. Thus, the present situation has 
arisen whereby in the absence of a licence, a person either 
does not record or he breaks the law. 
For a while, the record industry was hoping to be able to 
solve the problem technically, using a spoiler system, but 
until recently the problem was always that although spoilers 
are technically and theoretically possible, they do not work 
in practice45 . The system has worked under controlled 
d·· b t h . 46 con ltlons ut no ot erWlse . One idea by Magic Alex 
Mardas and the Apple record company in 1967-8 involved 
putting an ultrasonic whistle over the music on the record, 
which would be too high-pitched to be heard on normal replay 
but would react with the ultrasonic bias signal in tape 
recorders giving a lower pitched, audible whistle spoiling 
the recording. However, no standard frequency for tape 
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recorder bias exists and success relies on matching spoiler 
and bias signals - so there would have to be a high pitched 
whistle for each type of tape recorder47 . A variation is to 
have several ultrasonic tones beating with each other on the 
tape but this is more likely to happen in the record player1s 
amplifier, causing distortion48 . Apparently, it is very 
difficult technically to record and reproduce a signal at a 
frequency high enough not to be heard for normal 
listening49 . Another solution was to put a small permanent 
magnet in the record material, under the label, for example, 
to produce very low frequency signals in a magnetic pickup 
or to cut a low frequency wave in the groove, the idea being 
that such a low frequency cannot be heard during normal 
listening but will overload the tape and upset any automatic 
level control circuits in the tape recorder. The problem 
here is that normal sound reproduction will be distorted and 
automatic level control does not operate in all recorders50 • 
I n any case, spoil ers are eas ily fil tered out by the home 
taper, so not long after a spoi 1 er was developed, 
anti-spoilers would be available to add to existing recorders 
51 and as part of new recorders • This is why the Green Paper 
says that if a successful spoiler is developed, it will 
consider introducing legislation to make anti-spoiler devices 
illegal. Fox52 notes that the advent of digital recording is 
not the solution to the problem since every piece of digital 
reproduction equipment has to have a digital-to analogue 
converter because the human ear can only hear analogue sound 
and it is after such conversion that illegal copying 
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occurs
53
• Recently, the CBS Technology Center in the US has 
developed a spoi1er system which, everyone seems to agree, 
has more chance of success than most, the Financial Times 
reports54 . The device is a microchip, which apparently will 
cost 1 ess than £1 in bu 1 k but the problem is that it has 
to be built into a tape recorder. It works by cutting out a 
narrow notch of sound from the recorded or broadcast signal 
. and a sensor in the tape recorder detects when there is a 
notch and switches the tape recorder off55 . The system may 
also be applicable in the video industry56. Technically, it 
would seem the spoiler works very well and record company 
executi ves are apparently very impressed wi th it but i t 57 
would have to be phased in gradually because of the great 
number of recorders already in circulation. One would have to 
obtain legislation to force manufacturers to use the device, 
the chances of which are rather slim58 . The situation is 
likely to arise of two sets of systems - one containing the 
d e v i ~ e , , the other not containing it - so that the market for 
old hi-fils (without the spoiler) will expand and there will 
be an increase in the value of old hi-fils. People may keep 
their old systems for longer, have them repaired rather than 
repl aced if somethi ng goes wrong, and not buy new systems. 
Because of the long-term nature of the solution, the record 
industry is still talking of a levy in the meantime59 • The 
Financial Times articie60 also quotes Charles Levison, 
Managing Director of WEA Records, as saying that this 
solution would also be politically less popular because you 
are stopp; ng peopl e do; ng what they can and want to do and 
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that he would prefer people to be able to pay for the right 
to record rather than be prevented from doing so. A person 
might be less inclined to own a cassette recorder if he could 
not tape his own records which would mean the record industry 
be; ng in even more trouble espec i ally since the cas sette 
market is a growth area. A spoiler system would have had a 
much better chance of success in the 1970s before cassette 
recorder sales boomed. 
Meanwhile, the record industry has been trying various 
marketing devices to boost sales of recorded cassettes and 
attract people away from the blank tape sector. A campa i gn 
was started with the slogan uHome Taping is Killing Music. 
And it I s ill ega 1" • There was a cons i derab 1 e amount of 
controversy when Is 1 and Records 1 aunched its One Pl us One 
tape series involving a high quality recorded cassette on one 
side and blank tape on the other at a price of only £3.99. 
The BPI severely censured Island, regarding it as an 
encouragement to home tapi ng and the scheme was dropped. 
Island maintained, however, that it was only intended to 
boost cassette sales and was in line with the current market 
because more tape recorders were bei n9 bought than hi -fi IS. 
It was hoped that it would take sales away from the blank 
tape market - it had the advantage that the record companies 
got the money not the blank tape manufacturers. Similar 
devices to boost cassette sales have included the 2 in 1 
series - two albums by the same artist for the price of one 
on one cassette and putti ng extra tracks on the 
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cassette versions of records whi ch do not appear on the 
record. It has also been possible to buy packages containing 
both the album and cassette versions of a record and 
cassingles containing a few tracks on a cassette costing less 
than a cassette but more than a s i ngl e. On a more genera 1 
note, record companies are now moving into video as well, 
which seems to have come as something of a godsend, 
represent; ng as it does a major new market for them. The 
video is now one of the major form of promotion for artists. 
As to record rental, the IFPI suggests that the only 
realistic solution is national legislation to introduce a 
distribution right for the producer which is not exhausted on 
first sale and covers rental afterwards. The IFPI has also 
looked at commercial contractual solutions to the problem but 
rejects them. If the producer insisted that the retailer 
include a ban on rental in his sales contracts with other 
buyers and that the records contained a notice to the effect 
"for sale onlyll, the producer could not enforce the contract 
against the third party (because of privity of contract) and 
he would have no recourse to the retailer he first sold to if 
he had fulfilled his contractual obligations. There is always 
the problem of infringement of anti-trust law. If a producer 
sells directly to retailers, he can enforce a contractual ban 
on rental but if there are i ntermedi ari es and a cha in of 
contracts the producer cannot enforce such a ban aga i nst 
dealers who have signed subsequent contracts (only against a 
contract he has actually signed and entered into). Or, the 
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producer might lease records to retailers for a specific 
period of time (renewable) granting them a licence to rent 
records to the public subject to payment of a flat rate fee, 
after which the retailer could run his business as he liked 
and keep any profi ts he made, subj ect to cond i ti ons wh i ch 
might be imposed by the producer, such as rental price. This 
would allow the producer to share rental income without 
stopping rentals. The producer would keep all exclusive 
rights, including the distribution right, in his records so 
tha t unauthori sed sa 1 es or rentals by reta il ers or buyers 
would infringe copyright. Alternatively, the producer could 
sell or lease records to retailers for a fixed percentage of 
income from each rental transaction, although the IFPI notes 
that this would be an adminstratively complex system and 
difficult to control. An alternative would be for the 
producer to se 11 records to reta i1 ers for a hi gher pri ce, 
including an amount instead of rental earnings, but the 
problem here is that the extra return per record sold might 
not compensate the producer for the fall in the amounts s o l ~ ~
which might result from the higher price. All these 
approaches, however, could not work without the introduction 
of a distribution right not exhausted after first sale. The 
IFPI, however, notes that the last three solutions cannot be 
adopted without the record industry abandoning its 
traditional policy of marketing by sales only. Nor would 
such 1 eas i ng schemes prevent renta 1 or boost fa 11 i ng sa 1 es 
figures and the IFPI does not regard them as long term 
solutions. It favours legislation. 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART III - COPYRIGHT COLLECTING SOCIETIES 
The following three chapters deal with the three established 
copyright collecting societies which operate in the field of 
music in the UK - the Performing Right Society, the largest, 
which generally deals with the public performance, 
broadcasting and cable diffusion rights in musical 
compositions, the Mechanical-Copyright Protection Society, 
whi ch dea 1 s wi th the recordi ng and re-recordi ng of mus i ca 1 
c o m p o s i t i o n s ~ n d d Phonographic Performance Limited, which 
deals with the public performance and broadcasting of sound 
recordings. These have been chosen because they have been in 
existence for quite some time, so they have a great deal of 
experience and expertise in the field. Their methods of 
operation are therefore likely to be fairly typical of this 
kind of organisation, although MCPS does differ quite 
significantly from the other two societies. Other societies 
do exist, such as the Publishers· Licensing Society and the 
Authors Lending and Copyright Society Limited, mentioned 
earlier, but these are of recent origin. 
Dietz! notes that "both the Commission of the European 
Communi ties and the European Court of Justice have 
acknowledged the de facto dependence of authors on the 
collecting societies operating in their areas" since only by 
joining together in collecting societies can authors 
effectively exploit their copyrights and receive the reward 
for the fruit of their labours. With advancing technology 
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the number of collecting societies is likely to grow. A 
property ri ght approach may be used to exp 1 a in the 
development of the copyright system and collecting societies. 
Before the introduction of printing into England by Caxton in 
1476, piracy of intellectual works was not really a problem 
because it was a long and costly process and the market was 
very limited. With the advent of printing, however, copying 
became easier, demand for literary works in particular rose 
and a business developed to meet this demand. The property 
rights schoo1 2 notes that individuals or groups will attempt 
to exclude others from exploiting an existing good whenever 
they bel i eve it is to thei r advantage to do so, when the 
benefits they expect to derive from excluding others and 
staking a claim to the good exceed the costs they expect to 
have to meet to define, negotiate, police and enforce the 
claim. The exclusion of others from access to a good 
requires the specification or alteration of property rights 
in that good - and thi sis usually done through the 1 ega 1 
system. The present system of property rights is thus 
changed by new rights being created and old ones being 
altered because certain individuals or groups find it 
profitable to do this and they are prepared to accept the 
costs of doing so. Investment of resources in the 
estab 1 i shment and protecti on of property ri ghts wi 11 depend 
on the marginal cost and marginal benefit of doing so. The 
benefits derived from definition and enforcement activity 
depend on the value of the good and the extent to wh i ch it 
enables the owner to appropriate the true value of the good. 
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If there is an increase in the market value of a bundle of 
property rights, this will encourage individuals and groups 
to strive for laws to strengthen or create private property 
rights. Group act i on to dea 1 wi th new cost-benefi t 
combinations may occur where there are economies of scale in 
collective action, although here there is the problem of the 
free rider, where everybody sits back and waits for someone 
else to act, and of the cos ts of formi ng the group in the 
first place. Demsetz3 views the situation in terms of 
externalities property ri ghts ari se because new or 
di fferent benefi ci a 1 and harmful effects develop. Property 
rights develop to internalise externalities when the gains 
from thi s exceed the costs. New property ri ghts develop 
because of changes to whi ch old property ri ghts are poorly 
attuned. The nature of some goods may make creation, 
definition and enforcement of property rights difficult, 
however. With the development of printing the cost-benefit 
structure changed because costs were reduced, the market grew 
and demand increased. The benefits of obtaining new property 
rights grew and those concerned tried to appropriate the true 
worth of the goods concerned. It was the stationers, 
publishers and printers who pressed for new rights, not the 
authors, since they had more to gain from their introduction. 
In addition, writing is, by its very nature, a decentralised 
process and authors rarely had a chance to meet together to 
exert any pressure, especi ally before the advent of mass 
communication - the costs would have far exceeded the 
benefi ts. Authors were not organi sed and had no uni fyi ng 
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cause. The development of mass communications cut down the 
costs and enabled authors to meet together to press thei r 
claims. In any case, authors have always been reluctant to 
organ; se themselves. Pub 1 i shers, on the other hand, had a 
unifying factor - they were in business, which made it 
relatively easy for them to put forward their claims. 
Atti tudes have also changed - it has gradua lly come to be 
accepted that authors should be paid by those who enjoy their 
works and that they should be able to bequeath a valuable 
asset to their heirs. Similarly, declining sheet music 
sales, advancing technology and related factors changed 
cost-benefit structures in the music field. One of the 
noticeable features of the twentieth century in the copyright 
field has been the creation of specialised pressure groups in 
greater and greater numbers to protect copyright owners' 
interests in response to changing technology. The copyright 
system may also be looked at as an attempt to internalise an 
externa 1 i ty since wi thout such a system and wi thout 
collecting societies, authors would be providing a service, 
providing the community with a benefit, for which the vast 
majority would not receive payment. The main reason for the 
development of these externalities is copying technology. 
When a person buys a book or a record or a music or vi deo 
cassette, the author recei ves a royalty he prov; des a 
benefit to the public for which he receives a payment in the 
form of a royalty. An externality which would exist without 
the copyright system is internalised. However, modern 
technology has thrown up new externalities, which have not 
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yet been i nterna 1 i sed, as we saw inSect i on I I. When a 
person copies something, the copyright owner provides him 
with a benefit for which he receives no reward in many cases. 
The same goes for public performances. 
A further aspect of the problem is that of transacti or:s 
costs. Private and social costs and benefits develop because 
of high transactions costs or because legal restraints have 
been placed on the use and exchange of resources. If there 
is to be a market transaction, one must find out who to deal 
with, tell people that you want to deal and the terms of the 
deal, negotiate, draw up a contract, police and enforce the 
contract. Thi sis 1 ike ly to be costly and may prevent many 
transactions which would take place if such costs were zero. 
The coll ecti ng soci eti es reduce such transacti ons costs and 
perform a function which would be virtually impossible 
without them. An individual music copyright owner would not 
be able to collect the royalties due to him for public 
performance of his works because of the great number of times 
works are performed even ina day or the 1 arge number of 
establishments in which public performance of musical works 
occurs. Nor would it be possible for an individual music 
user to search out and negoti ate wi th each copyri ght owner 
each time he wanted to use a copyright work. It would be 
impossible to collect such royalties for overseas 
performances, too. An author of a book or play can control 
his copyright relatively easily and make sure he receives the 
royalties due to him through his publisher or agent but in 
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the music field individual transactions would be 
prohibitively costly and troublesome. Collecting societies 
represent a centra 1 agency through whi ch 1 i cences can be 
negotiated and royalties paid. As Whale4 notes, such 
collective licensing may be of two types - blanket, under 
which one licence from the society enables the holder to use 
any of the works controlled by the society (which represents 
a vast repertoi re and a 1 so i ncl udes overseas works through 
reciprocal representation contracts between national 
societies), and centralised licensing where the society acts 
as a central clearing house. PRS and PPL engage in blanket 
licensing whereas MCPS has a mixture of both. Such collective 
action reduces costs enormously and enables societies to take 
advantage of economies of scale. Blanket licensing also 
greatly cuts down the costs for promoters of public 
entertainment and owners of clubs, pubs and the like since 
one licence for each establishment is required by the owner 
of the premises to cover public performance of musical works 
and a licence is not required for each individual work. The 
owners of the premises know what is expected of them, where 
to get in touch with copyright owners, how much they have to 
pay, and to whom they have to pay it. To be most effective, 
however, such licensing requires as many copyright owners as 
possible (all if possible) to join so that as many works as 
possible are covered, thus ensuring that when a user wants to 
use a work, it will be covered by the licence issued. Only 
partial coverage wil I be much less attractive to a user. The 
problem is that such blanket licensing leads to the 
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development of a 'super monopoly'. Collecting societies also 
give members as a group more 'clout' and a better bargaining 
position as well as making for more effective lobbying of 
Governments. Such societies enable copyright owners to 
receive income they probably would not get and enforce 
copyrights which might normally be unenforceable. Collecting 
societies would thus seem to fit in with Coase's concept of 
the fi rmS - they are formed to reduce transacti ons casts, 
they have developed because they remove or reduce certain 
negotiation costs and costs of discovering the relevant 
parties, they replace a market transaction with an 
administrative one. The number of parties involved is 
greatly reduced, especially since the trend is towards users 
farming their own central negotiating bodies (countervailing 
power). Without collecting societies, it would also be very 
easy to evade the legal obligation - there would be an 
enforcement and policing problem. Of course, there are casts 
of performing even a centralised collecting operation but in 
comparison with what would otherwise be the case, these costs 
are very low (although the collecting societies may be 
subject to criticism even on this scare). As we have seen, 
in some areas such as reprography, ri ghts are unenforceable 
because of advancing technology but even here the roots of a 
centralised collecting system have sprung up. The costs of 
trying to police or enforce such rights individually would be 
as tronomi ca 1 • Much of the subj ect matter of copyri ght has 
the characteri sti cs of a cammon property resource, a pub 1 i c 
good. For an author to derive income from his work he has to 
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make it pub 1 i c, but once it has been made pub 1 i cit is 
impossible to exclude people, to prevent them using it, which 
makes it very susceptible to piracy, copying and plagiarism. 
In addition, once one person has consumed it, it does not 
prevent others from consuming it too. Thus, there are 
problems of over-use and exploitation. If copying of works 
severely reduces the market, the foundation on which copying 
takes place - the material - may be severely reduced. If 
photocopying makes publication of books uneconomic, books 
will not be pub 1 i shed. Pub 1 i c goods do not a 11 ow 
non-purchasers to be excluded because of high costs of 
policing, enforcement and negotiation. Because a number of 
the rights given to copyright owners are unenforceable, 
others may appropri ate part of the copyri ght owner l s 
potential income which may reduce the incentive to invest 
resources in producing copyright works and distort price 
signals,_ although the potential revenue to be earned may be 
enough to provide some leeway. A person who copies copyright 
works imposes external costs on others whi ch are not taken 
into account in deciding whether to copy or not. These costs 
take the form of increased pri ces for copyri ght works. Too 
much copyi ng may take place because some of the cost of 
copying is borne by others. One cannot bring the full 
expected benefi ts and costs of future benefi ts to bear on 
current users. The claims of the present generation are not 
given enough wei ght economi ca lly speaking. I f there were 
better or more enforcement dev ices, if fi nes for i 11 ega 1 
piracy were greatly increased, it might allow the author to 
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appropriate more of the value of his work and we would expect 
investment to rise. 
There has been a lot of discussion of the need for collecting 
societies to be monopolies to perform effectively - that they 
have to control virtually all works in a particular field, 
thereby eliminating competition. Blanket licensing would not 
work otherwi se. Even where there are a 1 arge number of 
collecting societies, as in France, each society operates in 
a limited area and has a monopoly in that field, so that 
there is effectively no competition in that area. The other 
side of the coin is one or a few societies operating in a 
number of different copyright fields, as in Italy6. One must 
remember, though, that the monopoly is not total since there 
is competition from public domain works and where a number of 
collecting societies confront a user, one would expect 
revenue paid to one society to be affected by revenue paid to 
the others. In Italy, the monopoly position enjoyed by the 
collecting society SIAE is even conferred by legislation7. 
Reservations were expressed by the European Commission in the 
GEMA case about this monopoly position, although Mr. Freegard 
at PRS suggested that the European Commission was in favour 
of one massive central European collecting society. Dietz 
notes, however, that competi ng co 11 ect i ng soc i eti es wou 1 d 
only operate to the detriment of all parties, especially 
authors since users would be able to play each society off 
against the others. Users could also claim in cases of 
i nfri ngement that they had not used the repertoi re of the 
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society bringing the action which would mean the society 
having to provide proof which would present difficulties, 
introduce time delays and put up administration costs. In 
addition, the organiser of public performances might be 
reluctant to pay a number of lump sum fees for the 
repertoires of the different collecting societies if he did 
not know beforehand that he was going to use works from all 
the repertoires. The user would have to hold a licence from 
each society to be on the safe side, which would probably 
cost him more than at present. The process of enforci ng 
copyright would become much more complex and administration 
costs would inevitably rise. Authors would receive less 
money. A number of ways exi st of getti ng round abuses of 
monopoly power - for example, laying down explicit rules 
governing collecting societies or setting up special 
tribunals to oversee their operations. As regards the 
applicability of Articles 85 (restrictions on competition) 
and 86 (abuse of a dominant position) of the Treaty of Rome 
to copyright, particularly the collecting societies, it would 
seem that mere reliance on copyright is not an infringement, 
only actions and agreements are - there is a difference 
between existence and exercise of rights8• Dietz9 maintains 
that copyright may be exempt on the grounds of ·promotion of 
cultural progress· J an analogy to the exemption under Article 
85(3) of ·promoting technical or economic progress·. He also 
thi nks that authors are not entrepreneurs but i nte 11 ectua 1 
workers and thus their associations, when making agreements 
with associations of exploiters of their works, are 
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... 
associations of workers not entrepreneurs and do not breach 
anti-trust law. Such agreements are similar to collective 
bargaining under labour law, he says. Only at the level of 
the exploiters of the work can cartel and competition policy 
be applicable. Dietz views collecting societies as similar 
(but not identical) to trades unions, a belief given weight 
by the social dimension of copyright on the Continent, where 
part of revenue is used to benefit authors generally rather 
than individually. The UK collecting SOCieties, however, do 
not seem to regard themselves as trades unions. Moreover, 
music publishers are as involved in the collecting societies 
as composers. 
10 I n the U. S. , there is compet it i on between the Ameri can 
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and 
Broadcast Music Incorporated (BMI). ASCAP was set up in 1914 
as a voluntary unincorporated non-profit making association 
and gradually developed to deal with public performance and 
broadcasting of copyright musical works (there is no 
performi ng ri ght in records in the US). However, in 1940, 
the National Association of Broadcasters decided to boycott 
ASCAP music and use public domain works and new works 
speci fi ca lly composed for the broadcasters whi ch woul d not 
enter the ASCAP repertoire. This followed a change from a 
lump sum royalty for broadcasters to a percentage of revenue 
formula. BMI was set up but was not expected to succeed 
because ASCAP had an effective monopoly. BMI prospered, 
though, because it found composers who di d not belong to 
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ASCAP but who wrote music to which people wanted to listen, 
although its repertoire is smaller than ASCAP and its revenue 
only about half of ASCAP's. Both BMI and ASCAP are subject 
to a consent decree under anti-trust legislation. 
is not allowed to belong to both societies. 
A composer 
A further 
society in the US is SESAC Incorporated which is a private 
licensing company owned by one family, representing a number 
of music publishers who have given it control of their 
repertoi res and it engages in other revenue-produci ng 
activities besides collection of royalties. The Harry Fox 
Office collects mechanical copyright royalties in the US. 
Thus, we can see that the system of collecting societies in 
the US differs somewhat from that in the UK. 
The following three chapters will attempt to provide a 
detailed picture of how the collecting society system 
operates in the UK. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE PERFORMING RIGHT SOCIETY 
The foreword to the 1983-84 Performing Right Yearbook 
descri bes the Perform; ng Ri ght Soc i ety (PRS) as II an 
association of composers, authors and publishers of musical 
works" and says that its main function is "to do collectively 
for its members something that they cannot effectively do as 
individual writers or publishers - that is to administer for 
the; r benefi t the non-dramati c performi ng and broadcast i ng 
rights in their copyright musical works" since "for the 
composer of songs and other musical works, which may be used 
publicly thousands of times daily throughout the World, it 
would be intolerably troublesome and costly, if not wholly 
impracticable, if those needing permission to perform his 
work had to trace and approach him - or even his publisher -
on each occas; onl! . An individual composercou 1 d not take 
advantage of, or enforce, his copyright properly without the 
collective administration organisations such as PRS (PPL and 
MCPS) provide. PRS' main objective is to collect for its 
members the maximum possible amount of income from the public 
exploitation of their works - that is, for the public 
performance and broadcasting of their worksl. It also deals 
with the diffusion right, although this is usually subsumed 
under the broadcasting right and this area of its operations 
is 1 ike 1y to grow greatly in the next few years after the 
Government I s announcement that it intends a 11 owi ng a 
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large-scale expansion of the cable system in the UK. The 
second objective, and a natural adjunct to the first, is to 
distribute the money collected as accurately as possible 
within the constraints of what is 'economically viable ,2 • 
It is very difficult to pin down the exact nature of PRS 
since it regards itself as neither totally a service nor 
totally a business (and this goes for all the collecting 
societies); it is, as lawyers say, II su i generisll, one on its 
own. It is in business in that it is attempting to maximise 
income but it is not like an ordinary business. Nor is it 
just a service. It is a hybrid. Nor is it really similar to 
a trade union, this being an opinion put forward by Dietz. 
(See Introduction to Part III). The collecting societies in 
the UK do try to maintain and improve the standard of living 
of thei r members and have characteri sti cs akin to trades 
unions but this does not make them trades unions. In fact, 
PRS' members are almost the equivalent of employers and pay 
PRS employees through the money PRS takes out of the revenue 
it collects as administration expenses. Some of the 
Continental societies are more like trades unions and it was 
thought that Dietz's views spring from the fact that a number 
of those, especially the French ones, tend to emphasise their 
professional functions, such as providing services to 
members, which are largely supplementary to their main task 
of collecting as much money as possible for members. The 
equi va 1 ent French soci ety carri es out many of the functi ons 
performed by composers' guilds and unions in other 
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countri es3 • Such other functions and serv ices are rna rg ina 1 
in the PRS set-up. It is really a matter of emphasis. Thus, 
although the collecting societies look after and monitor the 
interests of their members and one might regard negotiation 
between them and bodies representing user groups as the 
equivalent of a collective bargaining situation or a 
situation of bilateral monopoly with two large power groups 
confronting each other, this is not really enough to suggest 
that they are composers· trades unions. 
History 
There is a good deal written about PRS's history, so I shall 
only mention some of (what I regard as) the more important 
events4. PRS was registered as a company limited by 
guarantee on March 6, 1914 he 1 ped by the Bri ti sh agency of 
the French collecting society, SACEM, which was the first 
society in the World to collect p e r f o r m a n c ~ ~ royalties for 
musical works, having been set up in Paris in 1851. There 
were originally 39 members of PRS. The support of publisher 
members made its establishment possible since they supplied 
the finance, although they would only allow PRS an agency 
function at first so it could not sue in its own name. At 
first, there were many problems and the outbreak of World War 
I did not help. Initially, PRS controlled only a small 
proportion of musical works in the UK, although it signed 
reciprocal agreements \'Jith societies in France, Italy, 
Germany -and Austria, which enabled it to take advantage of 
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economies of scale in its licensing activities. PRS' tariffs 
were very low at first, almost nominal, because it was 
desperate to be accepted and it was felt that rates could be 
increased to more realistic levels when PRS was more popular. 
The first distribution was in 1917 involving about £11,000 
to a membership which had swollen to 297. There was a major 
set-back in 1919 when a large group of publishers who 
specialised in new popular dance music left (as well as their 
authors and composers) because they did not think PRS was of 
much use to them, thinking that sheet music would always 
provide sufficient income for them and that by allowing free 
performance without the need for royalties it advertised 
their works and thus affected sales of sheet music. Another 
factor in the decision was opposition from the Musicians' 
Union which feared that PRS' activities would adversely 
affect its members' employment opportunities, a fear 
compounded by the fact that PRS had initially suggested 
basing its tariffs on the number of musicians employed. 
Eventua lly, when sa 1 es of records decimated sa 1 es of sheet 
music and broadcasting grew, they were forced to re-join in 
1926. Music users were also opposed to PRS with trade 
organi sa ti ons j oi ni ng together in th is oppos i t i on and 
lobbying Parliament. In addition, in 1919, the British Music 
Union tried to undermine PRS by publishing ""free music", 
music which was either in the public domain or in which the 
performing right was not enforced, although it was not very 
successful in its campaign. 
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Up until about 1970, PRS also had to engage in a greal deal 
of litigation and court cases because its demands were just 
ignored in many cases. Technological change with the 
development of broadcasting and reductions in the price of 
gramophones and records made the perform; ng ri ght more and 
more important. PRS' fi rst i nfri ngement acti on was 
apparently PRS V Thompson in the King's Bench Division on 10 
Apri 1 1918. PRS has had to fi ght a number of cases in its 
hi story about whether it is a trade uni on and whether it 
operates in restraint of trade - fortunately for PRS, the 
answer has always been negative. In its early days, PRS was 
also somewhat restricted in the actions it could take because 
there was some doubt about whether it could sue in its own 
name unless there was very clear evidence of assignment. It 
also won a number of cases whereby the occupiers of halls at 
which copyright was infringed by bands who played there were 
found to have authori sed such i nfri ngements. 1923 saw the 
first licence issued to the BBe and McFarlane notes that this 
early acceptance of the idea of a performing right in 
broadcasting made PRS 1 survival more likely. Meanwhile, PRS 
increased greatly the number of affiliation contracts it had 
with sister societies in other countries, so it had a much 
larger repertoire to offer music users, and it set up 
agencies abroad where there were no national societies, 
especially in the Dominions and colonies. The cinema 
produced another large source of income for composers, 
broadcasting another. In 1927, a number of music users, the 
Musicians Union and some gramophone companies set up the 
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International Council of Music Users Ltd wh,'ch t' d , ne 
unsuccessfully to obtain bulk discounts on PRS tariffs and 
then promoted a Pri vate Members Bi 11 in Parl i ament in 1929, 
the Musical, Copyright Bill, which attempted to nullify the 
performing right in musical works by making it compulsory for 
the copyright owner to print a notice on the title page of 
all musical works which specifically reserved the performing 
right - he had to lopt into' the right - and by laying down a 
maximum fee of 2d for the performing right in musical works 
payable on purchase, hence its nickname, 'The Tuppenny Bil1'. 
The Bill was turned down by a Select Committee of the House 
of Commons which gave its seal of approval to PRS, although 
it thought that a super monopoly such as that PRS had might 
be subject to abuse. This latter comment had the effect of 
moderating PRS· policy towards tariffs and negotiations with 
music users so that its tariffs became even more out of line 
with those on the Continent. The 19205 and 130s saw a number 
of cases which established the meaning of IIpublic ll 
performance. Jennings V Stephens (1936), for example, 
concerned a performance of a play by a dramatic society 
organised by the local Womens' Institute in a village. There 
was an annual subscription and at the performance a number of 
members of the Institute, but no guests other than the 
performers, were present. It was held that whether there 
were guests or not, whether admission was free or not, 
whether the performers were paid or not, whether a person was 
resident in the village or not and the size of the audience 
were not the decisive factors. It was held that there had 
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been a public performance. The cases of Ernest Turner 
Electrical Instruments Ltd. V PRS and PRS V Gillette 
Industries Ltd (1943) defined the criteria further. Here, it 
was held that relaying the BBe' s "Music While You Work" radio 
programmes by loudspeakers to workers in factories and using 
such background music in places of entertainment was public 
performance, noti ng that such performances greatly damaged 
the commercial value of the copyright. Similarly, in PRS V 
Hammonds Bradford Brewery Ltd (1934), 3 songs in PRS' 
repertoire were performed at a cinema with its permission and 
the performance broadcast by the BBC. A hotel made thi s 
performance available to its visitors by means of a wireless 
set and loudspeaker system. This was held to be a separate 
pubic performance. The case of PRS V Camelo (1936) carried 
this concept further by holding that a wireless which was 
played so loud ly in the 1 i vi ng room of the 1 easeho 1 der of 
premises that it could be heard in the restaurant which his 
wife operated in the same premises was a public performance 
even though the intention was not that it should be heard in 
the restaurant. It was suggested in PRS V Rangers Supporters 
Club that a private party at a person's home would not be a 
pub 1 i c performance because it is not goi ng to fi nanci a 1ly 
disadvantage the composers since the guests would not 
normally pay for the privilege. Finally, in PRS V Harlequin 
Record Shops (1979) it was held that the playing of records 
in shops over loudspeakers was a public performance and 
required payment of royalties. Any performance outside the 
purely domestic circle will be "in public". 
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Gradually, PRS increased its acceptance by music users and 
the general public to such an extent that by 1934 it could 
ins i st that members fully assign thei r performi ng ri ghts to 
it. By 1939, acceptance by publ ishers was virtually 
unanimous. With its many affiliation contracts abroad and 
its participation in the Confederation Internationale des 
Societes dlAuteurs et Compositeurs (CISAC), an international 
associ ati on of performi ng ri ght organi sati ons, PRS was a 1 so 
consul ted more and more by the Government on top; cs rel ated 
to its area of expertise. After the War, the advent of 
nationwide television opened up a lucrative new market, 
followed by developments such as juke boxes, background 
music, LP and single records, stereo record-players, tape 
recorders and communications satellites which produced 
undreamt of revenue for composers and pub 1 i shers . Another 
important aspect of PRS 1 history was investigation of its 
activities in respect of the monopoly it had in its field. 
I twas looked into by the Se 1 ect COlToni ttee on the Mus i ca 1 
Copyright Bill, 1930, and the British delegation at the 
conference on the Brussels revi s i on of the Berne Conventi on 
in 1948 made their acceptance of Article 11 (which gave 
authors the excl us i ve ri ght to author; se pub 1; c performance 
of the; r works) subj ect to the UK Government be; ng able to 
pass legislation to prevent or deal with abuses of the 
monopoly rights given to copyright owners. PRS, though, was 
apparently reassured that thi s reservation was not entered 
because of its activities nor because there was any evidence 
that it had abused its monopoly position. However, problems 
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arose when PRS tried to increase its tariffs to take account 
of its cautious early policy, inflation and the new economic 
conditions, since the increases would have had to be very 
large to compensate. The mood of resistance to tariff 
increases by PRS grew ever stronger. One of the problems was 
that there was no official arbitration tribunal to which 
disputes could be submitted. A Copyright Committee was 
appointed in April 1951 to look into the whole copyright 
question. On the subject of monopoly abuse, it recommended 
the setting up of an independent arbitration tribunal, which 
became the Performing Right Tribunal in the 1956 Act. Since 
then, PRS has gone from strength to strength, culminating in 
PRS being awarded the Queen's Award to Industry in 1971. 
Revenue 
PRS collects substantial amounts of money for the publ ic 
performance and broadcast; ng of the musi ca 1 works of its 
members each year, to such an extent that it is very 
difficult to criticise it in this respect. Its performance 
over the years 1971-82 in both money and real terms (allowing 
for inflation) is shown in diagram 4.1 while Table 4.1 shows 
the figures for gross revenue in money and real terms as well 
as increases and p e r c e ~ t a g e e increases for the money values. 
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YEAR GROSS REALb INCREASE t % INCREASE1 
REVENUE (£) REVENUE FALL+(MONEY FALLUMONEY 
TERMS) TERMS) 
1971 10,624,742a 13,280,927 1,497,347 t 16.40% t 
1972 11,447,727a 13,357,907 822,985 t 7.75% 1 
1973 12,436,840a 13,301 ,433 ~ ~ 975,237 t 8.52% ~ ~
1974 14,456,681a 13,324,129 2,019,841 t 16.24% 1 
1975 17,180,733a 12,745,350 ~ ~ 2,724,052 1 18.84% l' 
1976 21,559,596a 13,723,485 4,378,863 t I 25.49% t 
1977 24,895,226a 13,678,695 J, 3,335,630 t 15.47% t 
1978 28,678,225a 14,550,088 3,782,999 t 15.20% t 
1979 33,065,158a 14,794,254 4,386,933 t 15.30% 1 
1980 39,341,612a 14,919,079 6,276,454 f 19.00% t 
1981 46,866,153a 15,886,831 7,524,541 t 19.13% t 
1982 54,442,312a 16,991,982 7,576,159 r 16.17% t 
TABLE 4.1 PRS GROSS REVENUE REAL & MONEY TERMS 
Source: a - PRS REPORT & ACCOUNTS 1971-75, PRS YEARBOOKS 
1977-83/4. 
b - The real revenue figures are calculated by 
applying the RPI, which is as follows: 
1971 - 80; 1972 - 85.7: 1973 - 93.5; 1974 (Jan 
15 = 100)- 108.5; 1975 - 134.8; 1976 - 157.1; 
1977 - 182.0; 1978 - 197.1; 1979 - 223.5; 1980 -
263.7; 1981 - 295; 1982 - 320.4. 
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Thus, we can see that PRS has increased its gross revenue 
every year in money terms and vi rtua lly every year in rea 1 
terms, the only really disappointing years being 1973, 1975 
and 1977. Between 1967 and 1982, money gross revenue rose 
nearly 700% while real gross income rose about 55%. One must 
note that the figures for 1981 and 1982 are somewhat out of 
line with the figures for other years because PRS changed its 
accounting policy in 1981 - whereas before British and Irish 
genera 1 1 i cence revenue (that is, revenue from pub 1 i c 
performance) was mainly accounted for in the year in which it 
was received, it is now accounted for when it is invoiced. 
The effect of this was to increase income by £1,258,000 in 
1981. Thus, whereas before income was brought into the 
accounts only when received and amounts due and invoiced but 
not paid and received at the end of the accounting year were 
largely ignored, now amounts invoiced but unpaid are included 
but only insofar as they relate to the year under 
consideration. PRS Yearbooks note some of the main factors 
affecting revenue - the effects of inflation on music users' 
revenues and expenditure resulting in greater revenue for PRS 
where its tari ffs a re based on percentages of mus i c user IS 
receipts and expenditure; tariff re-negotiations; index 
1 i nki ng of tari ffs based on monetary amounts; the 
development of new outlets for use of PRS members' works, for 
example, local radio, the increasing popularity of PRS 
contro 11 ed works abroad and changes in exchange rates, as 
well as emigration abroad of members for tax reasons; 
improved effectiveness of PRS' licensing activities, 
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especially in the public performance field, through the 
emp 1 oyment of more 1 i cens i ng inspectors so that there are 
fewer unlicensed performances and enforcement is improved. 
Administration Costs 
L 
Diagram 4.1 shows how administration costs have changed over 
the period 1971-82 in real and money terms, while Table 4.2 
shows the same in table form. 
YEAR ADMINISTRATION ADMINISTRATION INCREASE l' I NCREASEl' 
COSTS (MONEY COSTS (REAL FALL .J, FALL + 
TERMS (£) TERMS)b (£) MONEY TERMS PERCENTAGE 
1971 1,286,531 a 1,608,164 
1972 1,371,594 a 1,600,460 J. 85,0631 6.61% 1 
1973 1,546,592 a 1,654,109 174,998f 12.76% t 
1974 2,034,530 a 1,875,143 487,9381 31.55% t 
1975 2,528,282 a 1,875,580 493,752t 24.27% 1 
1976 2,934,743 1,868,073 ~ ~ 406,4611 16.08% t 
1977 3,403,427 a 1,870,015 468,6841 15.97% t 
1978 4,158,044 a 2,109,611 754,6171 22.17%t 
1979 4,952,265 a 2,215,779 794,221t 19.10% t 
1980 6,374,733 a I 2,417,419 1,422,468f 28.72% t 
1981 8,229,044 a 2,789,506 1,854,3111 29.09% 1 
1982 9,527,831 a 2,973,730 1,298,787f 15. 7 8 ; ~ ~ t 
TABLE 4.2 PRS A [ i ~ q q rn STRATION COSTS MONEY & REAL TERVoS 
Source: a = as Table 4.1. b - calculated as in Table 4.1. 
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DIAGRAM 4.1 PRS GROSS REVENUE & ADMINISTRATION 
COSTS, MONEY & REAL TERMS 
G.R. = GROSS REVENUE; RR = REAL REVENUE; MC = MONEY COSTS; 
RC = REAL COSTS 
Source: Tables 4.1 and 4.2. ("r tI.J -.----------------------------, 
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Costs have increased considerably over the period. From 1971 
to 1982, costs rose by 640% in money terms, 85% in real terms 
(as against 41.2%. in money terms and 28% in real terms for 
revenue). Rising costs seem to be a major problem for PRS _ 
they have only fallen twice in real terms over the period, in 
1972 and 1976. Cynics might say that PRS· monopoly pOSition 
is to blame but there are probably a number of other factors 
as well. Inflation is obviously one factor which affects 
such costs but the above fi gu res are expressed in real and 
money terms and costs still rose substantially. As with all 
the collecting societies, personnel costs represent the 
largest portion of administration expenses - at present, this 
percentage is 73% but it has been as high as 76%. PRS says 
that it has to increase its salaries in line with inflation 
to compete with other employers. It was noted in interview 
that PRS hopes to reduce personnel costs through 
computerisation. The number of staff employed by PRS has 
generally increased over the years. At present, the figure 
stands at 698 and one wonders whether PRS might actually be 
overstaffed or be paying more than it needs to. PRS is 
presently setti ng up a fully computeri sed database and has 
taken on quite a few temporary staff as a result. A further 
pOint to note here is that the cost of the database (£100,000 
in 1981 and £212,442 in 1982), does not appear in the figure 
for administration costs but comes out of PRS· distributable 
reserves. PRS has had to take on more staff to deal with its 
increasing workload since it is still expanding. Head Office 
staff has been increased to "expand and intensify the 
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Soci ety I s efforts to improve its 1 i cence covera,ge •... II and as 
a resu 1 t of its deci s i on to 1 i cence back'ground mus i c systems 
and juke boxes through site occupiers rather than bulk 
agreements with suppliers5. PRS has also deliberately 
increased the strength of its licensing field force in recent 
years in an attempt to improve enforcement and to increase 
public performance revenue - which seems to have had a 
certa in amount of success. I ncome has certa in ly increased 
considerably over the years but so have costs- in fact, cost 
increases have outstripped revenue increases. This opens up 
the possibility of a trade-off between efficiency and 
effectiveness (do you increase the amount of income coilected 
each year but not worry about the cost - revenue ratio or do 
you put more emphasis on the cost - revenue ratio and perhaps 
not collect so much revenue). A further reason for increases 
in costs arises from the need to process more and more 
documentation, often of a complex nature, as a result of 
growing membership and from the fact that a lot of publisher 
registrations have had to be amended because of recent court 
cases in the House of Lords and Court of Appeal on 
reversionary rights - the Redwood Music cases6 -which has to 
date led to 10,000 titles or more changing hands7. Another 
factor accounting for the increasing costs experienced by PRS 
is that the uses of music and new outlets for music that have 
developed in recent years are -more expensive to administer 
than previous forms of explOitation, based as they are on 
localised services and IInarrowcastingU (as opposed to 
broadcasting). For example, local radio is churning out a 
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vast amount of music, hour in, hour out, which has to be 
processed. These local radio stations are relatively small 
and they are numerous but the cost of processing one houris 
output of mus; c from them ; s the same as the cost of 
processing one hour of national radi08• The same is likely 
to be the case with cable television which is soon expected 
to take off in the UK and which is likely to be very 
localised with many cable stations. Head Office staff at PRS 
have also had to be increased to monitor radio and television 
output to check the veraci ty of returns sent in by them to 
PRS, which has effects on costs, too. This has revealed 
under-reporting, which means more data to analyse in addition 
to the massive growth of local radio in recent years. 
Table 4.3 shows how administration costs have taken up an 
increasing percentage of gross revenue. 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
12.11 11.98 12.44 14.07 14.72 13.61 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
13.67 14.50 14.98 16.20 17.56 17.50 
TABLE 4.3 ADMINISTRATION COSTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS 
REVENUE. 
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Operational Surplus: Net Distributable Revenue 
Operational Surplus is just the surplus of gross revenue over 
administrative costs. Between 1971 and 1982, operational 
surplus rose by £35,576,270 in money terms (381%) from 
£9,338,211 to £44,914,481. Thi s represents an increase in 
real terms of £2,345,489 or 20.09% from £11,672,763 to 
£14,018,252. The more important figure, though, is Net 
Distributable Revenue (NOR) since this is the amount of money 
which actually goes to the members. NOR is operational 
surplus minus taxation, donations to musical causes, 
sponsorship of awards to members and expenses which are not 
really part of PRS' operational costs. Between 1971-82, NOR 
rose by about £35,552,268 (387%) in money terms from 
£9,191,360 to £44,743,628. In real terms, however, the rise 
was only £2,475,727 (21.5%) from £11,489,200 to £13,964,927. 
One must be careful, however, in comparing net distributable 
revenue between years because in the more recent Yearbooks, 
NOR is operational surplus minus donations, taxation, 
sponsorship, copyright promotion expenditure, purchase of 
supplementary pensions and transfers to and from 
distributable reserves and contributions to the PRS Members' 
Fund. The earlier Yearbooks exclude the latter two from NOR 
(and call distributable reserves 'the revenue reserve'). One 
must also remember that in some years money is taken out of 
di stri butab 1 e reserves and added to NOR (such as in 1973, 
1974, 1978, 1979, 1981 and 1982), while in other years money 
is taken out of NOR and put into distributable reserves. 
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Table 4.4. and Diagram 4.2 show how NOR has changed over the 
period 1971-82. 
YEAR NDR LMONEY NDR [REAL INCREASE t INCREASE f 
TERMS (£)] TERMS (£)]b FALL ~ ~ FALL t 
(MONEY TERMS) PERCENTAGE 
1971 9,191,360 a 11,489,200 
1972 9,873,009 a 11,520,430 681,649 t 7.42% t 
1973 10,952,564a 11,713,972 1,079,555 t 10.93% 1 
1974 12,472,602a 11,495,485..t, 1,520,038 t 13.88% t 
, 
14,573,419a 10,811,141 J, 2,100 ,817 t 16.84% t 1975 
1976 18,457,990a 11,749,197 3,884,571 l' 26.66% t 
1977 21,278,417a 11,691 ,437 ~ ~ 2,820,427 t 15.28% t 
1978 24,257,462a 12,307,185 2,979,045 t 14.00% t 
1979 27,853,089a 12,462,232 3,595,627 f 14.82% f 
1980 32,523,100a 12,333,371 +' 4,670,011 t 1 6 ~ 7 7 % % t 
1981 38,502,542a 13,051,709 5,979,442 l' 18.39% t 
1982 44,743,628a 13,964,927 6,241,086 t 16.21% t 
TABLE 4.4 - CHANGES IN NET DISTRIBUTABLE REVENUE, REAL & 
MONEY TERMS 1971-82 
Source: a - PRS REPORTS & ACCOUNTS 1971-75: PRS YEARBOOKS 
1977-83/4. 
b - Calculated as in Table 4.1. 
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Thus, we can see that NDR fe 11 ; n real terms ; n 1974, 1975 
and 1980. Recent years have seen qui te 1 arge increases in 
NOR. NOR though, has generally kept pace with inflation and 
outstripped it in cases. NOR as a percentage of gross 
revenue has been generally falling over the years from 86.51% 
in 1971 to 82.19% in 1982, with a peak of 88.07% in 1973. It 
has fallen in 8 of the last 11 years, although the amount 
actually paid out has, of course, increased in money terms 
and generally in real terms. 
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Sources of Revenue 
PRS has fi ve rna in sources of income - pub 1 i c performance 
revenue, broadcasting revenue, investment income, income 
from overseas agencies, mainly Commonwealth, and income from 
affiliated societies. It was noted in interview9 that a 
better measure of performance and efficiency than gross 
revenue and admi ni strati on costs as a percentage of gross 
revenue was domestic revenue (publ ic performance and 
broadcasting revenue in the UK & Eire) and administration 
costs as a percentage of domestic revenue on the basis that 
PRS cannot really control what happens in other countries but 
it can in its domestic territories. One might also include 
investment income although I have excluded it because it is 
not a direct consequence of PRS· main job of work. Figures 
for public performance and broadcasting revenue are shown in 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6, and Diagrams 4.3 and 4.4 show public 
performance, broadcasting and domestic revenue in real and 
money terms. As we can see, performance in recent years has 
been very good as regards total domestic revenue, taken in 
i so 1 at i on although there was a rather bad peri cd b'etween 1973 
and 1975 when this fell each year in real terms. During the 
period, total domestic revenue rose £30,384,945 (514.31%) in 
money terms and £3,942,473 (53.39%) in real terms. Tables 
4.8 and 4.9 show how public performance and broadcasting 
costs have changed over the period in real and money terms. 
Diagrams 4.6. and 4.7 shows how total domestic costs, public 
performance and broadcasting costs have changed over the 
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period in graphic form. Total domestic costs have risen by 
£7,732,881 (727%) in money terms,£1,416,053 (106.52%) in real 
terms. Thus, the s i tuati on has been deteri orati ng from the 
point of view of NOR with costs taking up a larger and larger 
proportion of gross domestic revenue. Similarly, the ratio 
of domestic costs to domestic revenue shows a deteriorating 
position whether investment income is included or not. There 
have been times, such as 1971-2 and 1975-6 when the ratio has 
been falling but recent years have seen a strong upward trend 
(since 1977). Table 4.7 shows the ratio over the period. 
One criticism PRS made of my analysis was that allocations 
between sectors were judgemental and for the sake of 
convenience and that they were PRS ' own allocations which 
changed over the years. Where poss i b 1 e I have pi cked up 
changes in items included in various areas - for example, the 
changes i n what is inc 1 uded under the head i ng of 
lI administration expenses ll and IINDRII - but this is not 
possible in all cases. However, since the source of my 
figures is the Performing Ri ght Yearbook, which is 
distributed to a 11 members, one would expect the figures to 
be generally correct. These figures are the only ones 
available anyway. The problem is apparently most likely to 
occur in the public performance field, where the figures are 
more heavily weighted. 
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Y ~ R R 1971 1972 1973 
- - -
PUBLIC P E R F O ~ N C E E 2,740,777 3,032,721 3,122,900 
REVENUE (MT) 
PUBLIC PERF0§MANCE 3,425,971 3,538,764 3,340,000 
REVENUE (RT) 
INCREASE (MT) 291,944 90,179 
PERCENTAGE INCREASE 10.65% 2.97% 
YEAR 1974 1975 1976 
- - - -
PUBLIC PERF0§MANCE 3,250,423 3,773,176 4,675,159 
REVENUE (MT) 
PUBLIC PERF0§MANCE 2,995,782 
REVENUE (RT) 
2,799,092 2,975,913 
INCREASE (MT) 127,523 522,753 901,983 
PERCENTAGE INCREASE 4.08% 16.08% 23.91% 
YEAR 1977 1978 1979 
-
- - -
PUBLIC PERFORMANCE 
REVENUE (MT)a 
5,675,428 7,159,912 8,291,427 
PUBLIC PERF0§MANCE 3,118,367 3,632,629 3,709,811 
REVENUE (RT) 
INCREASE (MT) 1,000,269 1,484,484 1,131,515 
PERCENTAGE INCREASE 21.40% 26.16% 15.80% 
YMR 1980 1981 1982 
- - -
PUBLIC PERF0§MANCE 10,519,986 12,946,815 13,553,904 
REVENUE (MT) 
PUBLIC PERF0§MANCE 3,989,377 4,388,751 4,230,307 
REVENUE (RT) 
INCREASE (MT) 2,228,559 2,426,829 607,089 
PERCENTAGE INCREASE 26.88% 23.07% 4.69% 
TABLE 4.5 CHANGES IN PUBIC PERFORMANCE REVENUE, REAL & MONEY 
TERMS 1971-82. 
Source: a - PRS Reports & Accounts 1971 - 75, PRS Yearbooks 
1977-83/4. 
b - RT = Real Terms, calculated as in Table 4.1. 
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YEAR 1971 1972 1973 
- - - -
BROADCASTING 
REVENUE (MT)a 3,167,129 3,548,258 4,011,173 
BROADCASTINGb 3,958,911 4,140,324 4,290,025 REVENUE (RT) 
INCREASE (MT) 381,129 462,915 
PERCENTAGE INCREASE 12.03% 13.05% 
YEAR 19I4 ~ 7 5 5 1976 
BROADCASTING 
REVENUE (MT)a 4,722,436 5,947,487 7,301,501 
BROADCASTINGb 4,352,476 REVENUE (RT) 4,412,082 4,647,677 
INCREASE (MT) 711,263 1,225,051 1,354,014 
PERCENTAGE INCREASE 17.73% 25.94% 22.77% 
YEAR 1977 1978 1979 
- - - -
BROADCASTINGa 8,879,265 10,366,092 12,723,935 REVENUE (MT) 
BROADCASTINGb 4,878,717 5,259,306 5,693,036 REVENUE (RT) 
INCREASE (MT) 1,577,764 1,486,827 2,357,843 
PERCENTAGE INCREASE 21. 61% 16.74% 22.75% 
YEAR 1980 1981 1982 
- - -
-
BROADCASTING 
REVENUE (MT)a 
16,373,579 18,994,875 
1 
22,738,947 
BROADCASTINGb 6,209,169 6,438,941 7,097,050 REV ENUE (RT) 
INCREASE (MT) 3,649,644 2,621,296 3,744,072 
PERCENTAGE INCREASE 28.68% 16.01% 19.71% 
TABLE 4.6 - CHANGES IN BROADCASTING REVENUE, REAL & MONEY 
TERMS 1971-82 
Source: a - PRS Report & Accounts 1971-75, PRS Yearbooks 
1977-83/4 
b - RT = Real Terms, calculated as for Table 4.1. 
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DIAGRAM 4.3 GROSS TOTAL DOMESTIC REVENUE 
PUBLIC PERFORMANCE REVENUE, BROADCASTING 
REVENUE, MONEY TERMS 
PPRMT = PUBLIC PERFORMANCE REVENUE MONEY TERMS; BRMT = 
BROADCASTING REVENUE MONEY TERMS; DRMT = DOMESTI C REVENUE 
MONEY TERMS (GROSS TOTAL DOMESTIC REVENUE) 
Source: Table 5.5. 
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1971 18.00 
1972 17.17 
1973 17.43 
1974 20.94 
1975 21.25 
1976 20.00 
1977 19.19 
1978 20.14 
1979 20.64 
1980 21.43 
1981 23.96 
1982 24.24 
TABLE 4.7. TOTAL DOMESTIC COSTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL 
DOMESTIC REVENUE (MONEY TERMS) 
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YEAR 1971 1972 1973 
-
PUBLIC P E R ~ O R M A N C E E 845,271 876,612 952,229 COSTS (MT) 
I PUBLIC PERfiORMANCE 1,056,589 1,022,884 1,018,427 COSTS (RT) 
INCREASE (MT) 31,341 75,617 
PERCENTAGE INCREASE 3.71% 8.63% 
YEAR 1974 1975 1976 
- -
- -
PUBLIC P E R ~ O R M A N C E E 1,291,859 1,589,898 1,801,741 COSTS (MT) 
PUBLIC PERbORMANCE 1,190,653 1,179,450 1,146,875 
COSTS (RT) 
INCREASE (MT) 339,630 298,039 211,843 
PERCENTAGE lNCREASE 35.67% 23.07% 13.32% 
YEAR 1977 1978 1979 
PUBLIC P E R ~ O R M A N C E E 2,047,293 
COSTS (MT) 2,645,195 3,222,879 
PUBLIC PERfiORMANCE 1,124,886 1,342,057 1,442,004 
COSTS (RT) 
INCREASE (MT) 245,552 597,902 577,684 
PERCENTAGE INCREASE 13.63% 29.20% 21.84% 
YEAR 1980 1981 1982 
- - - -
PUBLIC P E R ~ O R M A N C E E 4,189,236 5,485,851 5,950,474 
COSTS (MT) 
PUBLIC PERbORMANCE 1,588,637 1,859,611 1,857,202 
COSTS (RT) 
INCREASE(MT) 966,357 1,296,615 464,623 
PERCENTAGE INCREASE 29.98% 30.95% 8.47% 
TABLE 4.8 CHANGES IN PUBLIC PERFORMANCE COSTS, REAL & MONEY 
TERMS, 1971-82. 
Source: a - PRS Reports & Accounts 1971-5, PRS Yearbooks 
1977-83-4. 
b - Calculated as for Table 4.1. 
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YEAR 1971 1972 1973 
-
- -
-
B R O A D C A S T I ~ G G 218,238 253,120 291,323 COSTS (MT) 
B R O A D C A S T I ~ G G
COSTS (RT) 272,798 295,356 311,575 
I 
INCREASE (MT) , 34,882 38,203 I 
PERCENTAGE INCREASE I 15.98% 15.09% 
YEAR 1974 1975 1976 
B R O A D C A S T I ~ G G 377,795 475,799 593,758 
COSTS (MT) 
B R O A D C A S T I ~ G G 348,198 352,967 377,949 
COSTS (RT) 
INCREASE (MT) 86,472 98,004 117,959 
PERCENTAGE INCREASE 29.68% 25.94% 24.79% 
YEAR 1977 1978 1979 
- - - -
B R O A D C A S T I ~ G G 746,036 885,108 1,114,243 
COSTS (MT) 
B R O A D C A S T I ~ G G 409,910 449,065 498,543 
COSTS (RT) 
INCREASE (MT) 152,278 139,072 229,135 
PERCENTAGE INCREASE 25.65% 18.64% 25.89% 
YEAR 1980 1981 1982 
- - - -
B R O A D C A S T I ~ G G 1,573,146 2,166,840 2,845,916 
COSTS (MT) I 
B R O A D C A S T I ~ G G 596,567 734,522 888,238 
COSTS (RT) 
INCREASE (MT) 458,903 593,694 679,076 
PERCENTAGE INCREASE 41.19% 37.74% 31.34% 
TABLE 4.9 CHANGES IN BROADCASTING COSTS, REAL AND MONEY 
TERMS, 1971-82 
Source: a - PRS Reports & Accounts 1971-75, PRS Yearbooks 
1977-83/4 
b - calculated as for Table 4.1 
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Source: Table 4.5 
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PPCRT = PUBLIC PERFORMANCE COSTS REAL TERMS; BCRT = 
BROADCASTING COSTS REAL TERMS; DCRT = DOMESTIC COSTS REAL 
TERMS (GROSS TOTAL DOMESTIC COSTS REAL TERMS). 
Source: Table 4.7. 
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Public Performance 
Diagram 4.5 illustrates quite well the dilemma PRS faces as 
regards collection of public performance royalties. Public 
performance revenue in 1982 represented 24.9% of gross 
revenue but 62.45% of gross administration costs. Table 4.5 
and diagrams 4.3 and 4.4 show a trend of increasing public 
performance revenue in money terms but a 1 ess impress i ve 
picture when considered in real terms with drops in 1973, 
1974, 1975 and 1982. Over the period, revenue has grown by 
394.53% in money terms but only 23.48% ;n real terms. Costs, 
cn the other hand, have risen 604% in money terms and 75.77% 
in rea 1 terms. I n fact, up to 1978, PRS had rather a good 
record on public performance costs since they fell in real 
terms every year from 1971 to 1978, except in 1974. The rise 
in public performance costs was kept to a relatively low 
8.47% in 1982. NOR has been up and down over the peri ad 
reachi ng a peak of 71.09% in 1972 but fall i ng every year 
since to reach 56.10% of gross public performance revenue in 
1982. The ratio of public performance revenue to. gross 
revenue genera 11y fe 11 over the peri ad 1971-6 (apart from 
1972), reaching a low point of 21.68% in 1976. From 1976 
until 1981 the ratio increased each year to reach 27.63% in 
1981 since public performance revenue increased at a faster 
rate than gross revenue. In fact, the average growth rate 
between 1977 and 1981 for pub 1; c performance revenue was 
22.66%. One reason for this was the employment of more 
licensing inspectors. 1982, however, was a great 
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di sappoi ntrnent wi th gross pub 1 i c performance r,evenue grow; n9 
on ly 4.69%, NOR by on ly 1. 9% and the gross revenue/ gross 
public performance ratio falling to 24.90%. Public 
performance costs as a percentage of public performance 
revenue reached a peak in 1982 at 43.9%. As a percentage of 
gross revenue, public performance costs were 10.93% in 1982, 
having reached 11.71% in 1981. Public performance costs as a 
percentage of total costs have generally been in the low-mid 
60% with the highest ratio being reached at 65.86% in 1981. 
1982, however, saw a drop to 62.45%. 1982 seems to have been 
a bad year for revenue but a pretty good year for keepi ng 
costs down. 
Public performance royalties are paid when the musical works 
contro 11 ed by PRS are performed in pub 1 i c ina 11 types of 
establishments under blanket licences. As one would expect, 
the vast majority of domestic revenue comes from the UK -
about 96-97%, with Eire representing about 2-3%. Over the 
period, Eire revenue increased by £306,171 or 393% in money 
terms to reach £383,998 in 1982 while UK revenue (excluding 
the Channel Isles and Isle of Man) rose by 394% to 
£13,058,001 in 1982, again in money terms. Licences are 
issued to the owners of the establishments where the 
performances occur, although unti 1 recently most juke boxes 
and background music installations were licensed to the 
lIoperatorsll who rented them out to the site occupiers. This 
is one of the main recent developments and means that PRS no 
longer recei ves revenue under the ti t jell background mus i c 
contractors ll • Previously, PRS had bulk agreements with these 
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operators so that individual premises and individual juke box 
renters did not need separate licences from PRS - the 
contractors negotiated the licences. The reason for this was 
that at the time the arrangement was made PRS representation 
through licensing inspectors was thin on the ground and the 
system was thought to produce administrative savings for PRS. 
Six or seven years ago, however, PRS decided that it was best 
to issue 1 i cences di rectly to the site occupi ers, as it di d 
wi th a 11 other mus i c users. Th i s was because PRS was now 
better organised, having many more licensing inspectors and 
thus being better able to license directly. In addition, many 
music makers have more than one method of publicly performing 
music - for example, a juke box in one bar and a television 
and/or radio in others. This meant that in many cases there 
was a duplication of effort for PRS if the premises where the 
juke box or background music system was installed were 
already licensed by PRS for these other public performances, 
resulting in more rather than less administrative work for 
PRS. PRS had to already license these premises in such cases 
anyway, so it might just as well take in juke boxes as well. 
PRS gave notice that it was going to end the bulk licensing 
system after abortive attempts at negotiating a new agreement 
wi th a consorti urn of the main background mus i c contractors 
(such as Reditune, Ditchburn and Planned Music). The 
background music contractors took the case to the PRT, 
arguing that PRS had to grant it 1 icences. PRS was of the 
opinion that the PRT had no jurisdiction to hear the case 
arguing that the background music contractors were not 
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responsible for the public performances given by their 
installations - the site occupiers were. Once the equipment 
is installed, the background music contractors have no 
control over it and the owner of the premises, not the 
contractor, performs the music. The contractors did not need 
licences to perform with their equipment. PRS argued that 
PRT cou 1 d on ly hea r cases concern i ng 1 i cences and 1 i cens i ng 
schemes to perform copyri ght works not cases concerned wi th 
licensing schemes whereby the licensee effectively authorised 
others to perform works. The contractors argued that 
copyright involved the right to do any of the restricted acts 
or authorise others to do so, so that PRT's jurisdiction 
should cover their authorisation of site occupiers as well. 
The PRT agreed with the contractors in thinking it had 
jurisdiction to hear the case but PRS appealed to the High 
Court which rejected this point of view. PRS thought that to 
hold otherwise would mean that any middle man, which the 
contractors were, could go to PRT, demand a licence and make 
a profit by selling it to individual premises for more than 
it bought it. (One might also argue that the contractors were 
not a representative body of music users anyway). The main 
plank of PRS ' argument, though, was that it should be dealing 
with the person who is legally responsible for obtaining the 
licence - the site occupier - not the contractor. This new 
licensing method means that PRS can now integrate it into its 
other activities, that administration is more efficient and 
that it now knows exactly which institutions have licences, 
something which it was not always sure of before because it 
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had to check details with the contractors. In any case, PRS 
did not believe that the discounts claimed by the contractors 
under the bulk licensing scheme could be justified by 
administrative savings at PRS any more. Th,e change in 
approach affected 20,000 systems and licensing under the 
scheme started in March 1979. The 1981 Yearbook notes that 
in 1978, the 1 ast full year in whi ch the contractors were 
licensed, fees in the UK, Channel Islands and Isle of Man 
were £483,000 while in 1980 more than £850,000 was collected 
from site occupiers. Previously, there was a single uniform 
rate charged per installation whereas now the tariff is 
charged according to the type of establ ishment where the 
background music installation is situated. With effect from 
July 1981 all juke boxes were similarly directly licensed to 
site occupiers rather than to juke box operators. One direct 
consequence of this new policy was that PRS employed more 
licensing inspectors. The amount of money derived from juke 
boxes in the UK and Eire has increased from £388,562 in 1975 
to £1,746,825 in 1982, an increase of £1,358,263 (350%). In 
real terms, more is being earned from this source than in 
1976 but there w,ere real term fall sin 1980 and 1981. Juke 
boxes brought in about 13% of PRS's public performance 
revenue in the UK in 1982 (£1,743,857) but only about 1% of 
Eire public performance revenue, (£2,968 in 1982). It was 
thus PRS I fourth bi gges t money ea rner ; n the UK in 1982. 
Video juke boxes are also licensed, the tariff for both types 
(audio and video) being based on a fee per juke box subject 
to certain discounts. 
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Clubs are PRS· biggest money earner at £1,971,299 (15%) in 
1982, which has shown a steady increase between 1975-81 
lthough there was a fall in 1982. In Eire, this source of 
revenue was only 0.6% in 1982. The second highest source of 
revenue in the UK in 1982 was pub 1 i c houses at £1,785,916 
(13.6%). This, too, has shown a steady rise over the period 
1975-82. This was also the second largest source of revenue 
in Eire in 1982 at £83,159 (21.6%). Hotels, restaurants and 
cafes brought in 13.4% of PRS revenue in 1982 (£1,759,826) in 
the UK, while being the biggest money earner in Eire at 23.5% 
£90,431). Another important source of income is that from 
shops and stores at 10.6% in 1982 in the UK (£1,395,288). 
Previous to January 1976, PRS had waived its right to licence 
performances of copyri ght mus i c in reta i1 shops and stores 
where the performance was intended to demonstrate records, 
mus i ca 1 instruments, tape recorders and cassettes, rad; os, 
television sets and the like, but this was mainly an 
historical development and was no longer considered to be 
justified by contemporary circumstances 10 . In December 1975, 
PRS announced that in future all such p'erformances woul d have 
to be 1 i censed when copyri ght mus i c was pub 1 i c ly performed 
regardl ess of the type of good sold and of whether the 
performance was for the purpose of demonstrati on to 
prospective customers. The waiver would continue ~ o o apply to 
performances to i ndi vi dua 1 customers in sound proof booths 
and over headphones, however. The tariff is based on a fee 
per square metre of the area in which the music is audible to 
the public up to a limit of 329 square metres after which a 
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descending scale applies. This is for performances by 
mechanical means other than video. The tariff also applies to 
video and audio - visual performances and there is a fee per 
year for live performances by staff or customers and a yearly 
fee per loudspeaker for pavement music. There are also 
speci a 1 rates for spec; a 1 shoppi ng weeks. The rates are 
adjusted every January to take account of changes in the 
Retail Price Index. The waiver policy was dropped because of 
fundamenta 1 changes in the s i tua t ion since the po 1 icy was 
adopted - the record industry was in its infancy at that time 
but now it is large and well established; record and record 
equipment retailing is organised totally differently today 
than previously being sold in many different types of shops 
and along with many other types of goods (for example, note 
the growth of the mu 1 tip 1 es 1 ike W. H. Smi th, Woolworth and 
Boots) so that it is virtually impossible to distinguish 
between shops where music is just played for demonstration 
purposes and those where it has a wider purpose; composers' 
incomes are subject to severe pressures and it was no longer 
possible to justify waiving a significant source of income 11 . 
PRS' decision was met with great resistance at first, but it 
eventua 11y made a concess i on in the form of just a nomi na 1 
f f 1 d . f . 1 . t t 12 ee or ive emonstratlons a mUSlca lns rumen s . PRS 
was, however, forced to take the Harl equ i n cha in of record 
shops to court over the matter - and won. Revenue from this 
source rose by £1,348,208 (2864%) from 1975 to 1982 to reach 
£1,395,288. In Eire, too, this source of revenue has grown 
considerably - by 25,294 (14,131%) from 1976 - 82. 
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Another phenomenon to note is the spectacul ar fa 11 off of 
revenue from commercial dance halls and discotheques between 
1981-82 in the UK mainly due to closures apparently. During 
this period, revenue fell by 77% to £43,884. In Eire, there 
was a fall of 32% to £58,964. Revenue from dial-a-disc and 
hol iday camps and caravan parks has genera 11y been on a 
strong upward trend in the UK and that for popular concerts 
and vari ety shows has generally ri sen over the peri od, too, 
but bingo club revenue fell 54% between 1981-82 so that by 
1982 revenue was less than in 1976 and revenue from cinemas 
in the UK fell in real terms in 1980, 1981 and 1982. 
In the above analysis I have tried to note some of the main 
trends in the different categories of public performance 
establishments over the period 1976-82, but I have not dealt 
wi th a 11 of them - after a 11 PRS has about 50 di fferent 
public performance tariffs. As noted earlier, 1982 was not a 
particularly good year for PRS in this field, mainly because 
it was operating in a particularly difficult economic climate 
with many bankruptcies and closures which can be seen in some 
of the figures for different categories, notably corrunercial 
dance halls and discotheques, industrial premises, bingo 
halls and clubs. One might, however, argue that the previous 
year the climate was just as bad yet revenue from public 
performance rose 23%. Most of PRS' tari ffs are now index 
1 inked to the RPI or other indexes so factors other than 
inflation must account for such changes. As to Eire, PRS has 
greatly improved its operations over the years but it is 
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difficult to look at changes in revenue and come up with any 
meaningful interpretations because the base on which the 
change occurs is often low so that it is quite likely that 
changes of only a few hundred or thousand pounds will 
register as very large percentage increases. Additionally, 
revenue very much follows an up and down pattern. 
Broadcasting 
Revenue from broadcasting (including cable television) also 
rose considerably from 1971 to 1982 by £19,571,818 (618%), 
and is ri sing much faster than pub 1 i c performance revenue. 
Table 4.6 shows double figure percentage rises every year, 
the biggest rise being 28.68% between 1979-80. The real term 
increase has been 79% which is pretty good going. 
Broadcasting revenue represented 41.77% of total PRS revenue 
in 1982 (Diagram 4.5) - that is, the most important source of 
PRS revenue. This percentage has generally gone up over the 
period 1971-82, (although there were falls in 1976 and 1981) 
from 29.81% in 1971. Costs over the same period have risen 
1204% ;n money terms to reach £2,845,916 in 1982 (from 
£218,238 in 1971) and 225.6% in real terms, so NDR has 
genera lly fa 11 en over the peri od. As c. percentage of tota 1 
costs, broadcasting costs were 29.87% in 1982. This ratio 
has obviously risen considerably over the period from 16.96% 
in 1971 wi th fa 11 sin 1974 and 1978. The average ri se in 
costs has been 26.5% with rises of 29.68% in 1974, 41.19% in 
1980,37.74% ;n 1981 and 31.34% in 1982. 
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Broadcasting costs are still less than half those of public 
performance, however, and only 5.2% of gross royalties in 
1982. Boradcasting costs in 1982 were 12.52% of broadcasting 
revenue and broadcasting NOR was 87.48% of gross broadcasting 
revenue. 
Over the period 1971-82, BBC broadcasting royalties (which 
includes television and radio) increased by £12,122,861 
(544%) in money terms, 60.81% in real terms. The BBC pays a 
royalty of 2% of its income from television receiving 
1 i cences and grant-i n-a i d from the Government for external 
services, this basis having been set by the PRT in 1972. In 
1982, the SBC royalty was £14,351,123. Independent 
television and radio income rose £7,007,169 (807.47%) in 
money terms, 126.58% in rea 1 . terms over the peri od to reach 
£7 ,874,959 in 1982. 1973 saw the introduction of independent 
local radio in the UK but at present PRS is having problems 
over the royalties payable, as is PPL. Revenue in this area 
rose by £1,697,484 between 1971-79 (the last year for which I 
have data since commerciai radio and television are now 
included under one heading) to reach £1,700,379 in 1979. The 
royalty is based on a percentage of advertising revenue. The 
bas is for the roya 1 ty was negoti ated wi th the IBA in 1973, 
the percentage of advertising revenue being determined by the 
percentage of their total broadcasting hours taken up by the 
PRS' repertoire, fixed by reference to a hypothetical rate of 
12% which would be payable if a s t a t i o n ~ ~ output were totally 
and exclusively that of music controlled by PRS. In the 
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first four years, however, there were ceilings of 41%, 5%, 6% 
and 8%. In 1977 (according to the 1978 Yearbook), the 
unweighted average was 5.7% payable by stations to whom the 
cei 1 i ngs no longer app 1y13 . The 5-year agreement \'Ii th the 
IBA expired in 1978 since when PRS has been in dispute with 
the Association of Independent Radio Contractors (AIRC). The 
di spute was referred to the PRT in October 1978 but sti 11 
trundles on because it was linked to a similar dispute 
between PPL and the AIRC. The PPL di spute was heard fi rs t 
and, in fact, is still going on, so the PRS hearing is lion 
ice ll • Provisional payments by the commercial radio stations 
are on the basis of the previous agreement while the dispute 
is heard. Income from commercial television rose '£1,745,932 
(245.82%) from 1971-79 to reach .£2,456,177 in 1979. This 
tariff is negotiated with the Independent Television 
Companies Association (ITCA) and up to 31st March 1980 was 
based on a 1 ump sum of .£2 mill i on set in 1977 and adjusted 
automatically quarterly in line with the RPI with certain 
special additional payments. This agreement expired on the 
above date and PRS announced that in future it \'Ianted the 
roya 1 ty based on a fixed percentage of the companies' 
advertising revenue, which would have meant a substantial 
rise in the royalty. The dispute went to the PRT and is 
sti 11 being heard. Before the basic case was even heard, 
however, PRS objected to the reference to the PRT on the 
basis that the case was outside the PRT's jurisdiction - that 
the lTV contractors represented by the ITCA and Independent 
Television News Ltd. (ITN), both of which referred the case 
Page 262 
to the PRT, did not IIbroadcast" within the terms of the 1956 
Copyri ght Act and so cou 1 d not refer the case. I t was the 
lBA whi ch "broadcast ll and whi ch shou 1 d have referred the 
case. The two bodies who referred the case did not require 
licences because they did not broadcast, they just supplied 
programmes for broadcast by the lBA. Following the High 
Court decision on the jurisdictional matter in the background 
mus i c contractors case, PRS argued that the ITCA (and lTN) 
cou 1 d not have ali cence to authori se the IBA to broadcast 
PRS works. PRT cou 1 d on ly hear cases referred by 
organisations which represented people who required 
1 . 14 lcences . Both the PRT and the Hi gh Court rejected thi s 
line of argument - the ITCA (and lTN) did> broadcast and 
needed ali cence for it so they di d not need ali cence to 
sublicense someone else (the lBA) to broadcast - "they needed 
ali cence as one of two potenti a 1 joi nt tortfeasors ll15 (the 
other bei ng the IBA). The heari ng on the actual case has 
been taking place recently and in the meantime there was an 
interim agreement with the ITCA. Initial licensing terms 
were also agreed with TV-AM, Channel 4 and the Welsh Channel 
4, Sianel 4 Cymru (S4C). In Eire, royalties from Radio 
Telefis Eireann rose £384,370 (540.78%) from 1971-82 to reach 
£455,447 in 1982. Terms were agreed in 1979. One reason for 
a leap of 46.28% in royalties in 1979 was the introduction of 
a second te 1 ev is ion channel in November 1978 and a second 
radio channel in May 1979. PRS has also been involved in 
developments in satellite television, discussions on it and 
licensing of experimental transmissions and of the pilot 
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scheme, Satellite Television PLC, which transmits its own 
programmes from the UK to cab 1 e servi ces ina number of 
European countries via the Orbital Test Satellite (this 
i nvo 1 ves the UK up-l eg, but PRS is also havi ng di scuss ions 
with sister societies on the Continent to license the whole 
operation - up, down and cable diffusion- from the UK). In 
the field of cable television, PRS has been involved in a 
court case since the mid 1970s, PRS V Marlin Communal Aerials 
Ltd, which resulted in the virtual disappearance of revenue 
from cable tel evi s i on by 1978 when it fe 11 to just £50, 
although in 1975 it was only £10,654 anyway. Sy 1982, 
revenue from this source had risen to £57,418 (although this 
also contained a "miscellaneous ll element). The case only 
affected revenue in Eire, however, not the UK. This source of 
revenue is likely to grew in the next decade following the 
announcement of expansion of the cable service and the 
granting of a number of initial franchises by the Government. 
A 2-year experimental scheme has been operating since 1981 
and this, too, is to be expanded. The Marlin case concerned 
a cable system in Ireland which was rediffusing SSC 
programmes in Ireland. Under the 1956 UK Copyri ght Act, a 
cable company can rediffuse SBC and lTV programmes in the UK 
but it cannot do this with foreign programmes. The Eire 
copyright statute is similar to the UK one and contains a 
simi 1 a r except i on to the broadcas t i ng ri ght so that cable 
operators can di ffuse RTE prograJl1mes. PRS rna i nta i ned tha t 
the Irish equivalent of a UK cable company rediffusing aBC 
and I TV programmes was a cab 1 e company in Ire 1 and 
Page 264 
retransmitting Radio Telefis Eiranne (RTE) progranmes - but 
BBC and lTV programmes were foreign programmes in Ireland and 
thus not subject to this exception. Royalties had to be paid 
for such redi ffus i on of English progranunes • Marlin won the 
fi rst case because it turned out that the I ri sh Government 
had not extended protection against cable diffusion to 
foreign works under its legislation. PRS took the case to 
the Supreme Court in Eire and lost again. The Irish 
Government was made aware of the omission and the requisite 
Order was passed extending protection to foreign works. PRS 
took the case back to court and won in the Hi gh Court and 
again in the Supreme Court. The whole series of cases took 
about 10 years but the precedent was set. PRS negoti ated 
with the Cable Television Association of Ireland after the 
decision as regards implementation of licensing terms 
backdated. The first payments were made at the beginning of 
1983. At present, simultaneous cable diffusion of BBC and 
lTV programmes in the UK does not breach copyright under S40 
of the 1956 Act. With the expansion of the cable television 
network, one woul d expect there to be pressure for thi s 
exception to be lifted. PRS wants it to be lifted mainly 
because it ;s in breach of the UK's obligations under the 
Berne Convention, Brussels text. An agreement has, however, 
been concluded by PRS with the Cable Television Association 
of Great Britain for PRS works used in programmes originated 
by those cable systems taking part in the Government's 2-year 
experimental project. PRS has also given the Government its 
views on the expansion of the cable network. 
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Overseas Revenue 
REVENUE REVENUE INCREASE f PERCENTAGE MONEY REAL FALL ~ ~ INCREASE/FALL TERMSa{£) TERMSb(£) (£) t ~ ~
1971 OA 318,270 397,838 
AS 4,032,849 5,041,061 
1972 OA 314,096 366,506 J, 4,174 ~ ~ 1.31% + AS 4,019,006 4,689,622 " 13,843 -l- 0.34% -l.-
1973 OA 320,557 342,842 J, 6,461 t 2.06% 1-AS 4,415,115 4,722,048 396,109 t 9.86% t 
1974 OA 334,406 308,208 {.- 13,849 of 4.32% f AS 5,554,930 5,119,751 1,139,815 t 25.82% t 
1975 OA 447,284 331,813 112,878 t 33.75% t AS 6,379,319 4,732,432 ~ ~ 824,389 t 14.84% t 
1976 OA 544,671 346,703 97 ,387 l' 21. 77% 1-
AS 8,129,417 5,174,677 1,750,098 l' 27.43% f-
1977 OA 615,385 338,124 J. 70,714 t 12.98% t 
AS 8,688,114 4,773,689 it 558,697 t 6.87% t 
1978 OA 653,562 331,589 -l- 38,177 l' 6.20% t 
AS 9,375,004 4,756,471 ~ ~ 686,890 t 7.91% t 
1979 OA 335,779 150,237 ~ ~ 317,783 {.- 48 .62% ~ ~
AS lOt 019,062 4,482,802 -J, 644,058 t 6.87% l' 
1980 OA 402,157 152,505 66,378 t 19.77% l' 
AS 9,441,012 . 3,580,209 -L- 578,050 J,. 5. 77% ~ ~
1981 OA 443,287 150,267 J, 41,130 t 10.23% t 
AS 11,873,162 4,024,801 2,432,150 l' 25.76% f 
1982 OA 606,766 189,378 163,479 t 36.88% t 
AS 14,606,280 4,558,764 2,733,118 t 23.02% t 
TABLE 4.10 OVERSEAS AGENCIES AND AFFILIATED SOCIETIES' INCOME 
1971-82 REAL ANU MUNcY TERMS. 
Source: a - PRS Reports & Accounts 1971-75; PRS Yearbooks 
1977-83/4. 
b - Calculated as for Table 4.1. 
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Overseas agencies' revenue consists of revenue from countries 
where there is as yet no native performing right society and 
PRS has a mandate to administer the international repertoire 
and where PRS is helping new societies which have just been 
set up. These consist of Conunonwealth countries. Overseas 
agencies operations are administered by Music Copyright 
(Overseas) Services Ltd. (MCOS), a non-profit making company 
limited by guarantee set up by PRS in December 1977 Uto 
oversee and develop ...... the work of the overseas agencies ll 
as well as lithe establishment and support of new composers' 
ri ghts soc i eti es in these terri tori es wherever thi s becomes 
practicable" 16 • PRS and MCPS now collaborate through MCOS in 
those countri es where they both are res pons i b 1 e. Overseas 
agencies revenue is divided into 4 regions - Africa, Asia 
(and P a c i f i c ) ~ ~ Western Hemisphere and Mediterranean. 
Performance in this sector has hardly been very good, 
although the nature of the operation dictates against large 
revenue earning. Revenue from this source fell in money 
terms in 1972 and 1979 (where there was a mass i ve drop of 
nearly 50%), and in real terms (allowing for UK inflation -
after all, some of the money is paid to UK copyright owners), 
in 1972-74, 1977-79 and 1981. 1982 seems to have been a. good 
year, though, with revenue rising 37%. Revenue from Africa 
has conSistently fallen over the period with rallies in 1975 
and 1978-80 to reach an a11- time low of £10,357 in 1982 
having been about £84,508 in 1971. Asian & Pacific revenue 
has fallen even more dramati ca 11y over the peri od. Havi ng 
risen to a peak of £404,558 in 1978, it fell to just £22,391 
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DIAGRAM 4.8 GROSS TOTAL OVERSEAS REVENUE, AFFILIATED 
SOCIETIES' REVENUE {t OVERSEAS AGENCIES' REVENUE 1971-82, REAL 
& MONEY TERMS. -.. 
OAMT = OVERSEAS AGENCI ES MONEY TERJviS; OART = OVERSEAS 
AGENCIES REAL TERMS; ASMT = AFFILIATED SOCIETIES h C ~ E Y Y
TERMS; ASRT = AFFILIATED SOCIETIES REAL TEffi4S; TOMT ~ ~ TOTAL 
OVERSEAS MONEY TERMS; TORT = TOTAL OVERSEAS REAL TE;;':S. 
Source: Table 4.8 
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I' I TORT 
in 1979 although it more than doubled again in 1982. The 
reason for the very large fall was that after 1978, the Hong 
Kong Society, which represented about 95% of overseas 
agenc i es revenue in the sector, was treated as a fore; gn 
affiliated society. This also accounts for the large fall in 
overseas agencies revenue in 1979. Revenue from the Western 
Hemisphere (mainly Caribbean countries) and the Mediterranean 
has risen consistently since 1978, although the period 
1975-78 was something of an up and down affair, especially 
for the Caribbean countries, with a large rise being followed 
by a smaller (though large) drop. The Caribbean countries 
are now PRS' largest earner in the overseas agencies sector 
with the Mediterranean being the second largest. Trinidad is 
the largest earner in the Caribbean (about 50% of revenue) 
and Cyprus the largest in the Mediterranean (about 63%). PRS 
has great problems in the field of overseas agencies with 
di fferent po 1 i ti ca 1 systems in di fferent countri es and poor 
or decl i ni ng economi es ina lot of them 1 ead; ng to 
opposition, 
. ht17 copyrl 9 • 
1 ack of understand i ng or i nd i fference to 
A large number of infringement actions have to 
be taken out, diverting resources away from the main purpose 
of MCOS with consequent effect on collections. In the 
smaller countries, it costs more to pay someone to act as an 
agent for PRS than would be collected so agents sometimes 
cover a number of territories. There is also, of course, the 
problem of finding the right people to act as agents. In 
some cases, enforcement is virtually impossible while in 
others roya 1 ti es fi na lly gi ven to PRS are sma 11 because of 
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local penal taxes or exchange control 18. Decisions of local 
courts also hamper MeOS' work in some cases. One important 
impact of MeOS has been a reduction in the Head Office cost 
of administering the overseas agencies repertoire - costs in 
this field fell from £150,882 in 1977 to £110,017 in 1978 (a 
fall of 27%) and 66,132 in 1979 (a 40% fall). By 1982, they 
sti 11 had not reached the 1977 1 eve 1, a 1 though they rose by 
22% in 1980, 24% in 1981 and 40.5% in 1982. In 1982 overseas 
agencies only represented about 1.5% of total PRS costs and 
1% of PRS total revenue. The figures above for the various 
countries are after deduction of local costs but before 
deduction of PRS Head Office costs. Not all the royalties 
from this source are distributed to PRS members - some are 
distributed to affiliated societies and some to local 
composers. 
Revenue from affiliated societies arises from reciprocal 
representation contracts between PRS and performing right 
societies throughout the World for the public performance and 
broadcasting of PRS members' works abroad. Revenue from this 
source is very important, representing about 27% of total PRS 
revenue in 1982, and the cost of collection is low, 
representing only about 6% of total PRS costs in 1982, and 
only 4% ,of affiliated societies revenue. Thus, it is a high 
revenue, low cost market. Again, figures given are after 
deduction of local expenses and taxes. In money terms, 
performance in this field looks impressive but in real terms, 
less money was collected in 1982 than in 1971. Revenue in 
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this field fell in money terms in 1972 and 1980 and in real 
terms ; n 1972, 1975 and 1977-80. The problem wi th revenue 
from this source is that it is not really very controllable 
by PRS and is sens it i ve to changes in exchange rates and 
depends on how successful PRS members are abroad and on 
changes in musical tastes abroad. Within the affiliated 
societies total, PRS' biggest sources of revenue are Western 
Europe (£6,332,925 in 1982) and North America (£6,209,547 in 
1982). Together, these accounted for about 86% of gross 
income from affiliated societies in 1982. PRS figures also 
show money allocated to foreign affiliated societies for 
public performance and broadcasting of works of foreign 
society members in the UK. The only major country with which 
PRS has a large deficit is the USA (where the deficit was 
£1,051 ,149 - £6,406,606 against £5,355,457) although there 
were small deficits with some other countries. Since 1969 
(the first year for which I have figures), PRS has never had 
a deficit overall. In 1982, the overall surplus was the 
highest ever over the period at £5,854,967. One cannot 
really place too much emphasis on deficits and surpluses 
between PRS and individual affiliated societies in individual 
years because figures do not always relate to the year under 
consideration but contain arrears of other years. In this 
area, PRS has had a few measures of success in keeping Head 
Office costs down, since they fell in money terms in 1972, 
1980 and 1981 and in real terms in 1972, 1973, 1977, 1979, 
1980 and 1981. They increased by over £114,000 in 1982 to 
reach £591,062 but were still much lower in real terms in 
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1982 than in 1971. The revenue figure for the USA contains 
£24,615 for performances of PRS' members musical works in 
films in cinemas. This is because the US societies cannot 
collect such money because of anti-trust policy. Thus, PRS 
collects direct from producers who pass the cost of this onto 
US di stri butors. Ali cence is issued to the producer wi th 
the synchronisation licence but royalties are only paid if 
the film is exported to the US for exhibition19 . 
The final source of income at PRS is from investment which in 
1982 amounted to nearly £3 million. 
Distributions20 
Revenue from UK & Eire broadcasting, UK & Eire public 
performance and overseas is kept separate from each other and 
the former two are then broken down into II poo 1 s" or 
"sections" to give smaller groups of revenue. Overseas 
agency revenue is not subdivided into broadcasting and public 
performance revenue but is distributed according to territory 
or group of territories - either Africa, Asia, Western 
Hemi sphere or Medi terranean. Affi 1 i ated soci ety revenue is 
distributed in two categories - general and broadcasting, and 
films, the "general u presumably being equivalent to public 
performance. Distribution of the revenue from the US 
societies ASCAP and 8MI, however, is based almost solely on 
broadcasting, although IIconcert halls" revenue is distributed 
separately. Di s tri but i on to members are, as far as 
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possible. based on the extent to which works have been 
broadcast or publicly performed which is determined partly 
from returns from users, and partly from statistical 
information. UK and Eire broadcasters usually provide 
complete returns of all the works they have played, second by 
second, although local radio stations only provide sample 
returns where commercial or "stock ll records have been used 
but do supply complete returns for 1 i ve broadcast mus i c and 
material specifically recorded in their studios. Returns 
from overseas agencies for broadcasting stations are often 
incomplete, the small broadcasting stations being the worst 
offenders. In the UK and Eire public performance returns -
in pubs, clubs and suchlike - are not required in all cases 
because it would be impractical and 100% analysis of all 
public performances that occurred in a year would just not be 
economic, probably costing more than it brought in. For 
public performance, returns are only required for most live 
performances (not performances by mechanical means). 
However, returns for live performances are not required if 
the licence fee is under £80 (IR £40 in Eire). All licensees 
who pay royalties for live public performance of IIserious" 
music have to provide returns without exception. Cinemas 
also have to provide returns of all films exhibited so that 
composers of sound track music can be paid. Premises where 
such live public performances toke place (including cinemas) 
therefore have to fill ina PROGRANME RETURN FORM. The 
1i cence allows the holder to pub 1 i c ly perform the works of 
more than 250 ,000 composers and pub 1 i shers worl dvli de ar.d 
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covers public performance both live and by mechanical means. 
PRS tries to distribute the money collected to members on the 
basis of what is played and how often it is played21 . 
Programme Return Forms provi de i nforma t i on on the ti t 1 e of 
the work, a descri pti on of it, the number of performances, 
the composer I s name, the pub 1 i sher and the arranger. The 
frequency of returns depends on how often and how many such 
performances are gi ven and performers usually fi 11 them in 
(a 1 though the 1 i cence is issued to the owner of the 
premises). Tour promoters may be granted a Programme 
Exemption Certificate for a group's tour if details of 
performances at different venues at which content is largely 
unaltered have been provided in advance. In such cases, 
performers do not have to supply the licensee at each venue 
with a programme return form to send to PRS. One must 
remember, though, that it is always the owner of the premises 
where the pub 1 i c performance takes place who obta ins the 
1 i cence, not the performers. It is only where the 
performance takes place in the fresh air that the performer 
will receive the licence. An alternative to the Programme 
Return form is for the pri nted concert programme for the 
event to be sent in provided it contains full details of all 
music performed. PRS waives its right to charge royalties 
for music at wedding receptions, birthday parties or family 
get togethers and mus i c at re 1 i gi ous servi ces. 
ask for returns for occasional use of pub 
It does not 
pianos by 
customers. Nor does it ask for returns for performances by 
mechan i ca 1 means such as by record players, tape recorders, 
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radio, television, juke boxes and background music tapes. 
Here, statistical data rather than information from licensees 
is used to distribute royalties "reflecting contemporary 
patterns of music use ll , such as record sales information, the 
top 500 albums each week and the Gallup Chart and information 
from broadcasters on radio and television programmes. It 
also uses information supplied by the background music 
contractors. PRS also takes note of the extent and nature of 
the playing of records on the radio, to supplement 
information. All pieces of music lasting between 2 and 5 
minutes on the radio, ascertained by spot checks, are 
included for the purposes of this additional information22 . 
It was noted, however, that using record sales charts to 
determine what is publicly performed is not entirely 
satisfactory because it will not be just the hits of the day 
which are played, public performance will be more 
wide-ranging - there may be a lot of Ilgolden oldies u , for 
examp 1 e. There is no rea 1 reason why pub 1 i c performance 
should follow lithe charts" 23 . There is thus a fair amount of 
approximation involved in the process, resulting from the 
difficulty of obtaining adequate and accurate information. 
It is relatively easy to obtain returns from the authorised 
broadcasting companies, in fact, one might say that the 
opposite problem arises here, that of too much information. 
There is a strongly-rooted tradition at PRS that it attempts. 
to be as accurate as possible in all facets of its 
t " 24 opera lons • In some cases, though, there is just not 
enough information for PRS to be as accurate as it would 
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like. The problem with trying to improve accuracy is that it 
puts up costs maybe disproportionately. This was one of the 
points made by PPL - that while PRS tried to be as accurate 
as possible leading to higher costs, it adopted the opposite 
approach that by and large public performance data 
resembles broadcasting data so that information received is 
generally used to weight broadcasting figures and these 
fi gures used as a proxy for pub 1 i c performance fi gures and 
applied to public performance revenue. 
The information received is analysed to identify works in 
which PRS or affiliated societies have an interest. Some 
information is only sampled, such as some of the independent 
local radio returns. This is because it would cost too much 
to fully analyse them for example, the independent 
compani es pump out 15,000 hours of PRS contro 11 ed mus i c a 
year as agai nst 2,000 hours by the sse. Independent 
television companies' returns are fully analysed. In its 
distribution procedures 25, PRS apparently tries to take note 
of constantly changing patterns of music use and of the need 
for IIreasonable economy of operationU , particularly where the 
cost of analysing programmes and distributing royalties is 
disproportionately high in comparison with revenue. Each 
work identified as being of interest to PRS is given points 
under the PRS poi nt award plans according to the number of 
times it has been performed, how long the work 1 asts and 
other factors such as the type of work. If programmes have 
only been sampled, the figure arrived at i s mu 1 tip 1 i ed by a 
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"sample factorn to take account of the fact that there 
will be more actual performances. Each distribution pool or 
section contains revenue derived from a particular, usually 
fairly important, licensee or group of licensees. For 
British and Irish public performance revenue, the sections 
are Discotheques, Films, General (Live), Individual Works, 
Irish Special (Live), Irish Special (Recorded), Juke Boxes _ 
speci a 1, Recorded (Albums), Recorded (Background), Recorded 
(Singles), Serious Music (Live). For British & Irish 
broadcasting revenue, the sections are BBC National Radio, 
BBC Local Radio, BBC TV, BBC TV - Films, lTV - Commercials, 
lTV - Films, lTV, ILR - Commercials, ILR, RTE Radio, RTE TV, 
RTE TV Films, RTE TV Commercials, RTE Radio 
Commercials. In general, PRS ' distribution system is based 
on equality of treatment for all within each section IIwhere 
there is little possibility of, or justification for, 
establishing criteria to distinguish one performance or use 
of a work from another ll26 • In other cases, however, 
distinctions are made between performances of different works 
or di fferent performances of the same work and the poi nts 
system is varied accordingly and weighted. PRS has three 
poi rat award plans 27 - the combi ned te 1 evi s i on and rad; 0 
broadcasting point award plan, the film point award plan for 
genera 1 performances and the poi rat award plan for 11 i ve I 
general performances. The plans are somewhat complex in 
places but the general gist of them is as follows: for the 
combi ned te 1 ev is i on and rad i 0 broadcast i ng plan, a 11 i terns 
are treated the same and are awarded poi rats represented by 
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the sum of the performance duration of the item, multiplied 
by a multiplier which depends on duration multiplied by a 
station value, which depends on the potential audience for 
SSG radio and te 1 ev is i on and independent tel ev is i on and on 
actual royalties paid by each local station in the case of 
independent local radio. The multiplier varies from 1 for 
durations up to 1 minute to 2.4 for durations of 32 minutes 
or more. The station values range up to 43.1 for the entire 
independent television network, 25 for the whole BSG 
television network and 10 for each of Radios 1,2 3 and 4. 
The regions count less. This will give a full scale points 
total. This is subject to special provisions, however, 
reducing the total. Signature tunes and station 
identification signals have the full value but interval 
music, station breaks or programme identification music on 
television only have one-fifth of the scale value, for 
example. For the film point award plan for general 
performances, featured music counts 1 point for every 5 
seconds or part thereof and background mus i c 1 poi nt for 
every 6.2/3 seconds or part thereof28 . The point award plan 
for 1 i ve genera 1 performances is somewhat more complex. It 
is divided into 4 sections - popular music, which varies up 
to 6 points for 9-12 minutes and then goes up by 2 points for 
each additional 4 minutes; vocal music which is not popular 
or serious music, instrumental music which is not popular or 
serious music, both of which use the same scale varying up to 
48 points for 29-32 minutes and thereafter rising by 6 points 
for each add i ti ona 1 4 mi nutes; and seri ous mus i c wh i ch is 
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divided into 3 types depending on how many people take part _ 
for example, works for 1 or 2 players and or solo voice which 
varies to 144 points for 25-32 minutes and then increases by 
48 points for each additional 8 minutes, works for string or 
chamber orchestra which varies to 168 points for 25-32 
mi nutes and increases by 56 poi nts for each add i ti ona 1 8 
mi nutes and works for fu 11 orchestra wh i ch vari es up to 192 
poi nts for 25-32 mi nutes and goes up by 64 poi nts for each 
extra 8 minutes. The popular, vocal and instrumental music 
categories contain a weighting system whereby logged 
performances are multiplied 2-10 times depending on the size 
of the annual licence fee paid by the premises at which the 
performance takes place. Similarly, the serious music 
category contains a weighting system whereby the points 
awarded for each performance are multiplied depending on the 
seating capacity of the venue and the professional or amateur 
status of the performers. 
After these points values have been calculated, in each 
secti on the tota 1 number Of poi nts a\'/arded is added up and 
divided into the amount of money which is distributable in 
that secti on to produce a va 1 ue for each poi nt. For each 
work, this value per point is then multiplied by the number 
of points the work has accrued in total to produce the amount 
of money owing to that work at that particular distribution. 
The value for each poi nt wi 11 di ffer between secti ons and 
between distributions. Overseas revenue is also divided into 
secti ons -overseas agenci es revenue into the four secti ons 
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mentioned earlier and affiliated society revenue according to 
country or group of countri es in some cases and soci ety in 
cases where there is more than one soci ety ina country 
(Canada - CAPAC and PROCAN - and the USA - ASCAP and 8MI, 
for example). In most cases, revenue from each country or 
group of countries is divided into general and broadcasting 
revenue and films. Amalgamating revenue from two or more 
countries has the advantage of saving on the cost of analysis 
since works are distributed on the basis of returns from just 
one of the countries, perhaps in rotation, so that the other 
country·s returns do not have to be analysed in detai1 29 . 
The countries involved are only relatively small revenue 
producers, anyway. 
Once the amount owi ng to each work has been deci ded on the 
money is divided amongst the parties interested in it, such 
as the composer, lyric writer, publisher, on the basis of the 
contracts between them but PRS has a rule that the publisher 
share can never exceed 50% for any work. I f a composer or 
lyri c wri ter is not a member, hi s share is pa i d to the 
copyright owner or publisher. Similarly, if the publisher is 
not a member, the money is divided equally between the 
composer and lyric writer unless thepublisher·s rights have 
30 F' . t' h been assigned to a member. orelgn SOCle les may ave 
different division rules. In the UK, the usual division for 
a published vocal work will be 4/12 for each of the composer, 
lyric writer and publisher while for a published instrumental 
work it will be 8/12 composer, 4/12 publisher, although the 
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pub 1 i sher share can be adj usted up to 6/12. For 
sub-publication of British works abroad, the division may be 
more complicated and may be on the basis of a key - for 
example, the Stockholm Key calls for an equal division of 
total shares between the parties interested in the original 
work and in the sub-publication. The total publisher share 
for a sub-pub 1 i shed work may also be subject to a key - a 
50-50 publisher - sub-publisher share, for example (so they 
may each get 3/12 of the total - known as the London Key) or 
the full publisher share for both publisher and sub-publisher 
being paid to the sub-publisher (known as the Paris Key)31. 
In general, affiliated societies do not send non-member 
shares to PRS and vi ce versa. PRS and a number of other 
societies do not allocate any share to an arranger of a 
copyright work while the Continental societies allocate 2/12 
to him. Most societies, however, grade arrangements of 
non-copyright music. The PRS grading system is highly 
complex and varies from 1/20 to 12/12 where the arrangement 
is virtually a new original work. In the latter case, the 
normal division of fees will apply. Additions or 
a 1 terati ons to non-copyri ght words may also be graded, the 
maximum here being 6/12. The division of fees is adjusted to 
take account of the grades and any non-copyri ght element is 
returned to the pool to increase the points value of that 
particular section. 
PRS has a much more complex system of analysis and 
distribution than the other two societies, springing it seems 
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from its wish to be as accurate as possible. The time and 
effort involved in analysing just one work would thus seem 
greater than for the other societies and, of course, PRS has 
a great many more works to deal with than the other 
societies. This would seem to account for at least some of 
the difference in costs and cost-revenue relationships 
between PRS and PPL. (MCPS is not strictly comparable). 
There are 4 distributions a year, in April, July, October and 
December. The April and October distributions include 
payments on account for royalties from affiliated societies 
due to be paid in the July and December distributions (when 
the balance is paid). British and Irish broadcasting 
royalties and royalties from use of radio and television sets 
in public are paid in April for the 6 months ending the 
previous December 31st and in October for the 6 months ending 
the previous 30th June. The December distribution includes a 
payment on account for British and Irish general and film 
royalties and overseas agency royalties for the calendar 
year, usually made up of half the amount credi ted to the 
member for the source for the year before but subject to a 
minimum of £20 for a writer member and £100 for a publisher 
member. Where a member der; ves most of hi s roy a 1 ti es from 
overseas agencies or from a single distribution sector, the 
amount paid on account is usually reduced to take account of 
the fact that such royalties tend to fluctuate more from year 
to year. The balance is paid in the following July 
distribution. In the July distribution, PRS also makes 
certain lIallocationsll which are of three types - unlogged 
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performance allocations, allocations from non-licence revenue 
and payments under the Earnings Equal isation scheme. 
Unlogged performance allocations are paid for as a percentage 
of the gross revenue in distribution sections where 
information is inadequate, such as the public performance and 
overseas agenci es sections as we 11 as from the Independent 
Loca 1 Radi 0 section, where programmes are usually sampled 
rather than analysed fully. This particular allocation is 
paid to all writer and publisher members who have received at 
least one programme credit in the previous two years even if 
this was below the minimum. The minimum allocation is £30 
for a writer member and £150 for a publisher member, applied 
to wri ters who recei ved 1 ess than £150 and pub 1 i shers who 
recei ved 1 ess than £750 in programme fee earn; ngs in the 
previous year. New members automatically receive the minimum 
allocation in their second year. This minimum allocation is 
set off aga i nst the cost of regi steri ng the member in the 
first year. Members who earnings are greater than the above 
figures receive allocations under inverse ratio scales 
whereby lower - earni ng members recei ve J proportionately to 
their earnings, more than higher - earning members. The 
maximum allocation is £250 for writers, where earnings are 
£25,000 or over and £1,250 for publishers, where earnings are 
£125,000 or more. Allocations are made to affiliated 
societies in proportion to their share of the royalties in 
the distribution sections from which the allocations come. 
This was a new scheme in 1983, replacing a previous 
membership allocation scheme, under which £706,968 was paid 
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in 1982. Non-l i cence revenue a 11 ocati ons derive from PRS· 
income from interest and dividends received from investment 
of royalties while they are being processed prior to 
distribution. The allocation is in proportion to members· 
individual earnings in the year during which the interest was 
received. £2,272,126 was paid under this scheme in 1982. 
PRS recovers costs incurred on behalf of publishers in 
supplying documentation to affiliated societies where the 
contract provides for the sub-publisher abroad to receive the 
whole publisher share by deducting them from non-licence 
allocations. The deductions reflect the relative importance 
of the countries concerned. The third type of allocation is 
under the Earnings Equal isation Scheme, which PRS describes 
as the equivalent of a pension scheme, providing IIfinancial 
cushioning ll for older members who no longer receive as much 
money from PRS as previously because of changes in musical 
tastes or whatever32 . The scheme is open to living writers 
who are 50 or more years old and who have been members for 25 
years or more. Successor members may also benefit in certain 
cases. Th€ amount payable is calculated by listing the 
member·s earnings each year since he became a member, 
applying the RPI to make them IIreal term ll figures and working 
out an average of the member·s best 25 years, to produce a 
fi gure for adjusted average earni ngs. The adjusted average 
earnings are compared with current earnings and up to 50% of 
the difference is payable as the allowance, the exact amount 
payable depending on total revenue available under the 
scheme. There is a maximum and a lower limit for adjusted 
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average earni ngs and an upper 1 imi t for current earni ngs. 
There is also a maximum payable as an allowance. All figures 
are subject to adjustment in line with inflation. The money 
comes from domestic licence revenue and in 1982 450 writers 
qualified for an average payment of £750. Total payments 
under the Scheme amounted to £337,623. 
There is also a minimum distribution payment of £5 for UK 
resident members and £10 for non-UK resident members (we are 
not talking about allocations now) because it would be cost 
ineffective to distribute sums below this. Such sums are 
carried forward until the member1s credits reach the minimum 
and then distributed, although below the minimum members 
st ill qua 1 i fy for payment under the un logged performance 
allocation scheme provided there is a credit. Payment of 
some royalties may be suspended if there is not enough 
i nformati on on a certa in work or if there is di spute over 
them. They will be released when the necessary information 
has been provided or the dispute settled. 
P 1 · d Nt· t· 33 Tarification, Licensing 0 lCY an ego la lon 
As we have seen, the courts have had to be re 1 i ed on to 
provide definitions of the nature and extent of public 
performance because the 1956 Act does not supply one. The 
resu 1 t has been that pub 1 i c performance is any performance 
outside the domestic family circle and the type of 
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entertainment, the type of premises and the fact of an 
admission charge are irrelevant. PRS is an effective monopoly 
by virtue of the fact that it takes an assignment of rights 
from its members and its members own the copyright in 
virtually all British and Irish non-dramatic works broadcast 
and publicly performed in the UK. Its affiliations with 
societies abroad and its involvements in overseas agencies 
give a vast world-wide repertoire and effectively mean that 
if a person wants to broadcast or pub 1 i c ly perform such 
copyri ght works he requ i res ali cence from PRS. PRS will 
grant ali cence to anyone who wants to use copyri ght mus i c 
for broadcasting or public performance (except for pirates, 
of course) provided he signs a licence agreement, pays the 
requisite royalties and, in most cases, provides information 
on the works he has performed. Such ali cence has to be 
obtained before use is made of the works. Licensing 
inspectors are employed to license unlicensed premises 
throughout the country and to provide information, and 
1 i cences are a 1 so issued from Head Offi ce in London and 
Dublin when music users apply for them. Where necessary, PRS 
will take legal action. PRS issues year-to-year contracts in 
the form of blanket 1 icences so that the user can publ icly 
perform any of the works in PRS I repertoi re in return for 
royalties. When one considers that the repertoire covers the 
works of 500,000 copyri ght owners worl dwi de, the importance 
of the licence is apparent. The licence fee will vary as the 
nature and extent of music use at the premises changes. The 
licence is a contract, enforceable by law. Every conceivable 
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type of place where pub 1 i c performance of copyri ght music 
could possibly take place is covered and both live and 
mechani ca 1 performance. Thus, there are tari ffs for bi ngo 
clubs and halls, cinemas, restaurants, cafes and hotels, 
factories, offices and canteens, clubs, pubs, shops and many 
more. In all, PRS has about 52 tariffs for public 
performance, covering 175,000 premises in the UK and Eire and 
many more in its overseas agencies territories. Permits 
rather than licences are sometimes issued for occasional 
events, for s i ng1 e performances or short seri es of 
performances; where the premi ses are not norma lly 1 i censed. 
They are ad-hoc, temporary 1 i cences although they can cover 
more than one event. Licences are usua lly granted to the 
owner or occupier of the establishment, for practical 
purposes, not to performers, and promoters may sometimes be 
issued with licences. Performers are sometimes given 
1 i cences, however, as in the case of mobile OJs , where 
annua 1 1 i cences are given to cover pub 1 i c performances in 
places which would not normally be licensed annually and 
where such performances do not normally take place, such as 
pri vate homes and farmers I barns34 , although thi s does not 
cover premises which should already be licensed. The promoter 
and performers may, however, be 1 i ab 1 e for copyr; ght 
infringement as well as the owner or occupier of the 
premi ses. Groups of fi ve or more premi ses owned by one 
organisation which require licences, such as a chain of pubs 
or hotels, may be licensed together under one licence, 
(circuit licences) through the Head Office of the 
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organisation and royalties are calculated each year according 
to the number of premises and the various uses and frequency 
of use of copyright material for which returns are required. 
The advantage is that 1 i cences do not have to be cancelled 
when premises close or are sold and new ones issued when new 
premises open. 
Royalties payable are calculated under a series of tariffs 
which take account of the type of premise where the music use 
takes place, the type of use and the general circumstances of 
the use. The premi ses covered vary from concert hall s to 
dentists waiting rooms. The tariffs represent the rates of 
charge under which PRS is willing to license performances of 
the works in its repertoire in premises which fall into the 
category covered by the tariff35 . The main principle 
underlying PRS' tariffs is that where the use of music is an 
essential part of the conduct of the business - such as for 
concerts - PRS will usually take a percentage of the proceeds 
of the business, the idea being that these proceeds are a 
direct result of the use of music. If this is not 
practicable, however, for example in the case of commercial 
cabaret clubs, where it is not possible to identify the 
mus i ca 1 element of the bu s i ness because, for example, the 
business is also involved in catering by supplying food and 
drink, then PRS takes a percentage of expenditure on musical 
entertainment. The principle of "a percentage of proceeds" 
is not feas i b 1 e or appropri ate where mus i cis used 
incidentally in the business. Nor is it really feasible in 
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the case of juke boxes because it is virtually impossible to 
monitor receipts for these. Juke boxes fall somewhere in the 
middle between featured and incidental entertainment. Here, 
a sum per jukebox, subject to discount, is payable. The 
principle similarly may not be applicable where background 
music is provided by mechanical means. Featured music also 
attracts a higher royalty rate than background music36 . 
Other bases for tari ffs are a certa i n sum per number of 
people (as in the case of background music for bingo clubs 
and halls), a sum per number of seats or according to 
capacity (as for village and urban halls), and a lump sum for 
different mechanical uses of music (as for background music 
for clubs). Most of the tariffs are subject to automatic 
adjustment in line with the Retail Price Index, to take 
account of inflation. Often, another index is used as well, 
such as the Index of Average Earnings, so as to take account 
of changes in the standard of 1 i vi ng as well. Or, another 
measure taking account of the peculiar circumstances of an 
industry may be used - such as the mi nimum wage, as in the 
case of restaurants, cafes and hotels. Or, the average or 
mid-point of two indexes may be used instead. Such indices 
mean that tari ffs do not have to be revi sed every year. 
There is an automatic adjustment for those tariffs expressed 
in monetary terms in 1 i ne wi th the RPI and/ or some other 
index. There are changes in the who 1 e bas is on wh i ch the 
tariff is calculated, however, where the pattern of music use 
has changed in a certain area or because of changes in policy 
for example, in the case of the background music 
contractors. 
Page 289 
In general, PRS believes that its public performance tariffs 
are too low. They are apparently low in Germany, too, where 
GEMA, the West German society which deals with both 
mechanical and performing/broadcasting rights gets 
three-quarters of its revenue from the former ri ght. In 
France, though, public performance tariffs are pretty high -
tariffs there are expressed as a percentage of each venue's 
receipts and are of the order of 8-10%. PRS, on the other 
hand, can only take 2% of recei pts for pop concerts, for 
ex amp 1 e , under a dec is i on by the PRT. 1 n the US, pub 1 i c 
performance tariffs are even lower, particularly in the case 
of musical extravaganzas. It was noted that historical 
reasons account for these low tariffs, at least in the 
English speaking countries. When PRS was first set up in 
1914, it was strongly opposed by the lTIusic industry and 
vested interests. As a result, the first general managers of 
PRS decided to adopt a very moderate, cautious approach so as 
not to antagonise these interests. When its monopoly 
position came under attack PRS threw its weight behind the 
idea of an independent tribunal so as to diffuse this 
criticism. The result of all this was that very low tariffs 
were set in the early days. Then, when the PRT was 
established under the 1956 Act, its first Chairman followed 
the policy that past levels of tariffs were the only guide to 
the pri ce of the Society's repertoi re, so incases before 
it, PRT used these past (low) tariff levels to judge future 
levels. Thus, PRS was left for future levels with these past 
low precedents. The first Chairman of PRT used the criterion 
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of IIwilling buyer, willing seller ll to settle disputes. It 
was not until 1968, when this Chairman left, following a 
campaign against him by PRS pointing out the shortcomings in 
the criteria used, that PRS could attempt to increase its 
tariffs to realistic levels. The new Chairman of PRT had the 
opposite view - he did not think that future tariffs should 
be bound by past 1 eve 1 s. Often, incases before PRT, there 
are attempts to bring in what organisations in other 
countries are paying but PRS apparently believes that foreign 
cases are only of 1 imi ted use because ci rcumstances, 
conditions and systems differ between countries, so 
comparison is difficult. Thus, PRS generally does not bring 
in forei gn evi dence except for CotTUTlonwea 1 th countries where 
the system is generally similar to that in the UK since PRS 
helps administer many Commonwealth territories and many of 
these are former British colonies. The low tariff policy has 
caught on in these countri es, too, PRS has II exported ll low 
tariffs. The English-speaking territories generally have low 
tariffs. In addition, in the English-speaking countries, the 
concept of the author' s ri ght has not really caught on - if 
it had tariffs might be higher. A further problem until 
recently was that PRS' tariffs were not index linked because 
until the late sixties, early seventies, inflation was not 
really a major problem in the UK37 . In th late sixties, PRS 
started a campaign to index link (and review) tariffs, a 
concept it already used in its broadcasting agreements. In 
addition, in 1972, the Government introduced a statutory 
standstill on prices and incomes, followed by control by the 
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Price Corrmission. PRS was told that its tariffs were not 
subject to this, but the PRS General Council thought that PRS 
shoul d voluntarily comp ly so there were no ta ri ff increases 
between mid-1972 and the end of 197338 . Thus, PRS has had a 
lot of catching up to do and it has to do this gradually over 
a number of years, it cannot concentrate the increases in 
only a few years. 
As regards broadcasting agreements, the percentage of 
proceeds principle applies as well - where possible PRS will 
take a percentage of income. The agreement for commerc i a 1 
television with the ITCA, under which a lump sum is paid, ;s 
the subject of a dispute before the PRT referred in May 1981, 
one point of issue being exactly this principle. The ITCA 
represents the on ly broadcasters in the UK whose royalty is 
not calculated as a percentage of revenue. Another point of 
contention is apparently that the ITCA believes that its 
royalty should be based on what they have paid in the past, 
whereas PRS says it shou 1 d be based on pr'esent and future 
c i rcums tances and cond it ions. PRS is looking for a 
percentage of net advertising revenue - about 1.5% whereas at 
the moment the compan; es are payi ng only the equ i va 1 ent of 
0.6% of adverti sing revenue. When the fee was ori gi na lly 
set, there was some doubt as to the futu re prosperi ty of 
these compan i es. 15 years ago when the fee was set, it 
represented 1 % of advert is i ng revenue accord i ng to a pres s 
release of 22 January 1982. The Cable Television Association 
of Great Britain, with which PRS has been in negotiation for 
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an agreement for an experimental period initially seems to 
have agreed in principle that it should pay a percentage of 
its income, whether this is subscription and/or advertising 
revenue (although no figure has apparently yet been agreed). 
De Freitas39 notes that the main factors to consider in 
deci di ng the value of the ri ght to broadcast are the number 
of hours of copyright music broadcast a year, the size of the 
broadcaster IS audi ence and the revenue of the broadcaster. 
The percentage of revenue formula is the most often used to 
determine the royalty, he says, the rationale being that 
where music forms an important and integral part of the whole 
programme output by a broadcaster, it is convenient and 
logical to look on the value of that music to the 
broadcaster as a percentage of the value of the whole 
programme of which it forms part and the value of the whole 
programme can be measured by revenue generated for commercial 
broadcasting and revenue required for non-commercial or mixed 
finance stations. Prior to a PRT decision in 1972, the BBC 
used to pay a sum per pa i d recei vi ng 1 i cence subject to 
variation in line with the cost of living40 . PRS wanted a 
change in calculation, one reason being the abolition of 
radio licences in January 1971, although the BBC apparently 
was prepared to accept recalculation of the initial amcunt 
per licence to make sure that PRS did not suffer as a result 
of the fall in the total number of 1 i cences 41. PRS offered 
four new formu 1 ae - A, a percentage of the BBC' s mus i c use 
revenue; B, a percentage of the BBC' s 1 i cence revenue and 
government grant-in-aid; C, a percentage of the BBC's music 
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use operating expenditure; and 0, a per licence formula. The 
PRT thought all formulae would produce figures that were too 
high and would mean a very large increase in the royalty over 
a short period of time. PRS all but admitted this and 
offered cei 1 i ngs in the years 1972 and 1973, although thi s 
would still have meant a large increase in 1974. PRT thought 
this unreasonable, but it also thought that the SBC proposal 
would produce a royalty that was too low. The Tribunal noted 
that there is no market price for the right to broadcast PRS 
music because there is no market in the normal sense of that 
word whereby the ri ght is freely bought and sold. There is 
only one seller (PRS) but it cannot charge any price it wants 
because it is subject to the· jurisdiction of the PRT. At 
that time, there were only two potential buyers - the aBC 
and Independent Television Companies (now we could add the 
independent local radio stations). 
The factors that were taken into account were:-
(a) The continuing rise in the cost of living and in the 
standard of living. 
(b) The increased use of PRS music by the SBC. The SBC 
admitted that the greater its use of PRS music, the 
greater the value of it to the SBC. 
(c) The increase in the va 1 ue of the PRS reperto ire due to 
increased membershi p at home and abroad through 
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affiliated societies and overseas agencies. 
(d) A recent PRS Independent Television Companies 
agreement. This was index-linked and determinable on 
notice by PRS if the companies' use of PRS music 
increased by more than 5% of 1,000 music hours a year. 
BBC use of PRS music averaged 1,300 hours a year. It 
was also noted, however, that these compani es were a 
consortium and commercial concerns who were better able 
to meet rising costs and could share the burden, whereas 
the BBC was reliant on a licence fee fixed by the 
Government. Account was also taken of the fact that the 
PRS repertoire is used much more on radio than on 
television, that a lot of television music is background 
music and that the BBC makes great c o n t r i b u t i ~ n s s to the 
musical profession. On the other hand, music on 
television is just part of a much more expensive package 
and television audiences are much larger than radio 
audiences. PRT thought it fair to treat the radio 
element in the royalty as about twice the television 
element. 
(e) It was also argued that the imminent introduction of 
commercial radio justified an increase in the royalty, 
that the areater the number of buyers, the greater the 
~ ~
value of the use to each customer. This was rejected, 
however, on the basis that commercial radio might take 
away part of the SBC's audience and so reduce the vaiue 
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of the PRS repertoire just as easily as enhance it. 
(f) The fact that more was paid for broadcast of musical 
works in other European countri es and that 
dissatisfaction with the BBC royalty was so great that 
some members had threatened to leave PRS. 
The PRT did not regard a per licence formula as acceptable 
because of the abolition of sound-only licences which would 
mean fixing the royalty by reference to television receiving 
licences when the main value of the PRS repertoire to the BBC 
is through radio, because of the difficulty of estimating the 
future growth rate of total television licences and the fact 
tha t eventually the rate wou 1 d slow down and then a peak 
be reached for total licences, so that the royalty would not 
reflect improvements in the standard of living or increased 
use of PRS music, and because a large increase in the royalty 
was justified but this should be spread evenly over the 
period, for which the licence formula is rather inflexible. 
Formula A, the music use income concept was regarded as not 
the correct one because the share taken up by television 
woul d be much greater than that for radi 0 since the BBC 
allocates much more income to television than to radio. If 
one tri ed to app ly a much lower percentage to te 1 evi s ion 
music than to radio music, the BBC might be tempted to spend 
much less on radio than now and thus avoid paying a large 
part of the raya 1 ty whi ch wou 1 d be due. Formul a C, a 
percentage of music use expenditure, produces the same 
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problem. It may also be more difficult to estimate future 
expenditure than future revenue and the royalty might vary 
widely due to changes in items of expenditure which have 
little to do with use of PRS music. Formula B was felt to be 
best because it is simple and is not dependent on allocations 
between radio and television. The royalty asked for by PRS 
was reduced, however, and made subject to cei 1 i ngs in the 
first 2 years. 
Because PRS has to be, by necess i ty, a vi rtua 1 monopo 1y and 
as a result is always open to the criticism of abuse of 
monopoly power, it always tries, wherever possible, to 
negotiate tariffs with national associations representative 
of the class of users with which it is dealing, and tries to 
obtain an agreed basis for calculation of royalties with each 
of them. For example, it deals with the British Hotels, 
Restaurants and Caterers Association, the Theatres' National 
Committee and the Music Trades Association. It does not 
usually impose its tariffs unilaterally. Sometimes42 , there 
is no such organisation or there is such an organisation but 
it will not carry out the functions of a representative 
organisation as PRS would like. For example, the CBI will 
talk to its members and give a view but point out that this 
is only the view of the CBl and cannot bind its members. 
Other such organisations may say that they cannot bind their 
members but that there will be strong pressures on members to 
conform to such agreements. There is also a very usefu 1 
wider body - the Music Users Council - which is a composite 
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organisation composed of many music user representative 
bodies, with which PRS often has discussions. Most of the 
bodies representing commercial users of music belong to it, 
except for the broadcasters. PRS has negotiations and 
discussions with the individual bodies making up the MUC, but 
it is also important that it keeps on good terms with the MUC 
itself, representing as it does a central reference point so 
that the bodies in the MUC can compare notes with each other 
on various matters. It can informally help to decide 
discussions with PRS by giving them a nudge in the right 
direction, although it must be stressed that it is not an 
arbitration body as such, nor does it act in a formal 
capacity. If there does not seem to be an organisation which 
is representa t i ve of the type of premi ses covered by the 
tari ff, PRS wi 11 impose the tari ff uni 1 a tera lly and wa it for 
a representative body to appear43. If music users consider 
tariffs to be unreasonable, they can always refer them to the 
PRT, following the unsuccessful completion of negotiations. 
The PRT can hear disputes concerning licensing bodies (such 
as PRS and PPL) and. people requ i ri ng 1 i cences or 
organisations claiming to be representative of such people 
on reference of a licence scheme to the Tribunal or on 
application of a person who wants a licence either under an 
existing scheme or in a case not covered by a scheme. Having 
heard the various sides of the argument, PRT makes an Order 
confi rmi ng or va ryi ng the scheme 44 Poi nts of 1 aw can be 
referred to the High Court for final settlement. Sections 
23-30 of the 1956 Act lay down the provisions. A number of 
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PRS publ ic performance tariffs have been referred, such as 
popular concerts, variety theatres, dance halls and cinemas. 
Broadcas ti ng agreements have also been referred. PRS does 
not charge royalties for all uses of music - it does not do 
so for religious services, or for performances to patients in 
hospitals and nursing homes provided advertising is not used 
and will accept applications for reduced or no royalties for 
use of music in PRS· repertoire at occasional musical events 
held to raise money for bona fide UK registered charities 
whose aims are to relieve human suffering, subject to certain 
conditions. Royalties are payable annually in advance with 
adjustments at the end of the year since at the beginning of 
the year the 1 i censee pays a royalty based on the prev i ous 
year. In the fi rst year, an estimate of use for the comi ng 
year is made. I n genera 1, pub 1 i c performance tari ffs are 
regarded as comprehensive enough, but as being too low. 
Broadcasting tariffs, though, are good, and stand up well to 
international comparison, it is thought. 
Negotiation of tariffs is done by the senior management of 
PRS. The Chief Executive, Michael Freegard, leads the 
negotiations where large amounts of money are involved, as 
with the broadcasting agreements. In cases where not so much 
. 
is at stake, the Head of the 1 i cens i ng department may be 
chief-negotiator. This is not a general rule, however, and 
will depend on circumstances. Michael Freegard tries to get 
involved wherever possible. Licensing policy (and policy in 
genera 1) is determi ned by the General Coune; 1 . The Chi ef 
Executive and the negotiating team talk to the Executive 
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Council of the General Council, which meets every month. The 
Executi ve Counci 1 is composed of between 12-14 of the 24 
members of the General Counci 1 (some of them bei ng 
consultants), the General Council having delegated its 
negotiating powers to the Executive Council. The General 
Council does not do the actual negotiating. The situation 
has changed somewhat over the years since negotiations used 
to be carr; ed out by a number of comm; ttees of the Genera 1 
Council; now, a single body and a single team does all the 
negotiating. The final decision arising from any negotiation 
is usually taken by the General Council, especially on major 
matters, the General Council being the equivalent of a Board 
of Directors. The Executive Council is appointed by the 
General Council and meets every month except for August. It 
has set powers and its main functions are to deal with 
1 i cence agreements, premi ses and equ; pment and staff. It 
also has a general sweep-up function. It looks at the 
problem it is set, comes up with a solution and the General 
Council usually accepts this. 
45 Licensing Inspectors 
By the end of 1982, there were 133,395 licences on issue by 
PRS, although the number of 1 i cences has increased qu i te a 
lot in recent years because of the movement away from 
licensing background music contractors and towards licensing 
individual premises as regards juke boxes46 • PRS employs 39 
licensing inspectors throughout Britain to issue lion the 
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spotU 1 i cences and genera lly enforce the performi ng ri ght, 
each one of which has his own area(s) to deal with. 
Extensive travel is involved. 90% of them are ex-policemen. 
Their main sources of information are advertisements and the 
press. They also have ali st of all the premi ses on thei r 
territory which are licensed. In addition, Head Office sends 
contact 1 i sts to them gi vi ng them 1 eads and te 11 i ng them 
about premises which to its knowledge have changed hands. 
The inspectors themselves also look out for changes of name, 
ownership and tenancy in public houses, clubs and the like. 
Licences are not transferable from one owner to another 
because it is quite likely that the new owner will have 
different views on the use of music and use different musical 
activities. A good deal of local knowledge, local and 
persona 1 contacts and keepi n9 your ear to the ground is 
involved. It is very much a learning job since they glean 
information as they go about their job - a visit to a certain 
establishment may produce new information or they may notice 
a change of ownership or unlicensed premises on the way, so 
the job snowballs. There is nothing really very hard or fast 
in the job - it develops as you go along. The job also 
involves a liaison role and a public relations function, 
explaining PRS' job to the public and maintaining good 
relations with it, since PRS cannot advertise probably 
because it would be accused of using members' money for the 
wrong purposes and unwisely. Apart from licensing unlicensed 
premises, the inspectors also have to make sure that 
royalties are paid and to look out for a stepping up of music 
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use at premi ses and presumably to check that returns are 
correct. PRS rarely revokes a licence, apparently, and if it 
does it is only as a last resort. The job involves tact and 
diplomacy rather than heavy handed tactics and persuasion is 
the best weapon because enforcement through the courts is 
generally long-winded and difficult. If a licensee has what 
he thinks is a justifiable grievance, the licensing 
inspector will help to deal with it. He will even help a 
licensee fill in the forms required. The job is a necessary 
part of PRS' operations because it is generally not possible 
to rely on trust - there are always going to be some who will 
try to defy the law and others who just do not know about or 
do not understand the law. In many cases, people just deny 
that they are infringing copyright and it may be difficult to 
prove o t h e r w i s e ~ ~ Although the field force is only a small 
proporti on of total staff, it is an important part of PRS. 
The licensing inspectors are theoretically managed from Head 
Office, although contact between the two seems to be minimal. 
47 The field force is Head Office's eyes and ears . They work 
very much on their own, however, using their own cars and 
telephones, operating from home and hours are very flexib1e. 
Supervision is minimal and they regard themselves as 
something of a group apart. It is a unique job, not really 
being like a salesman's job since salesmen have targets 
whereas 1 icensing inspectors cannot because they would be 
easily d; sappo; nted - and there is no promoti on. Contact 
wi th Head Off; ce ; s rna i n 1y by telephone and there ; s an 
annual conference for licensing inspectors, involving 
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discussions of new tariffs, future PRS policy and 
developments in the field of licensing. The licensing 
inspectors are only involved in the public performance field, 
not the broadcasting field, although they are sometimes asked 
to monitor the output of radio stations as a check against 
returns. In any case, they would be only of limited use in 
the broadcasting field because they are not in anyone place 
long enough. 
Efficiency V Effectiveness 
PRS is a non-profit making organisation, the money it 
collects being distributed to its members after deduction of 
its administration costs. The qUestion arises of the 
relationship between effectiveness, success in achieving 
stated goals, and efficiency, the ratio of costs to revenue. 
As we have seen, PRS does not seem to have had an awful lot 
of success in keep; ng costs down and costs are genera lly 
taki ng up a greater percentage of gross revenue each year 
(and of domestic revenue). The problem is that unless there 
is control, costs will just increase, probably at an 
exponential rate, so that eventually some very difficult 
decisions will have to be taken. What is really needed is an 
on-goi,ng cost-control programme rather than a number of 
economy measures every few years, whi ch 1 arge ly tack Ie the 
symptoms without getting to grips \'/ith the actual problem. 
Unless the underlying problems are tackled, the same 
situation will keep recurring every couple of years but in an 
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enlarged form, making the medicine even more difficult to 
take. One gets the impression that this is one of PRS. 
problems - that it adopts a stop-go approach, implementing 
economies every now and then, rather than using a programmed 
on-goi ng approach and IImanagi ngll costs. It was poi nted out 
by PRS, however, that it was sensitive about costs and was 
presently upgrading financial management, introducing 
financial planning and budgetary contro1 48 . It was also 
noted that no-one has yet established what is an lIacceptablell 
level of costs for a collecting society. 
The problems of efficiency against effectiveness are amply 
illustrated by the problems of enforcement in the public 
performance field, where PRS admits that a fair amount of its 
1 · .. . 49 lcens1ng 1S uneconom1C . A recent survey carri ed out for 
PRS by an independent research group suggested that in 
certa in areas of pub 1 i c performance, about 10% of premi ses 
seem to be using music from PRS· repertoire without paying 
for it. These unlicensed premises are mainly small-scale 
operations. PRS tries to license such establishments but it 
is very di ffi cul t to deci de how much effort and how many 
resources to devote to it, although the line has to be drawn 
somewhere. For example, PRS licenses residential hotels but 
does not bother wi th the very small ones, those wi th 1 ess 
than 6 bedrooms. Similarly, many village halls are small and 
it is often difficult to explain that royalties have to be 
paid for all types of public performance. These are usually 
charged only a moderate tariff. It is a matter of judgement 
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as to where to draw the line in such cases. Another example 
is doctors' and dentists' waiting rooms, which would require 
a public performance licence if music were played in them. 
PRS does not send its representatives to all of these, 
however, because it would just not be worth it. If it hears 
that music is being played at one of these establishments, 
however, it will license it. A pragmatic approach is 
required. The size of the field force has been greatly 
increased over the years and to see if they are effective and 
how many resources to devote to this particular aspect of its 
work, PRS just has to look at the results. The problem is 
that if you increase the size of the fi e 1 d force, you a 1 so 
have to increase head offi ce staff to deal wi th the extra 
workload. By doing this, costs as a percentage of revenue 
will probably increase but so will the amount of money 
di stri butab 1 e to members. PRS issues hundreds of wri ts a 
year but re 1 at i ve ly few are defended. Enforcement is not 
really a problem in the broadcasting field because the 
organisations concerned are large and few in number, although 
problems obviously arise with pirate broadcasting stations. 
Public performance tariffs may result in unrealistically low 
returns for PRS where musical use is incidental in the 
business because the amounts involved are not particularly 
hi gh - but PRS really has to enforce its copyri ght in such 
cases. The different attitudes in different parts of the 
activities of PRS, therefore, do not reflect different 
objectives in different fields (one might suggest that 
enforcement is the main objective in the public performance 
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field and maximisation of revenue the main objective in the 
field of broadcasting) but rather are the result of the facts 
of 1 i fe in each fi e 1 d. Oi fferent approaches are requ ired 
because of different situations in each field. The nature of 
the problem in each case conditions the policy. In Eire, 
pirate broadcasting is apparently a great problem but PRS 
does not enforce the copyright in such cases because it was 
informed that if it co 11 ected roya 1 ties in such cases, it 
would be tinged with illegality. PRS will go to court over a 
case if it wants to set a precedent. 
It was stated in interview that although PRS is a de facto 
monopoly, it still wants to be as efficient as possible. Its 
members would accept no less. However, it was thought that 
members woul d not benefi t through PRS bei ng too effi ci ent 
since it might devote too much time and effort and too many 
resources to distributive and processing efficiency, leaving 
little money to distribute to members. One must remember, 
though, that there are more forms of efficiency than 
distributive and processing efficiency and that one might 
like to see an increasing level of revenue achieved for a 
constant level of costs. For example, one might like to see 
the cost-revenue ratio kept constant or for costs to be held 
to increases equal to or less than the rate of inflation. 
This would mean net distributable revenue increasing or at 
least being held constant as a percentage of gross revenue. 
Revenue at the moment is increasing but one might say that 
PRS cou 1 d do even better. PRS, though, regards i tse 1 f as 
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being amongst the most efficient collecting societies in the 
World and as constantly striving to be more efficient within 
the constraints imposed by economics. It was accepted, 
however, that PRS is not as effective in meeting its 
objectives as it would like because of the low tariffs it is 
stuck with, but it is trying to break out of this situation. 
For example, it has tried to introduce some new arrangements 
into its 1 i cens i ng - a growi ng phenomenon in theatres has 
been that_ of compilation shows based on the career of famous 
people, for example the Beatles. For such shows, producers 
in the past often wanted exclusive licences to the works 
concerned but PRS was unable to provide them since its 
licences are, by definition, non-exclusive since it will 
" 
provide anyone with a licence provided they pay the requisite 
royalties. However, PRS agreed to give the individual rights 
ho 1 ders concerned thei r respecti ve ri ghts back so that they 
could negotiate their own exclusive licences on the best 
tenns they could. Such negotiations produced tariffs of 
8-10% ofrecei pts for the copyright owners concerned. PRS 
then negotiated with the Theatres' National Committee for 
non-exclusive licences for use of such music with the result 
that the tariff ranges on a sliding scale up to 6% of box 
offi ce recei pts where PRS-contro 1_1 ed mus i c takes up 70% or 
more of the running time of the production for interpolated 
music. The problem of low tariffs is emphasised when this is 
compared to the 2% of receipts PRS charges for pop concerts-
and here the music used is 100% PRS controlled in most cases. 
Thus, PRS is tryi ng in di fferent ways to break out of the 
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low tariff barrier to improve its effectiveness. 
PRS has also attempted to improve its efficiency in a number 
of ways. The main way it has done this is through 
computerisation of its operations. The heart of the 
organisation is still a manual card index system, consisting 
of more than 3 million titles50 , and PRS is attempting to 
computerise this system. At the moment, it has about half a 
million titles on computer which form the IIActive Works 
Fi 1 ell . To get onto th is fi 1 e, a work has to have been 
performed somewhere in the UK. PRS is now creating a 
Repertoire Works File of its titles, which it intends 
computerising. At the moment, the system is rather 
inefficient - if a title does not now match a title on the 
computer, on the Active Works File, it is necessary to send a 
message to the repertoire department to obtain the requisite 
i nformati on. When the system is fully computeri sed, however, 
~ ~
all the information required wil be stored in one place. It 
is expected that the development of this computerised 
database will take about 5 years to complete and cost about 
£1 million at 1979 money levels51 . PRS also tries to keep 
pace with information and office technology by using word 
processors. It believes that it is essential that it 
computerises apace. In fact, this is PRS' second attempt at 
computerisation. It initially used computers in 1966 in the 
licensing department but did not really make full use of them 
or take advantage of their benefits since it just continued 
to use the same system as before but using computers instead 
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of people. There was no real attempt to improve the system 
or gear it to the advantages of computers or use them to 
their best purpose. PRS is also looking for a substantial 
improvement in the number of people it employs as a result of 
the introduction of the database which should reduce costs 
quite considerably in view of the fact that a large part of 
PRS' costs are taken up by staff costs. In 1965, PRS had 
about 530 employees; by 1967-8 this had fallen to 440, even 
though the amount of work done by PRS had grown greatly; in 
1982, PRS employed an average of 698 people52 . At the 
moment, it is employing quite a lot of temporary staff to 
dea 1 wi th the new database. When PRS embarks on a major 
expendi ture campai gn, it tri es to spread the costs over a 
number of years because the profi 1 e of members recei vi ng 
payments changes every year and it would not be fair to have 
just a small number of members subsidising the expenditure, 
as would happen if the cost just impacted on one or two 
years. By spreading costs over a large number of years, each 
member pays a smaller amount of money than might otherwise be 
the case and a 1 arger number of members pay .. I n fact, the 
database is being paid for out of reserves. There has also 
been an i nternati ona 1 improvement in effi ci ency through the 
i nternat i ona 1 confedera t i on of authors • and composers I 
societies, CISAC, which allows the various people involved in 
the technical side of rights societies to meet to talk about 
various problems, standardise collection and distribution 
methods, float ideas, exchange information and so forth. PRS 
noted that it had spent a lot of money on schemes which made 
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other societies more efficient without any effect necessarily 
on its own efficiency. In addition, the Swiss Society 
(SUISA), has possession of the CAE file (Composer, Author, 
Pub 1 i sher fil e) made up of a 11 the composers, authors and 
publishers represented by all the societies in the World. It 
is a World Index and has about 800,000 names on it. CISAC is 
also trying to produce a World Repertoire File, containing 
all the works represented by all the societies in the World, 
which is a very ambitious scheme. At the moment, there is an 
Anglo-American file covering works represented by US and 
Eng1 ish soc i et i es and th is wi 11 represent a good proportion 
of works in the World. Such files can be used to give 
earlier and more accurate information, which is obviously of 
great use. A lot of the problems involved in administering 
the copyright system are caused by lack of information, so 
such schemes are vital. The World Repertoire File is still 
in its early stages but the CAE list is well tried and has 
been around for quite a time. The leading societies in the 
World are in Western Europe, America and the Commonwealth, so 
the Anglo-American file is already quite extensive as regards 
the World repertoire. The other countries in the World are a 
mish-mash, either having no rights equivalent to copyright or 
being very lax in enforcement or being pirates· paradises. 
Members expect that when thei r works are pub 1 i c ly performed 
or broadcast they will be paid for it. Sometimes, members· 
expectations are too great - for example, some of them expect 
to be pa i d for every performance in every es tab 1 i shment, 
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however small. But this is just not feasible because of the 
economics of the operation. Members do not always appreciate 
tha tit is ju st not economi c to co 11 ect revenue in some 
cases. This particularly applies to members at the lower end 
of the revenue scale who are natura 11y very anxious to be 
paid for every use since they receive very little money. 
Costs are taki ng up a greater and greater percentage of 
revenue, but this is a deliberate policy to increase the 
resources devoted to revenue collection, and to bring in more 
money every year. Because of the nature of the operation, it 
is felt necessary to spend more in order to increase 
collections. There is no doubt that soon some very difficult 
decisions will have to be made as to how many resources and 
what sort of resources to devote to revenue collection, 
enforcement procedures and process tng. If PRS sacked ha 1 f 
its field force it would have little immediate effect on 
costs since the field force is only a small proportion of 
costs but the subsequent effect on costs through cutting Head 
Office staff might be more substantial. However, loss of the 
field force would cause revenue collection to fall 
considerably, it was thought. It was felt that PRS by no 
means has the worst record on costs in Europe or Worldwide -
the French society, for example, has a figure for costs as a 
percentage of revenue of about 30% but it also collects about 
ha 1 f as much revenue again as PRS. It is a much bi gger 
soci ety wi th hi gher tari ffs and more 1 i cens i ng 
representatives. PRS would really like to put even more 
resources into enforcement efforts but it has to be careful. 
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The Society is subject to two conflicting pressures from 
members - they want costs contained within reasonable limits 
but individual members, especially the poorer ones, want PRS 
to collect every bit of revenue possible (which is 
uneconomic) and to analyse returns 100% (which is not 
economically viable or possible). PRS is unlikely to be able 
to or to want to increase the amount of money and resources 
devoted to pub 1 i c performance - the 1 imi t has probably been 
reached, it was thought. The amount devoted to broadcasti ng 
is 1 ike ly to increase, however, because of the increase in 
the number of local radio stations. Within the broadcasting 
field there are differences in the cost involved in 
processing returns from the different organisations - the 
Independent Television Companies apparently cost about 17-18% 
of revenue collected, the BBC only about 10% and independent 
local radio about 15%. In Ireland, revenue costs about 50% 
to collect. Costs in Ireland, in fact, are likely to 
increase when 1 oca 1 commerci a 1 radi 0 arri ves. The accounts 
in Eire at the moment are apparently subject to negotiation 
as to the costs to be attributed· to collection and 
distribution there. 
In fact, PRS has been subject to some criticism in the past 
from members, particularly Mr. Trevor L y t t l e t o n ~ ~ who was 
concerned at the size of administration costs and about loans 
to senior executives which appeared in the accounts. In 
fact, Mr. Lyttleton waged something of a campaign against PRS 
starting in 1976 and ending with the abandonment of a libel 
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court action by Nr. Freegard against Mr. Lyttleton early in 
197853 • The dispute was highly publicised and ev,en led to 
MPs demanding a Department of Trade enquiry into PRS, 
although this was rejected, PRS says, on the grounds that it 
was not necessary. Others say that there was insufficient 
evidence for such an inquiry. It apparently arose from Mr. 
Lyttleton's belief that the PRS-executive was rather 
secretive in what it did with members' money and over the 
fact that voting rights were limited to only a small 
proporti on of members and that no-one knew who was 
enfranchised through full membership and who was not, except 
for the General Council Mr. Lyttleton tried to get hold of 
the voters' 1 i st and cri ti ci sed the management in I Mus i c 
Weeki in July 1976, after which he received the libel writ. 
Following two court cases (PRS winning the appeal and losing 
the first case) to attempt to get the voters' list revealed, 
a canvass by Nr. Lyttl eton of members and a great dea 1 of 
acrimonious dispute, PRS finally called an Extraordinary 
Genera 1 Meeti ng in November 1977 to propose extend; ng the 
franchise from 13% to 54% of the membership, but weighted so 
that big earners had the majority say and recommended at the 
next AGM that the list be revealed. The memory of the 
dispute still lingers somewhat at PRS. 
Organisational Structure 
In general, the departments at PRS can be divided into five 
. 54 
maIn sectors licensing, documentation, distribution. 
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management services and general (such as financial 
management, p e t ~ s o n n e e1, 1 ega 1) . The former three of these are 
the central operating divisions of PRS. The licensing 
departments employ about 180 staff,including the licensing 
inspectors, the general licensing department employing about 
60 of these, and offer blanket licences to broadcasters and 
public performance music users. The departments issue 
licences and collect royalties. Licensing is highly 
centralised and is mainly carried out by Head Office with 
support from the field staff. The documentation section 
consists of about 165 staff divided into five departments, 
the largest of which is repertoire registry with 55 staff. 
Documentation is vital in the work of any collecting society 
since the whole of its operations is based on it - it has to 
know on whose behalf it is collecting and distributing. It 
has to know titles and distribution shares so that it knows 
who has an interest in the work, for example. The level of 
detail it has vari es greatly between works, in many cases 
being very sketchy. Nor does it have details on all works of 
affiliated societies. A high proportion of the works in PRS' 
index system are never performed, but if a work is likely to 
be performed a lot, it will generally have full details. The 
departments involved in documentation attempt to maintain all 
this information as best they can. PRS' repertoire consists 
of about 10 mi 11 i on works. The repertoi re regi stry has the 
job of upkeep and registration of the works controlled by 
PRS so that, for example, it has to register new works, 
change details to take account of changed circumstances, such 
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as changes in or sales of ca ta 1 ogues by pub 1 is hers. Each 
collecting society has to know who to send royalties to. The 
repertoire services department has an informational role to 
perform, it seems, such as to answer queri es and to supply 
information when the computer file does not provide what is 
required. It supplies information to the distribution 
departments so that the correct shares are allocated to 
members and it also answers enquiries from members, licensees 
and the general pub 1 icon PRS' repertoi re. There are about 
190 people employed in the distribution area spread fairly 
evenly between sectors. Also, there is a department called 
broadcasting liaison associated with distribution, consisting 
of about 6 people which, amongst other things, monitors 
broadcas ts to ensure that retu rns are accurate. The 
management servi ces departments employ about 70 people, the 
bul k of them in the systems and programmi ng and computer 
operations departments. At the moment, it also employs over 
40 temporary staff to help on the database and it is intended 
that this computerisation will be particularly used in the 
distribution departments. Under the heading "general", we 
have the finance department, office services and building and 
maintenance. Together these employ about 35 staff, about 
ha 1 fin fi nance. I t was noted that fi nanci a 1 management is 
currently being upgraded at PRS with the development of 
financial planning and budgetary control. Personnel employs 
only 6 people but it is an expanding area, having only 
started in 1968. PRS also employs 7 solicitors and a lega1 
assistant. One interesting fact about PRS is that the union, 
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TASS, operates there and there are now 240 staff members. 
Nei ther of the other two soci eti es have uni ons operati ng 
within their organisations. There are also a number of 
miscellaneous departments, probably the most note'tJorthy of 
which is that of Publications and Information which employs 7 
people. In view of the fact that PRS does not advertise, 
this is an interesting development. Neither of the other 
soci et i es have such a department. The department hand1 es 
communication with the press, such as through press releases, 
and tri es to make the pub 1 i c aware of PRS I act i v i ties and 
raison d'etre. It is Council policy.not to advertise. It is 
felt that since it is difficult to measure the effectiveness 
of advertising, a different approach should be adopted by PRS 
- hence it does a lot of below-the-line advertising such as a 
film which it has just produced, the yearbook, which it 
produces in greater numbers than necessary for its members 
and exhibitions. PRS' structure is given in diagram 4.9. 
In 1980-1, PRS seems to have been reorganised. Previously, 
Mi chae 1 Freegard, who was then call ed the General Manager, 
was at the top of the organisation and had the Controller of 
Administration and Finance, the Repertoire Controller, the 
Operations Controller and the Secretary reporting to him. 
Then the General Manager was renamed the Chief Executive and 
a three man team appeared at the top of theorgani sati on, 
consisting of the Chief Executive, the Director of Operations 
and the Director of External Affairs. The Operations 
Controller became the Director of Operations responsible for 
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genera 1 1 i cens i ng, royalty di stri buti on and management 
services and with extra responsibilities, too, while the 
Chief Executive is responsible to the General Council for 
PRS' overall management55 • Robert Abrahams, who had been a 
special consultant since 1979, was made Director of External 
Affairs responsible for relations with outside groups such as 
major music users, broadcasters, affiliated societies and 
MCOS56 • Thi s was one reason for the changes apparently, to 
bri ng Robert Abrahams into the sen i or management team. A 
number of new pos i ti ons were a 1 so created, such as head of 
documentation, repertoire services and documentation 
projects. The management changes that took place at that 
time were not regarded as major reorgani sati on by PRS but 
rather were a way of responding to a particular situation, 
and to the environment in which PRS operated, as a better way 
of using the human resources PRS already had and bringing in 
new talent57 . The changes represented a re-allocation of 
duties since Michael Freegard had too much to do and was 
coming under too much pressure. Marshall Lees had too many 
people reporting to him. The organisation was growing and 
the changes were a way of responding to this growth. The 
change of Mi chae 1 Freegard' s ti t 1 e was seen as a way of 
updating the position since the General Manager is usually 
further down the organisation than the Chief Executive58 . 
The Chief Executive usually runs the business, which was what 
Michael Freegard was doing anyway. The management also 
wanted PRS to be treated more seriously. Managers had 
previously been loathe to delegate author'ity further down the 
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line. Until the pop music explosion of the 1960s, it was 
apparently difficult to get PRS treated as seriously as it 
shou 1 d have been and to be accepted by the mus i c bus i ness _ 
if you were in the music bUSiness, you worked for a publisher 
not PRS. The organisation was run as a IIserious music" 
organisation. In the 1960s, the money to be earned in the 
business started to accelerate. PRS had the problem of 
trying to instil the correct attitude into staff further down 
the organisation, that it was worth working for PRS. Now, 
the organisation is dominated by people engaged in the 
popular music market and there is a more commercial attitude 
and, in fact, PRS is investigating the possibility that 
perhaps its subsidisation of serious music goes a little too 
far. The organisation has changed a lot since the 1960s. 
The Lyttleton saga put PRS back a little and caused a 
rethink. It apparently ushered in something of a new era. 
Mi chae 1 Freegard is apparently not i nvo 1 ved too much in the 
administration and management of PRS but Marshall Lees is 
seen rather as the uchief mechanic" and Michael Freegard and 
Robert Abrahams are the high-level operators. Obviously, 
though, Marsha 11 Lees does not have a completely free hand 
and Michael Freegard has to be satisfied of the need for 
change first. 
5i nce 1981, there have been a fe\v management changes, too, 
with the three man Board seemingly still in place but with 
the Director of External Affairs now being Deputy Chief 
Executive. The three man team works closely together. In 
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1982, the post of Chi ef Accountant and that of Controller 
(Administration and Finance) disappeared, replaced by Head of 
Finance and Office Services and Finance. In 1983/4, a 
Financial Controller was recruited, who reports to the three 
man Board. In addition, Personnel no longer reports to the 
Head of Finance and Office Services but directly to the three 
man Board. In the distribution departments a new position, 
Distribution Services, was created and the Broadcasting 
Distribution department broken into two, Radio Distribution 
and Television Distribution, one would suppose because of the 
growth in work in this area. In the documentation 
departments, Overseas Collection was replaced by Overseas 
Documentation. A new department was also created in the 
Member Relations Group and a new post, too, Solicitor 
(Membershi p) • Both report to the Repertoi re Contro 11 er. A 
Broadcasting Liaison group was also set up and a Legal 
Assistant to the Director of External Affairs recruited in 
1983/4. The position of I n t e ~ n a t i o n a l l Representative and 
Secretary of MCOS was also split into two and the person who 
filled the latter post was also made Assistant Head of 
Licensing. The Registrar was brought into the documentation 
department. In many ways, PRS has a very fl uid management 
structure since in a number of cases, there do not seem to be 
defined subordinate-superior relationships, where members of 
management can report to whoever they like. These appear as 
dotted lines on diagram 4.9. Who these people report to is 
determi ned as much by strength of character as anythi ng, 
apparently. The thick full lines represent a report 
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relationship with the three man team at the top of the 
organisation. Thin full lines represent subordinate-superior 
relationships. Very few people report directly to Michael 
Freegard, one exception being Lesley Bray in Publications & 
Informati on. In general, though, where necessary, a person 
can report to any member of the three man team. 
PRS is trying to develop a management training scheme59 . It 
has brought personnel into the organisation from outside 
where this has been felt to be necessary but grown them from 
within the organisation in most cases. Managers are sent on 
trai ni ng courses when and where necessary and PRS has an 
ongoing relationship with the Industrial Society which has 
arranged several courses for PRS. The money comes from a 
staff training budget. However, it was noted that it is very 
difficult to recruit manpower from outside the organisation 
wi th the requ is i te experi ence because there are no ex.act ly 
comparable organisations -' how many people know how to run a 
royalty department and the problems involved, for example? 
All positions, which become vacant are advertised internally. 
There is a certain amount of coming and going between PRS and 
its pub 1 i sher members but the problem is that PRS is much 
larger than most of its publisher members. The largest 
pub 1 i sher members only have about 150 employees. PRS does 
not recru it from any spec i fi c occupa t i on more than from any 
other and if it cannot fill a vacancy internally, it will 
advertise externally. For example, it did this with the 
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recent vacancy for a Fi nanci a 1 Controller. I n the end, it 
appointed two people, one as Financial Controller \'/ho was 
previously Financial Controller of a book publishing company, 
the other as Assistant Head of Licensing and Secretary to 
MCOS, who had experience in the brewing and catering 
industry. 
The General Council is the ruling body at PRS. It is the 
equivalent of a Board of Directors. Michael Freegard is not 
a member of the General Council, he is just a paid employee 
of it under a 5 year contract. The General Council is wholly 
non-executi ve and makes po 1 icy and ensures that po 1 icy is 
carried out. It also acts as a watchdog. There are 24 
members of the General Council, 12 Writer - Directors and 12 
Publisher-Directors. There are also 5 Consultant Directors 
and 8 Honorary Members. The General Council also breaks down 
into an Executive Counci 1 of 12-14 members made up of 7 
Writer Directors and 6 Publisher Directors. There is also a 
Consultant Director. PRS also has a committee system, which 
is something PPL and MCPS do not have. The main committees 
are the Executive Staff Committee, which is really a mini 
Executive Council, the Premises Committee, which deals with 
leases, refurbishment of buildings and so forth, the Finance 
Committee, which meets 4 times a year, the Distribution 
Committee, which meets 2-3 times a year, the Public Relations 
Committee, the Music Classification Committee, the Donations 
COlTIITIi ttee, the I ri sh Advi sory Commi ttee. Mi chae 1 Freegard 
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and members of the seni or management team try to make the 
running in meetings, especially as regards business matters 
because they are full time executives. There is a lot of 
liaison between Michael Freegard, heading the management team 
and the Chairman of the General Counci 1, especi ally as the 
present Chairman, Roger Greenaway, take a very full part in 
the affairs of the Society. The Chairman has two deputies, 
one a writer, the other a publisher and every 6 weeks or so, 
these have a discussion on a wide-range of affairs affecting 
the Society with the three man management team at the top of 
the organisation and the present Deputy PreSident, Vivian 
Ellis (now President), who also involves himself widely in 
the Society's affairs. The President of the General Council 
is really only a figurehead (or has been to date). There is 
genera lly a lot of regul ar contact between the management 
team and the General Council. There are also various 
discussion groups, formal and informal. The General Council 
also deals with all constitutional matters and in such cases 
the runn i ng is made by it in di scuss ions wi th management. 
Similarly, for professional matters, the General Council is 
theoretically the important determining body. The system 
requi res mutual trust between the General Council and the 
management team. Each has to believe that the other can do 
its job well. In some societies in the past, on the 
Conti nent, composers have apparently run the bus i ness 
themselves without appointing profeSSional managers and this 
has led to several disasters. However, the situation wou1d 
be equally disastrous, PRS believes, if the composers lost 
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contro 1 of the i r own soc i ety and the profes s i ona 1 managers 
usurped the power. We hear a lot in economi cs about the 
divorce of ownership and control in commercial organisations. 
A similar situation could arise in collecting societies. The 
General Council is designed to prevent this, meaning that the 
membership, who are also the beneficiaries of the society, 
retain at least some control over the activities of the 
professional managers and administrators who control the 
day-to-day running of PRS. There is obviously still quite a 
lot of scope for indiscipline over costs and one might argue 
that this is happening, but control is facilitated by the 
General Council, especially since the major publishers in the 
UK have places on it and are unlikely to let the Society be 
run along uneconomic lines. The General Council appoints the 
Chief Executive and the senior management team. The Chief 
Executive employs the staff, although this still gives him a 
lot of influence and control and the control of the General 
Council may not be as great as woul d be supposed. It is 
through the General Council, however, that the membersh i p 
controls the activities of the management. 
Membership 
Throughout its history PRS' membership has grown 
consistently, especially in the last 10 years or so, so that 
by 1st July 1982 it was 15,423. If we take a simple measure 
of income per member as domestic revenue plus investment 
income minus administration costs divided by number of 
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members, this too has generally risen over the period, and by 
1982 was more than twice what it was in 1971. If we divide 
the same. income measure but expressed in real terms by the 
number of members, however, income per member has fall en 
every year over the period except 1978 and 1980, and by 1982 
the measure was only about 52% of the 1971 figure. This is 
stri ct1y not an accurate fi gure, however, since PRS 
distributions are highly skewed. For example, in 1981, 68% 
of PRS writer members who received money received less than 
£250, 16% received £250-1,000, 11% received £1,000-5,000 and 
5% received over £5,0006°. If nothing else, this should show 
how important are the various devices PRS uses to supplement 
members' incomes. 
PRS seems to be much more rigorous, one might even say 
bureaucratic, about the rights it looks after for its members 
and about voting behaviour at AGMs than the other societies. 
, 
The rights it deals with are precisely defined in each field 
(public performance, broadcasting (radio and television) and 
cable diffusion). It usually excludes dramatico-musical 
works except in certain cases in each field61 ) these cases 
depending on whether non-dramatic excerpts (or just excerpts 
for radio broadcasts) are involved, the duration of such 
excerpts (in the public performance field, for example, PRS 
deals with non-dramatic excerpts of up to 25 minutes) and 
whether these excerpts represent a complete act or potted 
version. A 'yes' to the first criterion, a 'no' to the third 
and sati sfacti on of the durati on cri teri on wi 11 mean PRS 
Page 325 
looking after the rights in the performance or broadcast. A 
public performance or television broadcast of a 
dramatico-musical work by means of a cinema film will also be 
covered by PRS (as well as by means of a television or radio 
set for pub 1 i c performance) . Ballet music and words 
accompanied by a visual representation of the ballet or part 
of it are also covered in certain circumstances, as are 
commercial advertisements. PRS does look after 
dramatico-musical works in the case of simultaneously 
diffusing cable systems. PRS also looks after the film 
synchronisation right for writer members only, where the 
music is specifically written for a particular film(s) 
although PRS will at any time assign or licence the right to 
the film producer or commissioner of the work at the author's 
request provided PRS receives from the film producer an 
agreement for payment of fees to PRS for exhibition of any 
film containing the work in US cinemas. 
PRS has three types of copyright owner as members - writers, 
pub 1 i shers and other copyri ght owners and three ty"pes of 
member - full, associate and provisional. Some copyright 
owners are successors to members who have died. Various 
criteria have to be fulfilled to qualify for each type of 
membershi p and each type of member had di fferent ri ghts62 . 
Provisional members have to fulfill a criterion of number of 
works commercially published or recorded or performed in 
public. Associate members have to have been provisional 
members for at least 1 year and to satisfy an aggregate PRS 
earnings criterion over a certain period of time. A full 
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member has to fulfill a similar but much higher and stricter 
earnings criterion. Provisional members can only receive the 
Report and Accounts, Associate members can also attend 
General Meetings and have 1 vote on a show of hands or poll 
or postal ballot and full members are also eligible for the 
General Council and receive 1 vote on a show of hands and 10 
votes on a poll or postal ballot. They may also qualify for 
10 extra votes if they ful fi 11 a 1 ength of membershi p and 
add; tiona 1 aggregate earni ngs cri teri on. The earni ngs 
criteria are automatically adjusted each year according to 
revenue distributed in the year to members. Movements up to 
full and associate member are automatic and if earnings 
subsequent 1y fall to below current cri teri a, the new 
membership status is not lost. The General Council may elect 
below the criteria if it chooses and successors to dead 
members cannot normally become fu 11 members. About 3% of 
members qualified for extra votes in 1982. The intention of 
the differences in voting ability is so that "a preponderant 
voice in the Society·s affairs may be exercised by those of 
its members who rely upon it for thei r 1 i ve 1 i hood to a 
63 h· ·t· reasonably significant extent" and those w ose actlvl les 
as publishers and writers are marginal and whose income from 
PRS is small do not receive a disproportionate amoum: of 
i nfl uence (i n fact they seem to have no i nfl uence at all). 
In 1982, full members received 82% of royalties distributed 
and 77% of total voting rights. Those members who qualified 
for the extra 10 votes represented 56% of roya1ties 
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distributed and 28% of voting rights in 1982. Also, in 1982, 
of total membership 43% were provisional members, 45% were 
associate members and 12% were full members; 86% were 
writers and 14% were publishers. Thus, we can see that PRS 
seems to have a much more comp 1 i ca ted voti ng procedure than 
the other societies, probably a function of its size and it 
seems to devote more time and effort to constitutional 
matters. 
Apart from collection and distribution of royalties PRS also 
performs a number of other functi ons for members, such as 
providing advice and financial assistance. Apart from the 
allocations system, it also runs a loan scheme for writer 
members and a "benevolent fund to assist necessitous Members 
and ex-Members of the Soci ety and thei r dependents II, call ed 
the PRS Members' Fund. (These are separate and independent 
schemes) • This is a trust fund to help cases of genu i ne 
hardship. It is a registered charity and assistance may be 
regular, temporary or in an emergency. PRS also helps 
financially, through donations, many organisations involved 
in the music world and those bodies that promote music. It 
also sponsors the annual Ivor Novello popular music awards. 
Such help is a sma 11 percentage of PRS' total income but is 
substantial nevertheless. In addition, it helps minority 
groups, such as folk and jazz music and particularly "serious 
music". In the case of serious music, the pool of money to 
be distributed according to public performance and 
broadcasting is augmented by revenue from other areas of PRS' 
activities so that the actual amount distributed is 5-6 times 
more than it would normally be. This extra money does not 
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represent a very large proportion of the source from which it 
comes but makes a great di fference to composers of seri ous 
music. Such aid is provided because it is felt that 
production of such works involves more investment of time and 
effort than popular works and performances of them are a lot 
fewer. The subsidisation is to adequately remunerate 
performances and to encourage creat; on of such work and is 
achi eved in 3 separate ways - through addi ng revenue from 
other sources, through the combined television and radio 
broadcasting point award plan (since longer works receive a 
higher rate per unit of duration - the multiplier is higher, 
for example) and through donations64 • 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE MECHANICAL- COPYRIGHT PROTECTION SOCIETY (MCPSl 
Under the 1956 Copyri ght Act, the copyri ght owner is gi yen 
the right to reproduce his copyright work in any material 
form. Part of this right allows the copyright owner to 
control mechanical reproduction of his work. It is in this 
area of copyright protection that MCPS operates, although its 
interest is confined to the music field. As MCPS ' Report and 
Accounts of 1982 says, its main activity is lithe collection 
and distribution of royalties and licence fees arising from 
mechan i ca 1 copyri ghts II • I t protects the i nteres ts of, and 
collects royalties for, lIits members whenever their works are 
recorded either in the UK or overseas"l. Its main objective 
is set down in the 5-year Corporate Plan under IIStatement of 
Purpose ll and is stated thus: IIMCPS exists to maximise the 
net income of all copyright owners by offering services which 
can be economically and corrunercially jUstifiedu2 • 
There are 4 main sources of income for MCPS - overseas 
societies collecting mechanical royalties on behalf of MCPS 
members whose \Jt'orks are recorded abroad; record compani es 
when MCPS members I works are recorded on di sc or tape for 
sale to the public; broadcasters when MCPS members' works 
are recorded for use in television and radio programmes; 
product ion compani es when MCPS members I works are recorded 
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for use in films of all types, videograms, slide/tape 
presentations, audio-visual productions and so forth3. 
MCPS seems to operate in a much more political environment 
than PRS and PPL (although the whole field of copyright is 
very pol i ti ca 1 in nature anyway) and its role is much more 
broad-based and industry-wide than the other two societies. 
The fact that it does not have a 100% mandate in collection 
and distribution in most of its operations (except for the 
broadcasting field) but is only an agent for its members 
makes the task that much more difficult and has important 
implications for its entire mode of operation, necessitating 
a conti nuous attempt to persuade members to increase thei r 
mandates to MCPS. Both PPL and PRS take an ass i gnment of 
ri ghts from members and so can sue in thei r own names as 
ri ghts owners. MCPS, however, is only an agent so that its 
scope for action is severely limited. Copyright owners 
retain ownership of their copyrights - they do not pass to 
MCPS. The consequence of all thi sis that the deci s ion 
making process is much more complex than it would be in a 
normal business organisation and it is difficult to take a 
purely economic decision political, artistic and 
expedient elements also have to enter the choice between 
alternative courses of action. This aspect of the situation 
is not just confined to MCPS, but is a common dimension in 
the whole copyright sphere, although MCPS does seem to have 
to balance more elements than average. This makes study of 
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the collecting societies somewhat difficult from an economic 
point of view - one cannot evaluate decisions and results 
just on economi c cri teri a, one must take an overall 
multi-faceted view. Of course, it could be argued that no 
decision, even in business, is ever totally economic and this 
may indeed be true, but the added dimensions in the copyright 
field are much more overt and form a higher proportion of the 
necessary input into the decision-making process. Like all 
the collecting societies, MCPS was set up to make control and 
enforcement of copyright more effective, to facilitate 
collection of royalties, and to give composers II cl ou t ll • 
History 
The Berne Convention, signed in 1886, did not protect 
copyright works against mechanical reproduction, for the 
simple reason that it was hardly known at the time - musical 
boxes and barbary organs were the only known forms and this 
industry was dominated by Switzerland4. Gradually, new forms 
of mechanical reproduction developed such as perforated rolls 
and the gramophone; composers and pub 1 i shers brought court 
actions to decide whether these infringed copyright, only to 
be told that this was not so and a large industry developed5. 
The 1908 Berlin revision of the Berne Convention introduced a 
provision giving the exclusive right of mechanical 
reproduction to authors and composers6. In 1909, in England a 
departmental Committee of the Board of Trade set about 
di scuss i ng how to amend copyri ght 1 aw to meet i nternati ona 1 
needs7. The 1911 Act introduced a compulsory licensing 
system for recording of musical works despite the 
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fact that the Committee recommended against thisB. MCPS has 
its origins at around this time with the formation of the 
Mechanical Copyright Licences Company Ltd (Mecolico) and the 
Copyri ght Protection Society Ltd in 1910 ) just before 
introduction of the 1911 Act9. In 1924, these two 
organisations merged to fom MCPS1O. Today11, MCPS is a 
non-profit making organisation (although this is not a 
statutory or contractual obligation, is not written into the 
Articles of Association, and is not required in the 
membership contract nor by the MPA. It is simply Board 
policy, which mayor may not change depending on 
circumstances, although it is not intended that it should 
change at the moment) but until fa i rly recently it was a 
privately-owned profit-making company until in 1977 it was 
taken over by the Mus i c Pub 1 i shers Associ ati on (MPA) , the 
trade association of the music publishers in the UK. MCPS is 
now a wholly owned subs i di ary of the MPA. Ori gi na lly, there 
were 8 rna in pub 1 i shers i nvo 1 ved in MCPS, whil e the MPA has 
a lways been associ a ted wi th MCPS. However, when MCPS was 
fi rs t formed, there was no-one to negot i ate 1 i cences except 
the MPA, a job which the MPA did not really want to have to 
do for various reasons. As a result, a series of informal 
commi ttees were set up, as the need arose, to negoti ate 
various rights and to discuss common issues of importance, 
often prompted by MCPS. One such commi ttee was the Ri ghts 
SUb-Committee. There was no formal structure, just ad hoc 
commi ttees. The pub 1 i shers woul d not allow composers seats 
on such committees. In August, 1954, the Mechanical Rights 
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Society (MRS) was formed after the Managing Director of MCPS 
suggested that it would be a good idea to bring together 
copyright owners to provide submissions on mechanical rights 
to the Committee investigating copyright law at the time. 
The Report of this Committee was the basis for the 1956 
Copyright Act. This new body was formed because it was felt 
that MCPS was not the proper vehicle for such submissions and 
a more representati ve industry body was requi red but wi th a 
formal structure. The MRS was set up as a company limited by 
guarantee, membership of which would be open to all 
publishers willing to guarantee that they would pay a sum of 
money should the company be Wound up. Composers could also 
join. In fact, it was open to any copyright owner. The 
company grew rapidly and now has 372 members, all publishers, 
although this has arisen by accident rather than design. 
Each company pays a subscription. Membership of the MPA was 
not and is not a pre-requisite of joining the MRS and MRS has 
developed as a separate organisation from the MPA. The MRS 
Council is elected by its members and includes non-MPA 
members. At present, there is a Council of 18 made up of 14 
publishers and 4 composers. The MRS negotiates on behalf of 
all copyright owners and MRS and MCPS have both developed 
down different roads, although there are sti 11 strong 1 inks 
between the two. The problem was always that the publishers 
di d not want a pri vate company (MCPS) deal i n9 wi th 
industry-wide rights, thinking it might adopt too narrow, too 
limited and individualistic a view of the sitation. 
Gradually, MCPS became more and more inefficient; there was 
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a 1 arge amount of unprocessed paperwork around, the 
management failed in its job and the situation just generally 
deteri ora ted. By 1977, the i ndivi dua 1 s runni ng MCPS as a 
pri vate company had deci ded to II cash ; nil the; r investments 
and the industry thought it would be better and more 
eff; ci ent to have such an organi sati on under the industry· s 
(and MPA·s) control. Interest was high in taking control of 
MCPS. The Performing Right Society (PRS) wanted to take 
over, for example. This would have been an interesting 
development because on the Continent it is very cOlmlon for 
one collecting society to control both 
performing/broadcasting and mechanical rights in musical 
works -but in the UK the move met wi th a great dea 1 of 
resistance and antagonism. The West German collecting 
society, GEMA, for example, controls both sets of rights and 
many argue that it is a much stronger, much more effecti ve 
and efficient organisation because of this, that having two 
societies involved is inefficient and makes it easier for 
users to playoff one society aga ins t the other and that a 
single organisation could eke out larger royalties and cut 
administration costs and would have more II cl out ll in promoting 
copyright owners· interests12 . Whatever the advantages of a 
single organisation, the MPA finally bought MCPS and there 
was an element in this of pre-emption of PRS. It would seem 
that publishers have an ambivalent attitude towards PRS being 
very happy with the large amounts of money they obtain from 
it, but also mistrusting it because it is a large 
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organisation and a monopoly. If MCPS had been owned by the 
MPA in the first place there would probably have been no need 
to set up MRS because the MPA would have controlled MCPS, 
which is what it wanted all along. Then,even if MRS had been 
set up, the MPA could have controlled it through MCPS. The 
history of MCPS seems to have been highly charged 
politically and the political nature of the situation remains 
even today. MRS nowadays is the negoti ati n9 arm of the 
industry dea 1 i ng wi th maj or i ndustri a 1 po 1 i ci es and 
agreements. However, the Managi n9 Di rector of MCPS is the 
general administrator of MRS and it is virtually impossible 
to see the join between MRS and MCPS because a 11 MRS 
administration is carried out by MCPS. MCPS, though, regards 
itself as working for the industry as well as for individual 
copyright owners. The MRS - general industry view/MCPS 
individual copyright owner distinction does not really exist. 
There is some overlap of power between MRS and MCPS and there 
is talk of amalgamating them, but there is only partial 
overlap at Board level. The opposite view of splitting them 
has also been put. The industry, though, does not generally 
understand the di fference between the two. But there are 
differences and the limited overlap between the MPA Council, 
and ~ 1 R S S Counci 1 and the MCPS Board means that no body can 
control the others. The main difference between MCPS and MRS 
lies at MCPS Board and MRS Council level since there are 
different people in each of these with different objectives 
who would like to lead the organisations in different 
directions, which sometimes causes conflict between the two. 
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MRS may thus cause MCPS to carry out a function or act in a 
way which the MCPS Board did not intend. 
Functions 
MCPS performs a number of servi ces and functi ons for its 
members13 : 
1. Collecting and distributing royalties. 
2. Negotiating rates of royalties for different kinds of 
use of copyright. 
3. Controlling audits of major copyright users in the 
record industry. 
4. Policing and monitoring the activities of copyright 
users. 
5. Royalty accounting for copyright users. 
6. Provision of information on ownership of copyright. 
7. Activities in new markets. 
8. Promoting copyright owners' interests nationally and 
internationally and liaising with and lobbying 
governments. 
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MCPS' functions and ability to act are restricted by the fact 
that it is only an agent for its members and can only do what 
its members allow it to do through their limited mandates to 
it. Since MCPS ;s involved in a specialised type of business 
- the music industry - it cannot really go outside it, it 
cannot really diversify, so it has to attempt to make a niche 
for itself as best it can in this limited (though broad) 
area. It is involved in the business of COPYRIGHT CONTROL 
and the collection and distribution of royalties relating to 
the mechani ca 1 ri ght - it does not deal wi th grand ri ghts 
(stage and dramatic performing rights as Whale14 calls them), 
for example. In interview, it was admitted that MCPS has not 
yet worked out exactly how to achieve its stated objectives, 
that it was still in something of a state of flux, in a 
learning phase,about how to reach them. The reason for this 
is that its destiny is very much in the hands of the major 
publishers (who control MCPS and represent its most potent 
members) who have not yet reached a consensus amongst 
themselves. Meanwhile, MCPS is trying its best to work 
towards thi s consensus, to persuade the major pub 1 i shers to 
reach agreement amongst themselves and sort out their 
disagreements and conflicts of interest. Copyright control 
is control of the various revenue sources for copyright. 
It is necessary to regulate the way the industry works too. 
Thus MCPS also generally, rather than specifically, looks 
after mechanical rights since it does a lot of work which 
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benefits the industry as a whole rather than individual 
copyri ght owners. Even though the work benefi ts the who 1 e 
industry, the industry does not di rectly pay for it - the 
money has to come from revenue MCPS earns from other sources, 
so that MCPS and individual copyright owners are subsidising 
the expenditure for the industry. During discussions at 
MCPS, the thought was expressed that it would be interesting 
to see who picked up the tab if MCPS ever failed, who paid 
for these general industry servi ces then and even if they 
continued. Part of this general involvement also covers an 
information collection and dissemination function - MCPS has 
to try to ensure that situations are fully comprehended by 
the parties concerned and that they are fully informed. It is 
in this area of general rather than specific involvement that 
grey areas appear and MCPS experiences the most problems. It 
is not clear how far along the road of general functions MCPS 
should go rather than concentrating on its specific 
collection/distribution functions and the situation is rather 
blurred. 
Collection and distribution of royalties is the main function 
of MCPS and provides the greatest amount of income. Members 
can, however, limit who MCPS collects from, which territories 
it collects in and generally give a limited mandate. Another 
aspect of copyri ght control is the carryi ng out of industry 
negotiations on rights and various aspects of rights through 
MRS with various user groups. This is, in fact, related to 
the collection/distribution function since MCPS can improve 
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this function in its negotiations with users through MRS. If 
the rights agreements are negotiated well in the first place, 
it makes collecting and distributing income derived from 
those rights much easier. This is actually the case for a 
number of MCPS 1 functions - there is quite a lot of 
interaction and interrelationship between them so that they 
can each be used to imnprove each other. The pol i ci ng and 
moni tori ng functi 0(\ of copyri ght users performed. by MCPS is 
a 1 so very important, especi ally at the bottom end of the 
market (the more fly-by-night and very small operators) 
because if the rot sets in at the bottom, it will soon work 
its way up. The royalty accounting function for copyright 
users is important so that everyone knows who owes whom what, 
a function which is more efficiently performed by one 
organisation than several. The information service provided 
by MCPS is equally valuable and in many cases MCPS can act as 
the record companies l copyright department by clearing 
copyrights and providing information on ownership. Or, a 
person may get in touch because he wants to make a record but 
is unsure of the copyright position. However, MCPS will not 
provide information if it thinks the information is 
potentially damaging to another member. The carrying out of 
market surveys and ana lyses and the work it carri es out in 
new markets is a relatively new function for MCPS, which is 
becoming more and more important with the development of new 
forms of technology which affect the music industry. 
Initially, educating users on the copyright position is a 
major problem when it comes to new technologies. When video 
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was first becoming established, for example, a number of 
companies were guilty of neglecting copyright aspects as 
regards the music on the video and looking on the new medium 
as just a new form of marketing. MCPS had to set the record 
straight. 
Most of MCPS' functions relate to collection and distribution 
of royal ti es for its members and most of its revenue comes 
from this source, although the accounting function brings in 
an extra £10,000 or so a year. CommisSion on collection and 
di stri buti on servi ces, interest on money co 11 ected but not 
distributed and various other fees for services provided (the 
latter bringing in about £20,000 a year) are used to cover 
costs. However, MCPS· industry - type services, which no-one 
else could provide have to be paid for out of 
collection/distribution revenue. MCPS recognises that this 
is far from an ideal situation but the complex nature of the 
environment in which it operates, the politics inherent in 
the situation and the history of the organisation means that 
it is very difficult to reach a consensus of opinion as to 
direction and scope of activities, although MCPS is trying as 
best it can to develop a consensus and the whole situation is 
presently under revi ew and is the subject of thoroughgoi ng 
analysis. The scene is further complicated by the fact that 
the pub 1 i shers themselves fi nd it di ffi cul t to reach 
agreement on a consensus because they each run very different 
businesses. As it was explained to me by MCPS, there are 
three main types of music publisher - the serious music 
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publisher, the popular music ("pop") publisher and the 
library music publisher. The other side to the industry is 
represented by the composer, who often comp 1 a ins about bad 
deals from publishers and being IIripped offll by them, 
although publishers offer a very valuable promotional 
function to composers as well as taking the risk. The new 
composer usually needs the publ isher to show him how to 
exploit his work to the greatest advantage. MCPS represents 
one place where both sides come together and to the extent 
that publishers and composers want to increase use of their 
works to maximise revenue from the copyright, both sides 
benefit and they can be said to share at least some 
interests. However, MCPS does not actively seek to "sign up" 
composers and has to be careful in doing so because then it 
would to an extent be taking custom away from the publishers 
- and remember that MCPS is owned by the MPA. The publishers 
do not really want MCPS to interfere with their relationship 
with the composers but would prefer the present system to be 
enhanced, preferring to bring the creator to the user through 
the pub 1 i sher. MCPS noted that one must consider whether 
there could be a satisfactory user-creator relationship, 
whether new talent could find markets and whether the 
composer1s earning potential would be reduced if there were 
no pub 1 ish i ng. MCPS does, however, dup 1 i ca te much of the 
administrative work of the publisher and can do it much 
better and more efficiently than most because of a higher 
volume of work a 11 owing it to benefit from economies of 
scale, for example. MCPS is largely dominated by pub 1 i shers 
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and we have the novel situation that the shareholders of MCPS 
are also its major customers, yet MCPS is also in competition 
with the shareholders for the available business. MCPS has a 
very delicate balancing act to perform. The differences 
between the va ri ous types of pub 1 i sher represented by MCPS 
further complicates the situation. For the serious music 
publisher, mechanical royalties are not the main source of 
income. They are more long-term in their thinking - hiring 
out orchestral parts and publishing music books being some of 
their functions. Such publishers tend to look to grand 
rights, public performances and hire fees for their main 
source of income. Sheet music publishing and piano and vocal 
scores are very important to them. The situation in the 
IIpOpli music publishing market is almost the complete opposite 
- their thinking is more short-term and they are more 
interested ina rapi d short term turnover of arti sts and 
repertoires, paying advances and signing up artists quickly. 
A lot of thei r income comes from mechani ca 1 royal ti es and 
they are in the entertainment industry rather than the music 
industry. The exception to this more short-term approach is 
those publishers who deal with 'standards', old favourites, 
which represent long-term bank deposits. Serious publishers 
would seem to have little in common with the pop music 
pub 1 i shers - they go about thei r bus i ness di fferently and 
they look at their business differently. The library 
publ ishers produce music ("Library Music", "Mood Music" or 
"Production Music") specifically to be used in audio and 
audio-visual productions which is already recorded IIfor 
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convenient synchronisation and/or dubbing into these 
productions .. 15 • It does not cost much and is a IIreadily 
available source of recorded music" which can be used by 
anyone who wants to use it such as broadcasting and video 
companies, for example, as background music, generally to 
visual material. The library publishers have a sub-committee 
which works with MCPS and MCPS does all the auditing for the 
1 i brary pub 1 i shers. This particular aspect of music 
publishing is a similar operation to any industrial business 
in the UK - it is just like selling anything with similar 
methods bei ng requi red and used - whereas the other forms of 
publishing are somewhat more complicated and have their own 
peculiarities and difficulties. This is thus a further 
aspect to the political problem confronting MCPS - how do you 
develop a consensus as to what direction an organisation is 
to take and what activities it is going to pursue when you 
have three different types of publishers running three quite 
different types of marketing operation? The co-operation MCPS 
gets in developing a consensus and in achieving its 
objectives varies according to the type of publisher - the 
"pop" music publishers, for example, apparently tend to guard 
aga ins t MCPS getting too i nvo 1 ved at the top end of the 
market because it is very lucrative and there is a lot of 
money at stake. They do not want to have to pay MCPS its 
commission for collection and distribution of such large sums 
of money since it win obviously amount to a lot and they 
want to be able to hang onto as much of this as possible. 
However, as long as MCPS is i nvo 1 ved J they do not mi nd ; t 
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dea 1 i ng wi th the lower end of the market whi ch is the most 
bothersome and difficult sector from which to collect. Thus, 
on the record side, the 1 a rge pub 1 i shers tend to co 11 ect 
royalties from the large record companies themselves while 
leaving MCPS to collect from the small companies, the medium 
sized compani es and the sma ll-change merchants. Thi s 
obvi ous ly represents a great 1 imi tati on on the revenue MCPS 
can collect. MCPS is constantly trying to get its mandate 
increased from its members - for example, when a new 
membership agreement came into effect in 1978 it allowed MCPS 
to collect from hi gher revenue beari ng record compani es in 
return for a lower commission rate for publisher members. 
Revenue 
Revenue can be defined either as total royalties and fees 
collected in the year or total royalties and fees distributed 
in the year (defined by MCPS as TURNOVER) or as comnission 
plus interest plus mi nor sums and other income. Since the 
latter is used to cover costs (a situation somewhat different 
from the other two societies which just take costs out of 
revenue co 11 ected in the year and do not charge a 
commission), I will discuss performance in that field later. 
Performance in terms of royal ties and fees co 11 ected and 
turnover both in money terms and real terms is given in the 
table and graph below for the period 1978-1983. 
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YEAR 
Turnover 
(Money 
Terms) 
Turnover 
{Real 
Tenns)b 
YEAR 
Roya 1 ties 
collected 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
a a a 7,610,055a 5,138,547 7,132,455 7,542,176 8,011,163a 10,046,305a 
, 
2,607,076 3,191,255 2,860,135 2,579,680 2,500,363 2,997,108 
TABLE 5.1 MCPS TURNOVER 1978-1983 Money and Real Terms 
Source: a - MCPS Reports and Accounts 1978-1983 
b - calculated as in Chapter 4 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
6,756,335 a 7,989,950 a 7,780,176 a 7,707,250 a 9,.200 ,000 a 
(approx) 
(Money Terms) 
Royalties 3,427,872 3,574,922 2,950,389 2,612,627 2,871,411 
co 11 ected 
(Real Terms)b 
i 
(approx) 
16 TABLE 5:2 MCPS COLLECTIONS 1978-1982 Money and Real Terms 
Source: a - MCPS Reports & Accounts 1979-1983 
b - calculated as in Chapter 4 
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FIGURE 5:2. MCPS Collections 
Money & Real Terms 
Source: Table 5:2 
Collects = Collections 
Until 1982, MCPS' performance in terms of royalties collected 
and royalties distributed was hardly inspiring. 1982, 
however, seems to have represented somethi n9 of a turn; n9 
point, the year in which MCPS finally saw the benefit of its 
reorganisation and many changes. Obviously, only time 
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will tell but the signs are encouraging. Before 1982, 
figures for collections were frankly not very good, since 
they fell even in money terms every year after 1979. 1982 
saw a rise in collections in real terms of about 10% but for 
1983 figures for collections are not available - there are 
only figures for royalties invoiced. In 1982, however, the 
figure for collections in real terms was still lower than the 
real term figure for 1978. As to turnover, performance was 
broadly similar to that for collections, with the figure 
falling in real terms in 1980-82. This corresponds with the 
peri od of re-organi sati on for MCPS. 1983, though, was an 
exceptional year with turnover rising by over £2 million and 
25% in money terms and 20% in real terms. 1978-9, too, was a 
particularly good period, especially for distributions, which 
increased by 38.8% in money terms and 22.4% in real terms. 
Collections rose 18.3% in money terms and 4.3% in real terms. 
The 1979/80 figures suffered somewhat because of the 
introduction of the new membership agreement which caused 
members to review their mandates and some to leave and 
because MCPS was concentrating on developing a new in-house 
computer distribution system, with collection of royalties 
apparently not being the problem. Distribution, though, was 
very difficult. 
In comparing years in real terms, we must make certain 
allowances. For example, as regards turnover a large part of 
MCPS I ,revenue comes from commerc i a 1 records and for 
recordings of musical works after the first one, the royalty 
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is set by statute at 6.1/4% of the normal retail selling 
pri ce. The pri ce of records rose by 95.2% between 1974 and 
1981 while the RPI rose over 190%. Recalculating the figures 
using a retail price index for LPs, applied to 40% of the 
revenue fi gure, (s i nce 40% of MCPS income is from records) 
and then adding back 60% of the RPI adjusted revenue figures, 
however, shows the same downward trend from 1979 onwards as 
Table 5:1, although the fall is not quite as large. Carrying 
out the same operation for MCPS collections, we get the same 
picture. This is hardly surprising when one considers that 
co 11 ecti ons fe 11 even in money terms in 1980 and 1981 and 
distributions rose only by small amounts between 1979-8l. 
In addition to the need to take account of changes in retail 
prices of LPs, one further allowance which one must make is 
for the time lag between collection and distribution and for 
the backlog of royalties collected but not distributed 
between 1978 and 1982. In any case, over the period 1978-82, 
the RPI rose 62.6% while turnover rose only 55.9% and 
collections 36.2%. 1983, however, saw a dramatic improvement 
in tu rnover, so that over the peri od 1979-83, the RP I rose 
70.1% while turnover rose 95.5%. One cannot really compare 
collections after 1982 because MCPS has changed its 
accounti ng pol icy to take account of the 1981 Compani es Act 
so that there is no longer a figure for co llecti ons but 
rather for royalties invoiced. There are signs from the 
1983 figures that MCPS has turned the corner. 
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In 1976, the computer Dureau MCPS then used 1 eft and the 
organisation itself decided to computerise and develop its 
own internal distribution and royalty accounting system. For 
12-18 months, no rOyalties were distributed. This followed 
the taki n9 over of MCPS by the MPA in 1977 when a new 
managing director and senior management was appointed, which 
decided to computerise as a priority. The previous 
management had left a terrible mess and the new team had to 
make a number of difficult, expedient management decisions 
for which MCPS is still paying somewhat, although the price 
is falling as time goes on. 
At the time of the takeover, MCPS was in rather a sorry state 
and the accounting systems then in use made control of 
operations very difficult indeed. The 1979 Report and 
Accounts notes that the IIroyalties payable accounts had not 
been fully balanced for many years pri or to the takeover of 
the company". There was a vast amount of unprocessed 
paperwork and royalties. Control was not established until 
1981. Some idea of the problems MCPS had is provided by the 
fact that in the 1980 accounts the royalty liability at 30th 
June, deri ved by addi ng total co llecti ons and taki ng away 
total distributions, was calculated as £7.5 million but 
investigation of supporting documentation and computer 
analysis revealed only £1.6 million. MCPS has now 
computeri sed and is deve 1 opi ng a database apace. The new 
computer di s tri but; on system started in October 1978 and 
II s ignificant distribution" using it began in December. 
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Distributions are once a month, much quicker than the other 
two societies which distribute quarterly. The yearly figure 
for 1978-79 of £7,132,455 was actually distributed in the 
seven months December 1978 to June 1979 and between July and 
October 1979 the Report and Accounts notes that about £2.5 
mill i on was d i stri buted, so the actual yearly fi gure was 
probably over £10 million. Over the period, overseas 
royalties represented a particular problem since there were a 
large number of them unprocessed and undistributed. 
The future is beginning to look much better for MCPS, 
however. Targets are set for distributions for the year - in 
1982 the target was set at £8 mi 11 i on and in 1983 at £10 
million - both were reached. For 1984, the target is 
£10,955,000. This is likely to be exceeded by a long way. 
For the first 8 months of the 1983-4 financial year, up to 
the end of February 1984, turnover reached £8,147,000 and the 
forecast was £12,000,000 by the end of the financial year. 
Collections and distributions were expected to rise by about 
20%. Factors affecting the amount MCPS collects are complex 
and numerous and it was suggested that they include 
inflation, cost control effectiveness, copyright control 
activities, changes in members' mandates, the volume of 
activity of recorded music, interest rates and investment in 
new sys terns and methods. The way in wh i ch MCPS co 11 ects 
record company royal ties also affects the amount MCPS can 
collect. This will be explained later. Record company 
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royalties represent a large part of MCPS royalties, so 
anything which causes the record companies to suffer will 
also affect MCPS. In 1981, these royalties fell by £1 
million. The small/medium sized companies suffer more than 
the large companies in a recession because the latter have 
more resources to weather the storm. These small/medium 
companies represent MCPS· market in the record field. There 
are large fluctuations between the months as regards MCPS 
income. 
Administration Expenses 
Large increases in costs over the years is a problem all the 
collecting societies have had to face and one to which all 
are very sensitive. Attempts to keep costs down have met 
with varying degrees of success amongst the three societies 
and it is one area in which it would be quite easy to attack 
them. But they all seem alive to the problem and at least 
are trying to do something about it. In fact, the way MCPS 
operates would seem to make it much better able to control 
costs than the other two societies - MCPS collects a 
cOllUTlission while the other two just take costs out of the 
revenue they collect. The latter method would seem to leave 
a lot of room for i ndi sci p 1 i ne over costs whil e wi th MCPS· 
method it at least has some idea of the cost of each 
transacti on and can pi n down unexpectedly hi gh cost 
increases. It woul d also seem to make it eas i er to ana lyse 
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each market sector in terms of cost-revenue relationships and 
in fact MCPS has carried out such an analysis and identified 
suspect areas and sectors whi ch cou 1 d be improved. It has 
introduced a cost-control system, which is a welcome sign. 
To use an economic term, MCPS would seem to have more idea of 
what is its marginal cost of transactions. The difficulty 
with the other system, used by PRS and PPL, would seem to be 
that it is easy to lose speci fi c areas and transacti ons in 
the general haze of figures making it more difficult to 
identify problem areas and cost-saving opportunities 
especially since in PRS· case allocation of costs between 
sectors is judgmental and can vary over the years. It ; s 
interesting to note that in interviews with PRS it was 
mentioned that cost control was about to be upgraded. 
Obviously, again, politics playa part in the level of costs 
in these organisations. For now, I will concentrate on 
general trends in administrative costs and leave discussion 
of cost-revenue relationships and cost control to later. 
Tab 1 e 5: 3 shows how costs have increased both in money and 
real terms over the period 1978-83. To calculate the real 
va 1 ue of costs I have used the RPI rather than any other 
measure of cost inflation. One could argue that the RPI is 
not the best measure to use, but it simplifies the analysis 
and at least gives an idea of the general trends which is all 
I want to do. Besides which, it is difficult to know which 
other measure to use. 
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1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
992,966a a 1,294,972a 1,770,10Sa 2,069,040a 2,163,83517 Adm; ni strati on 1,157,867 
Costs (tJloney 
Terms) 
-- -
Admi ni strati on ' 503,788 518,061 491,078 600,036 645,768 645.535 
Costs (Real 
Tenns) b 
, 
TABLE 5.3 MCPS ADMINISTRATION COSTS 1978-83 MONEY & REAL TERMS 
Source: a - MCPS Reports & Accounts 
b - calculated as in Chapter 4 
2.f. Figure 5.3 depicts the same infonnation graphically 
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As we can see, in money terms MCPS costs were rising steeply 
unt i 1 1983, but in rea 1 terms costs have been kept dO\'Jn 
remarkably well and they are not that much higher now than in 
1978 and they fell in 1983. The position would have been 
even better but for the sharp rise in 1980-81 of 3 6 . 7 ~ ~ in 
money terms (22.2% in real terms), although there were 
reasons for this. Up until then the picture was very 
encouraging with costs even falling in real terms in 1979-80 
by over 5% and the rise in 1978-79 being less than 3% in real 
terms. The rise in 1983 was only 4.6% in money terms. There 
are two main reasons for the large increase in costs in 
1980-81. At that time, it seems, MCPS embarked on a general 
overhaul of its business. Staff costs, which until 1980 were 
round about 58-60% of total costs, suddenly shot up to 64.5% 
of total costs. This was accounted for by the fact that MCPS 
believed it was paying its staff at a "ridiculously low 
level" 18 before that period. Those at the lower end of the 
scale in particular were earning very low wages, little more 
than pi n money ; n some cases. It was agreed by the Board 
that salaries would have to be raised if the quality of 
personnel was to improve. As a result, the salary scale was 
changed and grading systems and comparisons with local 
industry and the music industry introduced. Previous to this, 
there were many anomalies in the salary scale between 
different people doing the same job. Now, generally, people 
are paid similar salaries for doing similar jobs. At the 
same time, a number of members of staff were replaced but 
this only partly funded the new system. Having fallen from 
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an average of 154 in 1978 to 144 in 1980, the number of 
employees had risen again to 169 in 1981. This was cut to an 
average of 162 in 1982, and 160 in 1983. The proportion of 
total costs accounted for by staff costs fell to its lowest 
level in 1982, at 56.1% but rose to 58.5% in 1983. The other 
main move in the general overhaul which pushed up costs was 
the move from old to new accommodation. Before June 1981 MCPS 
occupied 4 different buildings and was paying low rent on 
properties which were near the end of their long lease. This 
rather unsatisfactory situation led to MCPS acquiring the 
nickname "The Housewives of Streatham". (MCPS is located in 
Streatham, South West London). MCPS was faced with an 
increased rent demand to renew the lease. In 1982, MCPS 
moved to a single location and started paying a rent, fixed 
for the next 15 years at lIa current market level li • The 
costs of moving were large and the new building was 
completely refurbished, while many of the benefits were 
intangible - before, there was a rather grubby, bad civil 
service atmosphere, it was suggested, but the single location 
has made the atmosphere more businesslike, professional and 
workmanlike. Communications and morale have improved 
considerably. Other factors affecting costs were the backlog 
of undistributed royalties from previous years which were not 
distributed on time and heavy investment in computerisation 
and the development of a database. In the circumstances, the 
1983 cost figure represents a very good performance. 
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Markets 
1 sha 11 now dea 1 wi th the compos it i on of the royal ties I-iCPS 
collects. MCPS has five main markets - Corrrnercial Sound 
Recordings, which may be sub-divided into black discs, 
compact discs and audio t a p e s ~ ~ Broadcasting made up of 
independent te 1 ev is ion, BBC tel evi sian and rad i 0, Channe 1 4 
independent local radio and Radio Teleafis Eireann. Audio-
Visual comprising TV corrunercials, slide tape _presentations 
and video; International comprising royalties received from 
overseas mechanical societies for recording of MCPS members' 
works abroad; and Other such as cable television, background 
music-and dial-a-disc. 1 shall deal with each of these in 
turn. 
FIGURE 5.4 - MCPS BUSINESS: BREAKDOWN BY SECTOR 
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Figure 5.4 gives a general breakdown of MCPS' business by 
sector with approximate figures supplied by MCPS, while 
Figure 5.5 shows the percentage of business in each sector 
held by MCPS. This shows clearly that MCPS is not a 
monopoly. In only one sector - broadcasting - does MCPS 
control 100% of the market. In all the others, it only 
controls part of the market. This is one big difference 
between MCPS and the other two soc; eti es, whi ch both have 
virtual monopolies in the fields in which they operate. 
Thus, for example, MCPS only has about 20% by value of the 
commercial sound recording market - MCPS mainly collects from 
the small and medium sized record companies. The other 80% 
of money received in royalties for recording musical works in 
the UK is collected by members themselves. One word of 
caution about the two figures - they are not strictly 
comparable. Figure 5.4 is based on information supplied in 
interview, while Figure 5.5 is derived from an MCPS internal 
document on MCPS market size in 1982. Obviously, too, the 
fi gures are subject to change over the years. Fi gu re 5.5 
percentages would produce market shares for Figure 5.4 of 
38.6% for Commercial Sound Recordings, 26.3% for 
broadcasting; 13.2% for overseas; 17.5% for audio-visual 
and 4.4% for miscellaneous. Both figures, however, give a 
general picture. 
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FIGURE 5.5. - MCPS shares of the Market 
RECS = Commerci a 1 Sound Recordi ngs (MCPS share 21% = £4.4 
million); BC = Broadcasting (MCPS share 100% = £3 million); 
AV = Audio-Visual (MCPS share 50% = £2 million); INT = 
International (MCPS share 15% = £1.5 million); OTH = Other 
(MCPS share 50% = £500,000). 
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Commercial Sound Recordings 
Collections from record companies represent the largest part 
of total MCPS royalties collections. However, at the bottom 
end of the market MCPS is carryi ng out a II tota lly cost 
ineffective exercise ll19 • The problem with the previous 
administration in this field was that MCPS was only 
collecting from the smallish record companies. Members were 
allowed to collect royalties directly from the record 
companies rather than going through MCPS (and paying a 
commission), if they wanted. This meant that the residue of 
royalties left for MCPS to collect was small and in rather 
obscure areas. Obviously, it was less than cost effective. 
In 1978 t therefore. MCPS deci ded that it had to have a 
greater share of the market. Because of recent 
computerisation, MCPS decided that it could just as easily 
pi ck up £2 mill i on or £ 12 mi 11 ion - it wou 1 d not ra i se any 
s i gni fi cant new problems or cost much m ~ r e e to handl e the 
higher figure. Naturally, MCPS wanted to grow bigger since 
the larger collecting societies are the more clout they 
generally have and the more royalties MCPS collects and 
distributes, the greater the total amount of corrunission it 
gets. Ita 1 so wanted to increase its share of the market 
which would make its operations more cost effective. As a 
result, MCPS introduced a new membership agreement telling 
its members that they could continue collecting individually 
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from the 1 arge royalty areas, from the 1 arge record 
companies, but it wanted to increase its participation in the 
market to the medium revenue areas in adGition to the areas 
in whi ch ita 1 ready operated (the sma 11 record compani es). 
In return for this increased participation, it would give 
members lower tariffs. 
For the whole of MCPS· operations, not just the commercial 
record sector, there are now just two main tariffs - A and B 
with a residual C tariff covering non-members. In the record 
sector a publisher member may collect royalties himself from 
the largest eight record companies and their subsidiaries 
(without going through MCPS) - from CBS Records Ltd, EMI 
Records Ltd, Pickwick International (G.B) Ltd, Polygram 
Record Operations Ltd, P.R.T. Ltd, R.C.A. Records Ltd, 
Readers Digest Association Ltd, W.E.A. Records Ltd and any 
other record company wi th in the same corporate ownersh i p as 
the member. He may also exclude royalties paid on behalf of 
labels within pressing and distribution and/or licensing 
agreements. These record compani es control about 180 other 
1 abe 1 s whi ch may be excl uded. MCPS wi 11 then coll ect from 
all other record companies and sources. If the member agrees 
to this, he will be on tariff A. In tariff A, commissions 
vary according to who the royalties are collected from. 
Thus, if MCPS collects royalties from the specified 
television merchandising and promotional record companies -
K-Tel International (UK) Ltd, Ronco Teleproducts (UK) Ltd, 
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Ellem Publications Ltd (Arcade label) and Warwick Records 
(label only) - the commission is only 5%, while for royalties 
collected from other UK and Eire commercial record companies, 
the commission is 8%. If, however, a member wishes to 
collect from the largest eight record companies (plus their 
subsidiaries) and another company(ies), say K-Tel or Virgin, 
then he is placed on tariff B which lays down a commission of 
15% on all collections. If a member wishes to collect from 
outside the IIbig 8u he is put on tariff B. Most members are 
on tariff A. The new membership agreement was a major step 
towards effective operation for MCPS since it did not want to 
deal with just the troublesome, obscure, low-total 
collections and it wanted to increase its market share. Nor 
was its introduction trouble-free - the members kicked up a 
tremendous fuss at first, but eventually accepted it. The 
new agreement enables MCPS to exert more influence and 
control over those from whom it collects and over its 
members. A record company is perhaps more likely to take 
note of a body like MCPS which has a bit of muscle than of an 
individual or single publ ishing company. Moreover, MCPS is 
more likely to hear of obscure, small companies and places 
where recording takes place than individual members and can 
devote more resources to fi ndi ng out more i nformati on and 
taking action than an individual member would be willing or 
able to do. If MCPS did not exercise control over the lower 
and smaller end of the market, the number of copyright 
infringements would grow greatly and gradually spread 
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upwards. A strengthening of MCPS· position resulted from the 
move. In fact, most publishers do collect directly from the 
bi 9 ei ght record compani es because they do not mi nd setti ng 
up Copyright and Royalties Departments. Even the small 
publishers do the same, in fact. MCPS does collect from 
the 1 arge record compani es in some cases, however, because 
composers cannot e 1 imi nate them from thei r mandate and MCPS 
also collects from them for foreign societies. In fact, most 
of MCPS· collections in the commercial record sector are from 
1 arge record compani es and thi s produces over £2 mi 11 i on a 
year even though it collects only 20% of total major record 
company royalties. The television merchandisers such as 
K-Tel and Ronco are the main companies from which MCPS 
collects and it also does the royalties accounting for them 
(and many other record companies) for which the companies pay 
MCPS. This provides an additional form of control for MCPS 
over the record companies. In all, MCPS holds files on about 
4,000 record companies. Obviously, these companies vary 
greatly ; n size, some of them be; ng no more than one man, or 
one work operations. The 5% commission charged for 
collecting royalties from the television promotional record 
companies is very low. Although the figures are not strictly 
comparable, PRS, for example, deducts from the royalties it 
co 11 ects over the year a sum to cover its admi ni strati ve 
costs and this usually amounts to 14-15% of total royalties 
collected in the year and this figure is generally rising 
each year. At MCPS, the average tariff is about 12%. MCPS 
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can charge low tariffs because corrunission is only used to 
cover part of cost, II i nterest" supp lyi ng most of the res t. 
MCPS also does a lot of work for the record companies in the 
form of clearing music and recordings. 
A great limitation on MCPS· actions in the field of 
commercial recordings is the statutory royalty of 6.1/4% 
under Section 8 of the 1956 Act. This means that MCP5 is 
compelled to charge 6.1/4% of the normal retail selling price 
of the record provided the musical work has previously been 
recorded - there can be no vari ati on on thi s (there are 
problems in determining the normal retail price of a record. 
however) • Thi sis in compari son wi th the s i tuati on on the 
Continent where the royalty is set by negotiation between the 
respect i ve parties under the genera 1 agreement between the 
IFPI representing the record industry and BIEM representing 
t h ~ ~ copyright owners. So, for 1000 copies of a record 
retailing at £5, the total royalty payable would be 6.1/4% x 
£5 x 1000 = £312.50 (assuming the £5 is net of VAT). One then 
has to fi nd a per track royalty. So, 31. 25 pence (6.1/4 x 
£5) is divided by two, representing the two sides of a 
record, producing 15.625 pence per side. Then, suppose side 
1 has four tracks and side 2 six tracks, this gives a per 
track royalty of 3.9 pence for side 1 and 2.6 pence for side 
2. The per track royalty may be required if a separate 
accounti ng is needed for all or a number of tracks - for 
example. if it is a compilation album, different publishers 
may be involved and royalties will have to be paid to each 
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according to the number of tracks they have on the album. 
Generally, the record department at MCPS is divided into two 
parts - large record companies and small record companies and 
the agreements MCPS has with each are rather different. The 
large record companies account to MCPS on record sales every 
quarter, whilst the small record companies are invoiced on 
pressings. One might say that this is somewhat unfair on the 
small companies, however, since they have to find a fairly 
large amount of money before they can sell the records 
whereas the large companies do not (although it is possible 
to claim back royalties on records not sold in certain 
circumstances - but it is a bit late then). The basis of the 
difference seems, however, to be that of· competence and 
trustworthi ness. Any company can joi n the record industry 
with no particular financial backing or commercial competence 
or experi ence and use copyri ght rnusi ca 1 works for record; ng 
provided it follows the set procedures and without much 
control over how it does this. The large long establ ished 
cornpani es are well respected and the agreements they have 
made with copyright holders give them certain commercial 
advantages. "There is no reason why a srnall record company 
cannot have the sarne advantages as a large record company 
provided it can show that it is adequately financially 
backed, appropriately managed with competent staff and 
dernonstrate that it understands its business .. 20 . In fact, 
many small cornpanies do operate Sales Agreements with MCPS. 
These agreements .. confer greater respons i bil i ty on the record 
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company an are not Just to the advantage of the record 
companies since they give copyright holders various rights to 
investigate record companies' businesses. The Application to 
operate a Sales Agreement with MCPS attempts to ascertain the 
nature and financial position of the company. So, typical 
questions asked are whether royalties liabilities have 
previously been settled promptly, the type of organisation, 
and questions to ascertain the company's ability to meet 
royalty liabilities (interest is payable on late royalties 
liabilities) - such as the number of releases envisaged, 
exports, whether a catalogue is printed and infonnation on 
costs, revenue and profits 22. An invoice is issued for the 
small companies based on their pressings whereas the large 
companies self-account. The record department will receive a 
pressing notice concerning orders a pressing plant has 
recei ved. There may be an i nfri ngement of copyri ght if a 
copyright stamp (representing a royalty) is not bought and 
fixed to every record which contains copyright material 
before it is put on retail sale to the public, a stamp which 
is provided by the copyright owner or his agent on payment of 
the royalty and which shows how much has been paid. One must 
also remember that a person can equally be liable for 
authorising an infringement as for infringement itself (and 
this applies to all MCPS' markets, not just commercial 
records) • However, ~ 1 C P S S has an arrangement wi th the press i ng 
plants whereby it will not sue them for authorising an 
i nfri ngement as long as they inform MCPS of what they are 
preSSing and what pressing orders they have received23 . The 
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procedure for comp lyi n9 wi th Sect; on 8 of the 1956 Act is 
laid down under Regulations from the Board of Trade but these 
are varied in practice. For example, records do not usually 
have to have stamps on them but record companies enter into 
"facsimile agreements with MCPS, of which there are three _ 
the MRS Agreement for large established companies, the MCPS 
I B I Agreement for medi urn sized compani es and the MCPS I C I 
Agreement for new and small companies24 . Not all companies 
or people who record mus i c have agreements wi th MCPS, of 
course, and MCPS provides stamps for these, of which hundreds 
of thousands are issued a year mainly for "special one-off 
recordi ngs by schools, church choi rs, 1 oca 1 bands II and the 
like and for some specialist companies which produce their 
own records 25. The Agreements replace the sticking of 
stamps to records with the inclusion of the MCPS facsimile on 
the record or tape 1 abe 1 s and payment before release wi th 
periodical royalty payments26 • Exports are dealt with under 
the MCPS 'B' and MRS agreements but not automatically under 
the 'C' agreement while the latter agreement lays down 
payment of royalties on pressings and the former provides for 
concessions for payment of royalties on sales27 . The 
agreements also allow MCPS to control distribution of masters 
and uses of works in whi ch Members own the copyri ght more 
closely by means of undertakings in the agreements and 
include provision for MCPS to audit record companies' books 
and stock records which represents "additional assistance in 
maintaining clear and correct files" for .the record 
companies28 • The MCPS Audit Service will also suggest new 
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and improved systems such as for computeri sati on29 • MCPS 
also provides record companies with information on copyright 
status such as who is collecting the royalties (MCPS or the 
individual) and who owns the copyright in the music. In 
fact, it is manufacture of records whi ch is restri cted by 
law, not the sale, so one might argue that the large-medium 
sized companies should pay at manufacture, although one must 
remember that such companies have made arrangements with 
copyri ght holders to pay on sales wi th commerci a 1 benefi ts 
for both sides. 
The record company will send ; n a statutory not; ce to MCPS 
giving information on the records being pressed such as full 
details of the titles used on each side of the record, the 
name of the composer or author or arranger and the publisher 
and copyri ght owner plus the retail sell i ng pri ce of the 
record excluding VAT, the record company's name and address, 
the number of pressings, the name and address of the pressing 
plant, the type of record, its label, title and artists 
involved and its release date. MCPS receives about 20,000 
statutory notices a year (the forerunner to a statutory 
not ice may be a s ta tu tory enqu i ry as king whether the rna king 
in or importation into the UK of records of the musical works 
in question has already been authorised by or for the 
copyright owner since Section 8 of the 1956 Act only applies 
if this condition is met. If this is not the case, the 
record company will probably ask for authority to make 
records in the UK for reta il sa 1 e in the countri es in whi ch 
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MCPS O\A/nS or controls the recordi ng ri ght). The statutory 
notice may be sent in automatically by the record company 
concerned Qr MCPS may have to get in touch with it to remind 
it of the need to send in such a notice. MCPS chases after 
and fo 11 ows up all the statutory noti ces. I f no statutory 
notice is received following a pressing notice, a warning 
letter is sent out, then a reminder and then a final letter 
which also goes to MCPS' licensing representatives on the 
road, who look into it and take action as required. When 
MCPS receives the statutory notice, it clears the copyright 
details, calculates royalties owed and sends out an 
acknowledgement, stamps (if the record company has not signed 
one of MCPS' Agreements) and an i nvoi ce. Stamps are only 
valid on settlement of the invoice30 • The pressing plants 
are expected to keep MCPS informed as to their activities and 
MCPS wi 11 then approach the record compani es as necessary. 
If, however, nothing comes of MCPS' approach to the record 
company, it may ask the pressing plant to stop dealing with 
the company concerned. Apparently, it is not very easy to 
keep tight control over the small record companies since they 
may have in-house pressing facilities, for example, but MCPS 
has about 100% of the minor record companies' market (as 
against the bottom 20% of the major record companies' market 
which it controls through audit). MCPS distributes royalties 
once a month. The large record companies account to MCPS one 
and a half months after the quarter to whi ch they relate 
(mid-May for the January-March quarter for example) and 
account quarterly on sales. MCPS distributes royalties from 
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these large record companies within 5 months of the quarter 
to which they relate. The small record companies are 
invoiced on pressings and royalties from them are distributed 
within 4 months of receipt. Distribution of royalties from 
the television promotional record companies is within 3 
months of the end of the quarter to which they relate (so, 
for the January-March quarter, distribution would be in the 
June distribution). In 1983, distribution of royalties from 
commercial record companies was' £3.8 million. 
Importation of Records 
Section 8 of the 1956 Act, the statutory recording l i c e n c e ~ ~
appl ies only to the manufacture of records of musical works 
in the UK where records of such works have previ ous ly been 
made" in or imported into the UK with the copyright owner's 
permission. It does not apply to importation of records of 
musical works even if the work has previously been imported 
wi th the copyri ght owner I s consent - only to manufacture of 
records of musical works previously manufactured or imported 
into the UK for retail sale with the copyright owner's 
consent31 • Sect; ons 5 and 16 of the 1956 Act rna kes ita 
breach of copyright in the musical work and the sound 
recording respectively to import a record into the UK or any 
other country to whi ch the 1956 Act extends wi thout the 
copyri ght owner I s consent, if the importer knew that maki ng 
the record was an infringement of the copyright or would have 
been an i nfri ngement if the record had been made in the 
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place into which it is imported. In the field of importation 
of records, MCPS performs the functi on that a 11 coll ecti ng 
societies carry out faCilitating the licensing of copyright 
material by simplifying the administrative procedure for 
copyri ght owners and for importers. It issues 1 i cences for 
importation and sale of records so that, provided royalty 
stamps are attached to them, and subject to certa in 
conditions, some of the copyrights are not infringed32 • The 
only real requirement is that copyright owners receive the 
royalties due to them. If imported records do not have such 
stamps on them, retailers and who 1 esa 1 ers may also i nfri nge 
copyright themselves under Sections 5 and 1633 . 
As in the field of performing rights, many national 
mechanical rights societies are linked by international 
agreements and they license exports from their own countries 
at the royalty rate existing in the country into which the 
records are imported and make sure that the copyright owners 
receive the royalties owing to them34 • There are a number of 
countries which have not signed a mechanical rights 
international agreement and do not control licensing of 
exports or records, however - the Far East, Central and South 
America, for example, cause difficulties, but North America 
is the biggest problem, apparently, since U.S. record 
companies receive licences which only allow sales in the U.S. 
so U.S. copyright owners receive the U.S. royalty rate while 
records meant for export may not recei ve any royal ti es at 
all. These imports are therefore un 1 i censed, sell for a 
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lower price than those already on the market (since the 
1 atter attract a copyri ght royalty whil e the fonner do not) 
and deprive copyright owners of their royalties. The 
imported records compete unfairly with locally produced 
records which have been made by companies which have 
fulfilled their copyright obligations35 • MCPS licenses 
imports and issues IISpecial Import ll stamps36, covering all 
records made lawfully in the U.S., Canada, Japan, 
Australasia, the Philippines, West Indies and USSR containing 
musical works owned or controlled in the UK by members of MRS 
and MCPS but not pirate, bootleg or audio-visual records, 
although MCPS is an agent and is bound by what its members 
instruct it to do and some of its members will not allow 
import and sale of certain records, in which case import and 
sa 1 e wi 11 constitute i nfri ngement37 . MCPS keeps a regi ster 
of them. I t can only 1; cense rnus i ca 1 works controlled or 
owned by its members and other copyri ghts such as in the 
sound recording also have to be thought about (and MCPS does 
not deal with these). 
Different royalty rates apply to different records - 5p to 7" 
singles, lOp to L.P's deleted from the record catalogue of 
the country where the record is made and 12" singles, 17l-p to 
L.P.s which retail at £2.75 or less ("budget" L.P.s) which 
have been in the catalogue of the country of manufacture for 
longer than 6 months38 , 25p to L.P.s and 40p to L.P. picture 
discs - and each record requires a separate stamp (a double 
album requires two). Enough stamps to cover the number of 
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records imported must be bought before importation and fixed 
to the records or their sleeves or boxes at the earliest of 
14 days after import or before sale by the importer39 • The 
stamps must be paid for within 14 days of invoicing and the 
importer must not sellar di spose of the stamps to anyone 
else. If any of these conditions is broken partly or 
tota 11 y , import or sa 1 e of the records may i nfri nge 
copyright40 • The system only applies to those importing 
records and also allows retailers and wholesalers buying from 
those to sell the records or offer them for sale but does not 
cover hiring of records41 . Unused stamps have to be returned 
to MCPS which will give credit for them and where records are 
returned to the supplier or destroyed as faulty and 
unsellable with stamps still fixed to them, MCPS may give the 
importer a credit note or replacement stamps on production of 
evidence of thei r return to the suppl ier or destruction42 • 
MCPS has agreements with a number of major UK importers. 
Broadcasting 
All authorised broadcasters in the UK have blanket agreements 
with MCPS under which they have access to the works 
represented by MCPS in return for an annual 1 ump sum and 
provided they supply returns of the works they have recorded 
for use in broadcast programmes so that MCPS knows how much 
each member is owed. The blanket fee allows the broadcaster 
to record MCPS members I musical works for use in their 
broadcast prograrrvnes. The main aim is to obtain as much 
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money as possible from the copyright user (the broadcaster), 
an aim which is not always possible in MCPSI other spheres of 
activity. It is only possible to operate such a blanket 
scheme if a collecting society has an effective monopoly in a 
specific area of operation - PRS and PPL, for example, haVE 
effective monopolies since they control the respective rights 
inmost of the mus i ca 1 works and records in copyri ght in 
their areas and so can operate blanket licenSing schemes in 
all areas. MCPS, however, only has such control in the 
broadcasting field so it is only here that it can have a 
blanket scheme. Anything much less than 100% control would 
make it very difficult for MCPS to offer an attractive 
proposition to broadcasters because then the broadcasters 
would have to go through all the works it recorded and work 
out whether they were controlled by MCPS which would 
obviously be very expensive of resources. Once the 
broadcaster has negotiated a fee, all he has to do is pay it 
and he can use almost a 11 mus i ca 1 works wi thout fear of 
prosecuti on for copyri ght i nfri ngement (and the only other 
thi ng he has to do is provi de records to MCPS of works 
recorded). The obvious task for the collecting society is to 
persuade all its members to licence recording of their works 
for broadcast. Too many dissenting members would wreck the 
scheme. MCPS negotiates broadcasting blanket agreements with 
the SBC for television and radio, with the IBA for 
commercial television and with the AIRC (Association of 
Independent Radio Contractors) for the independent commercial 
radio companies. (The MRS Council will usually ratify such 
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agreements or instruct MCPS to do certain things). Figures 
5.6 and 5.7 show how the blanket fees for television for a 
number of years have grown in real and money terms. Figures 
for radio are much lower because of the ephemeral recording 
exception under the 1956 Act (about £200,000 a year). In the 
field of television, the blanket fee grew at an increasing 
rate in money terms up to 1982 when it only increased by a 
disappointing 6.9%. The greatest rate of growth was in the 
blanket fee for the ITCA wh i ch grew at a rate of over 15% 
between 1978-81. In 1982, the growth rate was only 5%, 
however. The BBC fee has shown a di fferent pattern wi th 
fairly slow growth between 1977-79 and rates of 14% in 1980, 
12i% in 1981 and 11% in 1982. In real terms, however, taking 
1974 as the base year, performance has been patchy wi th 
blanket fee income no more than keeping pace with inflation. 
Overall, income has fallen in real terms in every year apart 
from 1981, admittedly not by very much but the trend has been 
downwards, nevertheless. The SSC and ITCA fee have shown 
opposite trends with the BSC fee falling in real terms 
between 1977-80 and recoveri ng s 1 i ghtly afterwards and the 
ITCA fee rising up to 1979 and falling and rising alternately 
thereafter. 
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Whereas for other areas of MCPS activity, there seems to be 
some excuse for low income whether for economic, political or 
expedi ent reasons, thi s does not seem to be the case for 
broadcasting, where MCPS collects all broadcasting revenue 
for its members, although the fact remains that MCPS is only 
an agent and this may influence the situation. One would 
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expect a better performance in this area, however. The 
problem has been that MCPS had to renegotiate all blanket 
fees after the MPA takeover. Some idea of the extent of the 
problem is that for the year ending June 30 1976, collections 
from this source were £380,000 yet three years earlier they 
were £420,000. A long term agreement linked to inflation in 
return for a doubling of blanket fees was offered. In 
analysis of real term changes, one must remember time lags, 
so one must be careful not to attach too much importance to 
anyone year. In fact, new agreements have just been 
negotiated with the BBC and ITCA producing over £2.4 million 
in 1983, some of which will be collected in arrears in 1984. 
MCPS does not agree that it has a monopoly in the 
broadcasting field but that it rather acts "as a negotiating 
body on behalf of the very large number of members"43 and is, 
along with MRS, "an oligopoly in a market where product 
substitution represents a real possibility"44. Its 
position as an agent negates the possibility of it being a 
monopoly - major members can always try for individual 
licensing arrangements with television companies (apparently, 
thi s was wi de 1y di scussed before the recent agreement), and 
television companies can always use the ephemeral exception 
or go for individual licensing or commission music. In the 
fi e 1 d of co 11 ecti on of broadcasti ng fees, there may be some 
overlap between the different copyright collecting societies 
- for example, if a tel evi s i on company wants to record a 
piece of music to use on television, it will need a licence 
and have to pay royalties to MCPS for recording the music and 
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to PRS for broadcasting it. This apparently is a source of 
some dissatisfaction to the BBC because, it argues, it is 
ludicrous that it has to pay two different blanket agreement 
fees and negotiate two different licences for the same works. 
On the Continent, most collecting societies combine 
collection of royalties and negotiation of licences in the 
recording and performance/broadcasting of music fields. 
GEMA, the German society, for example, simply takes all the 
money it receives from the television companies and divides 
it up one-third recording, two-thirds performance/ 
broadcasting. The BBC would prefer to just have to pay and 
negotiate for one blanket agreement to record and 
perform/broadcast music, rather than two, with MCPS and PRS 
respectively. (It also has to negotiate separately with PPL 
for broadcasting/performance of sound recordings.) 
The broadcasti ng compani es send in cue sheets to MCPS of 
every programme made for broadcasting and MCPS processes 
them, looking for works in which MCPS has an interest. 
However, there is a difference between radio and television 
in this respect and MCPS is not interested in all programmes. 
A large proportion of MCPS' royalties from broadcasting come 
from television. This is because of the ephemeral recording 
exception whereby if a recording is made just for the purpose 
of broadcast and is destroyed or erased within 28 days of the 
date of broadcast, and no further reproductions have been 
made, it is deemed that no infringement of the work took 
place. This particularly applies to radio where a large 
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proporti on of recordi ngs are ephemeral, although the 
exception also applies to television. Thus, the local radio 
stations, both SSC and independent, do not provide 
significant returns to MCPS (the ephemeral recordings are 
just not reported) and "royalties paid on SBC network 
programmes do not necessarily bear any obvious relation to 
works played" 45 (as far as radio is concerned). Nor does 
MCPS process repeats, on which royalties are not payable, 
since MCPS is only interested in works recorded for inclusion 
in broadcast programmes and repeats do not involve additional 
recording and will have already been covered by the initial 
recording. Royalties are not payable on programmes imported 
from abroad (which will be covered in their own country and 
are not recorded here), nor on commi ssi oned works where the 
writing and recording of the works are covered in the 
contract, nor on live programmes. As well as covering 
domestic recording of copyright musical works for inclusion 
in broadcast programmes, MCPS' blanket agreements also cover 
recording of such works for inclusion in broadcast programmes 
for export to authorised broadcasters Worldwide, but it is 
the broadcaster's responsibility to ensure that the MCPS 
member holds the World or foreign country(ies) broadcast 
ri ghts and so can grant them under the agreement. These 
works in which MCPS does not have an interest mark it out 
again from PRS which processes all works broadcast -
royalties are payable to PRS on all works broadcast. Further 
restrictions on MCPS' blanket agreements concern 
dramatico-musicalworks and the length of recordings. The 
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agreements do not cover video rights and cable television is 
only partly covered46 . The licence only covers works 
recorded for the programmes themselves, not mus i c used in 
commercials, which has to be cleared separately, although 
some independent radio stations have blanket agreements which 
allow them to use library music in commercials without paying 
any more47 . 
Once MCPS has recei ved the cue sheets, it goes through them 
gi vi ng one poi nt for each 30 seconds of background use or 
part thereof for every piece of music recorded in a broadcast 
programme. If the music is featured, this figure is doubled 
to 2 poi nts for each 30 seconds or part thereof (a 1 though 
under new agreements, this has been changed to a ratio of 4:3 
between featured and background music for distribution of 
blanket revenue). Suppose the work is used 10 times a year 
by the BBC - each use of the work wi 11 have a poi nts total 
associated with it and these 10 points totals are added up to 
give a total points figure for that work. This is done for 
each work so that each work has a points total of use at each 
distribution. These individual points totals are then added 
to give a total points figure for all works which is divided 
into total blanket agreement revenue to give a sum of money 
per point. This is done separately for BBC television, ITCA 
television and BBC radio (for example, BBC television points 
are divided into BBC television blanket revenue, ITCA 
television points divided into ITCA television blanket 
revenue and so on). One then goes back to each i ndi vi dua 1 
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work and calculates royalties payable to it according to the 
points it has earned and the sum per point. For example, if 
the sum per point for domestic recording is f1.50 and the 
work accrued Ii minutes of background use, this is 3 points, 
which gives a sum payable for that work of 3 x fl.50 = f4.50. 
The same system - total revenue divided by total points - is 
used for works recorded in programmes for export abroad. The 
value per point both for domestic progranlTles and exported 
programmes vari es greatly from year to year. In 1981, the 
SSC domestic figure was f3.26 as against f4.79 for the ITCA 
and the export figures were fO.58 and fO.76 respectively. 
The ITCA figure is usually above the SBC figure quite 
substantially. The export value is weighted according to 
where the programme is sold. For example, World export is 39 
times the basic export value 48. For SBC Radio there is no 
di sti nct i on between featured and background mus i c and the 
figures are given as per minute values - 53 pence per minute 
in 1981. This value, unlike that for BSC television, has 
gone up every yea r since 1977. MCPS commi ss i on on 
broadcasti ng royal ti es is 15% for both tari ff A and Band 
distribution of royalties is within 8 months of the end of 
the calendar year to which they relate. In 1983, 
distribution of blanket fees was f2.3 million. 
Licensing & Video 
In theory, this is everything not covered by commercial sound 
recordings, broadcasting and overseas and includes recordings 
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of members' works in fi lms, audi o-vi sua 1 producti ons, 
videograms, background music, tapes and so forth. No royalty 
rate is set by law for such uses, so it is a matter for 
individual negotiation, usually with representative bodies _ 
for example, negotiations concerning video are usually 
conducted between the British Video Association (BVA) and 
MRS. A team of Licence Negotiators establishes the type of 
exploitation and the details such as, for a film, who the 
stars are, what type of film it is, the director's name 
(whether he is well-known or not) which will affect the 
royalty paid. They also negotiate clearance of music and 
fees payable, advise production companies as to use of music 
and answer questions on copyright and music generally49. 
Income from licensing (general and video) was £1.6 million in 
1983. 
Where a person or organisation wants to use pre-existing 
music, the terms of the licence are a matter of negotiation 
while if the music is commissioned, there is a direct 
composer - commissioner relationship and MCPS is not involved 
in collection and control of the copyright. MCPSis sensitive 
to the fact that commi ss i oned mus i c can be used when it is 
negotiating and this will influence the eventual rate 
negotiated. The Negotiators try to ascertain a minimum 
figure the copyright owner is prepared to accept for use of 
his music, reflecting his view as to the market value of the 
music, and obviously try to obtain a figure better than this 
minimum. 
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Most of the mus i c the 1 i cens i ng department dea 1 s wi th is 
library music specifically designed for use in films and 
licensed at set rates. This is in contrast to non-library 
music where there are no set rates and conditions and 
licensing is on an individual basis. A potential user of 
musical works will want to find out how much it will cost him 
to use that music and whether the works concerned are readily 
available or not. This is very easy with library music. It 
may be difficult to clear use of cowmercial recorded 
non-library music if a record company has contracted with the 
musicians and/or composer and clauses in that contract 
either prohibit or lay down rules for further exploitation of 
the record or provi de for certain subsequent payments. The 
broadcasting companies have blanket agreements with MCPS 
except for Channel 4, which obtains its programmes 
independently and does not produce its own. Thus, Channel 4 
music use has to be specifically cleared each time for each 
use, although there is actually what amounts to a fixed rate. 
Library music enables a company to approximate its budget 
before producti on. All a user has to do is phone up MCPS, 
obtain a quote for the price and availability of the music 
and it will be automatically cleared. Roya 1 ti es are 
collected by MCPS. Such music contains edit points at 
various intervals so that the music can be used in snatches 
of 15 seconds or 30 seconds, for example, and is sold by the 
second or minute, so that it is easily possible to tell how 
much has been used. Users must inform MCPS of how much they 
have used (timewise). 
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The type of music involved is very varied and the advantages 
are its cheapness and ready availability at published rates 
without the need for pre-clearance - and the fee covers both 
the copyright in the music and in the recording. There are 
different fees for different uses in different parts of the 
World in different media and the fee schedules are divided 
between film and television on the one hand, and radio on the 
other. Clearance for all media Worldwide for all categories 
including those not yet devised but not including commercial 
advertising is £140 for each 30 seconds. The minimum unit is 
30 seconds. For films, television and video productions, the 
library music schedule is divided by territory and by 
category of use, such as recordings made for cinema 
advertising (not television transmission) and productions 
shown to non-paying audiences (including through 
closed-circuit television and individual monitors)50. For 
example, North American clearance for recordings for pay and 
cable television is £17 per 30 seconds (or part thereof) 
while World coverage for recordings for cinema advertising is 
£220 per 30 seconds. For recordings for broadcast television 
advertising in the UK examples of fees are London £165 for 
ITV1, Channel 4 £85 and ITV1/Channel 4 combined £208. The 
regions obviously cost less. Full UK network clearance is 
£500 for ITV1, £250 for Channel 4 and £625 combined. Radio 
licences for library music are of two types - non-advertising 
recordi ngs for radi a transmi ssi on and recordi ngs for radi 0 
advertising. Fees are again divided by territory, so World 
clearance for radio advertising is £365 per 30 seconds and 
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North American non-advertising recording for radio 
transmission is £10 per 30 seconds. UK radio advertising is 
divided by radio station, Capital (London) and Radio 
Luxembourg being £62 per station, for example. The regional 
stations again cost less. Full network clearance is £200. 
VAT is added to the fee plus MCPS' Service Charge of £3. A 
dubbi ng fee of £3 per track per producti on (to cover the 
permission of the record manufacturer where an existing 
record is used as the source of the mus i ca 1 work to be 
reproduced) may also be payable51 • The fees mentioned 
earlier are for background use, featured use doubles the fee. 
Licences must be obtained before transmission. Concessionary 
rates are available for charity or religious appeal films and 
block fees for commercials for a single piece of music used 
to i dent i fy a good or servi ce ~ 2 . C O p y i i ng of part or a 11 of a 
film for sale or hire to the general public is usually 
excluded and changes to productions either sound or visual 
are regarded as separate productions requiring separate 
licences and payment of fees. All those involved in 
authorising the making of a film or production are equally 
liable for making sure that a licence is obtained. Library 
music may be recorded before a Licence is granted but as soon 
as the dubbing/synchronisation is complete, the user must 
send MCPS a Music Cue Sheet (MCS) containing all relevant 
information such as intended exploitation and duration and 
copyright information for all music used. Similarly, for 
non-library music and commercial recordings, a Music Cue 
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Sheet must be sent in, but in this b f case e ore recording as 
against after recording but before exploitation for library 
music. This is because there is no fee schedule for 
non-library music and commercial sound recordings so that 
every use has to be separately cleared and negotiated and 
this takes time. Non-library music used from a commercial 
record i nvo 1 ves two copyri ghts - in the mus i c and in the 
record - so two clearances and two fees have to be obtained, 
negoti ated and paid by the user. The MCPS Licence 
Negotiators usually handle clearance and negotiation of fees 
for non-library/commercial record music on behalf of the MCPS 
member53 . 
The MCS is a formal application for a licence, from which 
MCPS takes the necessary information. Licences are 
conditional on payment of the fee within a certain time so 
the next step is for MCPS to issue a Condi ti ona 1 
Licence/Invoice. If the relevant payment conditions are not 
met the Licence wil1 be inoperative and if the user goes 
ahead he may i nfri nge copyri ght. Users or stock-holders of 
Mood Music Library recordings have to sign a Letter of 
Agreement with MCPS before they are allowed to have 1 ibrary 
works, an agreement which lays down the process for recording 
and declaring copyright music and includes a number of 
undertakings by the user including the need for all premises 
where music is recorded to keep a log of the recordings made 
and to supp ly MCPS wi th a copy of it. The Log Sheet is a 
self duplicating set which is also an MCS when completed, the 
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studio and facility house completing the first part of the 
form and sendi ng a copy to MCPS as a Log Sheet and givi ng 
another copy to the payer of the royalty for submission as an 
MCS. Only the exploitation asked for in the MCS will be 
allowed by the Licence - if the user wants to make other uses 
of the work and to increase territorial cover, he must apply 
anew and pay extra royalties. Videogram exploitation is 
usually expressly excluded in the Licence. MCPS will usually 
negotiate clearance of records because recording of music 
into audio-visual productions often involves dubbing from a 
commercial record but in some areas MCPS cannot do this and 
users have to deal with the record companies concerned54 . 
Most of the music MCPS deals with is for use in information 
films, prestige films, training films and short films, each 
of which do not bring in a vast sum of money by themselves. 
MCPS does not get too much work from feature films where the 
music is usually commissioned. 
MCPS also offers a number of other licences - for example, it 
has contracts wi th background music operators who produce 
specially recorded tapes for use in establishments such as 
shops, factories and offices, a Licence for amateur film and 
s 1 i de/tape makers and 1 i cences and speci all i cens i ng 
arrangements for educational institutions. MCPS also issues 
a discretionary Miscellaneous Licence for small-scale uses 
where negotiation of individual clearances would be 
impractical. 
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Video is an expanding area. The 1982 distribution target for 
video was £200,000 which was reached and the 1983 target was 
£300,000 - £350,000. Use of music in videograms has to be 
specifically cleared and there is a royalty per copy 
manufactured and sold, a situation similar to that in the 
record department. Clearance for library music is automatic 
and there is the same division between commercial and library 
music. MCPS defines a videogram as Ita programme originated 
on, or transferred to, a video format for exploitation by way 
of retail sale and/or rental to the general public for 
private and domestic use ll55 • It is not a film or programne 
for public exhibition to a paying or non-paying audience, 
although it may start life as such and then be made available 
to the general public in video form for private and domestic 
use. A vi deogram company is defi ned as "persons or 
organisations involved in the duplication and the marketing 
of multiple video copies of films or programmes to the 
general public for private and domestic use ll • The royalty 
for videogram use is not fixed and varies according to 
circumstances but the conditions of the licence largely 
dictate the size of the royalty. Copyright music in existing 
films and programmes is unlikely to have been cleared for use 
in videograms so either a new licence or an extension to the 
original one will be needed. Music in copyright specifically 
originated for video programmes or films would also have to 
be cleared for use in videograms. A videogram maker must 
make sure all music used on it is cleared before production 
is finalised and copies made available to the public as must 
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a person or company who obtains videogram rights to a 
programme or fi1m already existing where the music has not 
been already cleared for videogram use. If this is not done, 
the programme or film producer or videogram company may lay 
himself/itself open to an infringement action and if the 
music is not cleared, the production may have to be stopped 
or the sound track re-dubbed if the works cannot be cl eared 
for videogram use, which may be costly. A person or company 
which originates new material to be used in a videogram or 
obtains video rights to existing material must supply MCPS or 
the copyright owner(s) with a Music Cue Sheet showing all the 
mus i ca 1 works used in the vi deogram, copyri ght ownershi p, 
duration and types of uses before the videogram is exploited 
or distributed. Each individual use of music in a video has 
to be cleared and a royalty feepa i d and MCPS acts as a 
clearing house in this respect and calculates the royalty 
payab 1 e and co 11 ects and di stri butes it. A person sell i n9 
programme rights to a videogram c o m p a n ~ ~ must obtain the 
consent of the owner of the music in the film or programme to 
avoid breach of contract and warn the video company that the 
music has not been cleared for video use if this is the 
case56 . Anyone who wants to duplicate videograms must sign 
an agreement wi th MRS whi ch lays down the procedure for 
declaring and clearing copyright music on videograms, which 
has to take place before duplication and for declaring sales 
and calculating and paying royalties as well as allowing MRS 
representatives to audit returns. 
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Roya 1 ti es on mus i c in vi deos are usually payable quarterly 
based on videos sold (although some video companies pay on 
manufacture as and when this occurs) and only cover retail 
sale or rental to the general public for private and domestic 
use, not further exploitation. There is again a division 
between featured and background music - background music only 
counts as 75% of its true duration57 (hence 1 minute counts 
as 45 seconds). The royalty rate is based on featured use 
duration on the assumption that 8.5% is the maximum royalty 
rate a video taken up entirely with featured music can 
attract. The royalty rate payable is calculated according to 
the fonnula:-
(58) 8.5% x Total Featured & Background Music Duration 
Programme Duration 
For example, a 45 minute prograrmne with 25 minutes featured 
music and 8 minutes background music would produce a royalty 
rate of:-
8.5% x 31 
45 
= 5.86% 
The 31 represents the 25 minutes featured music plus the 8 
mi nutes background mus i c reduced by 25%. Thus, the royalty 
would be 5.86% of the published dealer price (exclusive of 
VAT) for each video made and sold. For music programmes, 
however, there is a maximum royalty of 7% of the published 
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dealer price (excluding VAT). Th 4 us, a 5 minute video with 
42 minutes of featured music will produce a royalty of 7.93% 
normally but this is automatically reduced to 7% _ 
8.5 x 42 
45 
There is also a videogram production fee of £1 per minute or 
part thereof of music (after deductions for background use) 
whi ch has to be paid by the vi deogram company and an MCPS 
service charge of £3 per licence. Library music is licensed 
according to territory of sale per 30 seconds unit and on a 
once and for all fee basis so that, for example, the World 
fee is £33 per 30 seconds and Europe is £14 per 30 seconds. 
There is also a dubbing fee of £3 per track. The licence is 
conditional on payment of royalties due within 21 days of its 
issuance. Derivation of the 8.5% figure is based on a 
roya 1 ty payable for maxi mum featured use of 12.15% of the 
Published Dealer Price but with a 30% deduction for high 
production costs. Some uses of music in videos may produce a 
higher royalty rate than those above, which are only minimum 
rates. The royalty per copy is payable on all videograms 
duplicated in the UK regardless of the territory in which the 
sa 1 e occurs subject to terri tori a 1 control by the copyri ght 
owner but World clearance on any title cannot be guaranteed. 
The rates do not cover dramati co-mus i ca 1 works and incases 
where a programme's music content is not very great and the 
programme's life is limited, a once and for all payment may 
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be acceptable or, if the royalty rate per copy does apply but 
the music content is minimal, there may be batch licensing 
covering a number of sales at one time rather than a royalty 
on each copy made59 • MCPS' main market in this field is 
films and existing television progral11nes but there are a 
growing number of videos specifically made for specialised 
purposes, such as video juke-boxes and in-store videos in 
which case it will be necessary for companies to get in touch 
with MCPS to enquire about the video rights to see whether 
existing agreements cover them or not. In the case of 
in-store videos, there are 2 aspects - using the music in the 
video to sell the music, for which only a nominal rate is 
likely to be charged,and using it to sell unrelated products, 
for which full fees will be payable. Music is now being put 
on video games and computers too. The situation is, in fact, 
very encouraging for MCPS since a lot of record companies are 
now entering the market - after all, videos are really just 
another way of sell i ng records from thei r poi nt of vi ew and 
from MCPS' point of view another way of selling licences and 
earni ng income. The market is new and there are many novel 
problems, however, one of the greatest being to establish a 
c 1 a im by comi ng up wi th documents as ev i dence, for example, 
tha t ri ghts were meant to extend to vi deo or showi ng that a 
particular person owns the video rights. The audio-visual 
market is more fragmented and less understood than the other 
markets and infringement tends to be at the bottom end, for 
which MCPS has agreements with those in the field. At 
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present, MCPS is making a survey of the whole audio-visual 
market. 
Overseas 
The Angl o-Ameri can repertoi re is very popul ar throughout the 
World and royalties for this are collected by sister 
societies throughout the World. Worldwide, there are over 50 
mechani ca 1 soci eti es 1 inked by reci proca 1 agreements so that 
each society collects in its own country for its own 
composers and copyri ght owners and for the members of all 
other soci eti es in the Worl d wi th whi ch it has agreements. 
Most money from overseas arrives at MCPS unsolicited and 
there is not really that much MCPS can do to influence income 
from this source, although it is a joint partner with PRS in 
the fvlus i c Copyri ght Overseas Soci ety (MCOS) under whi ch PRS 
and MCPS jointly control their repertoires in countries where 
there are as yet no copyright organisations. (In fact, some 
of the highest earning members actually give MCPS an 
assignment of rights in certain territories outside the UK 
and Europe in its MCOS activities). The accounts show a 
deteriorating position in the overseas areas both in r e ~ l l and 
money terms with MCPS earning over £190,000 less in real 
terms now than in 1978. The years 1978-79 saw a rapid 
increase in overseas income of over 26% in money terms but 
thereafter the position worsened considerably with a fall in 
real terms in 1980 and falls in money and real terms 
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thereafter, by over 18% in money terms in 1982. In 1983, 
overseas revenue was about £1.3 million. 
Some societies are just not worth bothering about because of 
the problems and difficulties encountered in collecting 
royalties and because so little money comes out of them and 
the countri es concerned. For example, the South Ameri can 
countries have copyright laws but it is not enforced. In 
such areas, it is theoretically possible to collect royalties 
but in practice it is impossible. In other countries, there 
is just no copyright law - in the Middle East with the 
exception of Egypt, for example. In Jamaica, the situation 
is similarly very bad and nobody really bothers about 
copyright so that composers are just not paid. 
The Continental societies are the strongest by tradition, 
especially in France and West Germany. There, they are like 
songwriters' unions. In the US and UK most works are 
sub-published so royalties tend not to be paid to the country 
concerned (the country of res i dence of the copyri ght owner) 
but stay with the sub-publisher. The Harry Fox Agency 
collects for MCPS in the US. The publisher and sub-publisher 
would account to each other so not so much money would need 
to be sent abroad, saving costs. This is not so much the 
case in West Germany where there is rather less 
sub-publishing, one reason for which is the general view that 
GEMA is so strong that it can pick up royalties itself 
instead of the publ isher/sub-publ isher and probably make as 
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good as, or even better, a job of it. The 1983 Report & 
Accounts notes that IIthere is a trend towards a single 
copyright within the EEC and it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to collect mechanical income from sub-publishing 
agreements for individual countries." In addition, there is 
increasing centralisation of European production by the major 
record compani es and those compani es often pay "mechani ca 1 
royalties to the collecting society in the country of 
productionll. Commission on royalties from overseas societies 
is 10% for tariff A and 15% for tariff B and distribution is 
wi thi n 6 months of recei pt of the statement or money from 
overseas. 
COVERING COSTS 
1978 1979 1980 1981 
1. Corrvnission 372,553 760,512 838,641 868,357 
[Money Terms(£). 
2. COl1lllission 189,017 340,274 318,028 294,358 
[Real Terms(£)] 
3. Administration 992,966 1,157,867 1,294,972 1,770,105 
Costs60 . 
[Money Terms(£): 
4. % of 3 covered 37.5% 65.7% 64.8% 49.1% 
by 1 
Source Rows 1 & 3:MCPS Reports & Accounts 1978-83 
TABLE 5.4 MCPS COMMISSION, REAL AND MONEY TERMS, AND 
PERCENTAGE OF ADMINISTRATION COSTS COVERED BY IT 
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1982 
987,106 
308,086 
2,069,040 
47.7% 
1983 
1,269,479 
378,723 
2,163,835 
58.7% 
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DIAGRAM 5.8 MCPS COMMISSION 
REAL AND MONEY TERMS 1978-83 
Source: Table 5.4 
1978 
Interest ~ M o n e y y
Tenns) (£) 528,038 
Interest (Real 267,904 
Tenns) (f) 
Adm; ni strati on 992,966 
Costs (Money Terms) 
% of 3 covered 53.2 
by 1 
1979 
709,292 
317,357 
1,157,867 
61.3 
1980 
1,086,265 
411,932 
1,294,972 
83.9 
"., - fnt 
YEAr.. 
DIAGRAM 5.9 PERCENTAGE OF MCPS 
COSTS COVERED BY COMMISSION 
Source: Table 5.4 
1981 1982 1983 
1,023,047 904,093 873,69161 
346,796 282,176 260,648 
1,770,105 2,069,040 2,163,835 
57.8 43.7 40.4 
TABLE 5.5 MCPS INTEREST RECEIVABLE, REAL AND MONEY TERMS, 
AND PERCENTAGE OF ADMINISTRATION COSTS COVERED BY IT 
Source Rows 1 & 3: - MCPS Reports and Accounts 1978-83 
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DIAGRAM 5.10 MCPS INTEREST 
RECEIVABLE, REAL AND MONEY 
TERMS, 1978 -83. 
Source: Table 5.5 
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DIAGRAM 5.11 PERCENTAGE OF 
MCPS COSTS COVERED BY 
INTEREST RECEIVABLE 
Source: Table 5.5. 
Because of the way MCPS conducts its business, the commission 
it receives from its members for royalties collected on their 
behalf from various sources and the interest it receives from 
deposit of royalties collected but not distributed are 
crucial. The above tab 1 es and di agrams shoul damp ly 
illustrate this. Whereas the other two societies are virtual 
monopolies and collect royalties and then take out their 
administration costs from the big"pot", MCPS is only an 
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agent and charges its members a commission at the time of the 
transaction in an effort to at least partly Cover its costs. 
Interest earned on the money collected is similarly used to 
help cover costs, a source of revenue which is also important 
to the other relatively small collecting society, PPL. Thus, 
commission and interest are essential in the economics of 
MCPS' operations. The process may be depicted as:-
REVENUE COLLECTED 
1 
REVENUE DEPOSITED ----..,> INTEREST EARNED 
t 
REVENUE D I S T R I B U T E D - - ~ ~ C O M M I S S I O N N EARNED 
As regards commission, one must remember that MCPS only earns 
it once the money has 1 eft the premi ses , once it has been 
distributed. One must differentiate between tariffs as MCPS 
app 1 i es them to its commi ss i on and the way the term is used 
by PRS, for example. MCPS has two main tariffs, A and a, in 
which it charges different commission - in a, it is 15% in 
all markets (record companies, overseas, broadcasting) while 
in A it varies according to each market. In MCPS' case, the 
tariff refers to the commission payable by the member to help 
cover the cost of collection, processing and distribution. 
The amount of processing required would seem to influence the 
size of the commission (as well as political factors and the 
extent of the mandate given by the member) and the different 
lengths of time required for distribution in different 
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markets will reflect this. In fact, most publishers and all 
composers are on tariff A. PRS, on the other hand, uses the 
term 'tariff' to apply to lithe negotiated rate for use of 
recorded musicu62 • PRS has about 50 tariffs which lay down 
the rate payable for public performance of musical works for 
different uses according to various criteria. In this 
respect, the term tariff applies to the royalties payable 
side of the equation and to the criteria for deciding how 
much is payable. Another way in which MCPS and PRS differ is 
that PRS is largely free to determine the rate payable for 
use of music in the areas in which it operates, which springs 
in part from its position as a monopoly. MCPS is only an 
agent, an intermediary between those wishing to record 
musical works and the copyright owners, so it can influence 
the roya 1 ty rate payab 1 e, but not rea lly set it and in the 
field- of commercial sound recordings, it is powerless to do 
anything with the rate since it is set by statute at 6.1/4% 
(although MCPS can influence to a degree the point at which 
the 6.1/4% is payable, what the 6.1/4% is of - manufacturers' 
recolTUTIended reta i 1 pri ce, actua 1 reta i 1 pri ce or whatever). 
The commission rates at MCPS have stayed the same for 5 years 
(although they may change in 1985 following a major review by 
MCPS of its operations) and were originally set at a level 
MCPS thought the market could stand and which would, at the 
same time, be attractive to members and induce them to 
increase their mandate to MCPS. Commission plus interest 
plus other non-royalty income must be sufficient to cover 
costs. At the same time, MCPS is a non-profit making 
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organisation (although, as noted, it does not have to be), so 
it does not want to make a 1 arge profi t (non-royalty income 
minus costs). Apparently, the aim is for each sector of 
MCPS I opera t ions to be self -fi nanc i ng bu tin practi ce some 
areas subsidise others. It was pOinted out during interview 
and in the answers to the questionnaire I sent MCPS that 
because of its industry-wide activities and point of view, 
MCPS cannot really limit itself to just its profitable areas 
and if it did, this might lead members to withdraw their 
mandates, which would have repercussions far beyond MCPS 
itself. MCPS regards itself as an industry body and as such 
has to accept that certain aspects of its work will not cover 
its costs. If one assumes that PRS and PPL taking out its 
costs from the IIpoolll is the equivalent of MCPS 1 cormnission, 
MCPS certainly seems to be performing as well as they are. 
PRS I costs represented 17i% of its gross royal ti es in 1982 
against PPLls ratio of about 10% and MCPS 1 average cormnission 
of about 12%. One could argue that these figures are not 
strictly comparable and that one ought to use the 
cost/revenue relationship for MCPS, too. In this respect, 
MCPS 1 performance is much worse than the other two societies 
with a cost/revenue ratio of 21.5% in 1983. Out of the three 
societies, MCPS is the odd one out in that it charges a 
commission and this is both an historical development and a 
result of MCPS objectives and Iraison d1etre l • MCPS was set 
up as a private independent company by a number of publishers 
to act for them in certain areas and the commission was 
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introduced as a way of covering costs. The other societies 
were set up for other reasons, as monopolies63 . 
Income from commission more than doubled in money terms 
between 1978-79 following the introduction of the new tariff 
structure but then fell in real terms in 1980 following the 
downturn in real terms of distributions. Even so, at that 
stage it represented round about 65% of administration costs. 
In 1981, the percentage fell to below 50%. In real terms, it 
rose again in 1982 but fell to only about 48% of costs in 
money terms. Commission rose considerably in money terms in 
1983 (by about 29%), to represent an increased 59% of costs. 
It has always been MCPS' aim to increase the percentage of 
its costs covered by commission and minor sums and income and 
reduce its dependence on interest earned. Commission can 
also be used as a bargaining counter- members can be offered 
a lower commission in return for a wider mandate. A wider 
mandate for MCPS means that it can collect more royalties 
hence earning commission from more sources and thus hopefully 
increasing the percentage of costs covered by commission. It 
is, in essence, the old high price low volume versus low 
price high volume argument. MCPS wants to increase its 
shares of the different markets and the volume of the 
business it processes. If, however, MCPS tried to increase 
its commission, members would quite likely withdraw their 
mandates, the opposite of what MCPS wants. 
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While there is an incentive for MCPS to distribute quickly in 
that it does not earn commission until the money is 
distributed, the opposite incentive also applies in that the 
longer MCPS keeps the money the more interest it earns. The 
constraint on this is that MCPS is contracted through its 
membership agreements to distribute revenue in different 
markets within a certain time period. The longer MCPS keeps 
the money invested without distributing it, the more money it 
can earn, so one would expect it to keep the money invested 
as long as possible. However, as mentioned, MCPS is 
contracted to distribute within a certain time period. If 
the royalties are distributed on time, cormnission is earned 
over and above interest already earned, so that total income 
for MCPS from this transaction will be:-
I = r(K) + C 
the amount of money earned on the capi ta 1 (capi ta 1 bei ng 
represented by royalties collected in that particular 
transaction) plus the conunission [rate of interest (r) x 
royalties (K) + conunission (C)]. Money earned over and above 
the lump sum, is used to partly offset its administration 
costs. The 1 ump sum goes to the members. If MCPS waits 
until the last possible moment to distribute but distributes 
on time, earning interest up to the time of distribution, the 
maximum it can earn is the interest earned on royalties plus 
the conunission. If the royalties are not distributed wjthin 
the contracted peri od, MCPS has to pay penalty interest to 
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members, currently at the market rate of interest plus 3%. 
However, since MCPS may expend a lot of time, effort and 
resources in "chasingll companies which have not paid 
royalties, it still charges corrnnission. In the majority of 
cases, MCPS will not be responsible for late distribution. 
In the case of a record company wi th a sa les agreement wi th 
MCPS, it wi 11 charge that company the pena 1 ty interest and 
then pay it to the members concerned. The interest payable 
will be based on the accounting period to which the royalties 
relate, not on the date of payment. The commission rate is 
not dependent on time of distribution - no matter when the 
money is distributed (up to the contractual distribution 
time), it is expressed as a constant percentage of the 
royalty collected, this percentage varying between markets. 
If MCPS is not going to distribute on time it might be best 
for it to invest the royalty and earn interest to offset the 
penalty if this is payable. Assuming interest earned, MCPS 
will always be better off investing royalties and earning 
interest, even if it does not distribute on time. 
Thus, the best possible case is to wait until the last 
possible moment, at which maximum interest is earned, and 
commission is added to this. This is called the LAST FREE 
DATE by MCPS. 
Thus, we would expect MCPS to keep the money until the last 
free date in most cases. Cash flow problems should not arise 
because of the different distribution periods in each market. 
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In view of this, it is rather interesting to note MCPS' wish 
to move away from earning interest and towards earning 
commission and the fact that it distributes money to members 
every month. Apparently, the once-a-month distribution was 
initially introduced because there were so many royalties to 
distribute following the departure of the previous management 
and MCPS was having to pay large amounts in penalty interest. 
The members were pleased, it would seem, with the earlier 
di stri buti ons and herei n may be one of the reasons for the 
move away from reliance on interest and towards commission. 
MCPS is an agent dictated to by its members, to a large 
extent. Would it have been possible for MCPS to increase the 
interval between distributions after the catching-up period 
anyway? It was noted in interview that MCPS could distribute 
even more quickly if need be but that the only justification 
for quicker distribution was the belief that you could 
attract sufficient new business or more business to outweigh 
the loss of interest. MCPS obviously thinks it can do this 
with a lower commission and a wider mandate from members. 
Increasing the number of distributions is one part of the 
package MCPS can offer for a wider mandate. A further reason 
for relying on commission rather than interest might be that 
commission is a more certain income, easier to predict and to 
influence than interest, which may fluctuate quite wildly. 
MCPS is a non -profi t maki ng organi sati on but because of the 
way it covers its costs, it is quite likely to overshoot or 
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undershoot - its costs are likely to be greater or less than 
its income (income not, in this case, being royalties but 
commission, interest and others sums). Other sums include 
the likes of profit on redemption of investments, rent and so 
forth. MCPS has made a profi t every year since 1979. In 
1983, there was a profit of £124,665 (before tax). In fact, 
MCPS rebates most of the profit it earns back to members in 
one way or another so that the members benefi t rather than 
the society itself. In 1983, the rebate was £145,000. 
Profit is given after rebate. Usually, a sum of £10,000 _ 
£20,000 is used to supplement titles which have a low value 
for broadcasting. MCPS' policy is only to retain those 
profits required to provide the working capital needed by the 
company. The rebate is usua lly pro rata accordi ng to how 
much commi ss i on the member has paid, although a di fferent 
criterion may be used each time - for example, the rebate may 
be distributed amongst low earning composers. The criterion 
in each case is decided by the Board. Despite its non-profit 
making nature, the Financial Controller, Mr. Lowde, pointed 
out during interview that he had tried to instil a commercial 
attitude into the organisation so that personnel at least act 
as if they are in a business environment. Although MCPS does 
not seek to make a distributable profit, it wants to have as 
much money in surplus funds as possible to spend on copyright 
control expenditure. Mr. Lowde had tried to prevent 
personnel from thinking of themselves as working for a 
society since this encourages a public service, 
non-commercial quango-like attitude rather than a 
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businesslike atmosphere. MCPS is not a society but a trading 
company, he noted, an attitude reinforced by the MPA 
resolution, which lays down that MCPS' "terms of business 
should be defined on a strictly commercial basis" 64 . 
The general impreSSion at interview was that quite a lot has 
been done to develop such an attitude and it was interesting 
to note that MCPS does seem to have done quite a lot to try 
to control costs. This seems to have had an impact in 1983 
but the system is very new and only future years wi 11 show 
whether Mr. Lowde's words on the subject are borne out - but 
the intent and attitude certainly seems there. MCPS can now 
boast having a total analysis of all the money in the 
organi sati on down to the 1 ast penny - a fact whi ch the other 
societies might find hard to match. There is now accounting 
control, which did not exist prior to the new regime. All 
revenue, collections and distributions are now monitored and 
controlled fully and can be measured easily. At the 
beginning of the year, a budget is set for the whole year and 
for each month a target is set for distribution, based on the 
previous year's performance, the areas in which MCPS is doing 
best, the fastest growi ng sectors, the state of the market 
and so forth. MCPS also projects how much it is goi ng to 
distribute each week, which provides a certain amount of 
discipline for the managers involved and allows them to 
compare real with actual so that they can decide whether they 
need to pull more stri ngs and work harder. Performance is 
monitored against budget. Mr. Lowde said that costs are very 
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tight ly controlled and mon i tored. The bas is of such cost 
contro 1 is the max im t "you cannot control income but you can 
control costs ". Accounts a d re prepare on a monthly basis and 
any changes in budget, resources, costs or whatever have to be 
approved by a member of the Executive. The Board decides the 
overall resources available and the individual manager has to 
state his requirements and make out a case. Allocation of 
resources is thus a two-way process between the Executive and 
the management. There is a 5-year corporate plan. 
Table 5.6 and diagrams 5.12 and 5.13 show administration costs 
as a percentage of turnover and of total royalties and fees 
\ collected - and the situation could hardly be described as 
good. 1983 saw a 1 arge drop in the ratio, though, and there 
does seem reason for optimism, especially as the cost control 
system is rather new and is unlikely to have had a dramatic 
impact yet. Mr. Lowde seemed to paint a hopefu 1 pi ctu re of 
the future. 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
r. TURNOVER 5,138,547 7,132,455 7,542,176 7,610,055 8,011,163 10,046,305 
2. COLLECTIONS 
3. ADMINISTRATION 
COSTS 
4. 3 AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF 1 
5. 3 A ~ ~ A 
PERCENTAGE OF 2 
6,756,335 7,989,950 7,780,176 7,707,250 
992,966" 1,157,867 1,294,972 1,770,105 
19.3% 16.2% 17.2% 23.3% 
14.7% 14.5% 16.6% 23.0% 
TABLE 5.6 MCPS ADMINISTRATION COSTS AS65 A PERCENTAGE OF TURNOVER & COLLECTIONS 
9,200,000 
2,069,040 
25.8% 
22.5% 
(Source for rows 1, 2 and 3: MCPS Reports and Accounts 1978-83) 
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DIAGRAM 5.12 ADMINISTRATION 
COSTS AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF TURNOVER 
S o ~ r c e : : Table 5.6 
YEU. 
DIAGRAM 5.13 ADMINISTRATION 
COSTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF 
TOTAL ROYAL TI ES A.ND FEES 
COLLECTED -
Source: Table 5.6. 
MCPS completed an exercise in 1983 to calculate the cost of 
work done by function and the profitabil ity of each market 
sector66 . Since staff costs account for the largest 
proportion of administration costs (about 58.5% in 1983), 
personnel were grouped together into cost centres representing 
groups of people who "either individually carry out similar 
work functions or work collectively as an integral team" and 
costs grouped to these personnel cost centres. About 80% of 
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costs were accounted for in this way. Cost centres were then 
grouped into four categories - member registration, title 
registration, collection and copyright control and 
distribution. Cost centres which did not easily fall into one 
of the four categories were allocated to "computer" or 
IIsupportll. Support costs were then allocated to the four 
other groups on the basis of headcount - the people employed 
in the support function were excluded and support costs 
reallocated equally to the other functions on the basis of a 
cost per non-support head (support costs to be allocated 
divided by total number of employees minus Ilsupport" 
employees) multiplied by number of people employed in the 
function to which the support cost is allocated. IIComputer li 
costs were allocated on the basis that each yellow book, green 
book (which are thick telephone directory-type computer 
produced indexes of titles and copyright owners with which and 
wi th whom MCPS deals) and VDU was counted as one unit, each 
unit allocated to a group, each group unit total expressed as 
a percentage of tota 1 uni ts and th is percentage app 1 i ed to 
tota 1 computer costs, Rema i ni ng overheads whi ch had not yet 
been a 11 oca ted to any category were then allocated on an ad 
hoc basis. This produced one new category - IIIreland" - where 
MCPS collects virtually all mechanical royalties. The result 
was then fine-tuned for anomalies. 
These total costs by function were then allocated to market 
sector - commercial sound recordings, broadcasting, licensing 
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general, licensing video, international and other (such as 
import stamps, dial-a-disc and background). Each function was 
considered separately and allocated to market sector on a 
different basis. As regards registration (title and 
membership), each market sector was weighted according to the 
problems encountered in registration from MCPS ' point of 
vi ew. The broadcasti ng sector was wei ghted by three on the 
basis that some members only register for blanket fees (from 
broadcasting) and regard any other income as a bonus. Thus, 
revenue from broadcasting was multiplied by three and then 
registration cost for broadcasting taken as total 
registration cost multiplied by the percentage weighted 
broadcasting revenue represents of total weighted revenue. 
Weighted broadcasting revenue equals actual broadcasting 
revenue multiplied by three. This gave the registration cost. 
Licensing does not deal with as many titles and many of those 
it does deal with are registered by library publishers who 
give a virtual 100% mandate and register in a more orderly 
manner. Thus, licensing revenue was given its basic 
unwei ghted value and thi s expressed as a percentage of total 
weighted revenue. This percentage, multiplied by total 
registration cost, gives registration cost for licensing. The 
international sector is very difficult to control and was 
weighted by 3. Commercial sound recordings were weighted by 
2. It is noted in the MCPS documents that distributions 
affect only 6% of MCPS titles in any year, but 100,000 new 
works are registered every year anq the cost of such 
registration is very high. As a result, MCPS is considering 
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introducing a registration fee or membership qualification 
criteria which seems only good sense. Most collecting 
societies do this, anyway. As to collection and copyright 
control, allocation to market sector was a mixture of 
judgement and the reallocation of Support costs carried out 
earlier. For distribution costs, allocation to market sector 
was by heads associated with the activity in each market 
sector. Thus, 6 people are involved in distribution in the 
field of commercial sound recordings, which is 30% of the 
total number of people involved in distribution at MCPS (the 
total complement is 20). 30% of the total distribution cost 
is then taken as the cost allocation to the commercial sound 
recordi ng sector. The same is done for the other market 
sectors. 
Profi tabil i ty per market sector was ascertained by compari ng 
costs and revenue from commi ssi on, interest, mi nor sums and 
fees. Allocation of commission between market sectors was 
based on forecast distribution. Interest receivable was 
allocated according to an average balance of undistributed 
royalties (undistributed royalties in each market sector 
expressed as a percentage of tota 1 undi stri buted royal ti es 
and this percentage multiplied by total interest). By 
deducting costs from revenue, profitability per market sector 
was deri ved. This shows an i nteresti ng pi cture wi th a sma 11 
profit in commercial sound recordings, a small loss in 
broadcasting, a heavy loss in licensing (general and video), 
a large profit in the international field and in the lother l 
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sector and a small profit in Ireland. Overall, the picture is 
one of breaking even. The summary notes a few points. 
A 1 though 1 i cens i ng is not profi tab 1 e at the moment, it is a 
growth area. Little interest is earned in the sector so it is 
suggested that the situation could be improved by waiting a 
further month before distribution and increasing the service 
charge. The need for a registration fee was also mentioned 
a 1 though it was a 1 so noted that a 1 arge part of the cost of 
the function is in converting a manual index system to a 
computerised database. The field force which MepS has to 
police and monitor the system, also costs a lot to run and is 
spread throughout the market sectors but fall s most heavi 1y 
proporti onate lyon the 1 ow-i ncome ones. It is accepted that 
this is probably not a cost effective operation but the 
service is vital and its dismantling would result in 
wi despread copyri ght i nfri ngement at the lower end of the 
market sectors whi ch woul d undoubtedly spread upwards. In 
any case, this is the sort of service which would be expected 
from an industry body. Its loss would be strongly felt. The 
commerc i a 1 sound record i ngs market has 5 rna i n areas, whose 
performances vary greatly. The television-promoted record 
sector shows a large profit, the sales agreement record 
companies sector (the large companies) shows a very large 
profit in six figures. The pressing agreement record 
companies sector (small companies) shows a large loss while 
the sector conta i ni ng the record compani es wi th whi ch MCPS 
has no agreement shows a very large loss in six figures. The 
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royalty services sector shows a smallish loss. Overall, there 
is a small profit. The summary notes that the bottom end of 
the commercial sound recordings market represents a totally 
cost ineffective operation and a 50% commission would still 
not solve the problem. But, as with the field force, loss of 
this operation would be sorely felt. It is suggested that if 
publishers and composers want MCPS to continue with this 
operation, they might be asked to pay a greater percentage of 
the cost. The costing exercise represents, if nothing else, a 
pOint of discussion drawing attention as it does to a number 
of points worthy of further study. It raises a number of 
questions of importance and illustrates many of the problems 
MCPS encounters - should it jettison the loss-making areas and 
just concentrate on the profitable ones or continue with its 
industry functions? Is there a better way of financing the 
work? The exercise, however, was very judgemental and 
subjective in its allocation of costs so it can only show 
orders of magnitude not detailed situations. Thus, one should 
not pay too much attention to small losses and profits since 
the margin of error could take them either way. 
Efficiency versus Effectiveness 
One has to say that MCPS has not always been the most 
efficient of organisations, although things do seem to be 
changing. The cost-revenue ratio is much higher at MCPS than 
at the other two collecting societies. As to effectiveness, 
there is, of course, always room for improvement in the 
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objective of II max imising the net income of all copyright 
owners by offering services which can be economically and 
commercially justified ll • The word to note here is II all II 
copyright owners which no doubt could be used to justify MCPS 
involvement in the low income sectors and its industry 
services but as we have seem some of its activities are just 
not cost effective. How does this square with the later part 
of the objective of "offering services which can be 
economically and commercially justified"? And it is just 
these sectors whi ch reduce MCPS I effi c i ency by putting up 
the cost-revenue ratio. In interview, it was stated that 
MCPS attempts to be both effective and efficient although 
measurement of both is elusive and very subjective. It was 
noted that "distribution of every single penny to every 
ri ghtful copyri ght owner" coul d be described as effi ci ent by 
one member and inefficient by another, but Management, 
Executive and the Board try to reach a consensus as to "what 
is achievable, practical and worthwhile" 67 • As regards 
enforcement of the mechanical right, MCPS has· to decide 
whether it is worth it in each individual case. MCPS is 
frustrated in this because it does not own the copyright and 
has to sue in the name of the copyri ght owner, accordi ng to 
his instructions. One of the main problems is in ascertaining 
title to a work, proving that a certain person is the 
copyri ght owner and havi ng the necessary paperwork to prove 
the passing of title. In general, title is put in doubt in 
court cases. MCPS spends about £50,000 a year in legal fees 
and some members of staff spend most of thei r time deal; ng 
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with such problems. MCPS is not obliged to take legal action 
- in general, it would not take such action if the cost of 
doing so exceeded the benefit, although benefit does not just 
cover monetary benefit. MCPS might, for example, take such 
action if it wanted to justify a principle or set a precedent. 
The case has to be argued on an individual basis, which is an 
inefficient way of doing things but is necessary because it 
has not to date been poss i b 1 e to reach a consensus on an 
overall basis. 
MCPS has attempted to improve its effectiveness and 
effi ciency greatly in recent years wi th the effects bei ng 
particularly felt from 1981 onwards. Virtually every major 
position in the organisation was changed from 1976 onwards. 
Thi s meant that MCPS was very i nexperi enced in the industry 
because it had an entirely new management team. This 
accounts for many of the poor recent results, but the changes 
do seem to have been necessary and the benefits of the 
changes are just starting to accrue now. The new management 
team had to make a number of very difficult, expedient 
decisions at the time and MCPS is still paying the price for 
these to an extent but the price is falling as time goes by. 
The organisation is now looking forward, not back, is more 
sophisticated and professional in how it carries out its 
activities and has introduced a number of new internal 
systems adding to effectiveness and efficiency which have 
a 1 ready been dealt wi th. The structure of the company was 
completely reorganised. Everyone now knows exactly what they 
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are supposed to be doing, whereas before there was apparently 
some ambiguity in job assignments and titles. It has taken a 
number of years for MCPS to come to terms with the widespread 
changes wh i ch took place in the organ i sa t ion, to develop the 
necessary experience and reach the top of the learning curve. 
The copyri ght system is very comp 1 ex and produces very novel 
problems, so there is a longer learning curve than in most 
industries. The organisational structure at MCPS was changed 
approximately every 6 months in the space of two years because 
of the move to the new premises and of the mess MCPS was in. 
It is just starting to stabilise the situation it inherited in 
1977, which was not a very easy job considering the problems 
it had but more change obvi ous ly cannot be ru 1 ed out. The 
organisational change followed a structured, prograrrvned, 
gradua 1 approach. I t was dec i ded not to change everythi ng 
dramatically in one go because it was felt that this was only 
really possible if you have a good staff who know exactly what 
they are doing - but this was not really the case at MCPS. To 
change everyth i ng in one go, it was felt, wou 1 d have been 
unduly dangerous. The first major change followed the move in 
July 1981 with minor adjustments since. There was a major 
re-organisation of responsibilities with one of the first 
moves being recruitment of a Deputy Managing Director, who is 
also the Financial Controller and Company Secretary (this is 
Mr. Lowde). The Deputy Managing Director tends to concentrate 
more on the internal organisation and working of the company, 
whi 1 e the Managi ng Di rector looks outwards and deals wi th 
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MCPS' relationships with customers, members, other 
organisations and the like. 
Mr. Lowde is responsible for cost control - for example, staff 
salary increases have to be approved by him, while other costs 
are controlled by him or the Board. Accounts are prepared 
monthly and the Executive Team has to ensure that costs are 
within budget and make any adjustments needed. The major cost 
is staff. The Board form a sub committee each year to review 
salaries and recommend a percentage increase. 
The next area in which MCPS wants to improve its efficiency 
is in its documentation and this is related to 
computerisation. It realises that it is rather inefficient 
in th is area but no more so than its members or even the 
other collecting societies. The data MCPS receives from its 
members is not always very good and any mistakes contained in 
it may be compounded when MCPS puts it on the computer or in 
its index. MCPS has 2 million titles to deal with, the 
quality of the information varying greatly. Another problem 
may arise from different versions of the same title. It was 
noted that there are two rna in ways of getti ng i nformati on 
ready for the computer. One may get all the ti tl es ready in 
a useable form first, before putting anything on the computer, 
which may take a number of years to achieve, or one may get 
the information in a useable form and then put it on the 
computer immediately as one goes along. MCPS is using the 
second approach and has already put on some of the titles. It 
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recei ves 100,000 new ti tl es a year but only about 6% of its 
total number of titles are used each year. At present, it has 
about 32,000 works on the database on whi ch MCPS has full 
ownership details around the World and MCPS has decided to 
only put on the computer those works whi ch are used a lot. 
Thus, it will have a partly manual, partly computerised 
system. The capacity of the database is virtually unlimited, 
however, and will include 500,000 works at various levels of 
completion, the lowest level being just the title and 
interested parties in the UK known. The problem was in 
deciding how much time and effort to expend to sort everything 
out and whether it was worth investing a lot of resources in 
it. It does seem, however, that a partly computerised, partly 
manual system is rather strange, one might almost say 
inefficient since it will be necessary to go to the database 
first and then if the title is not in this to search through 
the manual system. However, the staff using the database 
would eventually come to know by memory the most popular 
titles on the computer, which would reduce time and effort 
wasted in 1 ooki ng in both the computer and manual index 
system; nor is there anything which says that the search 
through the database and the manual system has to be 
sequential .. one coul d get someone else to look through the 
other system. In any case, MCPS has estimated that it would 
take over 400 man years to fully database its repertoire. On 
the computer itself, each work has a tune code which 
identifies the musical work and a member code which gives 
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information on the copyright owner and the person(s) to whom 
the royalties are to be paid. 
MCPS has recently carri ed out a Resources and Revenue Rev; ew 
involving discussions with managers as to the resources 
(usually human) they were likely to need in the future. As a 
result, it soons intends taking on 27 new people. It;s 
believed that MCPS can afford these new resources out of the 
new revenues generated by the improvement in the organisation 
in every area. In 1983, following the Review, there was a 
. 
programmed over-budget. Investment in new areas ;s 
particularly important to MCPS, especially since MCPS has to 
invest in order to obtain a mandate from its members to 
collect in those areas in future. The extent of this 
investment will obviously affect MCPS' costs and cost-revenue 
relationships. The new systems MCPS has introduced allows it 
lito monitor the company's financial activities, determine its 
potential and appropriate resources accordingly"68. 
One view put forward was that it is difficult for a 
copyright organisation to be efficient anyway because so often 
in the field creation comes first and business acumen second. 
In addition, the majority of MCPS' members are music 
publishers and MCPS performs a number of administrative tasks 
that the publishers used to do and does them just as well and 
just as cheaply. Thus, MCPS represents something of a 
competitor to the music publishers since it may take work 
away from them and the more efficient it becomes the greater 
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the compet it ion. One of the rna in requ i reme:nts of copyri ght 
owners is for someone to look after and administer the 
copyright so that they do not have to bother with all the 
problems - and MCPS can do this just as we:ll as, probably 
better than, a publisher. MCPS is constantly trying to 
persuade pub 1 i shers that it is better to put thei r money 
through it than do the work themselves. MCPS faces a rather 
novel situation with the shareholders being the major 
customers and it being in competition with those shareholders 
for the available business. The different markets in which 
MCPS operates are each very different in nature and size and 
rather complex and in each case it is dealing with businesses 
whi ch get a product to its users (consumers) in di fferent 
ways and it does not deal with the actual user (consumer) of 
the product. MCPS is constantly trying to serve a number of 
different, often conflicting, interests. The organisations 
MCPS deals with vary from large to very small with different 
object; ves, methods of fi nance, type of customer, purpose of 
end product and so forth. This is all in addition to the 
problem of piracy and politics, internal and external. 
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DIAGRAM 5.14 - MCPS ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
MANAGING DIRECTOR 
I J -_ .. - ~ ~ ,-, 
FINANCIAL CONTROLLER COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS CONTROLLER OF REPERTOIRE 
COMPANY SECRETARY/ CONTROLLER AND COMPUTER OPERATIONS 
DEPUTY MANAGING DIRECTOR 
' I ' ~ ~
MEMBERSHIP IRISH OFFICE ACCOUNTS 
AND OFFICE SERVICES 
DISTRIBUTION 
AUDIT 
SERVICES 
COMMERCIAL 
RECORDINGS 
CREDIT INTERNAL 
CONTROL AUDIT 
LICENSING 
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REPERTOIRE 
MAINTENANCE 
VIDEO 
LICENSING 
REPERTOIRE 
SERVICES 
SYSTEftJS 
AND 
PROGRAMMING 
FIELD FORCE 
COMPUTER 
OPERATIONS 
DIAGRAM 5.15 MCPS POLICY MAKING 
IMPA COUNCILl(Parent Company) 
MPA appoints a NON EXECUTIVE BOARD FOR MCPS 
which determines MCPS policy. Members of the 
Board only go to Board meetings and assist -
they do not take part in the general running 
of MCPS. Implementation of policy is vested 
in the Executive Team which consists of:-
THE MANAGING DIRECTOR who is a full time Executive and also a member of the Board. 
I I I 
COMPANY SECRETARY/ COMMERCIAL CONTROLLER OF REPERTOIRE 
FINANCIAL CONTROLLER/ OPERATIONS & COMPUTER OPERATIONS 
DEPUTY MANAGING DIRECTOR CONTROLLER (COMPUTER & INDEX) 
Assisting the Executive Team, but separate from it are: 
SPECIAL PROJECTS CONTROLLER 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS EXECUTIVE - who maintains working relationships with foreign societies 
PERSONNEL CONTROLLER 
These three posts have virtually no staff. They work individually whereas the executives work as a team. 
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ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE & MANAGEMENT 
Diagram 5.14 shows the organisational structure at MCPS and 
diagram 5.15 illustrates how the Music Publishers Association 
can influence MCPS policy. MCPS has a non-executive Board of 
twel ve Di rectors appoi nted by the MPA Council whi ch 
determi nes pol icy and strategy and moni tors performance 
against this. In April 1984, the Board was enlarged from 
seven to include two more pub 1 i sher members and to introduce 
three writer representatives for the first time. Each member 
of the Board retires every 3 years. In general, the MPA does 
not get involved in MCPS policy although there has sometimes 
been friction between the MPA Council and the Board. There 
is, however, a liaison committee with the MPA in case 
anythi ng of a controvers i a 1 nature comes up. The Managi ng 
Director is the only full-time executive of the Board. Below 
the Board is the Executive Team consisting of the Managing 
Director, the Company Secretar.y/Financia1 Controller/Deputy 
Managing Director (the same person), the Commercial 
Operat ions Contro 11 er and the Contro 11 er of Repertoi re and 
Computer Operations. Implementation of policy is vested in 
the hands of the Executive Team which heavily influences 
Board policy. There were major changes in organisational 
structure at MCPS in 1982 and minor changes since, 
restricted, if possible , to January and June to provide at 
least some stability and lito keep the staff feeling 
comfortable ll69 • A few poi nts to note about the 
organisational structure are that the Controller of 
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Repertoire and Computer Operations has two parts to his job _ 
dea 1 i ng wi th the computer and database si de of the 
organisation and with the index system. II Systems and 
Programming" and IIComputer Operations ll is the computer side; 
"Repertoire Maintenance", (which involves "loading and 
maintaining members works and agreements on the computer ll )70, 
and Repertoire Services (which involves lIinterpretation of 
complex ownership structures including foreign claims and 
documentation ll )71 is the index side. On the index side, it 
was noted by MCPS that documentati on i nvo 1 ves both quanti ty 
and qual i ty. Repertoi re Maintenance corresponds to quantity 
and Repertoire Services to quality. How best to organise the 
Repertoi re Ma i ntenance functi on is regarded as one of the 
most important questions for the future. The Credit Control 
function involves collection of royalties and fees while 
Membership and Distribution is concerned with registration of 
members and allocation of royalties. The Internal Audit 
function deals with "quality control of all information 
processing systems II and Audit Services with "investigation 
and audit of uses of recorded music" 72 . MCPS is organised by 
function and span of management seems not to be excessive. 
One suggestion 1 put to Mr. Lowde was whether MCPS had 
cons i dered us i ng a system of proj ect management wh i ch seems 
to be geared to fast moving environments creating lots of 
novel problems. Proj ect Management i nvo 1 ves a normal 
structure of, for example, division of task by function, but 
superimposed on thi sis another structure centred around a 
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seri es of projects and project managers who can gather round 
them personnel from the various functions to develop a 
project team. This has the advantage of enhancing 
effectiveness and objective achievement as well as making 
reaction to new problems quicker even though it may be at the 
cost of some ambiguity in role definition and some loss of 
effi ci ency. Mr. Lowde exp 1 a i ned that there had not as yet 
been a system of project management at MCPS because it was 
felt not to suit the size of the company and its style of 
management, but that 1 imited project management is about to 
be introduced to tackle the next level of problems. It 
certa in ly seems true that project management is most 
effective in large organisations, not small ones like MCPS. 
It was felt by Mr. Lowde that the time available also 
necessitated against such a system. Time was so valuable and 
there was so much to do that it was not possible to have the 
large number of meetings required to explore new ideas. It 
seems true that project management leads to a large number of 
meetings, rather too many in fact. Mr. Lowde thought project 
management required very careful control and that it led to 
rather too much talking and not enough achieving. At the 
time that the new management took over, MCPS was at a stage 
in its development where it was more interested in achieving 
than anything else. It had some very severe problems which 
needed dealing with immediately. There was no time to debate 
the solution to the problem. Time was of the essence. 
Instructions were issued to achieve specific results. If you 
have experi ence of such s i tuati ons and know what you are 
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doing, you do not debate the issue, you take action. In such 
cases, project management is totally i nappropri ate - acti on 
is required and fast. Some form of dictatorship is 
essential. Quick decisions have to be taken even if these 
are later found to be wrong. MCPS is now moving away from a 
sys tern of di ctatori a 1 management because it has achi eved a 
certain amount of success in combatting its problems, rooted 
out weak management and improved management in general 
through a mixture of on-the-job and selective off-the-job 
training, movement of managers between functions and 
increased delegation of authori ty, so that it can now deal 
with less severe problems and can afford to adopt a different 
managerial style. The other managers can be relied on more 
now because they are more competent than previously and there 
is no need to be as autocratic. It will be interesting to 
see how MCPS changes under such a new management and what 
problems are encountered. In fact, it is very difficult to 
know exactly what type of structure is best sui ted to MCPS 
since it is such a peculiar animal - "su i generis", one on 
its own, is one phrase often used to describe collecting 
societies, requiring a certain type of knowledge and unique 
qualities, and capabilities. Mr. Lowde's management 
p'hilosophy is best described as lIentrepreneurial" and would 
seem to be more of an autocratic nature than democratic. As 
he sa i d himself, an entrepreneur woul d not thi nk along the 
1 i nes of project management - he is the project manager 
himself and does not use anyone else. He said that MCPS 
consists of a series of mini dictatorships and he believes in 
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giving people their heads and giving them a lot of scope for 
individual initiative while monitoring everything carefully. 
This even goes as far as deliberately stirring things up and 
creating situations while making sure that things do not go 
too far by monitoring events. The first thing Mr. Lowde did 
when he joined MCPS was to ban all meetings and committees. 
There are no company committees at MCPS with one exception _ 
the Staff Council. Members may form committees but these are 
industry committees or committees formed to look after 
specific interests - such as the Library Publishers Committee 
- and the management may meet wi th these, but they are not 
company committees. The Staff Council meets each month and 
tell s seni or management of general staff requ i rements and 
grievances but it does not negotiate salary structures. 
Meetings and committees are kept to a minimum because it is 
felt that they produce few results and waste rather too much 
time. Major problems are resolved by heads of department or 
controllers. I put it to Mr. Lowde that many of MCPS 1 
advantages arose from the fact that it was a relatively small 
organisation and that many of these advantages would 
disappear as MCPS grew larger. In reply, it was felt that 
the management techniques applied by large firms should be 
largely the same as those of small firms and that the 
problems arose when the top of the organisation became 
divorced from the bottom, regardless of size. The problem 
of scale is a matter of forgetting when you are at the top 
of the organisation what it is like at the bottom. The major 
advantage of being large in the industry was that it gave you 
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more Iclout l and meant you could use specialists full time in 
specific areas. Smaller organisations had less clout and 
executives were less specialised and had to perform a broader 
variety of functions and had wider responsibilities but lines 
of communication were shorter, and easier to control and less 
subject to distortion making implementation of policy easier. 
When the MPA took over in 1976, management consul tants were 
called in to look at the organisation and many of the 
recommendations were implemented but in general MCPS believes 
that it can identify and solve its own problems and does not 
see the need for management consul tants. The company does 
use market research companies, however. 
Different parts of the organisation deal with different 
sectors of the mus i c industry so they have di fferent 
objecti ves. However, there is no conflict of interest 
between what the di fferent 'parts of the organi sati on do and 
there is interdependence between the objecti ves. The 
resources devoted to each objecti ve and each department 
depends on how MCPS looks at the situation at the time but it 
tries to take the industry vi ew if it can. The Manager of 
each department or group of departments has a job 
specification stating the main purpose of the job and 
specific responsibilities. Certain departments are also 
given specific financial objectives and targets. The 
Commercial Operations Controller and Financial Controller 
work together closely to decide a reasonable target for 
invoicing and collecting royalties and these targets are set 
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for each department for which the Commercial Operations 
Controller has responsibility. The exception is overseas 
income which MCPS is not readily able to control or 
influence, so no target is set for this. Each Executive who 
has departments to run (as we have seen there are only three 
executives) is responsible for achieving the company's 
objectives individually and as part of the Executive Team and 
they work closely together, and wi th the Managi ng Oi rector. 
Allocation of resources within the organisation is discussed 
regularly by the Team. The Revenue and Resources Review 
arose from the Executive Team asking the next line of 
managers to report on thei r own departments' resource 
requirements and potential and on that of each others' 
operati ons and it resul ted in the Board approvi ng an extra 
budget of £300,000 mainly for recruitment. No financial or 
other incentives and benefits are used to encourage staff to 
reach their targets on the basis that "good management does 
not need an incentive". Staff are expected to have pride in 
the company and in reaching targets, which should be 
incentive enough. Constant monitoring by the Executive is 
one form of i ncenti ve, however, and further i ncenti ves are 
being considered. The main problem is finding criteria which 
are generally useable and applicable in all the different 
areas in which MCPS operates and into which it is divided and 
one must guard against the incentive system working against 
you resulting in conflicts of interest. Unless an incentive 
scheme is systemi sed and made generally app 1 i cab 1 e through 
-out the organisation, ill-feeling may be generated which 
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one must guard against the incentive system working against 
you resulting in conflicts of interest. Unless an incentive 
scheme ;s systemised and made generally applicable throughout 
the organisation, ill-feeling may be generated which will 
defeat the object of the exercise ultimately. Performance of 
individual managers is mainly monitored through contact with 
them, contact whi ch is eas i er ina sma 11 organ; sati on, and 
this is an on-going process. There are regular informal 
discussions with managers and yearly formal performance 
appraisals with superiors, the aim being to ensure that 
personnel are managing and supervising effectively. As far 
as possible the monitoring is done in such a way that it does 
not interfere with the day-to-day running of the 
organisation. Company performance is monitored carefully by 
the Board on the basis of information provided by the 
accounts department. There is a lot of interdependence 
between departments, so interaction and liaison between 
departmental heads is common and MCPS would like to develop a 
team spirit. Before the move to one location, it was the 
case that departments could and did form their own autonomous 
units, there was empire building and interaction and liaison 
between departments was not all it should have been. The 
move and re-organi sati on has improved 'communi cati on and 
broken down many of the barriers which previously existed, 
making MCPS operate much more as a team. A few members of the 
management have management experience outside MCPS but 
not many. The Executive Team, however, was recruited from 
outs i de the company and they all have management experi ence 
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outside the industry. MCPS uses a mixture of internally-bred 
managers and personnel recruited from outside MCPS. It ; s 
now consciously trying to train staff in management 
Performance appraisal identifies the techniques selectively. 
tra i ni ng needs of rna nagers and appropri ate tra i ni ng courses 
are selected where these are thought worthwhil e. MCPS does 
not usually recruit personnel from the music industry because 
of the peculiarities of its business and the special 
qua 1 i ti es needed. Some members of staff do have experi ence 
of the music industry, but not as a rule. A large part of 
the music industry is concerned with the creative/promotional 
side rather than the administrative side with which MCPS is 
involved. It is very difficult for MCPS to recruit managers 
from outside the copyright field because it is a very 
unusual, specialised area and there are few people with the 
necessary experience. Thus, MCPS tends to develop its own 
managers internally. 
MCPS is gradually trying to raise its profile in the market. 
However, it is severely constrained in what it can do in the 
field of marketing because of its relationship with its 
members and shareholders. It cannot be seen to carve up 
their business since by signing up composers, MCPS is taking 
away business from its publisher members. Thus, MCPS cannot 
solicit composer membership and has to use a low profile 
publicity campaign. Its relationship with copyright users is 
currently under revi ew. MCPS does not therefore acti ve ly 
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look for new members, especially since individual composers 
cost a lot relatively to represent so it is not really in the 
company's interest to go after them. However, all publishers 
should know that MCPS exists and generally belong to it so as 
to share in blanket licence (broadcasting) income. MCPS is 
trying to increase its credibility and respect in the 
industry and awareness of it is growing. It used to be 
somethi ng of a joke but thi sis no longer the case and the 
situation definitely seems to be getting better. MCPS is 
more interested in its reputation and awareness in the market 
that in awareness amongst the public since public awareness 
will not increase its revenue because MCPS does not deal or 
negotiate with the general public. It is only in specific 
areas such as home taping that the public has to be made 
aware. 
MISCELLANEOUS POINTS ON DISTRIBUTION 
Work comi ng into MCPS for process i ng is broken down into 
batches so that if problems are encountered or mistakes made 
(in which case work on a particular batch may have to be 
temporarily stopped) this does not foul up the whole system 
and all work does not have to cease. Most of the money MCPS 
distributes goes to publishers and there is no limit to the 
publisher's share (it may be 100%, for example). This 
di fferenti ates MCPS from PRS, where the maximum pub 1 i sher 
share is 50%. 
Page 440 
The main processing workers aim at speed and accuracy. 
However, if the copyright owner of a particular piece of 
music cannot be identified or relevant information is misSing 
so that the full process cannot be carried out, for example, 
then the c 1 aim wi 11 go into interim suspense - it wi 11 be 
left aside so that someone else can look at it and spend more 
time on it. MCPS also has a royalty research department 
which investigates royalties which have been wrongly paid or 
not paid at all when they should have been. The most often 
used s o u r c ~ ~ of information is index cards although, as we 
have seen, MCPS is computerising its processes very quickly. 
In many cases, where there is doubt or confusion or where the 
cost of processing or investigation is disproportionately 
high, expedient measures may have to be taken as with small 
claims, for example. The minimum figure below which MCPS 
will not distribute royalties owing because the cost would be 
disproportionately high usually depends on the circumstances 
of the case. Royalties and fees which are below £15 for UK 
resident members and £30 for non-UK resident members are 
carried forward to the next distribution until the gross 
value exceeds these figures. If the individual royalty line 
value (or title total, when this is supplied) for royalties 
from UK and Irish commercial record companies or overseas is 
less than £1, it will not be distributed, but it is credited 
as MCPS income. 50% of a 11 the 1 i nes MCPS processes are 
under £3. In addi t ion, PPL pays 8% of its gross revenue to 
MCPS each year - about half a million pounds - and this is 
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included in the figure for broadcasting. This is just an 
historical throwback arising from a de facto agreement 
between the two societies dating back to the Second World 
War. Station identification music only counts half a point 
for each 30 seconds of background music, (as against the 
normal one point). Accounts held in suspense because of lack 
of information are made available to members at the MPA 
offices in some cases. Sometimes sums of money are 
unallocable, in which case the Board will decide what to do 
with the money - for example, it may be given to impecunious 
composers. 
THE LICENSING REPRESENTATIVES 
Like PRS but un 1 i ke PPL, MCPS has a number of 1 i cens i ng 
representatives, whose job it is to enforce and police the 
mechanical right in their specified area. MCPS has 6 of 
these representatives - one covering the North East, one the 
North West, one London, one the South, one Ireland and one 
Scot 1 and. There is also a di fference between MCPS' 
representatives and PRS' since MCPS uses them to police the 
law, survey markets, educate, identify infringements, resolve 
problems of procedure, and collect debts, while PRS uses them 
to sell licences as well. 
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LICENSING, NEGOTIATION AND TARIFICATION POLICY 
In negot i at ions, MCPS sees i tse 1 f as a go between for the 
copyri ght owner and the user. I t does not set the rate but 
it may influence it. The user may ask 'what does MCPS 
usually charge for such and such a use?' so MCPS may 
i nf1 uence the outcome thi sway. I n genera 1, MCPS is just a 
jobber, influencing the rate through negotiation. The main 
principle underlying MCPS' tariffs is the immediacy of a 
market, the existence of a market. Where there is a market, 
MCPS will have a tariff (remember the difference in the term 
'tariff' between MCPS and PRS). Different people put 
different values on their copyrights. A member may even say 
that he will not allow a certain use of his music because it 
would, or might, damage the long-term commercial value of the 
copyright. MCPS has no licensing policy as such because it 
acts accordi ng to members' mandates, although it does work 
carefully with industry interests. Acting on behalf of its 
members, MCPS monitors use of recorded music and where a use 
is unlicensed may take action but only if the members' 
mandate a 11 ows. 
MRS involvement in negotiation is not direct since the direct 
right of negotiation is delegated by MRS to MCPS although the 
right to negotiate rests with MRS. Once negotiations are 
concluded, MCPS goes back to the MRS Council and explains 
what it has done. MRS delegates the day-to-day operations to 
MCPS. Its only real function is negotiation for industry 
interests. 
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A single person from the licensing department, a negotiator, 
will deal with matters where individual licences are involved 
and there are seven such negotiators. Where the 
negotiations are for major licences such as blanket licences 
wi th the broadcasters, the Managi ng Oi rector takes charge 
aided by 2 - 4 people often with additional research help. 
Negotiations are discussed with copyright owners beforehand 
on the basis that lIany negotiator will seek to provide 
himself with as much information as possible about the market 
place ll so that IIhe can carry out his function effectively"73. 
A vital part of such information is the value of the use of 
the music. The aim is to make as much money as possible for 
the copyright owner for the least amount of work and cost in 
terms of administration in collection and distribution 
although the use must not be excessive or it may not occur at 
all. Negotiations revolve around what rights are to be 
included and their value. MCPS may commission reports and 
surveys before negotiation if this is likely to help, 
sometimes from outside bodies. Preparations for negotiations 
generally depend on the type of negotiation involved. In the 
simple case of a low value individual licence, a user will 
want to use a copyri ght owned by an MCPS member and the 
negoti ator uses lIexperi ence and knowl edge ll to determi ne the 
royalty rate the owner requires for the use of his copyright 
work. II Hi s research is immedi ate and short 1 ived ll • For 
major negotiations, a lot of preparation is required with a 
lot of time and effort expended. For thi s, sometimes MCPS 
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deals with a number of different people to establish a 
recommended rate for the use. This involves market research, 
use of the field force to gather information, discussions 
wi th copyri ght owners and users, compa ri sons wi th overseas, 
analysis of internal records to work out use values, studies 
of the other party'S position and ability to pay, developing 
a negotiating strategy and so forth. The aim is to determine 
the various arguments for and against the use and the value 
of the copyri ght. Usua lly, negoti ati ons are rehearsed to 
cover all points of view. 
MEMBERSHIP 
The membership agreement differentiates between composers and 
publishers but MCPS does not consciously act differently for 
different types of member. Publ ishers, though, can choose 
whether they are on Tariff A or B while composers are 
automatically on Tariff A and they cannot exclude any record 
companies - MCPS collects all composers' royalties. In all, 
MCPS has about 10,000 members of which 4,500 are publisher 
members and 5,500 composer members but most of the money, 
about 80%, is distributed to publishers. 
ATTITUDE TO OTHER SOCIETIES 
There is a lot of co-operation between PRS and MCPS but not a 
lot between PPL and MCPS. A generally expressed view was that 
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PPL was rather a secretive organisation and that not a lot 
was known about it. It was thought that MCPS _ PRS 
co-operation resulted from the fact that PRS and MCPS dealt 
wi th the two most 1 i ke ly causes of copyri ght i nfri ngement _ 
recording and public performance/broadcasting of music. MCPS 
is somewhat frustrated in its dealings with PRS because the 
chain of command at PRS is long so that often decisions take 
a long time to be made and implemented because no-one seems 
sure who should be making the decision. This was an often 
mentioned criticism. It was also thought that PRS was rather 
more of a political organisation than a commercial one and 
that its commerci a 1 moti ves were somewhat muted. One sign 
cited of discontent at PRS was the existence of a union. A 
further criticism was that PRS was so large and powerful that 
it could really buy its way out of trouble so that it did not 
have to be parti cul arly cost-consci ous. It was genera lly 
thought that the collecting societies did not view themselves 
as being in competition with each other because they all 
dealt with different rights but one does get the impression 
that there is a certain amount of rivalry and in some cases 
the societies do confront each other in the market, as in the 
broadcasting field, and settlement of royalties with one 
society may, in practice, affect the size of the royalty to 
another, although in theory this should not happen because a 
royalty has to be paid for each act restricted by law. 
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THE FUTURE 
MCPS needs and wants more money go; ng through the soci ety, 
through increased commission, and it wants to extend its 
contro lover its sphere of acti vi ty , increase its rna ndate 
from members, and be stronger. At present, it can influence 
the smaller publishers quite well and has 100% of members' 
mandates in the broadcasting market but the situation in the 
UK at the moment is rather patchy and slightly confused so 
quite a few infringements slip through the net and people 
avoid paying royalties which are payable. There is no one 
organi sat; on strong enough to wi e 1 d power and confront and 
take the situation in hand, although PRS comes nearest. It 
was stated that MCPS did not want to be a monopoly provided 
it had sufficient money without this to be able to carryon 
its operations successfully - it did not want to be a 
-
monopoly just for the sake of the resultant power. Too much 
money was spent on administration in the field. It would be 
much better to centralise the whole process more, ideally on 
an international basis, with just one Central European 
collecting society. This is highly unlikely, however -
imagine the politics involved in such an idea. It is in 
peoples' interests for there to be a· powerful central 
organisation to an extent because the entertainments industry 
is becomi ng more and more fragmented due to new technology 
and, it was suggested, records are losing their selling 
power. Users and copyright owners find themselves 
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increasingly unsure and uncertain about what to do with 
copyrights - how to clear them, collect royalties, find the 
associated documentation and so forth. It is in the 
interests of the music business for music to be used but if 
people are discouraged from using it because of uncertainty 
and administrative problems, the great potential increases in 
revenue wi 11 not be forthcomi n9 (there is also the oppos i te 
problem t of course, that people may react to such uncertainty 
and difficulties by ignoring copyright law and go ahead with 
the use anyway). 
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CHAPTER 6 
PHONOGRAPHIC PERFORMANCE LIMITED 
Phonographi c Performance Ltd (PPL) is the smallest of the 
three UK collecting societies operating in the music field 
(in terms of staff and revenue collected) and seems to be 
regarded with a certain amount of suspicion by the other two. 
It seems to have a reputation as rather a secretive 
organisation and there have been problems of communication 
with other organisations, although the situation does seem to 
be getting better. Since it deals with Ineighbouring rights' 
it has 1 ess contact wi th the rest of the copyri ght worl d, 
that is with those who only regard Part I works (and perhaps 
cinematographic works) as IItrue" copyright works in that they 
are really creative works whereas most Part II works are 
(they say) merely industrial products or mechanical works. 
PPL • s rna in obj ecti ve is to secure the greatest amount of 
revenue for the rights aSSigned to it by its member companies 
and to distribute such sums to them1. British producers of 
sound recordings (record companies) assign the rights of 
public performance and broadcasting of their sound recordings 
(this covers discs and tapes) to PPL, which licenses such 
use. The system is one of collective licensing with all the 
advantages that entails and most of PPL's licences are 
blanket, so that in return for a royalty, the licensee has 
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use of the entire PPL repertoire. In rare cases, only a 
limited licence is given where dubbing of specific items of 
the repertoi re ; s i nvo 1 ved, such as for comrnerci a 1 
promotional exercises and political campaigns. However, 
there is a very big constraint on PPL's activities in view of 
its relationship with the Musicians' Union concerning 
employment of musicians as a condition of the use of records 
in certain circumstances. Thus, a sub- objective of PPl is 
to look after the legitimate interests of musicians in the 
field. PPL's conditions for issuing licences, however, never 
call for replacement of musicians for records. If it is a 
condition of the licence that musicians be employed, however, 
this may be in addition to or in replacement of records, 
dependi ng on the user's needs and resources. It is hi s 
decision. In many cases, use of live music will not even 
apply such as for background music systems. 
Like all the collecting societies, PPL is a non-profit making 
organisation. In its field, PPL has an effective monopoly in 
that virtually all UK record companies belong to it and its 
only competition comes from public domain, out of copyright 
records and library music which is in copyright. Since it 
takes an as s i gnment of the ri ghts concerned, it can sue as 
pri nci pa 1, in its own name, and does not have to act as an 
agent like MCPS. This gives it much more scope for action. 
PPL regards itself a.s a business but, as already mentioned, 
it is difficult for collecting societies to act as ordinary 
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bus i nesses because there are too many constra i nts, too many 
political rather than commercial decisions made and artistic 
creation and business are difficult bedfellows. PPL, though, 
seems to regard i tse 1 f more as a commerci a 1 enterpri se than 
the other two societies, however, and this may be borne out 
somewhat by the fact that all PPLls members are record 
companies managed by businessmen rather than creators of 
musical works. They are more likely to instil a conrnercial 
attitude into their organisation (PPL). MCPS, too, is 
dominated by the music publishers whom one would expect to 
have a similar approach, although its agency relationship 
with its members is a severe constraint in this respect. 
PRS, on the other hand, seems to be more of a composer IS 
organisation, although the publishers have an equal say, and 
here the commercial-artistic attitude may meet head-on and 
cause conflict, although one would not expect a composer or 
author who joined PRS to be totally naive commercially. In 
any case, PRS is there primarily to collect money. PPL 
appa rent ly does not look on copyd ght from any ethi ca 1 or 
mora 1 poi nt of vi ew but as a commerci a 1 transacti on to be 
performed. Certain rights have been given by statute and PPL 
is there to co 11 ect the revenue accru i ng from the copyri ght 
owner1s exploitation of those rights. 
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History 
PPL was formed in 1934 following the case of Gramophone 
Company V Carwardine (which concerned public performance of a 
record in a West of England restaurant2) and before that the 
development of electrical recording and reproduction. In the 
case above, it was alleged that under S19(1) of the 1911 
Copyright Act, there was a public performance right in 
records. McFarlane3 notes that before the 1909 Copyright 
Commi ttee, gramophone manufactu rers had said that a person 
who bought a gramophone record a 1 so acqu i red a ri ght of 
public performance in that record so that he could play it in 
public or private and did not have to pay any more money in 
the form of royalties for- such pub 1 i c performance. 
Apparently, this was accepted as the position by everyone. 
It was, until the time of the Carwardine case, thought that 
the Section only gave protection to record manufacturers 
against copying of their records, to prevent piracy4 - that 
it only gave a reproducti on ri ght, not a pub 1 i c performance 
right. Until then, the record manufacturers seemingly 
regarded public performance as a great advertisement for the 
record and the composer5 McFarl ane 6 suggests that by the 
early thirties, the recession had begun to hit record sales 
and the record companies looked around for another source of 
income, noting the success of PRS and the large-scale use of 
records in broadcasting. Interested groups thought the lack 
of control over publ ic performances of records to be "an 
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objectionable restraint on their opportunities to secure 
additional profits7• In the Carward' . lne case, lt was decided 
that there was a public performance in records after all and 
thi s was gi ven statutory form in the 1956 Act along wi th a 
broadcasting right in records. It was soon realised that it 
was better to exercise the right on a collective basis and 
PPL was formed by a number of record companies including the 
Gramophone (and Typewriter) Company (now EMI), Decca, Regal 
Zonophone, the British Crystal ate Company and British 
Honophone. 
Since its formation, PPL seems to have aroused a fair amount 
of antagonism. Many did not want the record companies to 
have a publ ic performance right at all, on the basis that 
records are not artistic creations, only mechanical devices, 
while others were only prepared to grant a right to 
remuneration for public performance rather than the right to 
control it. In essence, formation of PPL turned it into a 
ri ght to t' 8 remunera 10n anyway . The right has similarly been 
accepted and a soci ety formed in a number of countries such 
as Australia, West Germany, India, New Zealand and in the 
S d " t' 9 can lnaVlan coun rles . Opinions are divided on whether 
there is a future for the right - McFarlane thinks it has 
reached its peak and is unlikely to be introduced in many 
more countries (although he is a former employee of PRS and 
may be biased on the subject) while Mr. Rogers at PPL (who is 
likely to be equally biased) thinks it is gaining more and 
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more acceptance. Many find it difficult to come to terms 
wi th the record compani es • change of mi nd. However, PPL 
pointed out that the Green Paper states, in its rejection of 
a levy on blank tapes and equipment, that the record industry 
may have to rely on income from public performance and 
broadcasting as its main source of income in the future. 
Thi s suggests that the government, at least, is sure of the 
future acceptance of the public performance and broadcasting 
right in records. The US does not have such a right. 
PPL is a company limited by guarantee and without share 
capital. At first, it was very small because when it was 
formed there were no di scotheques in the UK, no juke boxes 
and no broadcasti ng ri ght, although the SBe di d pay PPL 
royalties for playing records because it saw an equitable 
right if not a legal one. With the coming of World War II, 
use of the gramophone and records expanded greatly since many 
mus i ci ans were away fi ght i ng or enterta i ni n9 troops. 
However, even when the War was over and the musicians came 
back, sound recordings were still used on a large scale. 
Simil arly, ta 1 ki ng pi ctures put mus i c i ans out of work. The 
growth of the mass medi a and new forms of recordi ngs had 
similar effects on musicians. The result was negotiations 
between PPL and the Musicians· Union which produced an 
agreement whereby PPL woul d not authori se the use of sound 
recordings where ·'ive· musicians might otherwise have been 
used or in lieu of musicians where musicians were previously 
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used. This agreement affects the whole of PPL's operations, 
so that it cannot just maximise revenue but is constrained by 
the need to maintain the musician's position vis-a-vis 
records and to ensure that his employment is not unduly 
affected by new technology. In some cases, it even has to 
forego revenue becau se of thi s agreement so it tends to 
engage in more litigation than the other societies. One of 
the most famous resul ts of the agreement is that of "needle 
time"· under whi ch the number of hours of record broadcasti n9 
is restricted. One of the general long- standing policies of 
• 
the Musicians' Union is the elimination of the use of all 
records where musicians could be used instead, although this 
is rather an idealistic, unpragmatic view. It is an 
impossibility to totally eliminate records and the massive 
increase in the sca 1 e and size of the record industry has 
opened up many new areas and opportunities for musicians and 
others. 
PPL was also criticised by music users before the 1951 
Copyright Commission, which was concerned about the way the 
-
ri ghts had been "enforced in an arb; trary and autocrati c 
manner, with the minimum of consideration" lO • The arbitrary 
way in which licences were withheld or withdrawn was 
attacked ll • PRS, the MPA and the Songwriters Guild attacked 
the way the pub 1 i c performance of records was exerci sed on 
the basis that it affected composers' earnings through 
preventing public performance12 • In any case, the 1956 Act 
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set up the Performing Right Tribunal to adjudicate on 
di sputes between 1 i cens i ng bodi es and those requi ri ng 
licences from them. PPL and PRS, but not MCPS, are subject 
to its jurisdiction. As a result of the establishment of the 
PRT, complaints about PPL have subsided, although one cannot 
he 1 p but thi nk that PPL suffers for its past and its low 
profile contributes to its reputation for being rather 
secretive. The late 1960 ls - early 1970 ls coincided with 
many changes in the i ndustri es associ ated wi th copyri ght, 
such as the growth of discotheques, and the establishment of 
1 oca 1 radi o. I t was accepted that PPL does lag behi nd 
developments somewhat but it has changed a great deal in 
recent years because of the enormous increase in public 
performance and broadcasting of copyright works and it would 
be very difficult to react to such developments straight 
away. 
Revenue 
Table 6.1 shows PPLls performance in terms of revenue 
co 11 ected in money and real terms for the peri od 1980-1983. 
Although this covers a shorter period of time than for the 
other societies, it at least provides some idea of the main 
trends in PPLls operations. 
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YEAR GROSS REVENUE INCREASE t % INCREASEt REVENUE 
Money Termsa FALL 
-l. FALL + Real Tennsb 
(£) (£) (£ ) 
1980 6,123,340 2,322,086 
1981 6,632,723 509,383t 8.32% f 2,248,381 
1982 7,620,453 987,7301 14.89% f 2,378,419 
1983 9,005,578 1,385,1251 18.18% t 2,687,430 
TABLE 6.1: Changes in PPL's Gross Revenue, Real and Money 
Terms, 1980-83 
~ ~
Source: a - PPL Annual Reviews 1981, 1982. General Manager's 
Report 1983. 
b - calculated as in Chapter 4 
(1983 = 335.1) 
These gross revenue fi gures do not i ncl ude interest from 
investment of undistributed revenue, which is of vital 
importance for PPL in covering its costs. Over the period, 
the rise in gross revenue was £2,882,238 or 47.07% in money 
terms but only £365,344 (15.73%) in real terms. In real 
terms, revenue fell between 1980 and 1981 but this has been 
more than made up since. 
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Thus, in terms of gross revenue PPL seems t b f· 
, 0 e per Oroll n9 
pretty well. Distributions in the period were as in Table 
6.2. 
YEAR DISTRIBUTION I INCREASE t % INCREASE f DISTRIBUTION 
Money Terms a FALL oJ, FALL ~ ~ Real Terms b 
(£ ) (£) (£) 
1980 3,473,230 1,317,114 
1981 3,862,795 389,565t 11.22% t 1,309,422 
" 1982 4,622,460 759 ,665 ~ ~ 19.67%t 1,442,715 
1983 5,237,458 614,9981 13.30% t 1,562,954 
Table 6.2. Changes in PPL Distributions, Real and Money 
Terms, 1980 - 83. 
Source: a - PPL Annual Reviews 1981, 1982: General Manager's 
Report 1983. 
b - calculated as in Chapter 4. 
Over the period, PPL's distributions have grown by £1,764,228 
(50.80%) in money terms, 245,840 (18.67%) in real terms. 
These distribution figures reflect only money distributed to 
member compani es, and are after all owi n9 for money 
distributed not to members but to performers and after 
payments on beha 1 f of the industry. As we sha 11 see, PPL 
distributes part of the money it collects to named artists 
and the Musicians' Union. Some money is also given to the 
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BPI for its anti -piracy campaign in Britain (£300,000 in 
1983) and to the i nternati ona 1 federati on of record 
companies, the IFPI, for the international anti-piracy 
campaign (£35,370 in 1983)and to cover the costs of the IFPI 
operation (£167,727 in 1983). Money is also paid to the BPI 
for the IFPI Board and Conference (£5,610 in 1983). A 
constant percentage of revenue is a 1 so gi ven to the musi c 
publishers. Over the period 1980-83, distributions to 
members have grown roughly in proporti on to the growth in 
gross revenue. Thus, given the fact that the data covers 
only a relatively short period of time, PPL seems to be doing 
quite well in terms of collection and distribution. In any 
case, there is a limit on how large PPL can grow, which means 
that it is unlikely to ever grow as much as PRS since the 
amount of pub 1 i c performance and broadcasti ng of records is 
much less than that of music. 
Administration Costs 
PPL seems to have a pretty good record as regards 
administration costs when compared with the other two 
societies, although the figures for the last two years have 
put a question mark over this conclusion to an extent. 
6.3 shows how costs have changed over the period. 
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Table 
YEAR ADMIN INCREASE t % INCREASE11 ADMIN 
COSTS - Money FALL ~ ~ FALL 
'" 
COSTS-Real 
Termsa Money Terms Termsb 
(£) (£) (£) 
1980 915,498 347,174 
1981 688,169 227,329 -l.- 24.83% -t, 233,278 
1982 792,061 103,892 t 15.10% l' 247,210 
, 
1983 1,004,349 212,288 + 26.80% ~ ~ 299,716 
Table 6.3. Changes in PPL Administration Costs 1980 -83, 
Real and Money Terms 
Source: a - PPL Annual reviews 1981, 1982: General 
Manager's Report 1983. 
b - calculated as in Chapter 4 
The fall in administration costs in 1981 is attributed to the 
non-recurring expenses of the PRT by the 1981 Annual Review. 
As we can see, costs have risen rather alarmingly in the last 
couple of years but this cannot be attributed to the effects 
of inflation since this was on the way down generally during 
the period. Office running costs also remained fairly 
constant over the peri od. I n real terms, costs fell by 
nearly 33% between 1980 and 1981 and then rose by only about 
6% in 1982. Despite a large rise in real terms in 1983, 
administration costs are still not back to the level of 1980 
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in real terms. In addition, PPL still more than matches the 
other soci eti es in terms of costs as a percentage of gross 
revenue - costs represented 14.95% of gross revenue in 1980, 
10.38% in 1981, 10.39% in 1982 and 11.15% in 1983. Remember, 
too , that these fi gures for gross revenue for PPL do not 
include investment income. Including investment income in 
the fi gure for gross revenue, the fi gures for costs as a 
percentage of revenue would be - 1980 13.28%, 1981 9.32%, 
1982 9.40%, 1983 10.30%. (The figures for gross revenue plus 
investment income are 1980 £6,893,646; 1981 £7,379,968; 1982 
£8,430,558; 1983 £9,749,635). As a comparison, PRS' costs as 
a percentage of revenue in 1982 were 17.5%, the revenue 
figure including investment income. Excluding investment 
income, the figure would be 18.5% (there might be costs 
associated with investment that should be excluded from the 
cost fi gure but thi sis unl i kely to make that much of a 
difference) PRS might say that this comparison is unfair 
because its figures include overseas activities, which cost a 
disproportionate amount to administer and whose income is 
uncontrollable, whereas PPL does not engage in overseas 
operations. If we just include UK and Eire public 
performance and broadcasting income and costs for PRS, costs 
as a percentage of revenue for 1982 shoot up to 24.24% 
without investment income included and 22.42% with investment 
income included. Another point is that PPL does not operate 
in Eire, whereas PRS' does and its operations are not really 
very profitable there. In addition, PRS employs about 40 
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licensing inspectors to travel the country lookinG for 
... 
infringements, enforcing copyrights and issuing licences, 
whereas PPL does not and this increases the PRS cost revenue 
ratio (but not by very much). This item accounts for about 
5-6% of administration costs at PRS (although this figure 
also includes the cost of temporary staff) but only about 1.3 
1.5% of gross publ ic performance, broadcasting and 
investment income. Thus, even maki ng many allowances, PRS 
can get nowhere near PPL's cost revenue ratio. MCPS has the 
worst cost-revenue ratio of all at about 26% in 1982, 
although as mentioned in chapter 5, there are special factors 
at play. If we include investment income, the figure drops 
to 23%. PPL's operations are similar to PRS' and it does a 
similar job. Administration costs are deducted from total 
collections (unlike MCPS, which charges a commission) - and 
one wonders why there is such a large gap between the 
respective cost-revenue ratios. Surely, it is not just a 
difference of scale of operation - and in any case, PRS 
should be able _to exploit economies of scale. PPL does not 
break down its costs publicly, however, so it is difficult to 
make comparisons. It seems safe enough to conclude that PPL 
is the most efficient of the three collecting societies, 
however. 
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MARKETS 
PPL co 11 ects revenue for the pub 1 i c performance and 
broadcasting of records. Most of its revenue, however, comes 
from broadcasting (about 78% as against about 22% for public 
performance). PPL, unlike PRS, does not break down its costs 
(at least not publicly), so it is difficult to tell what 
percentage of costs is accounted for by pub 1 i c performance 
yet it was mentioned in interview that this sphere of 
activity takes up most of the time and staff. Virtually the 
whole of the staff at PPL is engaged in public performance 
areas with the broadcasting sphere being covered by the 
General Manager and a few others. It was also noted that PPL 
was probably still understrength in the pub 1 i c performance 
a rea (whi ch covers juke boxes, di scotheques and Di a l-a -Di sc 
amongst other things) and that public performance is unlikely 
ever to produce as much revenue as broadcasting. To get an 
estimate of PPL's public performance costs, we might have a 
look at PRS ' costs.PRS ' public performance costs were 67.6% 
of the total of public performance and broadcasting costs in 
1982, which for PPL would mean public performance costs being 
about £679,000. We might tune this figure for the fact that 
PPL does not employ 1 icensing representatives and for the 
fact that PPL is much smaller than PRS so it is unlikely to 
be able to take advantage of economies of scale, but all we 
really require is an order of magnitude. Using a similar 
method for broadcasting costs, PPL's broadcasting costs would 
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be about 32.4% of total costs - about £325,000. 
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 show how public performance and 
broadcasting revenue have changed over the period 1980-83. 
YEAR PUBLIC INCREASE t % INCREASE f REAL 
PERFORMANCE FALL i-- FALL 
-t PUBLIC 
Money Terms Money Terms PERFORMANCE 
(£) (£) REVENUE (£) 
1980 1,359,320 515,480 
1981 1,474,095 114,775 t 8.44% t 499,693 
1982 1,767,399 293,304 f 19.90% {' 551,623 
1983 1,917,272 149,873 l' 8.48% f 572,149 
Table 6.4. Public Performance Revenue 1980-83, Money & Real 
Terms 
Source: PPL Annual Reviews 1981, 1982; General Manager's 
Report 1983 
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YEAR BROADCASTING INCREASE l' % INCREASEt REAL BROAD-i 
REVENUE FALL J.- ! FALL ~ ~ CASTING 
(Money Terms) Money Terms REVENUE 
(.£) (.£) (£) 
1980 4,764,020 1,806,606 
1981 5,158,628 394,608 ,. 8.28% 1 1,748,687 
1982 5,852,514 693,8861' 13.45% t 1,826,627 
1983 7,088,306 1,235,792 t 21.12% t 2,115,281 
Table 6.5 Broadcasting Revenue 1980-83, Money & Real Terms 
Source: PPL Annual Reviews 1981, 1982; General Manager's 
Report 1983 
Pub 1 i c performance revenue represents about 22% of gross 
revenue (wi thout investment income) whil e broadcast; ng 
revenue accounts for about 78% of the same gross revenue 
figure. We can see that public performance revenue actually 
fell in real terms in 1981, although this was more than made 
up in 1982. It rose again in real terms in 1983. The PPL 
Review of 1982 and General Manager's Report of 1983 note that 
this is particularly good in view of the fact that public 
performance users were particularly hard hit by the recession 
wi th an unprecedented number of 1 i qui dati ons among clubs, 
dance halls and juke box operators. Within the public 
performance figure is revenue from British Telecom's 
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'Discline ' service. This showed a large rise of 26.66% from 
£165,669 to £208,186 in 1982. r b ~ ~ promise of increased 
revenue from this source was somewhat lost, however, with a 
fall to £204,965 in 1983. Negotiations have been taking 
place with British Telecom on this subject, however. For 
broadcasting revenue, the last two years have been 
particularly good, following a fall in real tenns in 1981. 
Most broadcasting revenue comes from radio, and trends within 
this figure are rather interestiflg. Table 6.6 shows the make 
up of broadcasting revenue. 
ommercia V 
Revenue (Real 
Terms (£) 
55.58% 
2,747,252 
7,088,3 
6 Compos ition of Broadcasting Revenue, 1980-83 Table 6.. _ 
Source: 81 1982 Ge neral Managerls PPL Annual Reviews 19, ; 
Report, 1983 
Page 473 
The figures for commercial radio include revenue from Manx 
Radio, although this is not a particularly high figure _ for 
examp 1 e, in 1982 it was about £29,000. The percentage of 
broadcasti ng revenue accounted for by commerci a 1 radi 0 has 
consistently fallen over the period while that for the BBC has 
consistently risen. We must remember, however, that the 
figure for the BBC includes both radio and television. 
Between 1980 and 1983, BBC revenue rose by £2,046,692 (98.09%) 
in money terms, £442,169 (55.88%) in real terms, while that 
for commercial radio and television only rose by £277,594 
(10.37%) in money terms and fell in real terms by .£133,495 
(13.15%). PPL, in fact, has just concluded a new agreement 
wi th the BBC worth £15. 1 mi 11 i on over 3i years coveri ng the 
period 1 October 1981 to 31st March 1985. The final 
instalment, from 1st April 1984 to 31st March 1985 will bring 
in £5 million. This is in return for an extra 30 hours a week 
needletime, mainly on Radios 1 and 2. Neverthe1ess, this 
apparently represents an increase in the rate at which the BBC 
has to pay for use of PPL members I works. Without the right 
to use PPL members I works, the broadcasting network woul d 
shri nk or at 1 east change fundamenta 11y. The fi gures for 
commercial radio represent a source of some concern and 
annoyance to PPL in that the fa 11 s from 1980 - 82 resul ted 
from a new ta ri ff introduced by the PRT under whi ch the four 
bands of charges are index l i ~ k e d d so that radio companies can 
earn more in adverti sing revenue but pay 1 ess to PPL if 
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adverti sing revenue increases by 1 ess than the Reta il Pri ce 
Index. 1983 saw an increase in the amount paid by the 
commercial radio stations because of increases in advertising 
revenue, a lower RPI, resulting in real increases in 
advertising revenue and new stations coming on air. PPL has 
been engaged in litigation with the Association of Independent 
Radio Contractors (AIRC) for a couple of years and this still 
drags on, having gone through the PRT and now being on its way 
to the High Court. The AIRC believes that only nominal rather 
than substantial royalties should be paid to PPL and is 
presently trying to get the royalties it pays cut. Revenue 
from independent television has been less than 1% of 
broadcasting revenue, although 1983 saw a rise to nearly 3%. 
This follows an agreement with the Independent Television 
Companies Association (ITCA) to phase in an increase in lTV 
Companies' hourly rates over 16 months, 1st August 1982, 1st 
January 1983, and 1st January 1984, although needletime 
remains the same (and is erratic anyway). This agreement 
involves a 361% increase in lTV hourly rates. A one-year 
agreement was also signed with Channel 4, starting November 
1982, worth about £200,000 if Channel 4 uses two hours a week 
needletime (although its use is erratic too). A longer-term 
agreement is on the way. One other problem PPL has is that 
TV-AM disputes the level of royalty PPL claims and it is noted 
in the Genera 1 Manager' s Report for 1983 that the amount 
involved is small but... a principle is at stake, and PPL is 
tryi ng to assess the roy a 1 ty so that it; s cons i stent wi th 
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other commercial television companies' agreements. I 
suggested that perhaps PPL might have different objectives in 
its different markets of public performance and broadcasting 
for example, in broadcasting, it might be more interested in 
maximising revenue, while in the field of public performance 
it might have the objective of maximiSing enforcement of the 
copyright. This might arise from the fact that in the 
broadcasting field, it is very easy to enforce copyright 
(except when it comes to pirate broadcasting) so it is a lot 
easier to have ap objective concerning revenue maximisation 
while in the public performance field, enforcement is very 
difficult and often revenue does not play the major part. The 
short answer is that PPL does not have different objectives in 
different areas of activity - it wants to maximise revenue 
overall (subject to the musicians' employment constraint) -
a 1 though the way PPL goes about thi sin each area may be 
different. PPL's function is to enforce the copyright as well 
as collect and distribute the revenue because the acts of 
collection, distribution and enforcement are inextricably 
linked. If a person says he is not going to pay the royalties 
he owes, you have to make him pay somehow, you have to enforce 
the copyright. One could argue that in certain cases the 
copyri ght is unenforceable, because of new technology, for 
example, but this is because sometimes circumstances create a 
situation where the copyright is unenforceable. This is not 
the same as not exercising the right, however, it is just a 
case of not being able to do so. The only reason for 
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enforcing the copyright is to obtain the royalties and you can 
only get the money by enforcing the copyright. The only areas 
where PPL cannot obtain the money are likely to be those which 
are subject to exceptions under the 1956 Copyright Act _ and 
here PPL cannot enforce the copyri ght by 1 aw anyway. For 
example, under S12(7) it is not an infringement of the 
copyri ght ina sound recordi ng to cause the recordi ng to be 
heard in public (a) at any premises where people reside or 
sleep as part of the amenities provided exclusively or mainly 
for residents or inmates or (b) as part of the activities of, 
or for the benefit of a club, society or organisation not 
established for profit and whose objects are mainly charitable 
or otherwise concerned with the advancement of religion, 
education or social welfare. The exception does not apply in 
the case of (a) where a special admission charge is made to 
the part of the premises where the recording is to be heard. 
(a) was meant to cover pri sons and hospi ta 1s but also covers 
hote 1 sand ho 1 i day camps (as shown in the case of PPL V 
Pontins), a situation which PPL finds rather irksome. The 
Whi tford Report and the Green Paper recommended del eti on of 
this part of the exception. Nor does (b) apply if an 
admission charge is made to the place where the recording is 
to be heard and the proceeds are appl i ed otherwi se than for 
the purpose of the organisation. PPL does not like this part 
of the exception either on the basis that it is very vague, 
appl ies to no other rights than sound recordings and assumes 
that PPL will not waive its claims to royalties for deserving 
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cases - PPL already has special agreements with the National 
Council for Social Services, for example. 
PPL does not use 1 i cens i ng representati ves in the fi e 1 d of 
public performance to enforce the right like PRS does because 
it was thought that it had found a method of operation which 
did not require this although it was also stated that the 
business is inconstant, so the matter is under review. It is, 
however, not current PPL policy to use licensing 
representa t i ves . I n any case, pub 1 i c performance of records 
does not take place to anywhere near the extent of public 
performance of mus i ca 1 works, so if PPL di d want to put 
licensing representatives on the road, it would not be on the 
scale PRS did it. There is also the question of whether these 
representatives are just meant to enforce and police the 
right, as at MCPS, or whether they also sell licences as at 
PRS. In the ideal case, PPL is informed of a public 
performance by the performer or owner of-- the premi ses where 
the public performance is to take place and it then tells him 
the conditions attaching to the public performance. He would 
then agree to the conditions and obtain a licence. In most 
cases, however, PPL has to discover the infringing performance 
itself, tell the infringers that they are acting illegally and 
then proceed to legal action or not as the case requires. PPL 
often has to resort to 1 egal action and at any gi yen time 
there are 400-600 cases in progress, ranging from 
correspondence before a Writ, cases where a Writ has been 
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issued and correspondence is conti nui ng towards t" nego latlon 
for an out-of-court settlement and cases where there have been 
settlements after judgement, following a Writ and solicitors. 
letters. PPL can sue for infringement, damages, costs and an 
injunction. There are numerous sources of discovery such as 
spot checks, advertising, the press and so forth. There are 5 
~ ~ 6 injunctions a month and rarely are cases defended. 
The Collection/Distribution Process 
The royalties PPL collects are distributed to record 
companies, recording artists and musicians and the record 
company must regi ster wi th PPL and te 11 it about each record 
released if the artists and musicians are to receive 
royalties. Only UK record companies or foreign record 
companies which license product through UK record companies 
or which can legally assign their rights to PPL are eligible 
for royalties and artists have to be contracted to such record 
companies before they are eligible13 . Once licences have been 
issued and fees collected in advance a pool of money is 
created. After deduction of administration costs, this pool 
is distributed in accordance with the amount of airplay and 
the amount of estimated public performance. The sse and most 
of the commercial stations (this is a rolling exercise ,so that 
not all the commercial stations provide information at anyone 
time - only a certain number of them do so each time) provide 
second-by-second accounts of the records played, through a log 
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compiled by computer, and a certain amount of information for 
the weighting of public performance revenue. PPL assumes that 
in general, by and large, public performance data resembles 
broadcasting data, that use of records for public performance 
reflects to a reasonable degree the use of records in 
broadcasting, so that insofar as possible, information 
recei ved is used to wei ght broadcasti ng fi gures and these 
fi gures used as a proxy for pub 1 i c performance fi gures and 
appl i ed to pub 1 i c performance revenue. Thi sis because PPL 
believes that analysis has shown that the additional costs 
involved in any attempt to obtain a more accurate public 
performance distribution would dissipate any additional gains 
that might be made for any given mark or artist. Thus, 
although PPL loses something in accuracy, it gains in terms of 
reducing administration costs. This is in contrast to PRS 
whi ch tri es to be as accurate as poss i b 1 e and ana lyses both 
broadcast i ng and pub 1 i c performance returns as thoroughly as 
possible. The di fference between the two may have somethi ng 
.. , 
to do with the fact that PRS has over 16,000 members while PPL 
has only about 350, so PPL does not have so many people to 
please so it can get away with less accuracy with fewer people 
clambering for money. Thus, PPL does not allocate the revenue 
on a fixed basis nor on a sliding scale according to size of 
record company but according to the indicated amount of 
broadcasting and public performance. Royalties are paid 
according to the record label (the mark), not the title of the 
record, and according to the recording artist. Under the Rome 
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Conventi on, 1961, each country is supposed to mak . . e prov, s, on 
in its domesti claw for performers to be remunerated for 
secondary uses of the; r recordi ngs. A 1 though the UK is a 
signatory, there is no such provision in our law. However, 
the spirit of the Convention is met by a voluntary arrangement 
between the Musicians' Union and PPL by way of an ex-gratia 
payment. There woul d a 1 so seem to be a moral ri ght to pay 
performers. Thus, of the distributable income collected by 
PPL (that is, after deduction of admi ni stra t i on expenses), 
67 i% goes to member compani es of PPL. Thi s represents the 
only statutory right PPL has to comply with and is the only 
statutory right in the field - the copyright owners (record 
companies) are entitled to royalties from broadcasting and 
publ ic performance of their copyright sound recordings. In 
other countries it is a legal obligation that other parties 
share in such royalties but this is not the case in the U.K. 
Of the remaining 32i% of the royalties, 20% is given to the 
named artists on the record and 12i% goes to session and other 
musicians, not directly but through their representative body, 
the Musicians' Union. This is the voluntary arrangement. 
When it has recei ved the returns from the BBC and corrunerci a 1 
stations, PPL knows how many seconds worth of music on records 
have been played, in total, over a given period. It does not 
work out how much each record has been played but rather how 
many times each record mark has been played and how many times 
a given artist's records have been played in total (so the 
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artist may have had several different records played or only 
one - the title of the record is largely irrelevant). What we 
have to start with is a gross total pool of revenue collected. 
From this, administration costs are deducted. Th 8 
. en, % of 
what is left is, for various historical reasons, given to the 
music publishers via MCPS. In 1983, this figure to the music 
publishers amounted to £607,434. What remains is net 
distributable revenue and this is then divided into two parts 
of 67i% and 32i%. At this stage, a rate per second has to be 
ca 1 cul ated by di vi di ng the total number of seconds of record 
playing on the air (derived from the logs sent in by the BBC 
and commercial stations) into the appropriate pool of 
distributable revenue. The 67i% share of distributable 
revenue is destined to be distributed to the record companies. 
For this, the rate per second is calculated by dividing the 
total number of seconds into this 67i% share of distributable 
revenue. It is then necessary to find out how much money each 
record mark has earned. This is found by multiplying the rate 
per second by the total number of seconds accrued by _ each 
record mark as shown by the submitted log sheets. As regards 
the 32i% share of distributable revenue, this has to be 
divided into two parts - 12i% goes to help musicians in 
general, represented by a block payment to the Musicians Union 
for the furtherance of mus i c generally. Thi s amounted to 
£919,893 in 1983. The other 20% is used to calculate how much 
goes to each artist, (which amounted to £1,471,829 in 1983). 
A rate per second is determi ned by di vi di ng the total number 
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of seconds into the 20% sha re of di str; butab 1 e revenue and 
this is then multiplied by the total number of seconds accrued 
by each artist to give the amount of money to be distributed 
to each artist. The rate per second is the same whether the 
record has been produced by a large multinational company or 
the sma 11 es t member of PPL in one case or by a famou s or 
obscure artist in the other. The total number of seconds to 
be divided into distributable revenue is the same in each 
case. Pub 1 i c performance revenue is di stri buted in the same 
way as broadcasting revenue according to the broadcasting 
fi gures, wei ghted accordi ngly. The amount of revenue comi ng 
in from each station depends on factors such as its size and 
the area to which it plays. There are two distributions a 
year (unlike at MCPS where there is one every month) - one in 
March/April based on the year ending May 31st of the previous 
year 14 and the other in September/October based on the year 
ending November 31st of the previous year15 PPL also makes 
payments on account of its final distribution during the year. 
In fact, three distributions were made in the year April 1st, 
1982 to May 31st, 1983 and its distribution periods are 
improving, due mainly to its internal computerisation. 
Licensing, Negotiation and Tarification Policy 
PPL cannot really go out to sell itself or sell its licences, 
it has to be almost passive and wait for potential copyright 
music users to come to it. It is a legal obligation on the 
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part of such users to obtain a licence to cover the acts they 
intend doi ng wi th the mus i c - or else they'll W1 i nfri nge 
copyright and breach the 1956 Act. N ' PP or 1S L allowed to try 
to persuade people to buy more records, even though it woul d 
swell PPL' s revenues if it was successful. PPL is reactive 
rather than active. All the collecting societies are faced 
with a fait accompli, although one could say that PPL has a 
lower profile than the others. This no doubt has something to 
do with its size. 
The theme of the business at PPL is that simplicity pays. 
This is not just because of the scale of PPL's business but a 
state of mind and an underlying principle of the organisation. 
PRS, on the other hand, depends and re 1 i es more on accuracy 
and aims to be as accurate as possible so as to, as far as 
possible, make sure that revenue is distributed according to 
the extent of use of any particular composer's work. Thus, it 
ana lyses returns and data much more than PPL and has more 
complicated distribution procedures and tariffs. This 
obviously adds to administration costs. The aim of PPL's 
tariffs is to make sure that the tariff reflects the value of 
the sound recording to the person(s)/organisation(s) using it 
without being unduly oppressive. For example, without records 
there would probably be considerably fewer discotheques. When 
one considers that the owner of the discotheque is paid 
admission charges and that he has to pay PPL a not very large 
roya 1 ty, he gets away qui te 1 i ghtly. It woul d not be a good 
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idea to impose the tariff as a percentage of th· f e 1 ncome rom 
admi ss i on charges because then the di scotheque owner coul d 
just set the admission price at zero and increase the price of 
drinks proportionately, although presumably PPL could 
introduce into its tariff a condition that the percentage of 
admission revenue criterion would only apply if admission was 
over a certa in fi gure. PPL does not thi nk its coverage of 
discotheques is particularly good and is trying to improve 
this. The trouble is that it is very difficult to obtain high 
1 eve 1 coverage of di scotheques because they keep openi ng and 
closing and changing hands. In addition, the structure of 
cateri n9 has changed over the years so that it is often the 
caterers themselves who run the discotheques these days, in 
pubs and clubs,rather than independent operators. This trend 
though, might make coverage of discotheques easier since they 
are often owned by large conglomerates so that all one really 
has to do is approach the Head Offi ce of the organ i sat ion in 
question and negotiate a licence for all the establishments 
owned or controlled by that organisation. This is obviously 
much easier than having to deal with individuals and single 
sites since it reduces transactions costs and, to the 
advantage of the organisation, bulk discounts may be 
available. It is all really a matter of how much you have to 
pay to obtain the extra revenue - if the cost of do; ng so 
exceeds the revenue, what do you do? It is collecting from 
the small establishments that adds to expenses 
disproportionately. PRS collects from these establishments 
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much more than PPL, hence its hi gher costs. It was thought 
that PPL had coverage in the di scotheque fi e 1 d of under 50% 
and that its tariff there was too low but that the situation 
was improving. In the field of juke boxes, coverage is about 
90%. There are discounts in the juke box tariff if the money 
is paid within a certain period of time, for example, and if 
the juke box owner is an operator, hiring out juke boxes from 
his stocks to individual premises. Coverage of tariffs varies 
from area to area. The tariff, however, is always applied 
co.nsistently and discounts are actually part of the tariff, 
not separate - they are not negotiated. PPL knows that in 
some cases, its tariffs are not good enough, that they are net 
high enough, and that it does not have enough penetration: 
enough coverage, in the pub 1 i c performance fi e 1 d. It expects 
pub 1 i c performance revenue to ri se, though, due to increased 
business and increases in its tariffs. Dial-a-Disc revenue 
will rise as the cost of calls rises. 
I n the fi e 1 d of broadcas t i ng, PPL has coverage of close to 
100% because it is very easy to deal with thE radio stations, 
to know where they are and when they are broadcasting. Most 
of them are large anyway and negotiation with the independent 
commercial stations is through the AIRC (Association of 
Independent Radio Contractors). PPL also negotiates with the 
Independent Television Contractors Association (ITCA) for use 
of its repertoire on television and has recently concluded a 
new agreement- with it. Royalties are set by negotiation. 
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Negotiations do not just centre around the level of royalties 
payable, however, but also cover limits on the use of records 
(needle time) and employment opportunities and levels for 
musicians. The main difficulties in the broadcasting field 
arise from pirate radio stations. Public performance tariffs 
are negotiated where possible with representative bodies. 
Thus, the tariff for discotheques is negotiated with the 
British Association of Ballrooms, that for juke boxes and 
background music systems with the British Amusement Caterers 
Trade Association and that for hotels and public houses with 
the Brewers Society. If there is no representative body, PPL 
has to come to an ad hoc agreement wi th pa rti es concerned. 
Like the other societies, PPL also differentiates between 
featured and background music, calling the former specially 
featured entertainment (SFE), where music is the main 
attraction. Musicians' employment conditions relate only to 
SFE. This avoids problems of categorising featured music 
since the initial immediate defence is to deny that you fall 
into a certain category of user. 
of a discotheque operator who 
The example put forward was 
denies that this is his 
occupati on but says he is a OJ presenter or a dance ha 11 
operator so as to pay lower royalties or so as not to have to 
fulfill certain conditions. For featured music, there is just 
this one category, SFE. 
PPL's licensing policy is based on the concept that "[t]he 
public use of recording can .•••.. only be authorised subject 
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to the condition that such use will not be detrimental to the 
recordi ng compani es and others who contri bute to the 
producti on of sound recordi n9S 1116. The interests of the 
recording artists and musicians must also be taken into 
account. Licensing is also designed "to preserve a reasonable 
ratio of live entertainment at the locations concerned ll17 • 
The musicians' conditions only apply to SFE, however. Most 
licences are blanket giving the licensee the ability to use 
a 11 the works in PPL' s repertoi re for the purpose des i gnated 
in the 1 i cence and they must be obtained in advance of the 
use. PPL only deals with the public performance and 
broadcasti ng of sound recordi ngs not the copyi ng or 
re-recording of then which can only be authorised by 
individual record companies 18 • It is up to the organisers to 
obtain the licences, although other parties may be jointly and 
severally liable. 
The special relationship PPL has with the Musicians' Union 
affects its licensing policy. The special problems musicians 
have is explained in a leaflet from PPL entitled "Records and 
Musicians. The Sociological Problem Explained ll • This notes 
tha t advances in broadcasti n9 and recordi n9 technology 
severely affect musicians' livelihoods but the British-record 
industry needs musicians to keep up professional excellence in 
producti on of records, whi ch requi res a healthy, broad-based 
musical profession covering all types of performance. Records 
are unique in repeatedly producing lithe actual work and skill 
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of the recording musicians; technology, in effect, has frozen 
their performance in time and space for later use anywhere and 
for any purpose ll . Lassen 19 wri tes that II It is a 
characteristic of the record that it can - perhaps more than 
any other commodity - be used and exploited for purposes quite 
di fferent from what was ori gi na lly intended and these 
secondary uses genera lly i nvol ve an enri chment for the userll. 
This, in fact, applies to music in general. The leaflet goes 
on to say that everyone has a right to decide when and under 
what conditions their work is used, including musicians, and 
that musicians only allow recordings on the basis that they 
will be sold to the general public for home use and that PPL 
will control public performance. Thus, musicians interests 
should be considered in applications for licences for public 
performance. Records are genera 11y made by the top qual i ty 
musicians while the grass roots of the profession have to rely 
on a variety of different performances in different 
establishments. If there were no limits on use of records for 
public entertainment, it is argued, the possibility of 
employment for musicians would be severely reduced, even 
eliminated in some cases. This would cause unemployment and 
prevent new musicians from developing and practising their 
ski 11 s. The profess ion woul d contract and eventually demand 
for musicians would exceed supply. The public interest and 
music itself would suffer. Thus, PPL only authorises use of 
records for public use for specially featured musical 
entertainment on condition that there are reasonable 
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employment opportunities for musicians and that a reasonable 
ratio of live to recorded performances is maintained so that 
the conflicting interests are balanced. One must remember 
that the performers have no copyri ght in the; r performances, 
a 1 though they do have a remedy in the Performers I Protection 
Acts 1958 - 72 which makes it a criminal offence to record a 
musical or dramatic performance, directly or indirectly, 
wi thout the performers I pri or wri tten consent and to se 11 , 
hi re or pub 1 i cly perform such a record. Oespi te thi 5, the 
record industry still has trouble with 'bootleggingl. 
Si r Arno 1 d Pl ant20 had some thoughts on th is subj ect, too. 
Performers always have the option not to record, although this 
would be a very unusual step in view of the money that can be 
earned and access gained to the media, particularly 
broadcasting, through records. There is a precedent, however, 
in Serjiu Celibadachi, the Rumanian conductor who has refused 
for 30 years to make records on the bas is that mus i cis 
naturally transient and it is artificial and unnatural to 
recreate it through technological means in that way. Plant 
noted that there will be a difference in reaction to records 
by musicians between solo performers and performers in 
orchestras, bands and the like. This presumably would also 
app ly to famous and non -famous performers (i twas, however, 
felt at PPL that these views did not really accord with 
reality). Solo performers are unlikely to find themselves 
less in demand as a result of record playing and one might 
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expect them to prefer their income to be maximised through the 
tariffs PPL charges rather than have limits on record playing. 
Increases in broadcasting and recording are likely to increase 
demand for thei r servi ces and attendances at concerts and 
performers can be more selective in the performances they give 
(by restricting appearances they can also increase demand even 
more and force pri ces up). Performers in bands, orches tras , 
and choi rs, Pl ant went on, however, are more 1; ke 1 y to wa nt 
"punitive rates and positive refusals" since they are likely 
to think that demand for their services will fall as a result 
of increased broadcasting and recording. There are more of 
them for a start and they are not employed on the strength of 
their reputation, they are unlikely to appeal on the strength 
of their personal appearance. They are not so much in demand. 
Also, lithe appeal made by their personal appearances is not 
always so markedly superior to that made by their records". 
There is also competition with other records of the same ilk 
or of the same work, too. All of thi s, of course, may not 
apply to a popular well-known orchestra but will apply to a 
grass roots musician. The organiser of a small social 
gathering is likely to have to consider cost very carefully 
and is likely to favour a selection of recordings by 
well-known orchestras rather than alive performance by the 
best orchestra funds can buy. In fact, Pl ant was rather 
against the ability of record manufacturers and performers to 
control public performance of their records and thought it led 
them to form combinations to restrict trade •. The PRT, 
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however, would seem to be pretty good protection against 
arbitrary restriction of public performance and broadcasting. 
Efficiency versus Effectiveness 
When asked about the possibility of a trade-off between 
efficiency and effectiveness, it was stated that PPL tried to 
be as effective as it can in the most efficient manner 
possible and vice versa. In all cases, there have to be 
compromi ses on the object; ves menti oned at the begi nni ng of 
this chapter, but it may be difficult to d e ~ i d e e what is 
efficient and to decide on the trade-off. For example, in the 
short-run, it may be inefficient to pursue an infringing 
performance if the cost of doing so exceeds the revenue 
thereby generated. Taking a longer term view of the 
situation, however, to do so may be efficient in that 
otherwise a precedent may be set in favour of the infringing 
act. It was thought that PPL had a more radical view of 
cost-revenue relationships than PRS in situations where the 
ultimate cost of the exercise exceeds the benefit or revenue, 
for example, and that for PRS such exercises were just an 
obl igation and a duty to be carried out almost regardless 
whereas for PPL commerc i a 1 real i ty and whether cost exceeded 
revenue was more important. PPL would not pursue an action if 
it thought the cost would exceed the revenue unless it could 
get something else out of the situation. It was felt that PRS 
woul d pursue the course of acti on even if cost.s exceeded 
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revenue. One must be careful, however, to not let your desire 
to achieve the greatest benefit in the short term cloud your 
view of the overall long term situation since this may lead to 
confusion and surprise when those with a more long term view 
of the picture turn against you. As regards enforcement, 
there are two types of efficiency, it was noted - efficiency 
at discovering infringements and efficiency in the time it 
takes you to dea 1 wi th the i nfri ngement. The 1 atter may be 
the most difficult to achieve because of delays in the 
judicial system. 
It was thought that as the years have gone by a more realistic 
market value has been set for the rights PPL deals with and in 
fact for all the rights dealt with by the collecting societies 
and this has been one aim of all the collecting societies. 
All the rights under copyright have a history of being 
undervalued, but the situation is gradually getting better. 
The problem is that there is no natural market for the rights, 
so there is no price as such. There is, in fact, a situation 
of bi-lateral monopoly with a representative body of mU3ic 
users facing a monopoly collecting society. One must also 
remember that revenue and costs are going up all the time 
anyway because of inflation. If costs are increasing with 
i nfl ation then so shoul d revenue and there comes a pci nt at 
which you do not have to employ any more staff but revenue is 
still increasing. PPL did not think it had reached the 
maximum attainable level of revenue yet because, for example, 
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of the problems of discovery and the fact that something new 
;s happening all the time and new markets are constantly 
opening up. In fact, this is the case for all collecting 
societies. PPL does have a cost centrol system as well as a 
budgeting system and an estimating system, although no details 
were available on· this. In any case, there is a level of 
costs at which management judgements have to be made. A 
management decision has to be made about increasing the level 
of costs in order to pursue a certain objective - it cannot 
always be an automatic process. PPL also thought its staff 
was of a high calibre and that it was likely to get even 
better in the future at carrying out its operations, although 
a 11 the soc i eti es wou 1 d no doubt say the same and i t ~ ~ s a 
matter which would be difficult to check anyway. If we take 
costs as a percentage of revenue as a measure of efficiency, 
however, PPL does seem to be more eff; c i ent than the other 
societies. In addition, we might take as a very simple 
measure of staff efficiency the revenue collected divided by 
the number of staff employed. Using this revenue measure, 
each member of PRS sta ff co 11 ected £77,998, each member of 
MCPS staff collected £58,228 and each member of PPL collected 
£162,137 in 1982, so PPL would seem to be the most efficient. 
PPL regards i tse 1 f as ti ght ; n how it spends the money it 
collects, and PRS as rather inefficient in some respects. It 
may overspend at times, it was felt. For example, PRS 
prepares a very glossy yearbook in large quantities each year 
and sends out large quantities of information, leaflets and so 
forth to members. One might say that comparisons of costs and 
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revenue are not particularly valid because each collecting 
society operates in a different market and there may be some 
truth in this but PRS and PPL in particular do operate in at 
least a similar way so there is likely to be some comparison 
possible. MCPS, however, operates in a very different way, so 
one must be careful. Further control on costs woul d seem to 
spri ng from the fact that the Board at PPL is composed of 
member companies which provides some degree of implicit 
control. This would seem to apply since the members of PPL 
a re record compani es and bus i nessmen although a cyn; c mi ght 
rep 1 y that the record compani es have not been loathe in the 
past to 'waste l money through extravagance and have not had a 
noticeably good record on cost control. In any case, the fact 
that the shareholders in the company and the members are also 
on the Board means that there is less separation of ownership 
from control than ; n II tradi tiona 1" compani es and i ndustri a 1 
organisations and therefore less scope for the economic 
concept of manageri a 1 d i scret i on and 1 ess cha nce of go i ng 
overboard on costs. 
It was felt that PPL had become more efficient over the years 
mainly because of the greater division of labour that has 
become possible. PPL was very small when it started but has 
expanded quite a lot since, although it is still quite small 
employing only 51 people, (47 in 1982). This has made greater 
departmentalisation possible, which has added to efficiency, 
particularly in the field of investigation. Information 
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systems have been improved and word processing and 
computerisation facilities introducea'. 1ft PP n ac, L has just 
installed its own in-house computer, meaning that the 1983 
final members' distribution was the first done entirely 
'" 
in-house). An indication of its growth is that it has taken 
over another floor of its accommodati on, Ganton House. An 
ever present problem for the collecting societies is that the 
money it distributes does not mean very much to the big stars 
but for its sma 11 est members every penny counts and they 
naturally want the societies to collect down to the last penny 
although the cost of doing so may be so large as to make it 
uneconomic. 
Covering Costs 
PPL has in common wi th MCPS that it uses interest recei ved 
from investment of undistributed revenue to cover its costs, 
although it does not charge a commission like t4CPS. However, 
its distributions are a lot less frequent (tv,ice a year as 
against monthly at MCPS - although this is changing) so it is 
able to earn a lot more interest. In 1980, investment income, 
at £770,306 covered 84% of costs, while in 1981 interest was 
£747,245, which more than covered costs. The same was true in 
1982 when interest income amounted to £810,105. In 1983, 
however, interest, at £744,057, covered only 74% of costs. 
The advantage of all this is that it means that PPL does not 
usually have to eat into the money it has collected to pay its 
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costs. PPL re 1 i es a lot more on interest than PRS does to 
cover costs. One mi ght suggest that the reason is that PRS 
collects a much larger amount of revenue - £54 million against 
£7.6 million in 1982 - so it is more able to stretch a pOint 
and take the vast amount of costs out of revenue collected and 
still have a very large amount available for its distributiops. 
Although PRS' costs as a percentage of revenue are higher than 
at PPL, at PRS the percentage is of a much higher figure. PPL 
starts from a much lower base and to take the vast bulk of 
costs from revenue would not leave a very high figure in 
re 1 at i ve terms. PRS' i nves tment income, at about £3 mi 11 i on 
in 1982, could only cover about 30% of costs of £9.5 million. 
I n add i ti on, there defi ni te 1y seems to be a di fference oj n 
emphasis on investment income between PPL and PRS. PRS has a 
whole section in its yearbook on investment income yet it does 
not even mention its impact on costs, it does not mention the 
percentage of costs covered by investment income. In 
interview with PPL, however, and in their review of the year's 
performance, emphasis is placed on the fact that interest is 
used to offset cost. The difference in emphasis may be 
accounted for by differences in size between societies - PPL 
and MCPS are much smaller than PRS. As an organisation grows, 
costs are going to increase too and there is always going to 
be a 1 imi t on the amount that can be earned from investment 
because the market rate is 1 ike ly to only ever be at about 
10-15% which means only this amount of revenue can be earned 
from it assuming that capital investments are not sold off. 
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Thus, if cos ts represent more than 10-15% of revenue, the 
collecting societies will not be able to cover all their costs 
with investment income. This also assumes that all revenue 
collected is invested and for a full year, which is obviously 
not going to be the case since the organisation is always 
going to need working capital and money at hand and PPL has 
two distributions a year and PRS four. An organisation which 
wants to earn as much interest as possible will obviously try 
to keep the revenue as long as possible. 
Organisational Structure 
PPL has just changed its organisational structure lito produce, 
by internal promotion, a management team able to help PPL to 
cope with the industry's future demands,,21 .. The new structure 
is as in Oi agram 6. 1. PPL is controlled by a 10 man Board 
headed by a Cha i rman, and thi s determi nes pol icy j although 
some policies will be management decisions. All directors are 
non-executive. In everyday affairs, the General Manager is at 
the top of the organisation and may advise the Board although 
he is not part of it. Below him is the Company Secretary and 
the Financial Controller. All departments have their own 
manager who reports to the General Manager. Basic 
departmentation is then22 as below. Licensing Support (also 
called the General Office) (12 people) deals with most of 
PPL's standard licensing correspondence. The Filing 
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Department, which is presently being computerised, m a i n t a ~ n s s
past and present records as well as the licence renewal 
system. Accounts (8 people) deals with all the normal 
accounts functions, computeri sed process i ng of broadcasti ng 
returns and distributions to members and artists. This 
department also houses the Computer Manager, who joined PPL in 
July 1982. Audio Typing (4 people) deals with all the 
secretarial services for the General Manager and Company 
Secretary, a 11 non -standard correspondence for 1 i cens i ng 
staff, rna i nly sen; or staff, all correspondence wi th new and 
current member companies, and all Board documents. Membership 
and Office Services (a staff of one) deals with the processing 
of new membership applications and a 11 day-to-day 
correspondence with current members. Music Systems Licensing 
(a staff of 6) licenses all audio juke boxes and background 
music installations and some video juke boxes. New Business 
Licensing (with a staff of 7) is the investigatory arm of PPL, 
seeki ng out i nfri ngements and un 1 i censed users and dea 1 i ng 
with them up to and including the issue of the first licence. 
They are then added to existing revenue and renewed each year. 
Business Affairs Department (Large Operations Licensing) (3 
staff) is a new department set up to look into and fi nd 
solutions to the problems associated with dealing with large 
organisations since PPL believes that such organisations 
require a different approach and special negotiating and 
administrative techniques. This covers the likes of Mecca, 
hotel chains, brewers and so forth. General Licensing (which 
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has a staff of 7) deals with renewals to licences and any 
prob 1 ems a ri sing wi th ex i sti ng 1 i cences. The 1 i nes from the 
General Manager to the various positions show lines of 
communications and superior-subordinate relationships are 
shown by movements up or down from the Head of Department. 
Thus, PPL is divided along functional lines, so that it can 
deal with any specific problem in any particular function. It 
does have .a fairly stable organisation structure although it 
also tries to stay sensitive to changes in the industry. The 
environment is ever changing, the industry is one of the least 
stable and PPL is very open to the environment in every sense. 
It believes itself to be very adaptable but ;s aware that it 
is not perfect and that there is room for improvement. 
Select committees are used to deal with particular problems 
which arise, problems of an internal or external nature, and 
the organisation is something of a talking shop with a lot of 
discussion and regular meetings which is obviously very 
different from MCPS where there are no internal company 
committees. When the commi ttees meet, there is no-or.e 
particularly in charge, it is based on who knows something 
about the subject under discussion. The report of the 
f t ".I.t commi ttee then goes to the General Manager or commen • 
was pointed out that there is really no need for anyone to be 
in charge since only 51 people in total are employed by PPL 
and about 30 of these are support staff. A system of project 
management is not used, however. Where necessary, however, 
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PPL uses management consultants and specialised management 
services. In interview, I noted that PRS seems to h 
. ave 
rather a bureaucratic structure with a lot of rules and 
regul at ions and stri ctly defi ned and comp 1 i ca tea procedures 
especially where members are concerned and asked whether this 
also applied to PPL. In fact, PPL does have a number of rules 
but these are mainly guidelines, although it is recoanised 
.. 
that such rul es are necessary so that PPL may operate ina 
Icoherent l manner. With infinite alternatives like there are 
in the industry, it was felt that one could not expect things 
to stand still and rules were not cast in concrete. The sheer 
diversity of PPLls activities means that these rules often 
just do not apply and original thought is required. ihere are 
rules about the administrative structure which must be obeyed, 
however. One of the disadvantages of a lot of rules, it was 
noted, is that sometimes there is pressure for the 
i ntroduct i on of ru 1 es for the wrong reasons, such as when 
people want to shed responsibility. It was felt that one of 
the advantages of PPLls small size was that ccmmun;cation was 
enhanced, a fact also noted by MCPS. In addition, in a small 
organisation, the decision making staff are of high ability so 
that they can be given a lot of responsibility without the 
need for' referral to a hi gher authori ty. As to recru i tment , 
there is no particular industry from which PPL takes on more 
people. Some, but not all, members of the organisation have a 
management background and at the moment PPL is actively trying 
to improve the management skills of its staff using outside 
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help. PPL is apparently more concerned about first recruiting 
someone who can do the job and then training him, or her, in 
management skills. As to the job i"tself, it was felt that a 
combination of outgoing negotiating ability, as one would 
expect to fi nd 1 n a sa 1 esman, and an abil i ty to cope wi th 
complex arguments, often of a legal nature and detail, often 
of a very fine nature, was required. 
Membership 
PPL now has over 350 members of a 11 sizes and contra 1 saver 
1500 labels. There are two main types of member, associate 
member and fu 11 member, the di fference be; ng that a full 
member can go to the Annual General Meeting and vote. .n.r. 
associ ate member can become a full member on Board approva i 
and the number of fu 11 members increases from ti me to time. 
The two rna in cri teri a for becomi ng a member are that the 
company has to be a bona fide record company, which means that 
it must produce and/or manufacture records in the UK (subject 
to the criteria about foreign companies mentioned earlier), 
which means that importers are excluded and that the company 
must be able to assign the rights in the recording to PPL (it 
must have the legal right to do so). There is no charge for 
joining and no commission. PPL does not and cannot tout for 
business - it waits for prospective members to come to it, 
since the rights are legal obligations. With a few 
exceptions, members are mainly specialised record companies. 
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Attitude to Other Societies 
All the comments under this category concerned PRS. For 
example, it was felt that PRS considered itself to be in 
competition with the other societies particularly PPL. This 
is a throwback to the IIslice of cake" argument that apparently 
used to be put forward in the literature - that there is a 
cake of available money which is at the disposal of the 
societies to collect and which is fixed. Thus, each society 
has to take out as much as poss i b 1 e before the others do. 
There might be some truth in this at least from the poirt of 
view of the user who will probably argue that he has already 
paid a certain amount to the other societies and that this 
should be taken into account in negotiations. This 
"competition theory" would certainly seem to apply in the U.S. 
but it is generally thought not to be the case in the UK and 
PRS denies it. In any case, it was felt at PPL that pqS 
follows a policy of trying to charge less for use of the music 
under its control than PPL that PRS regarded it as a 
competitor. Despite this, however, virtually all PR5' tariffs 
exceed PPL I S for the same use of music. It seems to be 
generally thought in the industry, however, that each society 
operates in a distinct separate market, although it was 
pointed out that from the consumer's point of view this is not 
the case since it is often difficult to comprehend the concept 
of different copyrights in the music and in the record. The 
consumer just thinks he is paying twice for the same use. The 
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point also noted by MCPS was voiced - that at PRS the lines of 
communication were rather long and that it was often difficult 
to get decisions made and to get staff to take the initiative. 
For example, 1 i cens i ng inspectors wi 11 not comm; t themselves 
or take decisions until Head Office is contacted. Despite all 
the comments below, however, the relationship between PPL and 
PRS has been greatly improved ;n recent years. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Si nce the fi rst acknowl edged copyri ght act, the Statute of 
Anne, in 1709, there have been many Acts dealing with 
copyright and copyright material, culminating in the 1956 
Copyright Act. As time has gone on, the subject has become 
more and more complex and more and more political, especially 
in the international field. The bargaining of many interest 
groups and the need for compromise, a clear head and a sound 
knowledge of general principles is no-where better illustrated 
than in the US, where the campa i gn for reform of the 1909 
Copyright Act lasted for well-nigh 20 years of acrimonious 
public debate, private compromise and powerful lobbying. The 
advance of technology makes it imperative that copyright law 
and practi ce be dynami c and subject to change. A constant 
re-evaluation of solutions and ways of thinking is needed. 
Since laws change very slowly, the various parties involved 
have to try to i nfl uence the course of events and thi nk; ng 
through lobbying and the p r a c t ~ c a l l application of the law. 
What seems very likely is that problems are likely to grow, 
complexity will increase and interest groups will continue to 
grow in number. 
As to the two technological problems mentioned earlier -
reprography and audio and visual copying - there seems little 
doubt that there is a problem and a large preblem at that. 
The question is, what is the solution? It is tempting to 
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suggest that these problems have been around for a long time 
without the record and publishing industries collapsing 
unduly. One might even put down the main problems encountered 
by these industries to other factors. This ignores the fact, 
however, that inmost cases such copyi ng ; sill ega 1 • Two 
approaches then suggest themselves - either one says that it 
is a bad 1 aw since it cannot be enforced and, for ex amp 1 e, 
takes away the right in these spheres, or one finds a way of 
making 'a right which is presently unenforceable enforceable. 
Si nce the fi rst approach stri kes seem; ng1y at the very heart 
of copyright and is rather a negative solution, it is to be 
rejected. Equally, though, the simple argument that copying 
breaches the reproduction right is not enough. What is 
required ;s a practical solution to a practica1 problem. One 
wants a solution which will make the marginal cost of copying 
greater - which would suggest a levy on blank tapes and 
photocopyi ng paper or cop; es made wi th a photocopi er. For 
photocopying, this might simply be achieved by putting up the 
cost of a copy from a slot machine. For non -s 1 ot 
photocopiers, a levy on the paper might be the best idea. Or 
these methods mi ght be combi ned. For blank tapes, the 1 evy 
would not have to fully compensate for estimated losses. 
Exemptions and non-copyright material could be taken care of 
in negotiations. The idea of full record keeping would 
probab 1 y have to be dropped in the reprography fi e 1 d and is 
not applicable in the audio-visual field so some other basis 
of distribution would have to be arrived at in the latter 
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fi e 1 d - i nfor-ma t i on on record sales and pub 1 i c performances 
(which PRS might be able to supply) for example _ and 
information on book and journal sales and library lending 
(which is required for Public Lending Right anyway), and 
sampling or limited record taking in the reprography field. 
Since journals are not normally lent out by libraries, some 
other form of information would be required on this. To keep 
costs .down, an existing society would collect and distribute 
revenue and a tri buna 1 wou 1 d oversee the 1 i cens i ng schemes. 
Eventually, representatives such as those used by PRS might be 
required to police the scheme - here I am mainly thinking of 
the reprography problem. Questions of fair dealing could also 
be taken care of in negotiations. A new copyright statute 
could lay down exemptions to the right of reproduction -
existing societies have to take account of exemptions in their 
spheres of activity - although the number of these would have 
to be kept fairly low. Since the difficulty ~ n n both the 
fields of reprography and audio/video taping is to find 
someone to enforce the right against (it is really impossible 
to enforce it against the individual copier), one might make 
the owner or occupier of the premises where pnotocopying takes 
place or the makers or importers of blank tape responsible for 
authorising such copying and for obtaining a licence. This is 
one of the suggestions of PRS. I make no claims to 
originality for these suggestions - it is really just a 
II cobb 1 i ng together ll of sol uti ons already put forward. Before 
any solution is arrived at in the reprographic field, however, 
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there is going to have to be real compromise on all sides. It 
is very difficult to put over the idea that a solution is 
themselves genu i ne 1 y sought when the copyri ght owners 
(publishers/authors) cannot put up a united front. If care is 
not taken, the correct time for a solution may pass. In the 
audio-visual field, the campaign for a levy on blank tapes is 
unlikely to be dropped until it is achieved - if not with this 
government then with another. There is a lot at stake, 
especially in the infant video industry which, it was noted at 
the BPI, was experiencing the same problems the record 
industry had had for a whi 1 e but wi th one excepti on - that 
these problems had arrived at a much earlier stage in its 
development for the video industry, which might do untold 
harm. 
As Whale notes 1, criticism of collecting societies does not 
usually attach to the system of licensing itself but rather to 
lIoperational procedures, which are necessarily highly 
comp 1 ex II. Both PPL and PRS have effect i ve monopo 1 i es, whi ch 
in the past has been the subject of some criticism - but the 
advent of the PRT seems to have di ffused these cri ti ci sms 
somewhat. It was felt at PPL that collecting societies vJere 
more like oligopolies, with one large organisation dominating 
the market. It is true that they do not cover the whole 
field, they do not contro) 100% of works, and in some cases it 
is possible for broadcasters and places of public performance 
to negotiate individually with copyright owners and, of 
Page 512 
course, there are always public domain works, but the 
collecting societies are the only organisations operating in 
their fields in their areas of competence and they do not have 
competition from other similar organisations, so the 
"monopoly" label seems nearer the truth. One might also note 
that they fu 1 fi 11 the cri teri on used by the Monopo 1 i es and 
Mergers Commission in determining what is a monopoly - they 
contro lover 25% of the market. It is worth noting the 
comment made by Mr. Lowde at MCPS, however, (although one must 
remember that MCPS does not operate i ~ ~ the same way as PRS and 
PPL and is only an agent, and does not have a monopoly in most 
areas of its operations anyway) that MCPS is "an oligopoly in 
a market where product substitution represents a real 
possibility". 
One must admit that all three societies do a very good job, 
even though the benefits of its work are not felt equally by 
all composers and writers, with earnings being highly skewed 
to a small percentage of composers. A recent survey by 
" Jean-Loup Tournier', General Manager of SACEM, revealed that 
only about 4% of living authors were on the minimum wage in 
their respective countries when one considers the royalties 
they received from their national collecting societies. About 
30 collecting societies took part in the survey, virtually all 
in Europe and North America. A skewed earning distribution 
would be expected since only a small minority of composers 
reach the top of their profession, but this figure at least 
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shows the material problems of being a composer. Think what 
the situation would be without collecting societies! PRS, PPL 
and MCPS between them co 11 ected over £71 mi 11 i on in 1982, 
about three -qua rters of that by PRS. Wi th new rna rkets for 
composers such as cable and satellite television and video 
(the music video market is now estimated at £25 million a year 
and growing3) opening up all the time, this figure promises to 
grow at an exponential rate and reach heights undreamt of when 
the societies were first set up, one might even say undreamt 
of even in the 1960s. A number of landmarks have been reached 
recently - PRS has gone through the £50 million barrier, MCPS 
has just exceeded £10 mi 11 i on for the fi rst time and PPL 
should exceed the £10 million mark in 1984. In terr.1S of 
revenue, the picture seems very rosy. 
As with most situations, though, a note of cauticn must be 
sounded. Criticisms of the system are likely to revolve 
around whether members receive the maximum possible amount of 
money after deducti on of admi ni strati on costs. PRS woul d 
probably be the main target here, since costs are taking up a 
greater and greater proporti on of costs, a trend whi ch is 
likely to continue as broadcasting, for example, takes on a 
more localised nature. One may argue that PRS can no longer 
afford to be as accurate as previously in its distribution 
methods. PRS is gOl ng to have to ana lyse retu rns 1 ess and 
1 ess as the sheer number of such returns grows and grows, 
unless it is willing to employ an ever-growing staff, 
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something which it seems not to want. If morE: staff are 
employed, costs are likely to grow at an even faster rate. 
Computerisation will undoubtedly help, however. One may ask 
whether PRS needs to be as accurate in distribution, anyway -
PPL, for example, uses something of an approximate method in 
some cases but seems to cope well. It does not attempt to be 
that accurate and has a very low cost revenue ratio as a 
result. This may reflect a political aspect, however, - that 
PPL has a lot fewer members, who are likely to be 1ess 
demanding and they are all companies not individual composers. 
One must remember that PRS has been subject to quite a lot of 
criticism from members in the past, however, which may 
influence the situation. PRS is subject to increasing 
workloads and says that it could cut corners on d i s t r ~ b u t i o n n
but i t all rea lly depends on what the General Counci 1 wi i 1 
accept. It does not believe that costs have gone up more than 
justified and recognises that some of its iicersing is not 
ccst effective but PRS does a lot to defend the c r e d i b ~ l j t y y of 
copyright and is constantly e n ~ a g i n g g in a balancing act which 
is subject to continuous review. In general, PRS does not 
want to reduce the present 1 eve 1 of its serv ice, a 1 though it 
is going to have to make some very important decisions soon in 
all areas of its operations. In all cases of assessing 
performance by collecting societies, however, we must remember 
that it is very difficult and probably unfair to rely entirely 
on economic criterion. 
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Despite the fact that PPL has an effective monopolY, it does 
seem to be pretty efficient and, in fact, from this point of 
view, seems to perform the best of a11 the societies. PPL was 
set up by the record companies to look after their interests 
and it seems to do this well. !t will be interesting to see 
if PPL employs licensing representatives in the future and 
whether it attempts to increase the accuracy of its 
distribution system. At the moment, it is still quite a small 
organisation and it has some very important decisions to make 
in the future, not least because of the development of the new 
markets menti oned whi ch wi 11 present some new prob 1 ems and 
some old ones. The outcome of PPL IS restructuri ng of its 
organisation will also be of great importance. PPL has 
something of a reputation for secrecy in the industry but i 
must admit that I did not find this. 
MCPS ' actions are more limited than the other s c c i e t ~ e s s
becau se it Y'ecei ves only ali mi ted mar.da te from its members 
and does not have an e f f e c t i ~ e e monopoly in most areas of its 
operati ons 1 i ke PRS and PPL. All the s o c i e t ~ e s s are 
constrained by the political environment in which they 
..J 
operate. In many ways, MCPS is the most interesting of the 
three societies to study because its method of operation is so 
different from the others. It seems to be trying its best to 
develop a more commercial approach and improve its methods of 
operation. There is still quite a long way to go but the 
effort is there. Costs still seem to be too high, requiring a 
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correspondingly larger amount of f money rom commission, 
interest and other fees to cover them but some allowances must 
be made for the fact that MCPS collects from the v e r ~ ~ lowest 
., 
parts of the market in many cases, operations which are just 
not cost effective but are required by members. In fact, it 
will be interesting to see if MCPS keeps its industry 
functions in the review of its operations which has been 
taking place. Overall, though, one would expect MCPS' 
performance to improve significantly in years to come if the 
promising signs are borne out. 
All the soc i eti es do a great deal to promote the concept of 
intellectual property and to extend the copyright system. 
The music industry has changed somewhat in recent years so 
that now the rule is short-term agreements between 
composers/artists and the publisher/record company, for 
example for a certain number of albums/singles. If the 
composer/artist is successful, he may set up his own 
publishing company. Another interesting development is that 
many of the biggest music publishers are also owned by record 
companies - for example, EMI has both a music publishing and a 
record arm, Chappells is owned by Polygram and April 
r4usic/United Artists is owned by CBS. The co 11 ect i ng 
societies are naturally affected by such developments. Gavin 
McFarlane4 regards this as an "insidious threat" to the 
independence of collecting societies - after all, record 
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companies are music users, which represent the other side of 
the coin to copyright owners. If such publishing houses which 
have been taken over by record companies are members of 
collecting societies and are economically dependent on these 
record companies, this may compromise negotiations with music 
users. As McFarlane says, it may allow a "Trojan Horse into 
the inner counsels of the authors' societies". 
All the collecting societies will, in the future, have to come 
to terms with and face up to the challenge of new technology, 
such as cable and satellite television, the former of which at 
least would seem to be about to take off. There still seems 
some doubt about the future of satellite television. 
Decisions made now in this area will vitally affect the future 
of individual collecting societies and the copyright system 
in general. When one remembers that copyright is entirely a 
statutory right conferred by law and that technology seems to 
have outstripped the law, the need for quick action and 
influence on the copyright system through practical procedures 
is evident. For example, one problem in the field of 
satellites at the moment is that Satellite Television PLC, 
which PRS licenses for transmissions from the UK, wants PRS to 
1 i cense it for a 11 ri ghts at source in the UK, even those 
rights of transmission by cable systems in European countries. 
This is not very easy for PRS to do, however, since it deals 
differently with those societies in the EEC and those outside 
it. For those societies outsiqe the EEC, PRS can sign an 
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agreement giving the foreign society an exclusive licence to 
handle the PRS repertoire, but inside the EEC, because of its 
competition policy, it can only give a non-exclusive licence 
so that any soci ety whi ch wants to handl e the PRS }"epertoi re 
can do 50
5
• We have noted how the advent of 1ecal radio has 
greatly increased the cost of licensing the broadcasting 
right. This is a trend which is likely to continue with cable 
television. The advent of local radio in Ireiand will no 
doubt have the same effect. 
Thi s thes is has been an attempt to cast more 1 i ght on ,3 
subject which has as yet received relatively little academic 
a ttent ion. Th is is a pi ty since there is an abundar.ce of 
interesting topics to discuss in all fields, economic, social, 
political, philosophical and managerial. I have just 
concentrated on what I regard as some of the more interesting 
quest ions. Even thi sis not exhaustive, however. The next 
5-10 years could be crucial for the copyright system as a new 
wave of technological devices establlsh themselves on the 
scene. There have always been criticisms of the system as 
regards its monopoly nature, the fact that it may keep prices 
hi gher than they need be, that the protecti on peri od is too 
long and so forth and these attacks are 1 i ke ly to grow in 
volume as new technology develops. However, it would seem 
unlikely that a better system can be developed and such 
'criticisms can be met by various devices such as compulsory 
licensing, returning rights assigned to publishers to authors' 
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heirs before the copyright term has run out and so forth. In 
any case, it will be interesting to watch what happens in the 
next decade and how the collecting societies I have 
investigated develop and what new societies appear. The field 
is worthy of further study. 
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POSTSCRIPT 
Since this thesis was written, as one would expect there have 
been a number of interesting developments in the field. In 
view of the fact that some of these are important, I felt that 
it would at least be worth noting some of them. 
Firstly, in the photocopying field there has been something of 
a breakthrough for the proposed 1 i cens i ng scheme. The ALeS 
and PLS, through the CLA, have reached agreement wi th the 
Local Authorities on a 12 month experimental scheme for 
schoo 1 s and co 11 eges . Pol ytechni cs and Un i vers i ti es are not 
covered because of the peculiarities of their copying 
practices. In return for a purely notional sum of £350,000, 
the Local Authorities are licensed to photocopy from books and 
periodicals for one year. It is stressed that this is just a 
small scheme to start, not related to the amount of copying 
actually taking place, but the principle of such l i c e n s i n ~ ~ has 
been finally accepted and it is a step in the right d i r e c t i c ~ . .
It is accepted that after administration costs are taken out 
of this sum, there will not be a great deal left to distribute 
but at least it will provide statistics for a more permanent 
scheme. A sample of the schools and other educational 
institutions (about 10% of those involved) will keep full 
records. The scheme started in the autumn of 1984 and the sum 
to be paid is divided between the 116 or so Local Authorities 
taking part. Local Authorities in England, Scotland and Wales 
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are covered but not those in Northern Ireland where, at the 
time of writing, an agreement is still to be finalised. The 
terms of the 1 icence are generally as in the chapter on 
photocopying - up to 5% of a work and enough for a class may 
be copied. Works controlled by the music publishers are not 
covered. Negotiations continue with the Universities and 
Polytechnics. A few individual licences have also been 
issued, such as to English language schools. 
In the audio-visual field, the BPI noted that there had been a 
change of Minister at the Department of Trade & Industry, the 
Department respons i b 1 e, amongst other thi ngs, for copyri ght 
matters. Before this, it apparently seemed 1 ikely that the 
Government was going to introduce piecemeal legislation on 
copyright - for example, on the proposed blank tape levy. The 
BPI thought that this had now been largely shelved but that it 
now seemed likely that there would soon be another Green Paper 
on copyright matters to deal, in particular, with the most 
contentious matters in the field - on the blank tape levy and 
des i gn copyri ght. It was felt that such a Green Paper will 
deal with the practicalities of a blank tape levy and that the 
Government seems to have at 1 east accepted the pri nc; p 1 e of 
the levy. The distribution system is one of the main focuses 
of attention. The Green Paper will be a discussion document 
and the BPI hopes that this discussion will be brief and that 
legislation will be enacted no later than autumn 1985. 
Whether a White Paper wi11 follow the Green Paper is not 
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clear. The BPI at least felt that opposition to the levy was 
not as strong as it was and it was more optimistic than in 
1981, since it perceived a shift -in the Government's views, 
from almost total opposition to acceptance of at least the 
principle of a levy. It was also noted that the EEC 
Comm; ss i on is soon expected to bri ng out a Green Paper on 
harmonisation of copyright legislation in the Community and 
that it too seems to have accepted the p r ~ n c i p l e e of a blank 
tape levy, although it was thought unlikely that it would come 
out in favour of a measure binding on member countries. 
Another suggestion put forward was that Government and EEC 
action might be linked - that the Government is waiting for an 
EEC measure before it commits itself so as to take the sting 
out of an unpopular measure with the electorate. An 
EEC-forced measure would aliow the Government to say that its 
hands were largely tied. 
In the chapter on problems in the audio-visual field, I noted 
that the problem of record rental had not really caught on 
1 ike it has in Japan a 1 though it seems to be becorni og a 
probl em in the UK now. In any case, rental and hi re is not 
illegal under the 1956 Act. The BPI, however, feared that the 
problem might get worse with the development of compact discs 
in the audio field since these are about double the cost of a 
normal 'lP. In fact, it was going to introduce a Private 
Members Bill on the subject to make rental and hire of records 
an infringing act but did not eventually do so because 
Government action looked likely in the form of piecemeal 
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legislation (which did not finally materialise). Japan has 
recently introduced legislation on record rental which gives 6 
months - 1 year protection to new releases but then allows a 
free-for-all. The BPI would not like this taken as a 
precedent, however. The US is also in the process of 
i ntroduci ng 1 egi s 1 ati on to provi de a di stri buti on ri ght in 
records, apparently, so the concept of the distribution right 
seems to be gaining more grcund. Of course, the video 
industry actually encourages rental as part of the 
exploitation of its product but it is concerned with 
uncontrolled rental forcing prices down to uneconomic 1evels. 
I t wants to be able. to author; se who rents out its products 
and who does not, so that it has control over the market. 
There have been other developments in the fields of computers 
and cable television. In the US, the House of Representatives 
has approved Co B ill to protect computer ch i p des i gns under 
F edera 1 copyri ght 1 aws for up to 10 years (reported in liThe 
Times ll October 11, 1984). , ~ ~ new Act wi th copyri ght 
implications has also been enacted in the UK, in the Cable and 
Broadcast; ng Act, 1984. Thi s Act introduces another Sect; on 
(Section 14A) after Section 14 of the 1956 Act to provide that 
copyright subsists in cable programmes included in cable 
programme services. However, this copyright does not apply if 
the programme is included in the cable programme service 
through reception and immediate re-transmission of a 
television or sound broadcast. The person providing the 
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cable programme service is entitled to the copyright, which 
lasts for 50 years from the end of the year in which the cable 
programme is originally included. (Repeats do not produce 
another copyright). The restricted acts for a cable programme 
are: making a film of it or a copy of such a film, other than 
for private purposes, in so far as it consists of visual 
images; making a sound recording of it or a record embodying 
such a recording, again other than for private purposes, in so 
far as it consists of sounds; causing it to be seen or heard 
in public by a paying audience; broadcasting it or including 
it in a cable programme service. A cable programme is to be 
taken as seen, or heard by a paying audience if people have 
been admitted to the place where it is seen or heard or to a 
place of which that forms part, for payment or if they have 
been admi tted to the place where the programme is seen or 
heard in circumstances that suggest that the goods and 
servi ces supp 1 i ed there are pri ced hi gher than they woul d 
normally be and these higher prices result from the facilities 
prev; ded for seei ng or heari ng the programme. HO\tlever, the 
II payment II cri teri on does not app 1 y if peop 1 e are admi tted as 
residents or inmates or as members of a club or society, where 
the payment is for membership and the facilities are only 
provi ded as an i nci denta 1 part of the rna in purposes of the 
club or society. Inclusion in a cable programme is also made 
a restricted act for copyright in television and sound 
broadcasts, sound recordi ngs and fi lms. The PRT I S terms of 
reference are also changed to include the diffusion right in 
Page 546 
sound recordings. Secti on 40 (3), under whi ch a person who 
receives a SBC or IBA broadcast and thereby causes a programme 
to be transmitted to subscribers to a diffusion service is 
deemed to hold a licence to do so is also amended. First, it 
is limited to those who receive and immediately re-transmit 
the broadcast, but secondly is extended to include programmes 
comprising a sound recording. It is also limited only to 
programmes included in cable services because of the 
requirements of Section 3(1) of the 1984 Act and if and to the 
extent that the broadcast is made for reception in the area in 
which the service is provided. 
It is around S.40(3) that the lIinequitable double payment ll 
argument revolves with copyright owners consistently 
maintaining that this subsection is in contravention of the 
Paris revision of the Berne Convention (Article 11 bis) which 
holds that "authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy 
the exclusive right of authorising .....• ( .. , 1 1 j any 
communication to the public by wire or by re-broadcasting of 
the broadcast of the work, when this communication if made by 
an organisation other than the original oneil (as quoted in the 
Performi ng Ri ght Yearbook 1984-5, page 58). Thus, wh; 1 e the 
subsection has been limited somewhat it will still continue to 
be the subject of dispute. 
The collecting societies have also announced results in recent 
months. PRS total revenue rose by 5.66 million (10%) in money 
terms in 1983 to reach £60,100,624 (5.6% in real terms to 
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£17,935,131). C ~ s t s , , however, rose by 1.6 million (16.5%) to 
reach £11,098,125 (£3,311,885 in real terms, a rise of 11.4%). 
Thus, cos ts as a percentage of gross revenue increased to 
18.47% and NOR as a percentage of gross revenue fell to 81.2%, 
an all time low although NOR rose by 9.1% in money terms. The 
cost figure does not include "special costs ll including 
expendi ture on setti ng up the computer database (£602,200), 
costs of a Performing Right Tribunal reference (£350,000) and 
costs of "upgrading the Society·s computing and communications 
equi pment to meet the increased volume of process i ng 
(£127,000). These were financed from PRS· distributable 
reserves. There seems no particular reason for the large 
increase in non-special costs. The main problem seems to have 
been operating costs (printing, stationery, telephones, travel 
and so forth) which increased by 66%. Dcmestic revenue rose 
£2.6 million (7%) in money terms (2.4% in real terms). 
Public performance revenue rose £914,288 (6.7%) in money terms 
(2.1% in real terms) to £14,468,192 while public performance 
costs rose £918,325 (15.4%) in money terms (10.4% in real 
terms) to £6,868,799. Thus, public performance NOR fell 
slightly in money terms. Public performance costs represented 
47 . 48% of gross pub 1 i c performance revenue in 1983. Pub 1 i c 
performance revenue represented 24.1% of gross .revenue and 
public performance costs were 61.9% of total costs. 
Performance in this field thus seems to be rather 
disappointing again although PRS thinks it satisfactory "'hen 
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one cons i ders the problems of many pub 1 i c performance 
1 i censees. One reason for the ri se in pub 1 i c performance 
costs, PRS says, is the allocation of a higher proportion of 
general costs. 
Broadcast; ng revenue rose £ 1,680,427 in money terms in 1983 
(7.4%) (2.7% in real terms) to·£24,419,374 while broadcasting 
costs rose £420,422 (14.8%) to £3,266,338 ( a rise of 9.7% in 
rea 1 terms). Broadcast; ng NOR rose by 6.3% in money terms. 
Broadcast; ng costs represented 13.38% of gross broadcasti ng 
revenue in 1983. Broadcas ti ng revenue represented 40. 6 ~ ~ ~ of 
gross revenue and broadcasting costs were 29.4% of total costs 
in 1983. Both these fi gures represent fc.l1 s from 1982. BBC 
revenue rose 4.7% in money terms but only 0.1% in real terms 
while independent television and local radio revenue rose 
11.1% in money terms, 6.2% in real terms. Radio Telefis 
Eireann income was up 6.8% in money terms. Satellite and 
cable income rose 174% to £157,530. The year saw the end to 
the dispute with the ITCA with technically a defeat on a point 
of principle for PRS but a substantial rise in the royalty 
payable. PRS wanted the basis of calculation changed to a 
percentage of revenue. According to the Performing Right 
Yearbook 1984-5, the PRT put great store by the agreements and 
negotiations between the parties over the years and did not 
regard the percentage of net advertising reve.nue basis as 
reasonable since there is not an adequate correlation between 
use of PRS mus i c and the ITCA compani es I net advert is i ng 
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revenue (NAR). Other factors than mus i c come into play in 
attracting television audiences - it is part of a package _ 
and factors which have nothing to do with music affect NAR and 
NAR ignores other factors that are relevant. The PRT did take 
account of the fact that royalties from the ITCA companies had 
only just grown in line with inflation, that lTV use of PRS 
music had grown 30% between 1967-82, that the potential 
audience had grown by 30% and that there had been a "material 
increase in the range of choice of repertoire". It also noted 
that it cost PRS more to administer the repertoire nmy than 
previously and that changes in the standard of living, which 
were not fully reflected in the RPI, had a part to play. It 
was felt that comparison with the BBC was not possible because 
of its different structure and, ir.terestingly, an ITCA 
argument that it already paid royalties to MCPS was regarded 
as irrelevant. The award by the tribunal was an annual lump 
sum allied to a cost of living increase for six years from 1st 
April 1980 to 31s t March 1986. For the peri od 1st April 1980 
to 31st March 1983, PRS was awarded an increase of £2,507,450 
(25%). For the three years beginning 1st April 1983, PRS has 
been awarded royaities of £4,700,000, £4,800,000 and 
£4,900,000 plus a cost of living increase in each year. Thus, 
although PRS did not achieve all it set out to win, it at 
least managed a sizeable increase in royalties. The dispute 
with local radio continued in suspense awaiting the settlement 
between PPL and the AIRC. 
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MCOS revenue before deduction of Head Office costs rose 
£265,329 (44%) in money terms, which represents an excellent 
performance. Head Office costs for the overseas agencies 
sector, at £221,748, were up 58%, however. Distributable 
revenue was up 39% at £650,347. Gross revenue from affiliated 
societies rose 17% to £17,083,281 although costs rose 25.4% to 
£741,240. Cos ts st ill only represent 4.33% of gross revenue 
from these societies, however. Distributable revenue rose by 
16.6%. The depreciation of the pound against the US dollar 
was a major factor in the good results in this area. 
Membership of PRS rose by 1,777 to reach 17,919 at the end of 
1983. There were a1 so a number of changes in membership 
criteria, which I will not go into here. On the managerial 
side, the most interesting development was the creation of a 
new post, that of Financial Planning Manager. 
MCPS I encou ragi ng performance conti nues. I n the yearend; ng 
Ju ne 30th 1984, MCPS turnover was £ 12,055,208, a ri se of 
£2,008,903 (20%). It is thought that £14 million win be 
distributed in the year ending 30th June 1985. Administration 
costs rose 15.68% to £2,503,219. This represents something of 
a setback after the fairly small rise in 1983. Administration 
costs rose 15.68% to £2,503,219. This represents something of 
a setback after the fairly small rise in 1983. Administration 
costs were 20.76% of ~ 1 C P S S turnover in 1984, however, a fall 
from 21.5% in 1983. This is because turnover grew by more 
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than costs. Provided this situation can be maintaineo, it is 
a good performance. £14.1 million was invoiced in 1984 
(against £11.8 million in 1983) and £1.7 Qil1ion was 
distributed in the form of income from abroad. Commission 
rose by over £300,000 ; (23.7%) to cover 62.7% of costs in 
1984, (as against 58.7% in 1983) while interest, at £836,439, 
fell by 4.3% to cover 33.4% of costs' (40.4% in 1983). This 
increase in the percentage of costs covered by commission is 
in line with MCPS' aim of reducing its dependence on interest. 
In the year, MCPS made a profit of £190,833 after tax and in 
addition it rebated back to UK and Eire resident members 
£145,000 and £25,000 was put aside for low value broadcast 
titles. 
All ina 11, MCPS seems to have had another successful year 
with collections rising 17.2% to £13,380,000 and the volume of 
lines processed on members' statements increasing by 17%. 
Other poi nts hi gh 1 i ghted by MCPS a re the fact that MCPS r.ow 
emp 1 oys project management wi thi n the company structure and 
that 1985 is likely to see radical changes in ~ h e e commission 
structure and the Membership Agreement, which are likely to 
produce a lot of debate within the industry. Finally, in the 
past year MCPS has been involved in developments in the field 
of cable television and virtually all the licensing of music 
on video promotions for use on cable television is now handled 
by MCPS. It is also involved in use of music on home 
computers. 
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At the time of writing, no additional information was 
available on PPL. 
The future·of all the collecting societies is worth following, 
especially 'IJith the growth of so many new technologies in 
recent years. Only time will tell if they can fully come to 
grips with the problems involved but they are expending a lot 
of resources and effort in attempting to do just this. They 
do have a number of pressing problems, not least that of 
costs, highlighted in the main body of this thesis and cothing 
in this postscript has altered that view but they are 
organisations which are likely to grew in number and they 
warrant further study. 
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